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This thesis provides a complete, chronological view of Barth’s concept of history 
throughout his theological career.  The purpose of undertaking this hitherto 
unattempted task is to demonstrate that, ever since his full engagement with 
dogmatics in the mid-1920s, Barth has unequivocally affirmed the reality of the 
history which revelation becomes and is.  Though he continues to insist upon the 
transcendence of revelation, he does so by way of an increasingly christocentric 
theology, so that both divine sovereignty and human dignity are firmly upheld.  This 
is especially evident in his later theology, with his concentration on the history of 
Jesus Christ on the basis of the doctrine of election.  This thesis thus rejects both the 
charge that Barth’s theology is ahistorical or anti-historical on the one hand, and the 
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This thesis has as its immediate concern the concept of history in the theology of 
Karl Barth.  This concept is prominent in Barth’s theology, and has been a source of 
debates both old and new about his work.  Such debates have investigated Barth’s 
approach to the modern ‘problem of history’ in theology, and have explored the place 
and role of history in several of his individual doctrines.  However, the concept of 
history has never received the sustained and exhaustive treatment which its 
importance in Barth’s theology merits.  This thesis performs this task in two 
complementary ways.  First, it will trace the development of the concept of history 
in Barth’s entire career from the 1910s to the 1960s.  Second, in doing so, it will 
demonstrate that his christological understanding of revelation in the mid-1920s led 
to an unequivocal affirmation of the reality of the history which revelation becomes 
and is, and that in his mature theology the christocentric concentration on the history 
of Jesus Christ led to a further affirmation of the entirety of history in a way that both 
divine sovereignty and human dignity are upheld. 
This introductory chapter will first give a broad account of the problem of 
history in late nineteenth-century theology, and of the relation and distinction of the 
concepts of Geschichte and Historie.  It will then provide a critical evaluation of 
interpretations of Barth’s concept of history in the existing scholarly literature, 
demonstrating how they have contributed to an understanding of different aspects of 
his theology but have failed thus far to offer a complete picture of the concept itself.  
It will close with a concise outline of the chapters that lie ahead. 
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A. The Problem of History in Late Nineteenth-Century 
Theology 
The intellectual developments of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment period 
brought Christian theology into a close and sometimes controversial relation with 
history.1  With its pursuit of Natural Laws and its confidence in human reason, the 
Enlightenment exerted a powerful influence over many academic disciplines, 
including the discipline of history [Geschichtswissenschaft].  Historical 
investigation began to approach the past in a scientific, positivistic way, thus 
acquiring the status of an independent discipline.  Alongside its critical method, the 
discipline of history furthermore formed a specific view of the past and the present, 
according to which present reality could not be understood unless accessed from its 
own unique historical development.  The critical research method and the belief in 
process, development and individuality, broadly described as historicism,2 to a very 
large extent reshaped the method, form and content of Christian theology.  Scholars 
such as Reimarus (1694-1768) and Lessing (1729-1781) began to explore the 
relationship between the Christian faith and history in the eighteenth century.  By 
                                                 
1 For what follows I am indebted to A. J. Conyers, God, Hope, and History: Jürgen Moltmann and 
the Christian Concept of History (Macon, Ga.: Mercer, 1988), 28ff.; John D. Godsey, ‘Christian 
Faith’s Partnership with History’, Faith and History: Essays in Honor of Paul W. Meyer, ed. by John 
T. Carroll, Charles H. Cosgrove and E. Elizabeth Johnson (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1990), 
262-278 (265-270); Laurence W. Wood, God and History: The Dialectical Tension of Faith and 
History in Modern Thought (Lexington, Ky.: Emeth Publisher, 2004); Ch. 1 ‘The Problem of History’ 
in Terrence W. Tilley, History, Theology, and Faith: Dissolving the Modern Problematic (Maryknoll, 
N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2004), 9-18; ‘Introduction’ to Nathan R. Kerr, Christ, History and Apocalyptic: 
The Politics of Christian Mission (London: SCM Press, 2008), 1-22 (2-6).  For a brief introduction to 
the debate about faith and theology in the twentieth century, see Ch. 1 ‘Setting the Scene’ in Michael 
Gilbertson, God and History in the Book of Revelation: New Testament Studies in Dialogue with 
Pannenberg and Moltmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-19.  For the 
historicisation of theology see ‘Introduction’ to Thomas A. Howard, Religion and the Rise of 
Historicism: W.M.L. De Wette, Jacob Burckhardt, and the Theological Origins of Nineteenth-Century 
Historical Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1-22. 
2 Georg G. Iggers, ‘Historicism: The History and Meaning of the Term’, Journal of the History of 
Ideas, 56 (1995), 129-152.  For an account of the relationship between historicism and German 
idealism see The Discovery of Historicity in German Idealism and Historism, ed. by Peter Koslowski 
(Berlin: Springer, 2005). 
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virtue of the endeavours of Schleiermacher (1768-1834), Hegel (1770-1831) and 
Strauss (1808-1874), the problem of history continued to be one of the most 
important topics in late nineteenth-century theology, especially in the liberal school 
of theology in which Barth was educated.3 
The most important features of Barth’s contemporary liberal theology, in his 
own view, were religious individualism and historical relativism.4  What is termed 
the ‘historical principle of individuality’5 was an issue at stake particularly among 
two major theological camps within liberal Protestantism in late nineteenth century: 
the Ritschlian school, and the History of Religions School [religionsgeschichtliche 
Schule] represented by Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923).6 
The two camps had various and often contradicting views on what it means to 
be historical in theology.  Broadly speaking, Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889) held that 
being historical means sharing the collective experience inspired by Jesus within a 
Christian group.  It is thus not necessary to pay too much attention to what the man 
Jesus of Nazareth actually said and did.  By contrast, Troeltsch criticised his former 
teacher Ritschl for being heavily biased in favour of the dogmatic tradition of 
Protestantism, and, therefore, for not being sufficiently historicised.  For Troeltsch, 
being historical means that religions ought to be considered and approached as any 
other general historical events.  An event cannot be legitimately claimed to be 
                                                 
3 For detail see footnote 1 and section 1A.4 in Chapter One. 
4 Karl Barth, ‘Moderne Theologie und Reichsgottesarbeit’ (1909), idem, Vorträge und kleinere 
Arbeiten, 1905-1909, ed. by Hans-Anton Drewes and Hinrich Stoevesandt (Zürich: TVZ, 1992), 342f. 
5 B. A. Gerrish, Continuing the Reformation: Essays on Modern Religious Thought (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), 35. 
6 For what follows I am indebted to Alister E. McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology: 
From the Enlightenment to Pannenberg (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 81-83, 95; Simon Fisher, 
Revelatory Positivism?: Barth’s Earliest Theology and the Marburg School (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 146-153; Gary J. Dorrien, The Barthian Revolt in Modern Theology: 
Theology Without Weapons (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000), 15-32. 
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historical unless it has been examined through the historical-critical method by an 
objective on-looker who is not involved in any given tradition.  Troeltsch argued 
that a discontinuity existed between modern theology, the theology of the 
Reformation, and all the theologies of different periods of the past, and accordingly 
he denied any legitimacy to Ritschl’s appeal to the dogmatic tradition of 
Protestantism.  With the rise of the historical-critical method, Troeltsch discredited 
and discarded a dogmatic or supernaturalistic understanding of the essence of 
Christianity.  In response, Wilhelm Herrmann (1846-1922) endeavoured to defend 
Ritschl by defining history in terms of the influence of Jesus’ inner life on Christians 
in the past and in the present.  Revelation in history means for Herrmann not a 
historical event in the past, but ‘a religious experience in the transcendent dimension 
of an individual’s contemporary life’. 7  This debate over history between the 
theological camps may be broadly summarised by saying that after Ritschl’s 
moderate historical theology had been surpassed by Troeltsch’s radical historical 
theology, Herrmann emerged with his ahistorical theology. 
It is beyond doubt that both Ritschl and Troeltsch placed strong emphasis on 
the category of history in their theologies.  Even Herrmann, known for being 
ahistorical, could not simply ignore history but had to redefine it in order to keep 
engaging with it.  Two things need to be noticed here.  First, despite their various 
standpoints, none of the three theologians could manage to speak of theology without 
also speaking of history.  Second, as we shall see in Chapter One, it was 
Herrmann’s ahistorical view that exerted a formative influence on Barth’s earliest 
theology. 
                                                 
7 Fisher, Revelatory Positivism?, 152. 
5 
 
B. Geschichte and Historie for Barth 
In the foregoing section, two broad ways of understanding the term ‘history’ were 
sketched: history as a research method, and history as a certain perspective on human 
reality.  They broadly correspond to the distinction between history as objective 
facts and history as subjective significance.8  This distinction is related to the 
important German distinction between Geschichte and Historie.9 
Efforts have been made in the English-speaking world to describe the relation 
and distinction between these two words, together with their respective derivatives.10  
In general, the word Geschichte has a more ancient origin in the German language, 
whilst Historie did not appear until the beginning of the nineteenth century when 
history became a professional academic discipline [Geschichtswissenschaft].  
Geschichte, understood as reports, stories or tales, is often taken to mean what might 
have really happened in the past; in contrast Historie is employed to signify historical 
facts validated according to the standard of the academic discipline of history, and 
therefore what really happened in the past. 
In Barth’s view, however, Geschichte is what really happened in the past, and 
those events which are ‘historically’ verified to have happened in the past are 
Historie.  Geoffrey Bromiley is right in positing that Geschichte means for Barth 
                                                 
8 Godsey, ‘Christian Faith’s Partnership with History’, in Faith and History, 262f.  Cf. Conyers’ 
distinction between theology of history and philosophy of history, and his further distinction between 
critical philosophy of history and speculative philosophy of history.  Conyers, God, Hope, and 
History, 22. 
9 For what follows I am indebted to McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology, 76f.; Neil 
B. MacDonald, Karl Barth and the Strange New World Within the Bible: Barth, Wittgenstein, and the 
Metadilemmas of the Enlightenment (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2000), 140n11; Richard E. Burnett, 
Karl Barth’s Theological Exegesis: The Hermeneutical Principals [sic] of the Römerbrief Period 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 105n31. 
10 McGrath suggests either using objective-historical for historisch, and existential-historical for 
geschichtlich, or using historical for historisch, and historic for geschichtlich.  The first set 
illuminates the distinction between ‘objective historical fact’ and ‘history which is important to 




history as event and Historie history as record. 11  The two are not mutually 
exclusive; instead, Geschichte includes Historie, and therefore not all Geschichte can 
be verified as Historie.  In a discussion with English speaking students in the 
mid-1950s, Barth said: 
‘Historie’ is something that can be proved by general historical 
science, whereas ‘Geschichte’ is something that really takes place in 
time and space, but may or may not be proved.  The creation story 
has to do with ‘Geschichte’, for instance.  It has to do with 
something that happened and therefore something historical, but 
something that is not open to historiographical investigation.12 
It is crucial for a study of Barth’s concept of history to recognise his definition of 
Geschichte as ‘something historical … that is not open to historiographical 
investigation’, for it is one of his life-long commitments to argue for the legitimacy 
of unhistorische Geschichte, in order to argue for the unhistorische Geschichtlichkeit 
of certain Christian truth-claims.13 
C. Accounts of Barth’s Concept of History 
When it comes to Barth’s concept of Geschichte, three phenomena are observed.  
First, the concept surfaces at almost all important junctures in Barth’s theology.  
Several forms of Geschichte can be detected within different theological contexts, 
including: 1) the earthly realm in which fallen human beings reside, 2) the locus of 
the revelation of Jesus Christ, 3) the general relation of God to the world and His 
                                                 
11 Geoffrey W. Bromiley, An Introduction to the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
William B. Eerdmans, 1979), 112. 
12 Karl Barth, Karl Barth’s Table Talk, ed. by John D. Godsey (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1963), 
45. 
13 Neil MacDonald terms this as a ‘sui generis historicality’, which pertain to Barth’s views of 
creation, and resurrection.  See MacDonald, Karl Barth and the Strange New World within the Bible, 
107-112, 136ff., 193ff. 
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particular relation to the human Jesus and His people, and 4) the life in which the 
God-human Jesus Christ is and acts.  And in each of these connections ‘history’ 
plays no small part.  Second, for the immense theological weight it carries, ‘history’ 
is a concept which demands consideration in almost all the important dimensions of 
Barth’s theology.  It is prominent in research concerning his doctrines of 
revelation,14 creation,15 the resurrection,16 election, reconciliation, the Trinity, and 
Christology,17 as well as in studies of his theological exegesis,18 the connection 
between his notion of revelation and the Holocaust,19 his teaching of Israel,20 of 
historical theology and church history, 21  and of mission and church. 22   But 
unfortunately―this is the third point of observation―despite the concept’s 
importance in Barth’s theology and therefore in Barth scholarship, existing studies 
have not yet offered, or attempted to offer, a complete account of it.  Many 
fragmentary images have been provided; a complete picture remains largely missing. 
A brief overview of the existing literature in this connection will locate this 
thesis and its aims amidst the current scholarship on this matter.  The literature will 
                                                 
14 See discussion in sections C.1 and C.2 in this Introductory chapter. 
15 E.g. Robert Sherman, The Shift to Modernity: Christ and the Doctrine of Creation in the 
Theologies of Schleiermacher and Barth (New York: T&T Clark, 2005), 54-61. 
16 E.g. R. Dale Dawson, The Resurrection in Karl Barth (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 55-63. 
17 See section C.3 and footnotes 55 and 58 in this Introductory chapter.  See also Paul D. Jones, The 
Humanity of Christ: Christology in Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics (London: Continuum, 2008), 
188ff. for the concept of Geschichte in Barth’s mature Christology. 
18 E.g. Burnett, Karl Barth’s Theological Exegesis, 100-110. 
19 E.g. Mark R. Lindsay, ‘History, Holocaust, and Revelation: Beyond the Barthian Limits’, Theology 
Today, 61 (2005), 455-470 (460ff.). 
20 E.g. Katherine Sonderegger, That Jesus Christ Was Born a Jew: Karl Barth’s “Doctrine of Israel” 
(University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992) 153, 174. 
21 E.g., John B. Webster, ‘“There is no past in the Church, so there is no past in theology”: Barth on 
the History of Modern Protestant Theology’, idem, Barth’s Earlier Theology: Four Studies (London: 
T&T Clark, 2005), 91-117. 
22 E.g. John G. Flett, The Witness of God: The Trinity, Missio Dei, Karl Barth, and the Nature of 
Christian Community (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2010), 47, 56ff., 225f.. 
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be divided into three groups in the following discussion. 
C.1 Infinite Qualitative Distinction between Eternity and Time 
An overarching concern in some of the literature is that Barth denies or at best avoids 
the reality of history.  In his study of Barth’s doctrine of time, Richard Roberts roots 
Barth in the tradition of German idealism, traces the development of the concepts of 
eternity and of time in Barth’s theology, and argues that despite a shift from the 
‘eternal Now’ (of the Römerbrief) to the ‘contingent contemporaneity’ (in the CD), 
Barth never really departed from a Platonic tendency which upholds an eternal, 
antecedent ‘reality’ over against temporal, subsequent ‘realities’.23  This persistent 
one-sided emphasis on the eternal antecedents of temporal consequences makes 
Barth derive all that which is temporally ‘real’ from the eternal ‘real’, thus creating a 
series of difficulties and confusion of categories at each juncture of his thought.24  
As a result, although Barth manages to avoid the Platonic dissolution of time in 
eternity, in that he derives what is ‘real’ in time from the eternal, antecedent ‘real’, 
the alleged temporal ‘real’ can still in no way ‘relate to that existence experienced by 
the human subject’,25 but is rather removed from ‘the world of experience and the 
cosmos [and from the] shared time of human and cosmic existence’,26 contained in a 
self-enclosed circle.  In the final analysis, on Roberts’ account, Barth’s theology is 
characterised by a ‘monopoly’, ‘totalitarian demands’, and a ‘profound ontological 
                                                 
23 Richard Roberts, ‘Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Time: its Nature and Implications’, in Richard H. 
Roberts, A Theology on Its Way?: Essays on Karl Barth (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 1-58 
(17-20 ). 
24 That is, in his teachings of revelation (ibid., 15ff.), of eternity as God’s time (ibid., 21ff.), of the 
primacy of election (ibid., 30ff.), and of the incarnation and Christology (ibid., 34ff.). 
25 Ibid., 20. 




This characterisation of Barth’s concept of time as being dominated by a 
tendency to eternalisation has exerted a strong influence on the interpretation not 
only of the Barth of the Römerbrief,28 but also and especially of his doctrine of 
revelation in the CD.  Corresponding to this is the criticism that, for Barth, despite 
its occurrence in history, revelation has been antecedently determined in eternity by 
God.  This claim can be elaborated along the following lines. 
First, it is held that revelation for Barth did happen in history, but that history 
is nothing more than the form which revelation assumes.  For instance, Thomas 
Ogletree claims that in contrast to Ernst Troeltsch’s focus on the form of general 
history, Barth’s thought is primarily controlled by material considerations.  For 
Barth it is impermissible to talk about ‘history in general … regardless of its 
particular central, determinative content’, i.e., Jesus Christ.  The material 
significance of this particular history is such that ‘no formal analysis of the nature of 
[general] history … can be accepted as valid.’29  What really matters, then, is the 
specific content to be manifest by the general form rather than the general form 
which contains the specific content. 
Corresponding to this ‘formal’ understanding of history is the observation 
that revelation for Barth is predetermined by God, and therefore its historical 
occurrence is merely a recapitulation of what has already happened in eternity.  A 
strong sense of unease is felt concerning the one-sided emphasis laid on God and on 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 57. 
28 For instance, John Godsey remarks on the dialectical theologians in the 1920s that they employed 
‘whatever conceptual means they could find to emphasize what Kierkegaard had termed “the infinite 
qualitative distinction between eternity and time”’, Godsey, ‘Christian Faith’s Partnership with 
History’ in Faith and History, 273. 
29 Thomas W. Ogletree, Christian Faith and History: A Critical Comparison of Ernst Troeltsch and 
Karl Barth (New York: Abingdon Press, 1964), 223. 
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eternity.  For example, Alister McGrath notices in Barth a free and sovereign God 
whose subjectivity ‘precludes any … anthropological intrusions into … theological 
territory’. 30   Meanwhile Mike Higton posits that, due to his rejection of 
relationalism, Barth asserts that the divine sovereignty and freedom must be 
protected at all cost.31  Consequently, ‘[r]evelation and history are linked …, but in 
what appears to be a wholly negative way: revelation shows what history is not, it 
evacuates history of its pretensions.’32 
This orientation towards the sovereign God is seen to be reinforced by―and 
in turn reinforces―an orientation towards pre-temporal eternity.  Herbert Hartwell 
writes: 
The pure eternal being of God as the being of the Triune God already 
presents us with a ‘history’; in the dynamics of His inner life as Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit God is the basic type and ground of all history. … 
[To this specific] history as Heilsgeschichte and thus as the history of 
the people of God, … all other history, so to speak, is but a temporary 
appendage … .33 
This ‘eternalisation’ is seen by McGrath as a ‘deliberate refusal to engage in dialogue 
with the … questions raised by the historicization of reality’.34  He writes of Barth’s 
                                                 
30 McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology, 110. 
31 Mike Higton points out that Barth’s dominant concern is the sovereignty of God; everything else is 
subordinate.  There is for him no organic and immediate unity between humanity and God.  Mike 
Higton, Christ, Providence, and History: Hans W. Frei's Public Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 
43f. 
32 Ibid., 45.  On Higton’s account, Barth’s attack on relationalism ‘gets dangerously close to setting 
up a competition between God and mankind, with God’s freedom only being asserted by means of 
denials about human faith’, ibid., 46f.  In this regard Rowan Williams observes that for Barth God’s 
Word and its form in the world cannot be identified; ‘[t]o say that God’s Word becomes fully 
identified with the ambiguous circumstances in which it is spoken is to prejudice the sovereign 
freedom of the Speaker.’  Rowan Williams, ‘Barth on the Triune God’, in Karl Barth: Studies of His 
Theological Method, ed. by Stephen Sykes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 147-193 (155). 
33 Herbert Hartwell, The Theology of Karl Barth: An Introduction (London: Duckworth, 1964), 30f. 




The history of Jesus Christ can therefore only recapitulate in time 
what has already happened antecedently in eternity. … Barth’s 
reluctance to engage with historical questions, evident in the 
Romerbrief [sic], can be shown to have culminated in the Kirchliche 
Dogmatik, with the result that a Christology is constructed with only 
the most superficial contacts with human history. … Barth’s concept 
of divine freedom in revelation necessitates that the ensuing revelation 
merely recapitulates its eternal antecedents. … Barth thus denies the 
historical nature of revelation.35 
On this line of interpretation, then, Barth’s ‘eternalisation’ of revelation results from 
his notion of the dominance of eternity over time, and it in turn results in the 
dominance of the divine-eternal over the human-historical,36 that of revelation’s 
eternal antecedent over its historical occurrence,37 and that of Christ’s deity over 
Jesus’ humanity. 38   The conclusion is drawn that ‘[a]t the heart of Barth’s 
theological program, and of those who followed him, lay a deep antipathy towards 
the role of history in Christian faith’, and the ‘conviction that revelation does not 
occur in human experience’.39  Because of Barth’s attempt ‘to preserve Christian 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 110, emphasis original. 
36 Disregarding ‘how the multiplicity of religions and viewpoints in world history fits into the 
workings of God’, Barth leaves unanswered ‘questions regarding the relation of the multiplicity of 
viewpoints in human history to the action of God in Jesus Christ’.  Ogletree, Christian Faith and 
History, 227f. 
37 ‘The “eternalization” of revelation … inevitably means that the emphasis is actually shifted from 
that revelation itself to man’s recognition and appropriation of that revelation―and hence from God’s 
activity to man’s insights and knowledge.’  McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology, 
112.  When Christ’s universal lordship is thus construed as abstract, confined and relative, revelation 
ends up functioning merely as an ‘inner citadel’ into which to retreat.  Raymond Plant, Politics, 
Theology, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 86. 
38 Higton, Christ, Providence and History, 55f.: ‘… so great is [the] absolute concentration upon an 
account of the hypostatic union in Jesus Christ that little room is left for the contingent and irregular 
details of Jesus’ human life. … too little attention to the details of Christ’s humanity, too little 
attention to the contingent course of wider history.’ 
39 Scott Shauf, Theology As History, History As Theology: Paul in Ephesus in Acts 19 (Berlin: Walter 
de Gruyter, 2005), 14. 
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theology from the indifference and hostility of a secular world’,40 McGrath insists 
that: 
Barth must be regarded as deliberately disengaging himself from what 
is widely regarded as one of the most crucial questions facing 
contemporary Christology in the post-Enlightenment period: the 
relation between faith and history.41 
This first line of interpretation presents a Barth whose theology on the whole, 
and whose doctrine of revelation in particular, are ahistorical and even anti-historical.  
On this account, human history in general cannot be conceived as possessing any 
reality vis-à-vis the reality of revelation, and the particular history of the human 
Jesus has little to contribute to Christology.42 
C.2 Revelation There and Then 
A further portion of the literature offers a more positive account of Barth’s concept of 
history, especially regarding his doctrine of revelation.  For example, Bruce 
McCormack convincingly demonstrates that in Göttingen Barth’s strong commitment 
to the reality of Deus dixit prompted him to shift from an eschatological to a 
christological grounding of theology.43  Firmly adhering to the belief that God did 
speak there and then in Jesus Christ and only thereafter here and now to us, 
McCormack argues, Barth claimed that the Subject of Deus dixit is not outside but in 
history, thereby bringing revelation, previously construed as a mathematical point in 
                                                 
40 Roberts, ‘Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Time’, A Theology on Its Way?, 57. 
41 McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology, 114f., emphasis mine. 
42 As H. R. Mackintosh points out, some critics go so far as to claim that Barth is so opposed to 
anything related to human history that ‘it would make no vital difference to his faith were it proved 
that Jesus never really lived.’  H. R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology: Schleiermacher to 
Barth (London: Collins, 1964), 291. 
43 Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and 
Development, 1909-1936 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 327f.  Hereafter Dialectical Theology. 
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the Römerbrief, fully and completely into history.44 
Hans Urs von Balthasar observes that with his christological understanding of 
revelation as being fully in history, Barth is able to construe the ‘truth’ not as ‘the 
idea, the general, the transhistorical …, with history being only the unfolding of the 
Idea and its exemplification’, but as ‘that aboriginal history that was set by God in 
the revelation of his Word into the midst of history in the event of Christ.’45  In the 
same vein, Eberhard Busch notes the ‘unconditional priority to the specific over the 
general’ which places decisive emphasis on the historical ‘there and then’ as the 
objective basis of the subjective ‘here and now’.  This means for Barth, Busch 
contends, that ‘[t]he knowledge of God is inseparably attached to the “there and 
then”’ of Jesus Christ.46 
In addition to the recognition of Barth’s affirmation of the historical reality 
and concreteness of revelation, further observations have indicated what it is that 
Barth actually rejects.  Gary Dorrien, tracing the influence of Wilhelm Herrmann on 
the early Barth, clearly identifies Barth’s insistence that Christian faith, although 
independent from the canons of historical criticism, still belongs to history.47  He 
also posits that Barth promotes God’s transcendence over the world and not His 
absence from it, and that he opposes ‘Immanentism’ and not ‘Immanence’, 48  
historicism and not history as such.49  Such distinctions make clear that Barth is 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 340, 367. 
45 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, trans. by Edward T. Oakes (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1992), 205. 
46 Eberhard Busch, The Great Passion: An Introduction to Karl Barth’s Theology, ed. by Darrell L. 
Guder and Judith J. Guder, trans. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. 
Eerdmans, 2004), 69. 
47 Dorrien, The Barthian Revolt in Modern Theology, 175. 
48 Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, 287. 
49 Bruce L. McCormack, ‘Revelation and History in Transfoundationalist Perspective: Karl Barth’s 
Theological Epistemology in Conversation with a Schleiermacherian Tradition’, in idem, Orthodox 
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objecting to the modern, positivistic understanding of and monopoly on ‘history’.  
In John Colwell’s words, Barth is convinced that the arbitrary presupposition that ‘all 
events must be verifiable by modern historicist method if they are to be accepted as 
“historical” … excludes the possibility of a unique occurrence’,50 and that this lack 
of open-mindedness to the possibility of specific actuality in the positivistic 
epistemology can itself be neither rational nor moral.  Therefore, Barth does not 
deny history itself; what he rejects is the positivistic presupposition that only Historie 
can be qualified as Geschichte. 
These subtle yet important distinctions also help to clarify Barth’s conception 
of the relationship between revelation and history.  It is true that Barth strongly 
advocates God’s transcendence, refusing to allow the autonomy of human history, the 
authority of critical historical method, and the philosophical presuppositions of 
historicism to lay claim on it.51  But he does not therefore believe in a God who is 
absent from the real human world and its history.  As Trevor Hart puts it, although 
‘[a]s such “revelation” can and could never be apprehended or laid hold of at the 
level of nature or history’, yet ‘it is certainly apprehended from within nature and 
history.’52  Therefore, revelation itself should also be viewed as in history but not of 
history.53 
                                                                                                                                          
and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2008), 
21-39 (37f.). 
50 John Colwell, Actuality and Provisionality: Eternity and Election in the Theology of Karl Barth 
(Edinburgh: Rutherford House, 1989), 88f. 
51 Or, as John Webster articulates it, what Barth refuses to allow is ‘that “history” is a more 
comprehensive and well-founded reality than “revelation”.’  John B. Webster, ‘Introducing Barth’, 
The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. by John B. Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 1-16 (10-11). 
52 Trevor Hart, ‘Was God in Christ?: Revelation, History and the Humanity of God’, in idem, 
Regarding Karl Barth: Essays Toward a Reading of His Theology (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1999), 
1-27 (26). 
53 Trevor A. Hart, ‘Revelation’, in Webster, The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, 37-56 (44).  
Also 45: ‘If we identify “revelation” … with a set of texts, a particular human person, a series of 
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In summary, according to this line of interpretation, due to the special relation 
between revelation and history, revelation for Barth cannot simply be unhistorical.  
Rather, it is not only historical but also supra-historical or trans-historical: historical, 
because it does not stay outside, hover over, or merely touch upon history, but enters 
fully into it; supra-historical or trans-historical, because it is not purely or simply 
historical but more than historical.54 
C.3 The Divine Being-in-act Determined in the Election of Jesus Christ 
A further view on Barth’s concept of history highlights his doctrine of election, and 
constitutes one of the most hotly debated topics in the field.  The debate revolves 
around what can be called the actualistic-ontological character of Barth’s later 
theology, focusing on whether Barth’s understanding of election as God’s 
self-determination carries ontological consequences for the being of the Word and the 
triune essence of God, and whether, correspondingly, the category of ‘history’ might 
thus take on additional significance in Barth’s later theology. 
In this regard, Bruce McCormack identifies in Barth’s doctrine of election a 
‘historicisation’ of the eternal Logos with the historical existence of Jesus Christ, and 
argues that this tendency demands a revised understanding of God’s triune essence.55  
                                                                                                                                          
historical facts, a body of ethical and spiritual teaching or with some other phenomenon, we locate it 
firmly within the sphere of that which is of history as well as in it.’ 
54 In German terms, this could be described as geschichtlich but not historisch. 
55 McCormack’s contribution to this line of interpretation in the last decade has been weighty.  
Relative articles which are collected in McCormack, Orthodox and Modern include ‘Grace and Being: 
The Role of God’s Gracious Election in Karl Barth’s Ontological Theology’ (2000), 183-200; ‘Karl 
Barth’s Historicized Christology: Just How “Chalcedonian” Is It?’ (2002), 201-233; ‘Participation in 
God, Yes; Deification, No: Two Modern Protestant Responses to an Ancient Question’ (2004), 
235-260; ‘See God Where He May Be Found: A Response to Edwin Chr. Van Driel’ (2007), 261-277.  
Other literature includes Bruce L. McCormack, ‘Karl Barth’s Christology as a Resource for a 
Reformed Version of Kenoticism’, International Journal of Systematic Theology, 8 (2006), 243-251; 
Bruce L. McCormack, ‘The Actuality of God: Karl Barth in Conversation with Open Theism’, 
Engaging the Doctrine of God: Contemporary Protestant Perspectives, ed. by Bruce L. McCormack 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2008), 185-242; Bruce L. McCormack, ‘God Is His Decision: 
The Jüngel-Gollwitzer “Debate” Revisited’, Theology as Conversation: The Significance of Dialogue 
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He is convinced that Barth, in making Jesus Christ the Subject of election in CD II/2, 
pushes the historical existence of Jesus back into eternity where election took place, 
thereby rejecting the notion of a Logos asarkos which is not already incarnandus.  
This historicising tendency then culminates in CD IV in Barth’s ‘replacing the 
category of “nature” with the category of “history” and … then integrating “history” 
into his concept of “person”.’56  Hence McCormack proposes that if Jesus Christ is 
the Second Person of the Trinity, then it is required that ‘we see the triunity of God, 
logically, as a function of divine election’.57  With McCormack, we are presented 
with a Barth who historicises both Christology and the doctrine of the Trinity in strict 
adherence to his christocentrism. 
Other scholars have disagreed with McCormack’s interpretation of the 
issue.58  They posit that McCormack’s scheme dangerously rejects the precedence 
of the eternal Logos asarkos over the historical Logos ensarkos, thereby risking the 
deity of Christ and collapsing the immanent Trinity into the economic Trinity, which 
                                                                                                                                          
in Historical and Contemporary Theology, ed. by Bruce L. McCormack and Kimlyn J. Bender (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2009), 48-66; Bruce L. McCormack, ‘Election and the Trinity: 
Theses in Response to George Hunsinger’, Scottish Journal of Theology, 63 (2010), 203-214.  The 
debate between him and other scholars will be discussed in more detail in Chapters Six and Eight of 
this thesis.  For scholars who broadly agree on the proposed line of ‘historicisation’ but differ in 
detail, see Kevin W. Hector, ‘God’s Triunity and Self-Determination: A Conversation with Karl Barth, 
Bruce McCormack and Paul Molnar’, International Journal of Systematic Theology, 7 (2005), 
246-261; Jeffrey Hensley, ‘Trinity and Freedom: A Response to Molnar’, Scottish Journal of 
Theology, 61 (2008), 83-95. 
56 McCormack, ‘Karl Barth’s Historicized Christology’, Orthodox and Modern, 222. 
57 McCormack, ‘Grace and Being’, ibid., 194. 
58 See for instance Paul D. Molnar, Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity: In 
Dialogue with Karl Barth and Contemporary Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2002); Paul D. 
Molnar, ‘The Trinity and the Freedom of God’, Journal for Christian Theological Research, 8 (2003), 
59-66; Paul D. Molnar, ‘The Trinity, Election and God’s Ontological Freedom: A Response to Kevin 
W. Hector’, International Journal of Systematic Theology, 8 (2006), 294-306; Paul D. Molnar, ‘Can 
the Electing God be God without us? Some Implications of Bruce McCormack’s Understanding of 
Barth’s Doctrine of Election for the Doctrine of the Trinity’, Neue Zeitschrift für systematische 
Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, 49 (2007), 199-222; Edwin Chr. van Driel, ‘Karl Barth on the 
Eternal Existence of Jesus Christ’, Scottish Journal of Theology, 60 (2007), 45-61; George Hunsinger, 
‘Election and the Trinity: Twenty-Five Theses on the Theology of Karl Barth’, Modern Theology, 24 
(2008), 179-198; Paul D. Molnar, ‘Can Jesus’ Divinity be Recognized as ‘Definitive, Authentic and 
Essential’ if it is Grounded in Election? Just how far did the Later Barth Historicize Christology?’, 
Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, 52 (2010), 40-81. 
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correspondingly undermines God’s sovereignty and freedom by making Him 
dependent on the human-historical.  To their minds, the Barth presented by 
McCormack is ‘too historical’ and even redolent of Hegelianism. 
These brief sketches show that the existing studies of Barth’s concept of 
history, for all their worth, are highly diverse and sharply in tension, presenting 
obscure and confusing images of Barth where his concept of history is concerned.  
Clarification on this issue seems urgently needed. 
D. Reconstruction of Barth’s Concept of History 
This thesis, then, proposes to seek clarification of Barth’s concept of history by way 
of providing not only a thorough, chronological survey of his works but also a clear 
and consistent line of argumentation.  It will demonstrate, first, that since his full 
engagement with dogmatics in the mid-1920s Barth has in his doctrine of revelation 
unequivocally affirmed the reality of the history which revelation becomes and is, 
and, second, that by the time his mature Christology is fully brought out he is able to 
further affirm the reality of the whole of human history in a way that both divine 
sovereignty and human dignity are upheld. 
This thesis comprises eight chapters, divided into three parts.59  The first 
part covers what I term the pre-dogmatic period in Barth’s career, ranging from 1905 
to 1924, from the beginning of Barth’s academic publications to his first complete 
attempt at dogmatic investigation.60  Materials covered in this part include Barth’s 
earliest publications and sermons from before the ‘break’ in his theology (ch. 1), 
                                                 
59 It should be noted that this chronological sectioning is more formal than material, although it does 
correspond loosely to some important shifts in the development of Barth’s theology. 
60 This period embraces Barth’s ‘break’ with the theological liberalism between 1915 and 1916, 
which formed the starting-point of his dialectical theology.  For more detail see McCormack, 
Dialectical Theology, 129ff. 
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material from the War period, the two editions of the Römerbrief, and some early 
lectures in Göttingen (ch. 2).  It will be shown that what characterises Barth the 
liberal theologian, as far as his concept of history is concerned, is his replacement of 
the pastness of history with the contemporaneousness of religious experience.  This 
theologically liberal idea of history does undergo a steady development to relate to 
the outer and wider world due to his religious socialist concerns in the pre-war period, 
and then to embrace a rather pessimistic conception during the War, both before and 
after his theological breakthrough.  However, a more radical change is found in the 
eschatological overwhelming of this world by that world posited in the 1922 
Römerbrief. 
The second part covers what I term Barth’s early dogmatic period, ranging 
from 1924 to 1940, from the beginning of his dogmatic lectures in Göttingen to the 
publication of Church Dogmatics II/1.  Primary materials covered in this part 
include Unterricht in der christlichen Religion and Die christliche Dogmatik im 
Entwurf (ch. 3), and Church Dogmatics I/1, I/2 (ch. 4), and II/1 (ch. 5).  Despite 
their subtle differences, these materials have as their doctrinal focus the Word of God 
and the doctrine of God, highlighting questions concerning the actuality and 
possibility of revelation at both objective and subjective levels.  How it comes 
about that God reveals Himself whilst remaining Himself and how history is 
commandeered by God as the medium in which revelation took place without 
undermining His freedom and sovereignty will be the main focus treated in this 
section. 
The third part covers what I term Barth’s mature dogmatic period, beginning 
from 1940 when he began lecturing on the doctrine of election.  Primary materials 
covered in this part range from Church Dogmatics II/2 (ch. 6) through III (ch. 7) to 
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IV (ch. 8).  This period sees Barth’s material revisions concerning his understanding 
of the doctrine of election, and his implementation of these revisions in his doctrines 
of creation and of reconciliation.  For the broad range of doctrines treated in this 
period, the central statement around which his concept of history revolves is 
unmistakable: that in Jesus Christ’s self-election from all eternity to be incarnate in 
time, His history as a part of human history is anticipated and therefore integrated in 











God Present through History: Self, and the World (1905-1914) 
 
Introduction 
Chapter One of this thesis deals with how Barth construed history in the beginning of 
his theological career, ranging from his earliest theological publication in 1905 to the 
outbreak of the First World War in 1914.  With special attention to his work 
‘Christian Faith and History’ and his sermons in this period, we will discuss how 
Barth understood history as a view of reality first as a theological liberal and then 
also as a religious socialist.1 
1A History as a View of Reality 
1A.1 Preliminary Observations 
Whilst the young Barth was not unaware of the problem of history as a research 
method,2 what most interests us is how he construes history as a view of reality.  
Around 1910 Barth did not yet seem to have a coherent view on this matter.  
Sometimes he highlighted the fact of human being’s ‘dull dependence’ on history as 
the former’s fates and characters are conditioned and determined by the latter just 
                                                 
1 For more detail see McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 31-125; also Timothy Gorringe, Karl Barth: 
Against Hegemony (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 24ff; Karl Barth, ‘The Principles of 
Dogmatics according to Wilhelm Herrmann’, idem, Theology and Church: Shorter Writings, 
1920-1928, trans. by Louise P. Smith (London: SCM Press, 1962), 238-271 (238f.); Karl Barth, 
‘Concluding Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher’, translated by George Hunsinger from 
‘Nachwort’ in Schleiermacher―Auswahl, ed. By Heinz Bolli (Munich and Hamburg, 1968), in Karl 
Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher: Lectures at Göttingen, Winter Semester of 1923/24, ed. by 
Dietrich Ritschl, trans. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982), 261-279 (263). 
2 See for instance Barth, ‘Die Stigmata des Franz von Assisi’ (1905), Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten, 
1905-1909, 24, 37; ‘Rezension von G. Mix, zur Reform des theologishcen Studiums’ (1909), ibid., 
319f.; ‘Moderne Theologie und Reichsgottesarbeit’ (1909), ibid., 341ff.; Barth, ‘Rezension der 
Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftliche Theologie, 51. Jahrgang, 1. und 2. Heft’ (1909), ibid., 368ff. 
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like water is shaped in a stream.3  Human history only leads to the knowledge that 
what was once so has always been so; it never demonstrates what truly is or what 
should be.4  On other occasions, he noticed that it is also in history that human 
beings can learn and be educated through the inner life of great individuals in the 
past.5  The greatest among them is undoubtedly Christ Himself.  And the only way 
of recognising Him is to recognise His effects on history and on us in the present. 
Three observations can be made about this claim, although they are not 
necessarily coherent.  First, for the young Barth, historical certainty [historische 
Sicherheit] about past events is less important than their historical effectiveness 
[geschictliche Wirksamkeit] upon the present believers,6 because the life of God 
which inhabits present believers is effected and effective only in their connection 
with history. 7   Second, despite the dominant importance of His historical 
effectiveness, Christ’s historical certainty still matters in the sense that, as far as He 
stands in the chain of history, His objective existence prevents religious 
individualism from deteriorating into mystical subjectivism.8  Thirdly, it is Christ’s 
ontic supremacy over history which differentiates Him ultimately from all others: 
standing ‘in the chain of history’, He is also the only human being who in time lived 
in eternity, and thus ‘the most certain leader through the history before and after 
Him’.9 
                                                 
3 Karl Barth, ‘Lebensbilder aus der Geschichte der christlichen Religion’ (1910/1911), Karl Barth, 
Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten, 1909-1914, ed. by Hans-Anton Drewes and Hinrich Stoevesandt 
(Zürich: TVZ, 1993), 72. 
4 Barth, ‘Menschenrecht und Bürgerpflicht’ (1911), ibid., 363. 
5 Barth, ‘Lebensbilder aus der Geschichte der christlichen Religion’, ibid., 73. 
6 Ibid., 117.  Cf. Barth, ‘Religion und Wissenschaft’ (1912), ibid., 437. 
7 Barth, ‘Der Glaube an den persönlichen Gott’ (1913), ibid., 548. 
8 Barth, ‘Gerhard Tersteegen [Vortrag]’ (1910), ibid., 251f. 
9 Barth, ‘Lebensbilder aus der Geschichte der christlichen Religion’, ibid., 81. 
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1A.2 ‘Christian Faith and History’ (1910) 
Nowhere did the young Barth provide a more comprehensive survey of the problem 
of the relation of faith to history than in an essay entitled ‘Christian Faith and 
History’.10  At its outset, Barth acknowledges the faith-history problem as ‘the 
problem of the Protestant theology of the present’ and ‘the problem of Christian 
theology in general’.11  He then expresses his discontent with both Ritschl and 
Troeltsch in terms of their accounts of the problem.  On Barth’s account, Ritschl 
arbitrarily chose a very limited number of thoughts from the New Testament period 
and the Reformation, despite his intention to regard the ‘historical revelation’ as the 
Christ presented by the Christian communities in history.  And Troeltsch, following 
in a more radical fashion Ritschl’s turn to history, held a scientific, positivistic 
philosophy of history so as to exclude supernatural events such as miracles, 
revelation and even God from history.12  In Barth’s view, the urgent task concerning 
the problem of faith and history is: 
to verify the specifically religious and thus theological method by 
virtue of which an absolute relation to absolute history exists, [and] by 
virtue of which faith and revelation exist; such is a method of the 
factual origin and existence of Christian experience of God in history.  
I stress: what follows involves the appropriate depiction of an actual 
state of affairs, [namely] the relation of faith to history as it is present 
in actual Christian consciousness.13 
Clearly stated here is Barth’s twofold conviction that there does exist a 
                                                 
10 Barth, ‘Der christliche Glaube und die Geschichte’ (1910), ibid., 155-212.  Originally a lecture 
given in 1910, it was revised and published in 1912 in Schweizerische theologische Zeitschrift (1912), 
1-18, 49-72.  For a detailed treatment of this article, see Fisher, Revelatory Positivism, 216ff.; 
Burnett, Karl Barth’s Theological Exegesis, 176ff. 
11 Ibid., 155. 
12 Ibid., 157-159. 
13 Ibid., 160. 
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relation between Christian faith and history in terms of both the origin and the 
continual existence of the faith, and that this relation, considered as an ‘actual state 
of affairs’ [Tatbestand], is to be sought after in ‘actual Christian consciousness’, 
namely, in the ‘Christian experience of God in history’.  That is why Barth begins 
his investigation from the psychological aspect of the problem, and then moves 
further to the historical, critical, religionsphilosophisch, and dogmatic levels. 
1A.2.1 Psychological Level 
Barth starts addressing the problem of faith and history by pondering the essence of 
Christian faith.  He understands faith on a psychological level as the experience of 
God, i.e. an immediate consciousness of the living efficacy present to believers.14  
This experience is not formed on an individual basis, but is rather mediated by faith 
effected within the Christian communities and therefore embedded in history.15  
According to this understanding ‘[f]aith and the historicity of culture become 
synonymous.’16  This does not mean for Barth that history in general constitutes the 
mediation of faith; rather, it is the special time of Jesus’ personality that makes 
experience of God ‘somehow historically [historisch] caused and determined … 
within human society’.17  Because Jesus ‘is the same yesterday and today and 
forever’ (Hebrews 13:8), history is understood as contemporaneousness in relation to 
Christian experience of God rather than something which is in the past. 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 161. 
15 Ibid., 162: ‘faith understands itself as chained backward and forward in society and in history’. 
16 Ibid., 163. 
17 Ibid., 164. 
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1A.2.2 Historical Level 
The question then arises as to how exactly believers can find Jesus in order to have 
faith mediated to them through history.  In the second section of ‘Christian Faith 
and History’, Barth carries an investigation into the historical development of the 
notion of authority and the notion of faith from Paul through the Catholic Church to 
Luther and Calvin.  His conclusion is that, on the basis of the canon and of the 
rational agreement with the rational Word of God, faith can be mediated through 
history.18  In this way, faith and history are presented as positively connected. 
1A.2.3 Critical Level 
But the authority of the canon and confidence in human reason were severely 
challenged by the rise of the Enlightenment.  In Barth’s view, the conception of 
faith as rational or intellectual assent only leads to intellectual dishonesty and 
self-deception.  Moreover, modern scientific and especially philosophical criticism 
has made the turn from the object of knowledge to the knowing subject.  With 
legitimacy and indeed autonomy ascribed to the knowing subject’s consciousness, 
theological authority is rendered questionable.  In short, Barth is against the 
confusion of justifying and saving Christian faith with mere intellectual agreement, 
and he recognises the fact that the naïve conception of an innate authority in theology 
is bitterly challenged and undermined by the autonomous self-knowing 
consciousness of modernity.  The relationship between faith and history, previously 
reckoned as united, now has to be formulated otherwise.19 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 164-174. 
19 Ibid., 174-180. 
26 
 
1A.2.4 Religionsphilosophisch Level 
The young Barth finds a solution to the problem stated above in Schleiermacher.  
As Barth sees it, Schleiermacher’s philosophy of religion overcame the opposition 
between the objective reason and the subject consciousness of individuals by means 
of ‘the phenomenon which was already psychologically characterised as 
“reality-relation” [Realitätsbeziehung]’. 20   Similarly, Barth believes that the 
‘difference between the immediate consciousness and the reflection on it, between 
faith and thoughts of faith’21 can be overcome in the light of this reality-relation.  
Two factors play crucial roles in this connection.  One is the absorption [Aufnehmen] 
of efficacy [Wirksamkeit] into consciousness (termed by Schleiermacher as ‘intuition’ 
[Anschauung]); the other is that which is effected [Gewirkte] in consciousness 
(termed by Schleiermacher as ‘feeling’ [Gefühl]).  On Barth’s account, in intuition: 
The Finite in nature and history is surrendered to our reason, or 
namely to our objective consciousness … But in the Finite there is a 
universe which is eternal and absolute.  And this Infinite in the Finite 
is … revealed to our immediate self-consciousness every moment.22 
In contrast, the religious feeling is: 
the effected in the self-consciousness, the embracedness [Ergriffensein] 
which comes into being in the intuition from the eternal world which 
is taken to be true in the Finite.23 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 181.  In this context ‘Realitätsbeziehung’ is taken to mean an immediate experience of the 
relation to reality which breaks in the consciousness (cf. Fisher, Revelatory Positivism?, 224ff., 259ff., 
272ff.).  It is ‘both individual and trans-individual, both self-consciousness and God-consciousness’; 
it is ‘“neither a knowledge nor an action”, not a thought nor a decision, but the immediate, 
unanalysable, irrational, personally-individual liveliness.’  Ibid., 182. 
21 Ibid., 182. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 183. 
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When intuition and feeling coincide in human consciousness, the individual comes to 
life [individuelle Lebendigwerden].  Thus these two factors can be divided only 
conceptually; in actual effect they cooperate together. 
At this point Barth takes a turn, equating the Reformation ideas of faith and 
justification with the Romantic ideas of intuition and feeling.  According to Barth’s 
interpretation of the Reformers, ‘[t]he object of faith is in the act of faith; it does not 
need to become produced here firstly per fidem.’24  Over against the conceptual and 
logical precedence of the conceiving intuition over the effected feeling, priority is 
now given to the side of justification.  God’s sovereign endowment of justification 
to humanity ‘does not need first to become effective through human faith… ; rather, 
because and as it is effective, the human being believes.’25  Faith and justification, 
as the subjective and the objective aspect of the same efficacy, are here conceived as 
in an inseparable unity.  Thus: 
The relation between the subject and the object in the reality-relation 
of the individual’s coming to life will be described from the 
perspective of the Schleiermacherian religion-philosophy and the 
Reformers’ presentation of the problem: In intuition, in seeing God’s 
efficacy, in faith, and in moral obedience, the feeling, [namely] that 
which is effected by God―justification and election―becomes a 
fact.26 
1A.2.5 Dogmatic Level 
Finally, based on a reconstruction of Schleiermacher’s philosophy of religion, Barth 
advances his own dogmatic reformulation of the relation between Christian faith and 
history, thereby declaring: ‘The religious viewing of Christ, i.e. the seeing of God’s 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 184. 
25 Ibid., 184f. 
26 Ibid., 185f. 
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efficacy, is the justification …; hence this and only this intuition is the Christian 
faith.’27 
Two major problems are involved in this equation.  The first consists of 
three theses: 
The methodology of the Christian faith knows only one Christ outside 
us.  It knows no Christ in Himself.  It knows only one Christ in us.28 
The first and the third theses seem contradictory.  According to Barth, the Christ 
known to the Christian faith is the Christ outside us, because faith is understood as a 
subjective intuition, and an intuition requires something outside us.  But through the 
subjective intuition, the objective Christ has become present to us and effective upon 
us.  The result is that there is no objective Christ who is not already in the believers’ 
subjective consciousness.  The so-called ‘historical’ [historisch] Christ is simply 
irrelevant.29  After all, the notion of an ‘objective’ Christ is from the very beginning 
construed in subjectively effective faith.  From Calvin through Melanchthon to 
Schleiermacher, it has been affirmed that the efficacy of Christ inside us is no 
different than what is true and also outwardly objective.30  Thus Barth is convinced 
that the problem of faith and history is not solved [lösen] but rather dissolved 
[auflösen] in the following formulation: 
Everything about the trueness of feeling, of justificatio and of life, 
depends on Him being outside us; and everything about the trueness 
of intuition, of fides and of experience, depends on Him being in us.  
                                                 
27 Ibid., 188. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 190. 
30 Ibid., 192f. 
29 
 
The Christ outside us is the Christ in us.  The effective history is the 
effected faith.31 
Combining the first equation with the second, Barth presents his second 
problem: In what way is the effecting Christ (i.e. the effective history) the source and 
content of the effected Christian faith?  He discusses this problem regarding the 
objective side (of history and of Christ) and the subjective side (of faith).  On the 
objective side, Barth claims that the historical [historisch] knowledge of the life of 
Christ belongs primarily to the objective consciousness, and therefore is subject to 
‘every possible form of the uncertainty, relativity and un-efficacy of everything that 
is merely historical [historisch].’32  But what actualises justification is faith in the 
inner life or self-consciousness of Jesus.  Jesus’ obedience becomes the fons gratiae 
for us; this effectuation exists ‘loftily over every criticism and indifferently against 
historical [historisch] affirmation or negation.’33  Therefore, Christ as the objective 
fact of salvation is indeed the source and content of the Christian faith.  But this fact 
‘does not and cannot exist [as the historical (historisch) knowledge of Christ’s 
outward life] for the objective consciousness and for science.’34  Rather, through the 
historical process of the efficacy of Christian faith, Jesus’ inner life is intuited and 
becomes actually effective in our inner life.  What is objectively factual has become 
subjectively and individually actual in us. 
On the other hand, viewed from the subjective side of faith, Barth posits that 
faith is justification in that God is effective in human beings, 35 and that the 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 193.  See also 197. 
32 Ibid., 194. 
33 Ibid., 195. 




proclamation of justice [Gerechtsprechung] is justification as such 
[Gerechtsmachung] in that that proclamation is effective.36  This effectuation of 
faith, therefore, does not just take place suddenly.  Rather, ‘it is presented as a 
process of becoming in the life of the individual’.37  This is why Barth can ascribe 
historicity [Geschichtlichkeit] to faith by declaring that: 
Faith does not stand opposed to history [Geschichte], but it is simply 
the extension or the apprehensio of history [Geschichte] in the life of 
the individual.38 
Just as the Christ outside us is the Christ in us, in the same way, history is faith. 
1A.2.6 Concluding Section 
In the concluding section, Barth once again contends that faith and history are not 
two ‘historical-objective [historisch] and therefore … two separate phenomena’.39  
Rather, when one manages to live in the subject matter [Sache] and only then to 
speak about it accordingly, he or she can clearly see how faith is psychologically 
mediated to us in and through history [Geschichte].  That is why ‘[t]he historical 
[historisch] Jesus becomes the risen, living Christ in Christ’s community.’40 
Summing up his detailed exposition, Barth reiterates the simple fact that the 
effective history becomes the effected Christian faith.  But when it comes to how 
this actualisation takes place, Barth offers no further analysis, because for him ‘faith 
itself is the origin, the origin of the actuality of life, and the actualising of the 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 200. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 201. 
39 Ibid., 202. 
40 Ibid., 203. 
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consciousness-possibilities which are given in an a priori function.’41  For the 
young Barth, then, the relation between the effective history and the effected faith is 
undoubtedly actualised, but it is so in a mysterious and untold way.  It belongs to 
the category of self-evident and self-authenticating truth which does not require any 
further validation.42 
1A.3 Orientation from the Historical towards the Contemporary 
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that history, understood as a view of reality, 
was construed by the young Barth primarily as an effective medium of faith.  For 
him, what is effected through this effective medium is not the objective certainty of 
this or that event in the past, but the faith brought about as religious experience in the 
individual’s contemporary life and consciousness. 
Crucial to this distinctive conception of ‘history’ is a strong orientation 
towards contemporaneousness.  As Fisher correctly notes, ‘history for the early 
Barth had more to do with actualization, with which it is almost equivalent, than with 
temporality.  History is the overwhelming presence of reality in the infinite depths 
of personal experience’.43  If ‘[d]ivine-human relatedness is … a reality available to 
humankind at any time’,44 then the ‘history’ between God and humanity is in effect 
that which bridges the historical distance. 
A corollary of this orientation towards contemporaneousness is a certain 
disregard of the objective aspect of our salvation, i.e. Jesus’ deeds in history.  There 
is little mention of them in this article, because for the young Barth the foundation of 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 211. 
42 Ibid., 212. 
43 Fisher, Revelatory Positivism?, 219. 
44 Ibid., 219f. 
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our salvation today is not the history of past events but the ‘effective history’ itself, 
namely the reality of human history which functions as the medium through which 
the salvific effect ‘flows through’ biblical authors and Christian communities in the 
past and becomes conceived in the consciousness of contemporary believers. 
One might summarise the young Barth’s conception of history in relation to 
faith by making two points.  First, the ‘effective history’ is necessary but 
insufficient for the ‘effected faith’: necessary, because only by way of it is the 
efficacy of Christ’s righteousness carried through the temporal distance to 
contemporary believers; insufficient, because the connection between the present 
faith and the past salvation-fact effectuated through ‘history’ does not take place 
automatically.  Second, the effectuation of faith in God definitely cannot be secured 
by any human manipulation, whether it be the objective scientific verification of past 
events or the subjective conceiving and appropriating of them.  After all, the 
effectuation of faith, i.e. of religious experience of contemporary Christians, is 
dependent only on God’s sovereign will, which is hidden from us. 
1A.4 Intricate Liberal Heritage of the Young Barth 
It would be here useful to locate the young Barth’s location within late 
nineteenth-century theology regarding the problem of history.  Four observations 
can be made in this regard. 
First, the young Barth’s concept of history shows him to be a theological 
liberal in a generally Schleiermacherian manner.  If Gerrish’s categorisation of the 
important theological groups in Europe and North America at the turn of the 
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nineteenth and the twentieth centuries holds true,45 the young Barth was clearly 
aligned with the liberals.  Most liberals at that time shared a common connection to 
Schleiermacher, who was acknowledged as the pioneer in the historicising of 
theology.  The young Barth’s general appeal to the Romantic Schleiermacher is well 
documented.46  Von Balthasar rightly remarks that Barth’s ‘Christian Faith and 
History’ is ‘an attempt to infuse all the rigor of the old Reformers into 
Schleiermacher’s methodology without deviating even an inch from him.’47 
Second, within the general Schleiermacherian tradition, the young Barth was 
associated specifically with Ritschl’s classical liberalism.  Apart from their common 
heritage of Schleiermacher, the liberals’ conceptions of the nature of faith, of history, 
and the relation between them varied widely.  Classical liberals, such as Ritschl, 
were more open to the scholarship of historical criticism than the conservatives were.  
What really mattered to one’s salvation and faith, according to them, was not the 
                                                 
45 The four groups identified by Gerrish are the conservatives, the liberals, the radical rationalists, and 
the ‘left wing’ of liberalism.  B. A. Gerrish, ‘Jesus, Myth, and History: Troeltsch’s Stand in the 
“Christ-Myth” Debate’, The Journal of Religion, 55 (1975), 13-35. 
46 In his own account of his relationship to Schleiermacher, Barth admitted that it was through 
Schleiermacher that he had found ‘The Immediate’, and that he had become and was still ‘a bit of a 
romantic’.  Barth, ‘Concluding Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher’, The Theology of 
Schleiermacher, 262.  It is worth noting that here Barth suggests that he himself deemed the 
Speeches the most significant post-canonical texts in the Christian tradition, and that he held this view 
in spite of Herrmann’s oppositional opinion (Barth, ibid.: ‘That those Speeches were the most 
important and correct writings to appear since the closing of the New Testament canon was a fact 
from which I did not allow my great Marburg teacher [Herrmann] to detract’).  However, in a 
conversation with some students at the Kirchlichen Hochschule in Wuppertal, the ‘most important’ 
claim was put in Herrmann’s mouth, and Barth says that he did not accept Herrmann’s evaluation (see 
Karl Barth, Gespräche 1964-1968, ed. by Eberhard Busch [Zürich: TVZ, 1996], 475: ‘die vier ersten 
«Reden» waren für Wilhelm Herrmann so wichtig, daß er uns im Seminar gesagt hat, die «Reden über 
die Religion» von Schleiermacher, das sei die wichtigste Schrift, die seit dem Abschluß des Kanons 
des Neuen Testamentes an der Öffentlichkeit erschienen sei.  Das habe ich ihm nicht ohne weiteres 
abgenommen’).  The seemingly direct contradiction between these two accounts is resolved when 
one reads the German original of the ‘Postscript’.  According to it, Barth did not state that the ‘most 
important’ claim was ‘a fact from which I did not allow my great Marburg teacher [Herrmann] to 
detract’; instead, this claim was Herrmann’s and Barth himself rejected it (see Karl Barth, ‘Nachwort’, 
in Heinz Bolli, Schleiermacher-Auswahl [Hamburg & München: Siebenstern Taschenbuch Verlag, 
1968], 290-312 [291]: ‘Daß jene «Reden» geradezu das Wichtigste und Richtigste seien, was seit dem 
Abschluß des neutestamentlichen Kanons auf dem Feld christlichen Erkennens und Bekennens ans 
Licht getreten sei, nahm ich zwar meinem großen Marburger Lehrer nicht ab’). 
47 Von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, 211. 
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‘petty details’ or the judgement of facts, but the ‘essence of Jesus’ or the judgement 
of value.  The young Barth was sympathetic to the classical liberals here.  He 
might not have paid as much attention to the objective, historically given fact of the 
Jesus of Nazareth as Ritschl had; he might have found unsatisfactory Ritschl’s 
insufficient emphasis on the individual’s consciousness and deemed his selection of 
the New Testament and Reformation materials biased by his Lutheran 
Confessionalism.48  Nonetheless, as Barth recognised, it was Ritschl’s dogmatic 
restoration of Schleiermacher’s theology of religious experience and his 
christocentric justification of it that made it possible for religious individualism to 
gain an independent relation to history, and it was this position of Ritschl to which 
‘the typically modern theological historians are oriented completely dogmatically’.49  
To this extent, the shaping of the young Barth’s historical consciousness can be 
broadly attributed to his critical and reflective acceptance of Ritschl’s classical 
liberalism. 
Third, the young Barth kept his distance from the form of radical liberalism 
found in Troeltsch’s teaching.  Also derived from the liberal tradition of 
Schleiermacher, Troeltsch emerged in a more radical fashion than the classical 
liberals.  Unlike the conservatives, Troeltsch was prepared to accept and utilise 
historical research as a method free of preconditions, in order for faith to become 
completely conformed to ‘modernity’.  Distinguishing himself from the classical 
liberals, Troeltsch insisted that every bit of our knowledge of religion be directly 
acquired from strictly historical sources so that no norm at all was operative in this 
                                                 
48 Barth, ‘Der christliche Glaube und die Geschichte’, Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten, 1909-1914, 
158f. 
49 Barth, ‘Rezension der Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftliche Theologie, 51. Jahrgang, 1. und 2 Heft’, 
Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten, 1905-1909, 371. 
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process.  The young Barth not only kept a greater distance from Troeltsch than from 
the classical liberals, but used almost every means to overcome Troeltsch’s 
historicism.  It seemed to him that Troeltsch’s obsession with a ‘purely scientific’ 
theology had prevented theology from manifesting anything other than what was 
relative; that which was absolute, i.e. God and revelation, was excluded from this 
scientifically described and defined history which existed only for the sake of itself.50  
Furthermore, Troeltsch’s ascription of unconditional legitimacy to scientific 
historical method was based on certain metaphysical presuppositions.  In Barth’s 
judgement, this led to the confusion of ‘objective’ knowledge of the past (i.e. what 
Troeltsch took to be ‘history’) with the ‘subjective’ appropriation of the conception 
of the past (what Barth supposed to be ‘faith’).51 
Finally, in addition to his critical acceptance of Ritschl and obvious dissent 
from Troeltsch, the immediate influence of Herrmann on the young Barth is 
unmistakable.  Barth fully embraced Herrmann, who was considered an important 
figure by what might be called the liberal ‘left wing’.52  Barth might have seldom 
argued with Troeltsch directly,53 but his acquaintance with the longstanding debate 
                                                 
50 Barth, ‘Der christliche Glaube und die Geschichte’, Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten, 1909-1914, 
159. 
51 Nonetheless, it is also important to notice that the early Barth shared Troeltsch’s conception of the 
reality of history as ‘a lively, continuous flow and an enduring contemporaneity from generation to 
generation’ which carries salvation to people through the Christian community.  Ernst Troeltsch, 
Glaubenslehre: Nach Heidelberger Vorlesungen aus den Jahren 1911 und 1912 (München und 
Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1925), 360f.  Cited in B. A. Gerrish, ‘The Possibility of a Historical 
Theology’, B. A. Gerrish, The Old Protestantism and the New: Essays on the Reformation Heritage 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982), 225f.  See also Barth, ‘Der christliche Glaube und die Geschichte’, 
Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten, 1909-1914, 162, 203. 
52 Gerrish, ‘Jesus, Myth, and History’, 33ff.  According to Gerrish, Herrmann, Georg Wobbermin 
(1869-1943) and the lesser known Wilhelm Fresenius belong to this camp.  Herrmann is categorised 
as ‘on the left’ of liberalism in the sense that ‘he was less tied than some to the grounding of theology 
in historically verifiable features of Jesus’ ministry.’  Ibid., 33n92. 
53 Derk N. Stegeman, ‘Ethics or Dogmatics? The Case “Rendtorff vs. Barth”’, in Religious Polemics 
in Context: Paper Presented to the Second International Conference of the Leiden Institute for the 




between Troeltsch and Herrmann is seen in his inheritance of Herrmannian views of 
religion, science, history and modernity. 54   One particular instance is his 
understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge and historical knowledge.  For 
Barth, ‘knowledge’ [Erkenntnis] is not merely scientific verification but also 
‘knowing’ [erkennen] and ‘thought’ [Gedanken] made possible by the ‘thinking’ 
subject.  In this epistemological light, Barth is able to maintain that the construction 
of history does not lie in the scientific verification of the objective events in the past, 
but in the conception and appropriation which emerge only from the relation of 
history-viewers to history. 55   This closely resembles Herrmann’s criticism of 
Troeltsch’s failure to recognise the fact that ‘historical knowledge shares with 
science generally the epistemological operation of knowing [Erkennen] which 
succeeds precisely to the extent that it situates a given phenomenon in a 
temporal-spatial context and thereby relativizes it.’56  Furthermore, following the 
recognition that scientific and historical ‘knowledge’ is the human subject’s 
construction rather than purely objective facts, Herrmann also distinguishes external 
facts which can be guaranteed by historical investigation from inner facts which can 
be grasped only in the individual’s consciousness and experience.  It is the inner 
facts, then, that are said to provide the assurance of faith.57  Thus, ‘[w]hatever the 
findings of historical scholarship, the personal life of Jesus can at least become a fact 
                                                 
54 Brent W. Sockness, Against False Apologetics: Wilhelm Herrmann and Ernst Troeltsch in Conflict 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 206ff. 
55 Barth, ‘Der chritliche Glaube und die Geschichte’, Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten, 1909-1914, 160, 
fn c. 
56 Sockness, Against False Apologetics, 201. 
57 According to Herrmann, the inner life of Jesus is ‘never in any sense a minimum of the historically 
demonstrable’.  Wilhelm Herrmann, Gesammelte Aufsätze, ed. by F. W. Schmidt (Tübingen: 1923), 




experienced by us [eine von uns erlebte Tatsache]’.58  Thus comes the left wingers’ 
claim: The experience of God is the existence of God (in one’s experience); the 
history-viewers’ experience of history is the truth of history (for the history-viewers 
themselves).  In Barth’s own words: ‘The Christ outside us is the Christ in us.  The 
effective history is the effected faith.’59 
 
1B From the Self to the World: Pre-War Writings 
With his move from Geneva to Safenwil in 1911 to begin a ten-year career as a 
pastor, new elements began to be infused into Barth’s theology.   Besides his 
theological liberal heritage, religious socialism with its acute sense of community 
played a significant role in the first half of the 1910s.  This section seeks to 
demonstrate that in the first half of the decade, Barth’s conception of history was 
broadened first horizontally and then vertically by his theological reception of 
religious socialism. 
Barth’s social-political concern, which might be traced back to 1906,60 began 
to grow following his encounter with real problems of everyday life in the industrial 
village of Safenwil.61  There he attempted to direct believers’ attention away from 
political history to economic history and class conflict 62 by asserting a close 
                                                 
58 Gerrish, ‘Jesus, Myth, and History’, 33. 
59 Barth, ‘Der chritliche Glaube und die Geschichte’, Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten, 1909-1914, 193, 
197.  Also 200: ‘Christ’s righteousness becomes my righteousness; Christ’s piety becomes my piety.  
He becomes I.’ 
60 Barth, ‘Zofingia und die soziale Frage’ (1906), Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten, 1905-1909, 61-103.  
Here Barth is shown to be ‘keenly aware of political realities, and especially sensitive to the question 
of class.’  Gorringe, Karl Barth, 30. 
61 Barth, ‘Concluding Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher’, The Theology of Schleiermacher, 
262ff.  Karl Barth, ‘Autobiographical Sketches’ (1927), idem, Karl Barth-Rudolf Bultmann Letters 
1922-1966, ed. by Bernd Jaspert, trans. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982), 
154. 
62 Barth, ‘Menschenrecht und Bürgerpflicht’ (1911), Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten, 1909-1914, 366. 
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identification of Jesus with the social movement: ‘The two are one and the same: 
Jesus is the social movement and the social movement is Jesus in the present.’63  
Barth considered the socialist claims an important way of putting the gospel into 
practice, though he also recognised that the socialist ideals will not be realised 
without the gospel:64 ‘proper’ Christians and socialists are to delight in each other’s 
teachings. 65  In the same vein, having joined the Social Democratic Party of 
Switzerland on 26 January 1915, the ‘comrade pastor’ in Safenwil gave his first 
lecture as a new party member on ‘War, Socialism and Christianity’ on 14 February, 
insisting on the need for both Christianity and socialism to be reformed in the light of 
each other.66  At least before the disclosure of the scandalous involvement of some 
confirmation candidates with a manufacturer in 1916,67 which led him to focus more 
on the incompatibility of God’s righteousness with any existing ‘cultural, moral, and 
patriotic duties, [and] all efforts in “applied religion”’,68 Barth remained rather 
optimistic about religious socialism. 
This section will examine Barth’s view of history in a period in which both 
theological liberalism and religious socialism operated in his theology.  We seek to 
                                                 
63 Barth, ‘Jesus Christus und die soziale Bewegung’ (1911), ibid., 386ff.  English translation: Karl 
Barth, ‘Jesus Christ and the Movement for Social Justice’, idem, Karl Barth: Theologian of Freedom, 
ed. by Clifford Green (London: Collins, 1989), 98-114. 
64 Barth, ‘Evangelium und Sozialismus’ (1914), ibid., 731. 
65 Ibid., 729. 
66 Cited in Busch, The Great Passion, 83.  Barth’s zeal for religious socialism is clearly suggested in 
many lectures that he gave during this period: ‘Christ and Social Democracy’, ‘The Future of Social 
Democracy in Switzerland’, ‘What does it Mean to be a Socialist’ and so on.  Ibid. 
67 On Monday 10 January Barth wrote to Thurneysen: ‘Our factory owner Hochuli arranged a big 
binge to celebrate the marriage of his daughter for 500 employees and workers, who, including my 
male and female confirmands, got senselessly drunk in swarms and behaved wickedly in every way.  
So our people are fooled with a carrot and a stick’.  Karl Barth, Karl Barth-Eduard Thurneysen 
Briefwechsel, Band I: 1913-1921, ed. by Eduard Thurneysen (Zürich: TVZ, 1973), 123ff.  Also 
Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts, trans. by John 
Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1976), 88f. 
68 Karl Barth, ‘The Righteousness of God’ (1916), idem, The Word of God and the Word of Man, 
trans. by Douglas Horton (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1928), 9-27 (23f.). 
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show that, with his increasing awareness of vital problems in the social, economic 
and political realities, his individualistic understanding of religious experience gave 
way to the real experiences of a broader horizontal dimension, and that his strong 
idealist tendency to focus only on the specifically defined ‘contemporaneousness’ of 
historical moment is to some extent supplemented by a sense of the vertical 
dimension of historical process. 
1B.1 Vertical Compression and Horizontal Extension: ‘Jesus and the 
Social Movement’ (1911) 
The broadening of Barth’s understanding of the horizontal dimension of history can 
be clearly observed in a lecture widely considered to be revelatory of his earliest 
socialism.  Here, Barth asserts a close connection between Jesus and the social 
movement of his day, addressing the latter as ‘the most powerful Word of God to the 
present’ and as ‘the direct continuation of the … spiritual power which entered with 
Jesus into history [Geschichte] and life’.69  As McCormack remarks, this belief in 
the life-giving power entering history with Jesus comes from Barth’s liberal 
background (especially Herrmann).  The superstructure established upon this 
foundation, however, is no longer ‘the concentration on the existential problem of the 
self which had preoccupied Herrmann during Barth’s student years’, but rather the 
concrete political and economic problems.70 
Objections come from both sides.  On one hand, the Christians contend that 
the eternal Jesus Christ has nothing to do with what is temporal and accidental.  
Barth’s response is that what matters in the social movement is not its deeds but 
                                                 
69 Barth, ‘Jesus Christus und die soziale Bewegung’, Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten, 1909-1914, 
386f. 
70 McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 86. 
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rather its intention.  Whereas deeds of the individuals are specific and particular to 
the present-day context, their intention, i.e. the general, eternal and permanent 
subject matter of the social movement, is qualified to be placed on the same par as 
Jesus.71  On the other hand, an objection rises also from the socialists, who are 
doubtful about the Christian Church and its worldview.  Barth replies by 
differentiating the existing Christian Church from its origin in Jesus, in an attempt to 
persuade the socialists to shift their focus from the church to Jesus, and into 
understanding that what Jesus has to offer to the modern people is a concrete way of 
life which can be practiced and followed.72 
Then Barth moves on to establish the connection between Jesus and the social 
movement.  First, he maintains that socialism, like Jesus Himself, is a movement 
from below to above.  Through Jesus’ works among the lower class, the Kingdom 
of God has come to the poor and the dependent.73  Regarding the essence of this 
Kingdom, moreover, there is a presupposed contradiction between the ‘spiritual’ 
church and the ‘material’ world.  Indeed, Barth admits, the existing Church was 
inactive in its praxis.  But if we come to Jesus, he argues, there will be no such 
separation between the Spirit and matter.  Therefore, the Kingdom of God is also 
the Kingdom of God in the world.  Barth makes it clear that the citizens in this 
Kingdom are to bear fruit which is ‘nothing but social help in material terms’.  
Indeed, ‘the spirit that has worth before God is the social spirit.  And the social help 
is the way to eternal life.’74  In order to eliminate social misery, Barth continues, it 
                                                 
71 Barth, ‘Jesus Christus und die soziale Bewegung’, Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten, 1909-1914, 
387-389. 
72 Ibid., 389-391. 
73 Ibid., 391-393. 
74 Ibid., 397. 
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is essential to fight against capitalism, since the foundation of capitalism is private 
property, which is a sin based on self-seeking motives.75  Not merely talking about 
its ideas and ideals, socialism also takes action to bring them into realisation by 
means of organisation and solidarity.  In this connection, Barth explicitly blames 
German Lutheranism for the rift between religion (Jesus’ call to repentance) and 
social consciousness (the socialist call to solidarity), and evokes the Swiss Reformers 
(Zwingli and Calvin) to support not merely the correlation but also indeed the unity 
of the two. 76  In Social Democracy, Barth believes that he finds the idea of 
organisation most clearly and purely ‘in the way in which it must be worked out in 
our time’.77 
Two observations can now be made about Barth’s concept of history.  First, 
in dealing with these objections, Barth ascribes higher priority to the alleged general 
and eternal subject matter of socialism over the specific deeds of individuals in time.  
He also appeals to the Jesus who lived centuries ago as the origin of the current 
Church.  In doing so, the vertical dimension of history―the temporal distance 
between ‘now’ and ‘then’―is in effect compressed or even dismissed.  What is 
imperfect about the deeds of socialists and Christian Church today, Barth argues, 
may and should be ignored, because these deeds may and should be reduced to their 
respective eternal prototypes.  It would be interesting to ask, however, whether this 
strategy is compatible with the liberal idea of the life-giving power which is believed 
to have entered history with Jesus.  If this power did enter history, the historical 
process could not simply be ignored and dismissed.  On the contrary, if one is 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 398-402. 
76 Ibid., 403-405. 
77 Ibid., 407. 
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allowed to ignore the actual deeds in history and simply to evoke their eternal 
prototypes when there is criticism of imperfect present-day situations, can the 
life-giving power be said to have actually entered history?  It then appears that, 
whilst idealist optimism about the life-giving power entering into and penetrating 
through history is still maintained, Barth’s dissatisfaction with his current era might 
have led him to a scepticism of history, which is supposed to be responsible for the 
imperfect present. 
Second, if the way in which Barth manages to overcome the objections 
indicates his tendency to compress the vertical dimension of historical process, his 
explication of the subject matter of socialism might be taken to show his 
determination to extend the horizontal dimension of historical reality―that is, from 
‘me’ to ‘us’.  Whilst the significance and validity of concrete historical process are 
implicitly subdued to what is general and eternal, critical importance is explicitly 
attached to the concrete historical contexts.  His liberal individualistic notion of 
religious experience is now enlarged in extent and breadth.  In his insistence in 
extending our concerns from the spiritual to the material, from inner experience to 
outward connections, and from individual cares to cooperative and social 
responsibilities, Barth displays a keen awareness of the vital problems present in the 
concrete historical reality.  The self has now turned towards the world.  A certain 
tension might be observed, as with the ‘vertical compression’ the concreteness of 
history is admittedly remarkably reduced in its temporal distance, whereas with the 
‘horizontal extension’ the concreteness of history is significantly broadened in scope.  
This tension might suggest a lack of serious attention to history.  But what is certain 
is that, in view of the fact the horizontal dimension of historical reality in its 
contemporary context can be understood as ‘history’ only in the broadest sense of the 
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term, the concreteness of history as a whole is arguably neglected by Barth. 
1B.2 Concession with Reservation: Sermon on Acts 17:26-28 (1913) 
As McCormack rightly suggests, the year 1913 finds Barth occupied with the themes 
of divine judgement, criticism of religion, the wholly otherness of God, and the 
Kingdom of God and its relation to the history of the world, all of which prefigure 
what was later to emerge in his Römerbrief.78  In this section, we will discuss 
Barth’s vacillation between the negative and positive sides of history in terms of its 
contribution to the knowledge of God. 
This vacillation is shown in a sermon on Acts 7:26-28 in which Barth 
explicitly discusses the role that history can play in the acquisition of human 
knowledge of God.  Barth begins the sermon by engaging with Paul’s 
announcement to the Greeks that God is not far from us.79  Contemplation upon 
God in the Greek manner, according to Barth, will not take us any further towards 
the true knowledge of God, because the Greeks did nothing more than talking about 
‘perplexed notions and observations’ about God which ‘had no meaning or effect on 
their life’. 80  Due to the Greeks’ indifference to life, the question about God 
degenerates into ‘useless talkative scholarship’ which resulted in ‘a fruitless way to 
contemplate and to talk about God’.  But the lack of real relation to God, and the 
assumed separation between God and humanity, are mistakes made by modern 
people, too.  Since God is an unknown being over there, ‘letting our thoughts fly 
away’ is the only way to reach the world beyond: 
                                                 
78 McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 92-104. 
79 Barth, sermon, 13 April, 1913, Karl Barth, Predigten 1913, ed. by Nelly Barth and Gerhard Sauter 
(Zürich: TVZ, 1976), 156-160. 
80 Ibid., 160. 
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I am here in my small house with my little understanding, and God is 
over there in the eternal mystery―and in order to know Him, I must 
attempt to enter into the mystery over there.81 
This approach to a God far away is mistaken, according to Barth.82  In order 
really to know God, the idea of separation must be discarded.  A God who is ‘the 
mysterious thing on the other side of the ditch to which our thoughts had to flutter 
over in some way’ cannot be the power which preserves us and on which we depend.  
Disputing the notion of separation, Barth highlights the importance of balance 
between God’s lordship over us and His effect on us.  With the juxtaposition of 
God’s otherness from and connectedness with the world, God’s distinction from the 
world is here considered in terms with His inseparable relation to the world.  The 
object of human knowledge of God, therefore, is not a God over there, not the world 
in itself, nor we ourselves, but what happens to us, i.e. God’s deeds to us in the 
world.83 
At this point, Barth distinctly brings human history into the arena: 
I must abide by the experiences which humankind made in the 
hundreds of years of their existence, and seek to know: what is that 
which reveals itself to us in the thousand-year-long experiences, what 
is the outcome, the result of this history [Geschichte] to which we 
ourselves also belong?  We must discern what happens here, what 
happens to ourselves, in our life, in the world here around us, in 
human history [Geschichte].84 
It is crucial to note that what is proposed here is what happens to us as revealed ‘in 
this thousand-year-long experiences’ and ‘in the world here around us’.  The 
                                                 
81 Ibid., 161. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid., 162. 
84 Ibid., 163. 
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individual experience remains necessary, as Barth still believes that ‘we must look 
into our heart and conscience’ in order to see God,85 but it alone is not sufficient in 
the light of the religious socialist ideal of human solidarity.  Barth suggests looking 
beyond oneself for wider experiences of the past history and the present world.  
Barth believes that the God depicted by Paul to the Greeks ‘lives in us, in our world, 
in our human history, [and] in everything that is in us and around us and is happening 
to us’,86 therefore that we are ‘completely encompassed by His deeds’ and ‘entirely 
immersed in clear effects of God’.  If God’s effect on us happens at all times and in 
all places, we get to see Him, not from afar or beyond, nor merely from my personal 
experience, but from our living experiences in history and in the world.  Insofar as 
we do not shut ourselves to the broadened range of experiences so construed, Barth 
assures us, ‘every opportunity of knowledge of God’ will be brought to us.87 
Given the young Barth’s rooted liberal background, it is unsurprising to see 
his appeal to human experience as the medium to the knowledge of God.  What 
now distinguishes him from his liberal teachers, especially Herrmann, is the 
construal of experiences in human history as a qualifier of the individual experience.  
Indeed Barth still maintains in a good liberal manner that our experience of the 
dependence on God can lead to the recognition of the living God’s effect on us, and 
that, in turn, from God’s effect on us we can recognise the God who initiates the 
effect.  However: 
still more powerfully we experience everything as beings [Wesen] 
which belong to human history [Geschichte].  We do not stand alone 
or on our own; rather, we are within the great nexus [Zusammenhang] 
                                                 
85 Ibid., 162. 
86 Ibid., 163. 
87 Ibid., 164. 
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of human life, a nexus which lasts from the first day of humankind to 
the present day.88 
The sense of togetherness is shown to be in close relation to the awareness of history 
as the great nexus [Zusammenhang] in which human experiences take place and to 
which they belong.  As Barth’s understanding of experience is stretching from the 
liberal’s individual stance to the socialist’s cooperative disposition, he seems to be 
adding something to the notion of contemporaneousness shown in the 1910 lecture 
on faith and history.  A new kind of historical awareness is emerging, and the 
vertical dimension of history is no longer compressed but starts to assume 
significance.  In the 1910 lecture ‘Christian Faith and History’, history was viewed 
as the medium through which the effect of Jesus’ life upon us was experienced by 
individuals.  Now not only the life of God is experienced in history,89 but our own 
beings are also determined in it, and God Himself is known in it.  In this sense, this 
passage indicates a significant concession that the young Barth made to human 
history in his earliest theology. 
It should be noticed, however, that the concession to history is not granted 
unreservedly.  Immediately after giving history credit for being the locus of God’s 
effect on humanity, Barth warns against the temptation to boast that human history 
would be a portrayal of God’s benevolence.90  It is true that ‘[h]istory is filled with 
the calling after truth and justice’.  But the real climax of history lies in that: 
                                                 
88 Ibid., 167. 
89 ‘[O]nly the reflection on a fact which is created in us, can be the idea of God of religion.  This fact 
is the life from God which is given to us through our connection with history.  This our inner 
conditionality on history is the religious experience.’  Barth, ‘Der Glaube an den persönlichen Gott’, 
Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten, 1909-1914, 548. 
90 Barth, sermon, 13 April, 1913, Predigten 1913, 167. 
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at one point in history [an einer Stelle der Geschichte], something 
marvellous has now really occurred: God’s benevolence has become 
manifest not only as word, but as act, as pure act.  It took place in the 
life and death of Jesus.  There God displayed Himself as He is … 
There it became true in the highest way that God does not want to be 
far from us … For as the entire human history [Geschichte] belongs to 
us, so does Jesus belong to us in our life … .91 
It is therefore only in this sense that ‘human history is a great, or rather the greatest 
revelation of God’. 92  Apart from the higher event hidden in history, all the 
‘progress’ that is believed to have been brought to us in history is trivial and 
relative.93 
To conclude, during the transitional period in the first half of the 1910s when 
the socialist ideal of human solidarity was being blended into theological liberalism, 
Barth’s conception of history began to extend, firstly horizontally (from ‘me’ to ‘us’) 
and then vertically (from ‘now’ to ‘then’).  Insofar as the individual self, now no 
longer conceived as limited to his or her own present religious experience, is 
                                                 
91 Ibid., 168.  As an advance notice, this significant notion of God’s revelation as situated ‘at one 
point in history’, as ‘a definite moment of history’, will reappear in R1, 85, 87, 91, 106; in Karl Barth, 
Erklärung des Johannesevangeliums: Vorlesung Münster, Wintersemester 1925/1926, wiederholt in 
Bonn, Sommersemester 1930, ed. by Walther Fürst (Zürich: TVZ, 1999), 59; in §36 ‘Die Gegenwart 
Jesu Christi’, Unt3, 450; and then in §11 ‘Gott der Vater’ and §15 ‘Weissagung und Erfüllung’, ChD, 
233, 320.  The occurrences of this notion tell us that the ‘historicity’ of revelation was affirmed by 
Barth first in 1913 and then in R1 in 1919.  After the (temporary) radical opposition of eternity and 
time presented in R2 (1922), it was re-affirmed in a number of occasions in the two dogmatic 
enterprises in the mid-1920s.  The critical political situation in Germany in the early 1930s 
somewhat prevented Barth from mentioning again revelation as a point of history, but this means 
simply a shift in tone according to the context and not a denial of the historicity of revelation.  The 
references aforementioned will be treated in due course in sections 2B.1.2, 3B and 3C. 
92 Barth, sermon, 13 April, 1913, Predigten 1913, 168.  In relation to Barth’s concept of history in 
this transitional period, McCormack remarks that ‘Barth was still thoroughly “liberal” in his basic 
theological orientation.  Revelation was still understood in Herrmannian fashion.  The primary 
subjective locus of revelation for Barth was still the conscience of the individual.  On its objective 
side, revelation was closely identified with history.’  McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 103. 
93 Barth admits that the accumulation of knowledge, and the progress in technology and skills, have 
in truth come into existence over the last two centuries.  But these so-called accomplishments in 
history are, in his view, based on self-interest and superficiality, and lead to nothing but uncertainty in 
terms of the most important things.  Providing no help at all towards the inner situation of 
humankind, the ‘accomplishments’ in history can claim no merit but have to be condemned as ‘dead 
works’, which are supposed to be ‘cleansed’ by the blood of Christ (Heb. 9:14).  Barth, sermon, 21 
Mar. 1913, Predigten 1913, 125. 
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confronted with the collective experience of life in the ‘thousand-year-long 
experiences’ of the world, significant concession is allowed to history.  Such 
concession is cautiously qualified, however, in the sense that the highest privilege in 
history is reserved solely to God’s gracious act in Jesus upon humankind.  Elements 
of theological liberalism were still present in that both history and God are reckoned 
to belong to us. 
1C Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has examined the formation of the concept of history in the earliest 
theology of Karl Barth.  It has been observed that as a theological liberal the young 
Barth viewed history primarily as that which effectuates faith in the consciousness of 
contemporary believers, in an unmistakably Herrmannian fashion.  ‘History’ in this 
sense was understood in terms of contemporaneousness and not pastness.  It has 
also demonstrated that as a religious socialist Barth came to understand humankind 
more collectively than individually, thereby broadening his understanding of history 
first horizontally and then vertically.  In this scheme human history primarily serves 
the purpose of providing not only individual religious experience but also collective 





God’s Revelation Overwhelming History: 
The Römerbrief Period (1914-1924) 
 
Introduction 
The decade starting from 1914 was full of significant events which shaped and 
altered Barth’s theological path (including the turn from theological liberalism and 
religious socialism in 1915 and 1916), and brackets the writing and rewriting of his 
Römerbrief, the first edition of which led to his move from Safenwil to Göttingen in 
October 1921, the beginning of some forty years of teaching theology as a 
dogmatician. 
For our purposes, the main thrust of this period―what I term the Römerbrief 
period―is Barth’s conception of history as being overwhelmed by God.  This 
chapter seeks to demonstrate: 1) that with the outbreak of the First World War Barth 
began to construe human history in increasingly negative terms; 2) that this tendency 
was reinforced in the 1919 Römerbrief; 3) that this tendency culminated in the 1922 
Römerbrief where history was viewed as in total disjunction from God; and 4) that 
whilst the strong sense of priority given to eternity over time was still very much 
dominant during the first years of Barth’s stay in Göttingen, some development may 
still be found. 
2A The Significance of History Diminishing: on the Way to the 
Römerbrief (1914-1918) 
Prior to the emergence of a radically different view of history as revealed in the 
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Römerbrief, there had been occasions and new elements which paved the way for 
that change.  Before the outbreak of the First World War, Barth could still speak of 
history as a place in which ‘there are such particular times of grace where God 
speaks with us and works on us particularly powerfully’.1  Less than two months 
into the war, however, history came to be viewed as ‘merely a changing history of 
victories and defeats’2 where ‘many bloody battlefields [and] countless ravages’ are 
displayed to us,3 despite the fact that God still guides and leads history in His 
supremacy over history.4  From the classes Barth gave to his confirmands from 
1915 to 1919, it is clear that he took human history as where God’s gifts to humanity 
(e.g. technology, morality or conscience, and outstanding heroes) are manifest as 
God’s love.  However, all too often is technology misused, conscience misguided, 
and heroes eventually realise their own weaknesses.  Ultimately, these gifts cannot 
in themselves be the true meaning of history.  In the darkness of history, there is 
hardly any glory to be claimed.5  If there had ever been any slight confidence in 
history in Barth, it was now shattered by the war.  History now demonstrated only 
negativity.  All human endeavour is in vain; only the intervention of God in Jesus 
can serve as the turning point of time by putting an end to the old era.6 
                                                 
1 Karl Barth, sermon, 21 June, 1914, idem, Predigten 1914, ed. by Ursula Fähler and Jochen Fähler 
(Zürich: TVZ, 1999), 334. 
2 Barth, sermon, 6 Sept, 1914, ibid., 467. 
3 Barth, sermon, 13 Sept., 1914, ibid., 471. 
4 Barth, sermon, 29 Nov., 1914, ibid., 599f. 
5  Karl Barth, ‘1915/16’, ‘Unterweisungsjahr 1916/17’, ‘Präparandenunterricht 1917/18’, 
‘Präparandenunterricht 1918/19’, in idem, Konfirmandenunterricht 1909-1921, ed. by Jürgen 
Fangmeier (Zürich: TVZ, 1987), 121ff., 152ff., 225ff., 265ff.  Moreover, McCormack interprets 
Barth’s direct identification of the war with God’s judgement as Barth’s confidence in his own ability 
to ‘read the ways of God directly off the face of history’.  And this, concludes McCormack, is the 
evidence that the old liberal assumption was still in operation at the outset of the war.  McCormack, 
Dialectical Theology, 116f. 
6 In several sermons in 1915 Barth mentioned that ‘in the disastrous course [the old era] has come up 
to the point where it must be destroyed in dismay and dread’.  The end of time, nevertheless, also 
means the turning-point.  And Jesus Christ is that turning-point of times and of history.  See Karl 
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In this seemingly desperate situation, the five-day meeting with Christoph 
Blumhardt in April 1915 came as a light of hope.  Enlightened by Blumhardt’s firm 
conviction of the Christian hope in the coming of God in the last things,7 Barth was 
able to grasp the revolutionary and active essence of waiting.  The notion of waiting 
is seen not only on the side of the human, whereby clearer distinction between the 
Kingdom of God and the socialist ideals can be made, but also on the side of God.  
The Word of God, hidden as it might be, was depicted as waiting powerfully in us 
and in history.8  Hope in the last things seems to have helped restore some hope in 
history, as Jesus is taken as the actuality and power of God which decisively occurred 
in human history,9 and the vibrant advance of God’s will is the only purpose and 
meaning of the world and of history.10 
In addition to the dismay brought about by the war and the new-found hope 
in waiting, the newly emerged categorical principle, ‘God is God’, in contrast to the 
liberal presupposition of ‘God in us’ is crucial.  Barth came to the realisation of the 
centrality of the objectively self-existing God, who was now taken as the new 
                                                                                                                                          
Barth, sermon, 10 Jan. and 24 Jan., 1915, Karl Barth, Predigten 1915, ed. by Hermann Schmidt 
(Zürich: TVZ, 1996), 12, 13, 24.  By setting ‘such emphasis Sunday by Sunday upon the last things’, 
Barth wanted to demonstrate that ‘faith in the Greatest does not exclude but rather includes within it 
work and suffering in the realm of the imperfect.’  Letter dated on 5 Feb. 1915, in Karl Barth, 
Revolutionary Theology in the Making: Barth-Thurneysen Correspondence, 1914-1925, trans. by 
James Smart (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1964), 28. 
7 Karl Barth, ‘Afterword’ (1916), in Christoph Blumhardt, Action in Waiting, New edn (Farmington, 
Pa.: Plough Publishing, 1998), 217-222.  Also Barth, ‘Concluding Unscientific Postscript on 
Schleiermacher’, The Theology of Schleiermacher, 263; Barth, ‘Autobiographical Sketches’, Karl 
Barth-Rudolf Bultmann Letters 1922-1966, 154. 
8 ‘[T]his living Word of God is now waiting in the Bible, waiting in the history of men into which it 
stepped as the most hidden and yet the most immense power, waiting in illuminated men who live 
inconspicuously under the others and yet are actually nothing different than its his witnesses and 
prophets’, Barth, sermon, 25 Apr., 1915, Predigten 1915, 163.  Cf. Barth, sermon, 2 May, 1915, ibid., 
173. 
9 Barth, sermon, 26 Sept., 1915 and sermon, 10 Oct., 1915, ibid., 404, 425. 
10 Barth, sermon, 23 May, 1915, ibid., 210. 
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starting-point [Ansatz] and the true subject matter of theology.11  From this new 
starting-point he attempted to construct a widened, deepened, and wholly-other 
theological foundation.12  The consequent concentration on the Bible led Barth to 
the discovery of a new world of God where ‘history ceases to be … something 
wholly different and new begins―a history with its own distinct grounds, 
possibilities, and hypotheses’.13  With the dominant principle ‘God is God’, history 
is allowed to serve only as the locus where human possibilities (religion, morality 
etc.), rather than the divine reality, take place.14 
2B This World Connected to That World: Römerbrief (1919) 
All of this appears in Barth’s first edition of Römerbrief, the fruit of two years of 
painstaking writing completed in August 1918. 15   Although unfortunately 
marginalised in the English-speaking world due to the lack of an English translation, 
this commentary bears significance in its own right.16 
With its central motif, ‘the revolution of God’, and saturated with organic 
                                                 
11 Barth to Thurneysen, 6. August 1915, Karl Barth―Eduard Thurneysen Briefwechsel Band I 
1913-1921, 69.  According to McCormack’s citing of Ingrid Spieckermann, ‘this letter to 
Thurneysen [is] the first clear signal of the emergence of Barth's new theology’.  McCormack, 
Dialectical Theology, 125n118. 
12 Barth, ‘Concluding Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher’, The Theology of Schleiermacher, 
264; Barth, ‘Autobiographical Sketches’, Karl Barth-Rudolf Bultmann Letters 1922-1966, 154f.; 
Barth to Thurneysen, 26 June 1916, Revolutionary Theology in the Making, 37; Busch, The Great 
Passion, 97ff. 
13 Barth, ‘The Strange New World within the Bible’ (1916), The Word of God and the Word of Man, 
28-50 (37). 
14 As Colin Gunton puts it, the acute sense of judgement brought about by the War leads Barth to the 
pessimistic conviction that ‘history wasn’t just going on calmly towards better and better 
civilization―history was the place of this chaos’, Colin E. Gunton, The Barth Lectures, ed. by Paul H. 
Brazier (London: T&T Clark, 2007), 24. 
15 This first edition was completed on 16 August, 1918 when Barth wrote in his diary ‘Romans 
finished’.  Having already been printed in December, the book has 1919 as the date of publication.  
Busch, Karl Barth, 105f. 
16 Cf. Paul Brazier, ‘Barth’s First Commentary on Romans (1919): an Exercise in Apophatic 
Theology?’, International Journal of Systematic Theology, 6 (2004), 387-403. 
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notions such as origin, growth, immediacy and continuity,17 the 1919 Römerbrief 
contributes to our study of Barth’s concept of history in two ways.  First, a 
prominent dialectic in this commentary is that of ‘this world’ [Diesseits] and ‘that 
world’ [Jenseits], with which Barth seeks to build the relationship between the world 
and God whilst upholding the utter difference between them.  A special form of the 
dialectic is that of the ‘so-called history’ [sogenannte Geschichte] and the ‘real 
history’ [eigentliche Geschichte].  Barth’s accounts of these two kinds of history 
will be examined in section 2B.1.  Section 2B.2 will explore the standard which 
Barth employs to distinguish the misuse and the proper use of history. 
2B.1 The ‘So-Called History’ and the ‘Real History’ 
What is characteristic of Barth’s concept of history in the 1919 Römerbrief is the 
discrimination between the distinctive but not mutually exclusive ‘so-called history’ 
and ‘real history’.  These terms appear first in a paragraph in chapter two where 
Barth discloses that human attempts at self-establishment in the ‘so-called history’ 
can only be futile, because humanity is ignorant of the progress of the hidden ‘real 
history’ of God.18  In chapter three the distinction between the two histories is fully 
expounded when he establishes the righteousness of God by upholding God’s 
faithfulness over against human merits, and the divine revelation over against human 
history.  He views the ‘so-called history’ as the up-to-now ‘history’19 which is 
                                                 
17 Eberhard Jüngel, ‘Barth’s Theological Beginnings’, idem, Karl Barth: a Theological Legacy, trans. 
by Garrett E. Paul (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986), 53-104 (96-101).  For the general 
characteristics of the 1919 Römerbrief, also see von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, 64-68; 
McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 135ff.; Gorringe, Karl Barth, 37-48. 
18 R1, 46: ‘And because the progress of the real history makes no alarm to them, they feel all the 
more certain in their religious-moral exceptional status inside the so-called history.  They forget how 
relative this status is.’ 
19 Barth’s use of the quotation mark with this ‘history’ indicates that the ‘so-called history’ is a 
specifically defined concept which is termed as history merely in human terms.  Likewise, when he 
speaks of ‘reality’, he means in fact the unreal reality which is ‘real’ only to the human but not to God. 
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constituted primarily by human morality and religiosity, i.e. the various ups and 
downs of human righteousness.  In addition to the ‘so-called history’ there is the 
‘real history’, which is opened in Christ by God according to His faithfulness as the 
absolutely new history. 
2B.1.1 Paradox: Termination and Transformation of the ‘So-Called History’ 
The two histories, although distinctive, are still construed by Barth as connected in a 
paradoxical relation.  This can be explained in four aspects.  First, in God’s 
original creation ‘history had to be a single great movement of good will in the plan 
of God’.20  No antithesis was supposed to have existed in this one history.  Second, 
the distinction between the two histories is the tragic result of the Fall.  After the 
flesh took control of humanity, the ‘so-called history’ was separated from God’s 
original plan.  As a result, ‘the real history does not take place’,21 and the so-called 
history is merely able to ‘eternally remain a history of rudiments and possibilities’ as 
‘a “reality” which is shut from the truth’.22  Third, separated from the divine truth of 
God, the ‘so-called history’ attempts to establish the ‘righteousness’ of humanity but 
only in vain.  As no human ‘righteousness’ in history can stand before the 
faithfulness of God, the ‘so-called history’ has to be rendered old, and abolished by 
the new ‘real history’.  Fourth, the ‘real history’ is to terminate and transform the 
‘so-called history’, but not as a second phase following the first one in a temporal 
succession, but as something completely new.  For if the ‘so-called history’ were 
able to make way for the ‘real history’, the possibility of human ‘righteousness’ 
would survive, continuing to have something to boast of, and the ‘real history’ would 
                                                 
20 R1, 80. 
21 Ibid., 88. 
22 Ibid., 81. 
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become a mere continuation of the ‘so-called’ history, and therefore would not be 
absolutely new.23 
It is essential to note that, although the old ‘so-called history’ has to be 
terminated, it is not to be done by way of a total rejection of the old by the new.  A 
total nullification of the ‘so-called history’ would mean for Barth the rendering of 
God’s faithfulness groundless.  Barth compares the relationship between the two 
histories with that between the Law and the righteousness of God.  Like the Law, 
the ‘so-called history’ is inadequate and insufficient, because it is ‘always a 
postulation and a promise [but] never a statement and a creation of a life from and 
with God’.24  But also like the Law, it is inevitable in that it may create a fruitful 
situation which exposes the old world and prepares for the new world.  In other 
words, the ‘so-called history’ confronts human beings with a choice: 
Either the up-to-now historical and spiritual connection of the world 
grounded in nature [i.e. the flesh] and therefore the judgement of God, 
or the end of the up-to-now world history and history of the spirit and 
the constitution of a new world through an alteration of the 
metaphysical presupposition and therefore salvation.25 
In a word, the ‘so-called history’ is insufficient, so it needs to be terminated; 
it is also inevitable, so it cannot be terminated in a straightforward manner.  This is 
what Barth terms the ‘whole paradox of the relationship of God to the so-called 
history’.26  This paradox consists in the fact that God’s ultimate goal is not the 
destruction of the old but the renewal of it, not the abolition of the human pole of the 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 66f. 
24 Ibid., 78. 
25 Ibid., 83. 
26 Ibid., 80. 
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gulf but the restoration of unity.  In order to perceive this paradox and to realise the 
possibility of termination by transformation, a new standpoint is needed. 
2B.1.2 New Standpoint: Revelation as the Beginning of the ‘Real History’ 
The new standpoint which terminates and transforms the ‘so-called history’ emerges 
as the event of God’s revelation, according to Barth.  In that it terminates and 
transforms the old aeon, it is also the beginning of the new, of the ‘real history’. 
Several dimensions are worth noting concerning the event of revelation as the 
turn from old to new.  First, it is a change that took place not in ‘this world’ 
[Diesseits] but in ‘that world’ [Jenseits].  It took place on the other side of the 
human world, as ‘an inner movement in God’ which is not historically accessible.27 
Second, this event did not stay in heaven but rather entered the earthly realm, 
proceeding in history.  Barth emphasises that revelation took place ‘at one point in 
history [an einem Punkt der Geschichte]’,28 that is, in the old, ‘so-called history’, 
thus initiating the ‘real history’.  Moreover, as a consequence, the ‘real history’ 
proceeds in the ‘so-called history’, so that ‘[i]n the stream of the so-called history, 
the new counter-element of the real history becomes visible.’29  Also: 
the disclosure of the mystery must take its process in time, until the 
decision has come onto the whole line and has come to be shown 
inside all the depths of the world-connection.30 
This obligation reveals Barth’s conviction that the ‘real history’ cannot take place, so 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 161; cf. 117f. 
28 Ibid., 85, see also 87, 91, 106.  See footnote 91 in Chapter One for the occurrences and 
significance of the conception of revelation as a point in history or a moment of history. 
29 R1, 85.  McCormack rightly notes that for the Barth of R1 ‘the new world is not a second 
world … [it] is this world, but this world made new’, McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 143. 
30 Ibid., 88. 
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to speak, unless it does not simply happen in the same historical course with the 
‘so-called history’, but is also applied on the full width of it, rooted in the maximum 
depth of it.  It is in this sense that the ‘so-called history’ is terminated by being 
transformed. 
Third, the event of revelation begins the ‘real history’ and unfolds it not 
simply as the termination but also as the fulfilment of the ‘so-called history’.  It 
fulfils or restores the true meaning of the ‘so-called history’ in the sense 
that the most profound content of the Old rediscovers itself in the New, 
i.e. comes just to its full outcome and unfolding in the New; that the 
red thread of the up-to-now world history does not break off, but in 
contrast reaches its goal; that in the real history, not somewhat merely 
the non-sense of the so-called history but its most profound sense 
comes objectively and positively to the breakthrough and clarity.31 
Therefore, the ‘so-called history’ is ‘terminated’ in such a way that its content is 
found and its purpose fulfilled.  Barth insists that 
the possibility of revelation, on which the human righteousness is 
based, has become the reality of revelation in Christ and in faith 
through the righteousness of God.  It must be manifest that the 
so-called history is the necessary gateway to the real history.32 
Barth calls this event a ‘sublimation and reset’ [Aufheben und Neusetzen]33 because 
the negative quality of the up-to-now history is not only made known and superseded, 
but also overcome and lifted.  For Barth, God’s faithfulness is thus established in 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 67. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 85.  The multiple meanings of the term Aufhebung cannot be fully conveyed in one single 
English word, because it can denote 1) abolition, removal, 2) preservation, and 3) lifting up or 
sublimation.  Here according to its context, we translate the phrase as ‘sublimation and reset’.  For 
more detail see Garrett Green, ‘Translator’s Preface’ and ‘Introduction’ in Karl Barth, On Religion: 
The Revelation of God As the Sublimation of Religion, trans. by Garrett Green (London: T&T Clark, 
2006), viii-ix, 5f. 
58 
 
the intrusion of this event which terminates the old by renewing it.34 
Finally, the event of revelation is infused with the notion of an ‘eternal Now’.  
Barth maintains that, as revelation takes place at one point in history and keeps 
proceeding in it, ‘the beginning and the end have become present from past and 
future, and so time disappears in the eternal Now.’35  Of course, this ‘disappearance’ 
of time is to be understood as the end of the old human time as well as the beginning 
of a new divine time, because the emergence of the eternal Now is the fulfilment of 
time.  This claim is made on the basis that the end of the ‘so-called history’ and the 
beginning of the ‘real history’ is brought about by Jesus Christ: 
He is the point in time in which the time is fulfilled, [and] the 
historical appearance in which history is completed. … He is the 
beginning and the end; he has become the present.36 
Although Jesus Christ ‘stands apparently as “accidental truth of history” outside 
us’,37 yet ‘the transformation places in us something in which the “eternal truth of 
reason” comes to be shown to all.’38  The combination of Christ and faith is this 
eternal Now.39 
In summary, what is characteristic of the dialectic of the ‘so-called history’ 
and the ‘real history’ is the striking continuity in what can be depicted as an organic 
relationship between the two distinct realities, a notion supported by a joyfully 
triumphant optimism about the final victory of God.  Barth refuses to construe the 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 86. 
35 Ibid., 86f. 
36 Ibid., 91. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 92. 
39 This brings to mind Barth’s formulation in ‘Christian Faith and History’ (Vorträge und kleinere 




two histories as ‘stepping … one after the other, with the second being the removal 
and the cancellation of the first.  Rather, they are in each other, with the second 
being the fulfilment of the first’.40  To the extent that the ‘so-called history’ is the 
‘necessary gateway’41 to the ‘real history’ and ‘stands in the area of the effect of God 
in the present-time’,42 it can be claimed that in Christ ‘the meaning of history is 
actually recognised not as nonsense but as sense’.43  Ultimately, the taking over of 
humanity by the flesh is overcome by God’s triumphant reclaiming of it: 
God’s kingdom does not allow the ‘reality’ to stand, nor does it 
abandon it.  Rather, God’s kingdom grows in the ‘reality’ as its own 
and proper meaning, till the former has absorbed the latter completely 
in itself, till God is all in all.44 
2B.2 Misuse and Proper Use of History 
In chapter four of the 1919 Römerbrief Barth deals with history as a whole in its 
relation to God.  He first refutes three philosophical thoughts which employ the 
notion of history to oppose God.  He further posits that the only proper use of 
history is to bear witness to the single theme of history, i.e. the absolute triumph of 
God in history.  It is only by pointing to that theme that history acquires its true 
meaning: ‘[t]he meaning of history is God’s meaning.’45 
2B.2.1 Rebuttal to Misuse of History 
The first thought which Barth perceives as a misuse of history that threatens the sole 
                                                 
40 R1, 105; see also 100.  McCormack identifies this as ‘the Ineinander relation of eschatology and 
history’, McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 145f. 
41 R1, 67. 
42 Ibid., 100. 
43 Ibid., 84. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 106, also 70. 
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importance of God is individualism.46  On his account individualism, together with 
idealism, envisages God in the name of humanity, aiming to secure its own 
advantage in the alleged climaxes in history.  Behind human viewing of history 
[Geschichte] and writing of history [Historie],47 then, is individualism’s ultimate 
motivation of ‘the legitimation of individual self-consciousness against God’.48  In 
opposition to individualism’s pretentious use of history, Barth proposes realism and 
universalism: the realism of curse and salvation, and the universalism of judgement 
and grace.49  According to him, the history recorded in the Bible is not about the 
advance of heroes or the development of their personality, but about ‘the opening of 
a new history-connection’50 and the ‘participation of a new human history in God’.51 
Second, just as the historical heroes in the Bible cannot undermine the sole 
importance of God, so ecclesiasticism, i.e. all religions and even church in history, is 
not allowed to limit the sole importance of faith. 52  The ‘divine realism and 
universalism’ advanced by Barth renders problematic not only ‘the culture of 
personality and spiritual Christianity’ [die Persönlichkeitskultur und das 
Seelenchristentum, i.e. individualism and idealism],53 but also religion and church as 
a whole.  Religion and church belong to the world which is historically given and 
available, whereas, Barth contends, Abraham ‘stood on the other side of religion and 
church’, and therefore ‘God’s revelation to him did not coincide with his religiosity 
                                                 
46 Romans 4:1-8 ‘Gott und der Heros’, ibid., 106ff. 
47 Ibid., 108. 
48 Ibid., 109. 
49 Ibid., 108. 
50 Ibid., 110 
51 Ibid., 109.  And Barth refers to Abraham as an illustration, ibid., 111-115. 
52 Romans 4:9-12 ‘Der Glaube und die Religion’, ibid., 117ff. 
53 Ibid., 117. 
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and churchliness’.54  He still gives due credit to religion and church, as ‘[r]eligion is 
the necessary spiritual reaction to the creative deed of God, and the church is an 
inevitable historical [geschichtlich] formation, transmission line and canonisation of 
the breaking-open divine wellspring.’55  But in the long run, they are 
consequences of a cause, signals of an object, forms of a content … 
God’s decisive deeds precede them, and God’s actual intentions go 
out far over them.  They are means [Mittel].  That is what they are, 
but no more than that, and woe when this is forgotten.56 
Third, having refuted individualism and ecclesiasticism by denying any 
individual or collective advantage in history that they claim to have, Barth directs his 
criticism at ‘idealistic moralism’57 which considers Jesus as the highest blossom of 
humanity brought about in history by God.58  In opposition, Barth argues that God’s 
promise does not involve moral goodness developed in this ‘real’ world on our side, 
but rather concerns the Real itself which lies beyond.  What is found at the highest 
point of human historical development is merely the knowledge of the universal 
condemnation by God.59  The main thrust concerning the dominance of realism 
over idealism is perfectly illustrated firstly by the essence of God’s promise: 
The content of the Messianic promise … is not the ideal goal of the 
previous up-to-now history, but the real beginning of a new history, 
[i.e.] the sublation of the Given towards which the morality orients, 
[and the] ground-laying [of history] in the righteousness [of God].60 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 118. 
55 Ibid., 120. 
56 Ibid., 121. 
57 Romans 4:13-22 ‘Die Gerechtigkeit und die Moral’, ibid., 125ff. 
58 Ibid., 128. 
59 Ibid., 129. 
60 Ibid., 134, also 135. 
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and secondly by Abraham’s faith: 
[Abraham’s] faith is not the knowledge of the morality, but the 
grounded-ness in righteousness; his promise is not ideal and therefore 
practical, but real and therefore universal; his offspring is not humanly 
qualified, but spans the whole humanity by virtue of God’s 
faithfulness.61 
To be sure, individuality, religion and morality are all powers which are 
effective in history.  But Barth views Abraham as a sharp contrast to them: ‘alone, 
childless, and isolated without historical effect’, Abraham must be confronted with 
God’s miracle.  His faith is the acknowledgement of the impossibility of God’s 
creative act, something that is not a given in history as such.62 
2B.2.2 Triumph of God as the Meaning of History 
It is important to appreciate that Barth’s criticism of these three thoughts is levelled 
at the misuse of history rather than at history as such.  Once again, by way of 
illustration, the biblical history of Abraham shows us that, although the miracle of 
God does not emerge from history, it nevertheless takes place in history. 63   
Moreover, the new world, nature and humanity, in Barth’s view, not only happen in 
history, but also grow despite history.  His conviction is that ‘[u]nder the firm shell 
of historical-spiritual reality’64 the kingdom of God still prevails.  It is precisely 
because the old ‘so-called history’ has been completely overcome by God that He 
can, without nullifying the ‘so-called history’, have the new ‘real history’ take place 
and increase in it.  The past in the Bible, the present in Christ, and our own future 
                                                 
61 Ibid., 135. 
62 Ibid., 136. 
63 Ibid., 137. 
64 Ibid., 142. 
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are united in the ‘real history’, because the truth of God runs through the whole of 
the historical course, constituting the history of God.65 
On the basis of this absolute triumph of God, Barth is able to speak of the 
unified meaning of history.66  The multiple aspects of history do not make sense in 
themselves.67  Nevertheless, this manifoldness in history is the manifoldness of the 
One: ‘God is God and the meaning of history is His meaning.’68  When history is 
allowed to ‘speak of the one single theme of the coming kingdom of God’,69 the 
meaning of history as God’s meaning will eventually prevail ‘at every point of 
history’70 and ‘throughout all periods of history’.71  This one theme of God and 
therefore of history comes from a convergent point―the risen Christ: 
For it is in Christ that the meaning of times, which is hidden in the 
vertical incision of the past history and of the future history 
[Geschichte], becomes manifest.  It [i.e. meaning] is available; it also 
can be discovered.72 
To conclude, it is important to notice that, compared to his work in the early 
1910s in which history was viewed as one homogeneous whole, Barth’s concept of 
history in the 1919 Römerbrief is characterised by a clear distinction made within the 
concept.  The ‘so-called history’ is construed negatively as an obstacle to the true 
                                                 
65 Ibid., 107. 
66 Romans 4:23-25 ‘Historie’, ibid., 142ff. 
67 ‘By the sheer “interest” in the once has-been, history [Geschichte] becomes a confused chaos of 
meaningless relations and incidents, and historical investigation [Historie], despite all its skills of 
combination, becomes a triumphant development and depiction of this chaos, by which what was real 
remains securely hidden’, ibid., 143. 
68 Ibid., 71. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 142. 
71 Ibid., 73. 
72 Ibid., 144. 
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knowledge of God, but also positively as the foreground and ‘necessary gateway’ 
which prepares for and is fulfilled by the ‘real history’.  The climax in history is 
now defined strictly as the resurrection of Jesus.  This divine revelation still takes 
place ‘at one point in history’, as was conceived in the previous period,73 but does so 
by entering time as a vertical incision from above.  Firmly rooted in history, its 
effect comes to grow organically in the full width and depth of history, rolling like a 
wheel throughout history, in the triumphantly regained reconciliation of God and 
humanity. 
2C This World Overwhelmed by That World: Römerbrief 
(1922) 
In October 1920, it appeared to Barth that ‘suddenly the Letter to the Romans began 
to shed its skin; that is, I received the enlightenment that […] it is simply impossible 
that it should be reprinted; rather it must be reformed root and branch’.  Unwilling 
to allow the first edition, which he had then come to view as ‘overloaded and 
bloated’, as ‘[continuing] to give rise to misunderstandings and errors’, he rewrote 
the whole book within a year, to reach the conviction that he was ‘a bit closer to the 
truth of the matter than before’.74  Completed in 1921,75 the 1922 Römerbrief 
contains, among other things, probably Barth’s most ferocious criticism of history. 
A comparison between the two editions regarding their respective headings 
and subheadings given to chapters three and four of the commentary, where history is 
the topic, provides a contour of their differences. 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 168.  See footnote 28 in this chapter and footnote 91 in Chapter One. 
74 Barth, Revolutionary Theology in the Making, 53ff. 
75 The revised Römerbrief was completed in September 1921 and printed in December.  The 
publication date was 1922.  Busch, Karl Barth, 120; John D. Godsey, ‘Barth’s Life Until 1928’, in 
Karl Barth, How I Changed My Mind (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1966), 26. 
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R1 (1919) R2 (1922) 
Chapter 3 The Righteousness of God Chapter 3 God’s Righteousness 
3:1-20 Faithfulness 3:1-20 The Law 
3:21-26 Revelation 3:21-26 Jesus 
3:27-31 Finished Question 3:27-30 Through Faith Alone 
Chapter 4 The Voice of the Bible Chapter 4 The Voice of History 
4:1-8 God and Heroes 3:31-4:8 Faith is Miracle 
4:9-12 Faith and Religion 4:9-12 Faith is Beginning 
4:13-22 Righteousness and Morality 4:13-17a Faith is Creation 
4:23-25 Historie 4:17b-25 The Value of Historie 
Regarding chapter three, ‘faithfulness’ (in R1) is highlighted to mean God’s 
preservation of his own plan despite human disruption, whilst ‘the Law’ (in R2) 
indicates the futility of human effort to know God and to establish its own 
righteousness.  Also, in the section of ‘Finished Question’ in R1, we see a faithful 
God who does not abandon ‘reality’ but transforms it, whilst in the parallel section 
‘Through Faith Alone’ in R2 Barth emphatically demands a viewing of the 
meaninglessness of history, and of a wholly other history from the standpoint of God.  
In regard to chapter four, the targets of criticism in R1 (individualism, ecclesiasticism 
and moralism) are products of human misuse of history, whilst R2 depicts the unique 
importance of faith as miracle, beginning and creation―in other words, as what 
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history is not. 
Although von Balthasar suggests that between the two editions of Römerbrief 
there lies a common theme,76 most Barth scholars agree with Jüngel’s observation 
that ‘[w]hile the first edition of Barth’s commentary on Romans is characterized by 
the language of immediacy taken from the philosophy of origins, the second edition 
is distinguished by an abrupt distinction between God and humanity, between 
eternity and time.’77  And this distinction between continuity and discontinuity, as 
McCormack rightly points out, results from Barth’s shift from a ‘process eschatology’ 
to a ‘consistent eschatology’.78  The result is that the future dimension of the 
Kingdom of God almost completely devours its present dimension.  The tension 
between ‘already’ and ‘not yet’ in the 1919 edition now gives way to an 
eschatological conception of God’s Kingdom as a crisis, as His ‘No’ to and final 
judgement upon this world. 
Where Barth’s concept of history is concerned, the second edition differs 
from the first in that there is no longer the distinction between the ‘so-called history’ 
and the ‘real history’.  Now history in its entirety is associated with the negativity 
which was previously ascribed to the ‘so-called history’.  The ‘real history’ 
withdraws, as we shall see, backward and onward, with its positive role transferred to 
the notions of Urgeschichte and Endgeschichte.  In doing so, Barth replaces the 
previous optimism about God’s victory throughout history by an almost ruthless 
                                                 
76 He argues that a ‘dynamic eschatology’ saturates both editions, presented as pianissimo in the first 
but as crescendo in the second.  Von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, 64. 
77 Jüngel, ‘Barth’s Theological Beginnings’, Karl Barth, 101. 
78 McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 207ff.; Gorringe, Karl Barth, 58-69.  Cf. von Balthasar, The 
Theology of Karl Barth, 68-72; G. C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl 
Barth, trans. by Harry R. Boer, American edn (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1956), 
26ff.; Jüngel, ‘Barth’s Theological Beginnings’, Karl Barth, 101-104. 
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abolition of history by God’s furious judgement.79  Behind this drastic accusation of 
history lies his uncompromising insistence on the absolute otherness of God from 
this world, and thus the domination of eternity over time. 
This section explores three topics: 1) the problem of the historicity of the 
resurrection; 2) the lack of value of history as a reality in itself; 3) the true value of 
history as a witness pointing beyond itself to the true theme of all history. 
2C.1 The Impossible Possibility of the Resurrection in History 
Whilst the resurrection presented in the 1919 Römerbrief is the powerful 
manifestation of God80 which fulfils the ‘so-called history’ by setting forth the ‘real 
history’,81 it appears in the 1922 edition as the revelation of the divine judgement to 
human history as a whole. 
The 1922 Römerbrief gives a strong impression that Barth denies the 
historicity of the resurrection.  This is partly due to a common ‘failure to enter 
sympathetically into Barth’s convoluted thought [which] can take these words to 
mean what they say upon the surface’,82 as Mackintosh notices.  Partly, it has to do 
with the difference between the German original and its English translation.  On the 
one hand, the English translation does not distinguish Geschichte from Historie, 
rendering ‘unhistorisch’ into ‘non-historical’ without explanation, thus giving rise to 
much unnecessary confusion.  On the other hand, its rather free style of 
‘explanatory’ rendering, too, sometimes creates misimpressions which could have 
                                                 
79 ‘Now that the non-sense of history demonstrates its hidden meaning, is it not necessary that this 
meaning itself is nonsense?’  Also, ‘[t]he non-sense of history is non-sense, despite the meaning 
which comes from God into it’, R2, 56, 58; R2E, 82, 84.  Unless otherwise indicated, all translations 
are my own.  Page references to the English translation are included. 
80 R2, 65, 76. 
81 Ibid., 80, 82. 
82 Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, 306f. 
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been avoided.  Two examples suffice.  The first one comes from the opening 
passages: 
The Resurrection is therefore an occurrence in history, which took 
place outside the gates of Jerusalem in the year A.D. 30, inasmuch as 
it there ‘came to pass’, was discovered and recognized.  But 
inasmuch as the occurrence was conditioned by the Resurrection, in so 
far, that is, as it was not the ‘coming to pass’, or the discovery, or the 
recognition, which conditioned its necessity and appearance and 
revelation, the Resurrection is not an event in history at all.83 
And now my revised translation: 
The resurrection is the event before the gates of Jerusalem in the year 
A.D. 30 insofar as it ‘occurred’ there and was discovered and 
recognised there.  Then again, it is also not that event at all, as long 
as its necessity, appearance and manifestation is not conditioned by 
that occurring, discovering and recognising; rather, the resurrection 
conditions itself.84 
What Barth registers here is something that we might call a dual nature concerning 
the relation of resurrection to history, with his famous illustration of the resurrection 
as a tangent touching the circle, as a mathematical point.  On the one hand, in the 
sense that ‘the point on the line of intersection’ breaks open the boundary between 
the world known to us and an unknown world,85 the resurrection did take place there 
and then as an event.  On the other hand, in the sense that this tangent simply 
touches the circle without really entering it or taking up any space in it, the 
resurrection cannot be taken to mean the event taking place there and then as such, 
                                                 
83 R2E, 30. 
84 R2, 6: ‘So ist die Auferstehung das Ereignis vor den Toren Jerusalems im Jahre 30, sofern sie dort 
«eintrat», entdeckt und erkannt wurde.  Und sie ist es auch wieder gar nicht, sofern ihre 
Notwendigkeit, Erscheinung und Offenbarung nicht durch jenes Eintreten, Entdecken und Erkennen 
bedingt, sodern selbst ihr Bedingendes ist.’ 
85 R2, 5; R2E, 29. 
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because the resurrection itself is not conditioned by human discovery and recognition 
of that event.  This dual nature determines the basic tone of Barth’s conception of 
history throughout the whole commentary, and should not be simply dismissed, as 
the English mistranslation does, by claiming that ‘the Resurrection is not an event in 
history at all’. 
More straightforward is where Barth claims: 
We have already seen that the raising of Jesus from the dead is not an 
event in history elongated so as still to remain an event in the midst of 
other events.  The Resurrection is the non-historical (iv. 17b) relating 
of the whole historical life of Jesus to its origin in God.  It follows 
therefore that the pressure of the power of the Resurrection into my 
existence, which of necessity involves a real walking in newness of 
life, cannot be an event among other events in my present, past, or 
future life.86 
And my revised translation: 
For it is clear that the raising of Jesus from the dead is not an event of 
historical extension [historischer Ausdehnung] alongside the other 
events of his life and death, but the ‘non-historical’ (4:17b) relation 
[unhistorische Beziehung] of his whole historical life [historischen 
Lebens] to His origin in God.  Then again it is also clear that my 
‘walking in the new life’, which presses itself into my existence as 
necessity and reality in the power of the resurrection, is not and will 
not be some event among other events in my past, in my present, nor 
in my future.87 
                                                 
86 R2E, 195. 
87 R2, 175: ‘Denn so klar es ist, daß die Erweckung Jesu von den Toten kein Ereignis von historischer 
Ausdehnung neben den andern Ereignissen seines Lebens und Sterbens ist, sondern die 
«unhistorische» (4,17b usw.) Beziehung seines ganzen historischen Lebens auf seinen Ursprung in 
Gott, so klar ist es andrerseits, daß auch mein in der Kraft der Auferstehung als Notwendigkeit und 
Wirklichkeit in mein Dasein sich hereindrängendes «Wandeln in Lebensneuheit» weder in meiner 
Vergangenheit, noch in meiner Gegenwart, noch in meiner Zukunft etwa Ereignis neben andern 
Ereignissen ist und wird.’ 
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It is clear, then, that Barth neither says nor means, as the English translation 
explicitly states, that the resurrection is not an event in history.  Rather, the 
designation of the resurrection as ‘non-historical’ [unhistorisch] is intended to deal 
primarily with the issue of historical continuity.  Since the resurrection is for Barth 
an event of absolute uniqueness, despite its actual occurrence in history, it must be so 
delimited that two misconceptions be avoided.  First, the resurrection is not an event 
among other events which can be ascertained by historical method; moreover, it is so 
unique that it cannot be viewed as an event which is an extension of Jesus’ own life 
and death (as can be accessed by historical method).88  In Barth’s view, it is not a 
continuation but the initiation and the conclusion, not a Mittel but the beginning, the 
end, and the purpose.89  Barth insists that the resurrection, occurring not within the 
stretch of historical events but at their boundary, be understood strictly as 
Urgeschichte and Endgeschichte enclosing and conditioning all history.  Second, 
the resurrection is of such peculiarity that not even ‘the “historical” [historischen] 
fact of the history of resurrection (e.g. the empty tomb … [sic])’ can claim immediate 
continuity with the resurrection itself.90  Without such strict delimitation, Barth 
believes, the absolutely uniqueness of the resurrection would be obscured in the haze 
of any possibility, probability, or even certainty or necessity of history.91 
                                                 
88 That is why, as McCormack observes, ‘Jesus of Nazareth, standing on the plane of history, is not 
even the medium of revelation.  As a historical figure, Jesus is the veil of revelation’.  McCormack, 
Dialectical Theology, 250. 
89 As McCormack puts it, the resurrection for Barth in Romans II is ‘an event without before or 
after—which is to say, lacking any prior conditions which might be said to have produced the event 
and lacking as well any ongoing effects which might be said to be a continuing presence of that which 
produced the event’.  The revelation is ‘non-historical’, because it is not brought about by historical 
causation.  Ibid., 253. 
90 R2, 184; R2E, 204. 
91 Mackintosh, too, observes a ‘doubleness’ in this connection, but he applies it to ‘the word “history”’ 
(Types of Modern Theology, 292).  The preceding discussion, by contrast, demonstrates that the 
‘doubleness’ is not so much with the word ‘history’ as with the relationship of the resurrection to it, 
for with Barth, Geschichte and Historie are two different categories. 
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This dual nature of the relationship between the resurrection and history, as 
delimited above, gives a strong sense of separation.  But it is crucial to note that this 
sense of separation does not deny the historicity of the resurrection.  To be sure, 
viewed from the side of humanity and time the resurrection is impossible, in that it 
differs from any other historical happenings, and is not determined by the causal 
chain in history.  But viewed from the side of God and eternity, in order that the 
eternal God might be known by human beings in time, the resurrection did occur in 
and not outside of history,92 and is real, and therefore possible. 
For one thing, as this ‘impossible possibility’, the resurrection does take place 
in history so that Jesus can be and is ‘the bodily, corporally, personally risen one’.93  
For another, by virtue of the grace of God, it is possible for the unhistorical to 
become historical: 
The resurrection of Christ from the dead … is the revelation and 
intuition of the unintuitable grace of God (historically at the boundary 
of the Non-historical, and non-historically at the boundary of the 
historical [historisch am Rande des Unhistorischen und unhistorisch 
am Rande des Historischen]). … The possibility … that God’s will 
can happen on earth to humanity and through humanity, [and] also the 
possibility that a sanctified human life becomes historical 
[geschichtlich] and intuitable as such, that the infinite contains the 
finite―this possibility … must be affirmed from the viewpoint of 
grace as the ultimately single possibility … This possibility is the 
possibility of the impossible.  This happening is the Unhistorical 
becoming Historical [das Geschichtlichwerden des 
Ungeschichtlichen].  This revelation is the revelation of the eternal 
mystery, and this intuition is the intuition of the Unintuitable.94 
                                                 
92 Cf. R2, 22; R2E, 47: ‘The line of intersection between time and eternity, between the present and 
the future world … actually runs through the entire history’, and discloses what is invisible. 
93 R2, 204; R2E, 222. 
94 R2, 204f.; R2E, 222f. 
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In summary, in the 1922 Römerbrief the resurrection of Jesus is an 
impossibility made possible by God.  Its dual nature consists in the fact that, in that 
it did take place in history, it is historical [geschichtlich]; in that it is not caused by 
other historical happenings, it is unhistorical [unhistorisch]. 
2C.2 History Deprived of Reality-Value 
The resurrection has an important effect on human history.  In Barth’s view, the fact 
that it did take place as the impossible made possible, as the unhistorical turned 
historical, entails that all historical things as such be put to death.95  Under the sway 
of the ‘infinite qualitative distinction between eternity and time’, historical things 
come to be viewed as lacking originality and authenticity.96  With absolute priority 
given to eternity understood as the beginning and end, what is historical and in 
between can only be seen as unreal and valueless. 
For Barth, the fact that everything historical is worthless leads to the corollary 
that no particular period of history enjoys a higher status than the rest.  In terms of 
God’s condemnation of those who judge others whilst doing the same thing (Rom. 
2:1), Barth declares that ‘[w]hat is said about men in general is also said about the 
men of God.’  ‘Men of God’, insofar as they remain human belonging to history, are 
not to be considered any higher than their fellow human beings.  Following is what 
appears to be Barth’s ferocious denunciation of history in its entirety: 
There is not a particular divine history as particle or as quantity in the 
general history.  The entire history of religion and of church takes 
place completely in the world.  But the so-called ‘history of salvation’ 
                                                 
95 R2, 185; R2E, 205. 
96 Based on the Kierkegaardian infinite qualitative distinction between eternity and time, ‘… time is a 
nought when measured against eternity, and all things are semblance when measured against their 
origin and end’, R2, 18; R2E, 43. 
73 
 
is only the continuous crisis of all history, not a history in or among 
history.  There are no saints among sinners.97 
Faced with the crisis brought about by the ‘history of salvation’, the entire human 
history is deprived of any divine or salvific quality. 
Again, this rather harsh assertion is illustrated with the biblical history of 
Abraham.98  The argument is that the justification of Abraham arises not as a result 
of his achievement in the concrete, visible historical reality, but rather from his 
‘pre-historical’ [prähistorisch] life.99  For Barth, only when this ‘prehistoricity’ of 
Abraham’s life is upheld can the principle ‘through faith alone’ be maintained.100  
This principle is then expounded in three aspects.  First, Abraham’s justification 
does not consist in his works in history.101  Whatever work that one completes ‘in 
his life and in history’, insofar as it is presented in ‘the forum of world history’, 
cannot receive any credit before God, but can only be put under God’s judgement.102 
Second, Abraham’s justification does not consist in his religion in history.  
Just as his justification precedes his circumcision, so faith with its ‘pure 
other-world-ness’ cannot be assimilated into a mere ‘section in the course of life 
history, religious history, church history or salvation history’. 103   Abraham is 
                                                 
97 R2, 32; R2E, 57. 
98 It might seem questionable when Barth states that Abraham did not live ‘on the same historical 
[historisch] and psychological plane’ as us.  Here Barth has in mind the problem of Lessing’s ditch, 
in which two key dimensions are involved: the problem of historical distance (how can ‘merely 
figures of past history’ like Abraham ‘run consistently and markedly through history’ like a ‘crimson 
thread’ to mean anything to contemporary people today), and the problem of the possibility of a 
metaphysical leap (how can ‘relative and incidental and particular’ facts about the past, instead of 
remaining ‘ambiguous and relative’, become the necessary truth which is not merely ‘a time among 
other times, a history [Geschichte] among other histories, and a religion among other religions’).  R2, 
92f.; R2E, 117f. 
99 R2, 93; R2E, 118. 
100 Romans 3:27-30 ‘Allein durch den Glauben’, R2, 81ff.; R2E, 107ff. 
101 Romans 3:31-4:8 ‘Glaube ist Wunder’, R2, 90ff.; R2E, 115ff. 
102 R2, 94f.; R2E, 119. 
103 R2, 102; R2E, 126. 
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reckoned as righteous when his ‘faith is not yet circumcision, not yet religion, not yet 
the spiritual-historical phenomenon of faithfulness’.104  As the pure beginning,105 
then, faith is not the consequence but the presupposition of the likes of 
Religionsgeschichte and Heilsgeschichte.106 
Finally, Abraham’s justification does not consist in the institution of the 
church in history.  Although the Christian church is ‘the inescapable historical 
formation, transmission … of the divine deed towards humanity’,107 it remains true 
that the divine deed as such never becomes history.108  Elaborating on this, Barth 
refers to the Christian church in its manifold spiritual-historical contents 
[seelisch-geschichtlichen Inhalten], and notes that they rely on a divine form in the 
Beyond to be filled with meaning [die göttliche, die sinngebende, die erfüllende 
Form].109  Thus not even the history of the Christian church is in a better position 
than religion in general to constitute the original relation of God to humanity. 
To conclude, the justification of Abraham means for Barth that what is 
counted as righteous is not Abraham’s historical life but his ‘prehistorical’ life.  In 
view of this prehistoricity, human works, religion, and even the Christian church in 
history are altogether denied any positive value where the relation of humanity to 
                                                 
104 R2, 104; R2E, 128. 
105 Romans 4:9-12 ‘Glaube ist Anfang’, R2, 102ff.; R2E, 126ff. 
106 Just as faith is always ‘faith apart from the circumcision’ (Rom. 4:12), just as Abraham’s 
justification is not ‘by virtue of the law’ but ‘by virtue of the righteousness of faith’ (Rom. 4:13), 
likewise it is not that Israel constitutes ‘the actuality, power and reality of this “becoming”’ but that 
God’s promise ‘became’ Israel the historical nation in history.  R2, 109; R2E, 133. 
107 R2, 105; R2E, 129. 
108 In the first edition, religion and church are depicted as the necessary reflection and historical 
transmission of ‘the creative deed of God’, of the ‘divine source’.  The ‘interior’ and ‘exterior’ 
belong together in God (R1, 120).  In the second edition, religion and church are still necessary 
reflection and transmission, but their divine origin is now described as the divine deed ‘which as such 
never becomes history’.  The ‘form’ remain other than its contents (R2, 105; R2E, 129). 
109 R2, 105; R2E, 130. 
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God is concerned: 
Religious history, church history is ‘weak’ in the absolute sense.  It is 
so because of the infinite qualitative distinction between God and man.  
As completely human history it is flesh.  It is flesh even when it 
disguised as ‘salvation history’.  And all flesh is grass.110 
Therefore, just as humanity always means unredeemed humanity, so history can 
mean only limitation and transience.  The whole of history has a voice which shouts 
self-accusation.  Historical thinking leads only to the doctrine of original sin, which 
has to be the inevitable sole result of all honest historical investigation.111  No value 
is allowed to pertain to human history in itself and as such. 
2C.3 History Provided with Witness-Value 
This easily gives the impression that, in Mangina’s words, Barth ‘lapsed into a form 
of dualism in which God’s eternity floats free of a tragically fallen creation’.112  But 
it does not follow that history is utterly overwhelmed by God and rendered totally 
worthless.  To Barth’s mind, just as the condemnation of the whole world under 
God’s judgement constitutes in part the necessity of the manifestation of God’s 
righteousness apart from the law, so the ‘radical sublation [Aufhebung] of the 
historical … reality and … the all-embracing relativisation of its levels and contrasts’ 
are also required so that the true and eternal meaning of history may come into 
view.113  The question at issue is: given that human history has been so negatively 
conceived and so radically dissolved, is it still possible at all to relate it to the 
                                                 
110 R2, 259; R2E, 276. 
111 R2, 60; R2E, 85. 
112 Joseph L. Mangina, Karl Barth: Theologian of Christian Witness (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 17. 
113 R2, 52; R2E, 78. 
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revelation of God in a positive and meaningful way? 
The answer that Barth offers is yes.  History can be related to revelation, and 
it can do so by way of bearing witness.  Bearing witness, in this connection, 
involves three things.  First, it means pointing beyond.  Here the characteristic of 
history as being located between its beginning and end is given special attention by 
Barth.  In that history is situated as a mediator [Mittel], it is not itself the beginning 
and the end, but rather a means or a tool to which there is always a purpose or a 
goal.114  It is only by glancing at the beginning and the end that ‘they are what they 
are: signposts and witnesses which point beyond.’115  Second, bearing witness 
involves radical self-denial.  It is radical in the sense that witnesses not only have to 
be deemed merely something subsequent and provisional [nachträglich und 
vorläufig]116 in respect to their referents, but also need themselves to decrease and 
ultimately perish.  The paradox of self-denial about history thus lies in the fact that, 
as a witness, history is affirmed only when it is denied.117 
Third, bearing witness also involves renunciation of multiplicity for the sake 
of singularity.  In Barth’s view, the great variety of the contents in the historical 
series might be interesting and real, but that does not necessarily grant meaning or 
trueness to history as such.118  On the contrary, it is only when the multiplicity of 
the contents in history demonstrate a singular divine form that it is possible for 
                                                 
114 ‘Only as the mediator [Mittel] do … [the manifold contents of history] stand between Alpha and 
Omega, between the beginning and the end’, R2, 105; R2E, 130. 
115 R2, 105; R2E, 130. 
116 Ibid. 
117 ‘An impression of revelation is eternal reality when it has nothing to do with the impression but 
everything to do with the indication of revelation’, R2, 65; R2E, 90. 
118 Barth contends that, ‘For “real” is not the same as true, “interesting” is not the same as meaningful, 
and a past which is intuitive to us in its abundance of facets is therefore not a telling, understood and 
recognised past’, R2, 122; R2E, 145f. 
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history to be provided with meaning and value.  It is essential to see how Barth 
emphatically downplays the multiplicity of history in order that the single 
non-historical theme [Unhistorische] of history may be appreciated.  Apart from the 
unified theme of history: 
Even if the antiquarian life and meticulousness were so great, the 
‘empathy’ into the atmosphere of the old days and situations were so 
skilful, and the contingently applied principles were so brilliant, 
history [Historie] still, as a critical collection of material, is not 
‘history’ [Geschichte], but photographed and analysed chaos.119 
This specific formulation of the relationship between Historie and Geschichte 
is clearly in opposition to how it was usually envisaged.  Historical investigation 
claims to be the authority which, by way of analytical criticism, verifies Geschichte 
to be Historie.  But Barth makes the counterclaim that Historie cannot become 
Geschichte unless Historie, by way of synthesis, moves beyond the manifold 
contents of the past to grasp the single and unified theme of Geschichte.  This single 
theme, described as the ‘unhistorical radiance from above’ [ungeschichtliche 
Oberlicht or Oberlicht des Unhistorischen], not only eludes historical investigation 
(unhistorisch), but also originates not from within but from without the historical 
plane (ungeschichtlich).  This radiance gives sense to history, and it can be gathered 
only synthetically from the ‘centrifugal abundance … of phenomena’. 120   
Enveloped in the radiance from above, the multiplicity of the past is elevated into the 
monologue of simultaneity, and the witness draws attention to the witnessed.  This 
occurs when the past begins to speak and the present begins to listen, and that is 
                                                 
119 R2, 122; R2E, 146. 
120 R2, 116ff., 122ff.; R2E, 140ff., 145ff.  Cf. ‘God’s answer [is] … an answer which casts the light 
of eternity upon time and upon all things in time’, Karl Barth, ‘The Need and Promise of Christian 
Preaching’ (1922), The Word of God and the Word of Man, 97-135 (121). 
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when historical investigation can claim its true use [Nutzen der Historie], and history 
is provided with the ‘synthetic value of art’ [synthetisches Kunstwert].121 
To conclude, it is true that the Barth of the 1922 Römerbrief has a very low 
opinion of history as a whole.  The strong eschatological orientation of his theology 
makes him construe the history of this world as overwhelmed by the eschatological 
world that is to come, and therefore as deprived of any value as a reality.  But such 
fierce criticisms are made only as a corrective, in the hope that history might be 
guided back to its proper use of pointing beyond itself to the singular non-historical 
history [unhistorische Geschichte].  To that extent, history is provided with 
witness-value.  In chapter thirteen of the commentary, Barth speaks of the secret of 
time, claiming that the fact that time does not come or go is revealed in the eternal 
moment of revelation.  This moment is not in time but between the times, giving 
meaning to every moment in time.122  It is also the moment when the secret of 
history is revealed: 
the framework of history is burst open at the moment when history 
discloses its secret … We have no reason to eschew the light of 
history; it can do nothing other than bearing witness: the witness of 
one to many, of the forgiveness to the sinners.123 
2D Continuation and Moderation of the Römerbrief Principles: 
Early Lectures in Göttingen 
In 1921 Barth left Safenwil, beginning his academic career by taking a new chair in 
Reformed theology at the University of Göttingen.  Before he embarked on his first 
dogmatic lectures in early 1924, he had given several lectures in the fields of 
                                                 
121 R2, 122ff.; R2E, 146ff. 
122 R2, 481; R2E, 497. 
123 R2, 116; R2E, 139. 
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historical theology and of theological exegesis.124  Two of them are of particular 
interest for Barth’s concept of history: The Theology of John Calvin (1922) and The 
Resurrection of the Dead (1923/24).  In this section we will first examine how the 
category of history is elaborated and employed in these two lectures, and then argue 
not only that the eschatological view of history held in the Römerbrief still serves as 
the controlling factor, but also that some development can be detected in terms of the 
instructional function and the value of history. 
2D.1 History as the Teacher of Life: The Theology of John Calvin (1922) 
In the summer semester in 1922, Barth lectured on the theology of Calvin.  
Unsatisfactory and maybe even fragmentary when viewed as a work of historical 
theology on Calvin in the strict sense, these lectures are significant in their own right, 
because they are Barth’s first attempt at a work of historical theology.  They also 
shed light on Barth’s concept of history, which serves as an essential constitutive part 
in the lectures.125 
This subsection will first explore the guiding principle which Barth assigns to 
the lectures: ‘History is the teacher of life’, and then examine how he puts this 
principle into practice.  Finally, it will be argued that the concept of history as 
presented in The Theology of John Calvin is on the whole a substantiation of the 
concept of history formed in the 1922 Römerbrief. 
2D.1.1 Guiding Principle: ‘History Is the Teacher of Life’ 
The ‘Introduction’ consists of Barth’s objection to Calvin’s equation of sacred history 
                                                 
124 For a complete list of these Göttingen lectures from 1921 to 1925, see McCormack, Dialectical 
Theology, 293f. 
125 Hans Scholl, ‘Preface’, in Karl Barth, The Theology of John Calvin, trans. by Geoffrey W. 




[historia sacra] with biblical history over against secular history, and of his 
explication of Cicero’s phrase that ‘history is the teacher of life’ [historia vitae 
magistra], which was frequently quoted by Calvin and is now made by Barth the 
methodological principle of the whole lecture.  Barth begins the ‘Introduction’ by 
taking up the definition of sacred history.  He agrees in principle with Calvin’s 
positing of sacred history as opposed to secular history.  But he opposes Calvin’s 
equation of sacred history with biblical history.  For Barth, biblical history is no 
different from history as a whole in its relation to sacred history: 
the biblical history too can only proclaim the sacred history, salvation 
history, the history of God, the history that is the hidden meaning and 
content of all history, and that seeks to speak in and above and beyond 
all so-called secular history.126 
This passage suggests that like all other histories, biblical history is not sacred 
history or salvation history, which is the meaning of all history.  Insofar as the one 
history of God is recognised, Barth acknowledges, historical study can be instructive 
to life.  To the extent that the God to whom the one history belongs is the living 
God of the living, only history that is living can be the teacher of life. 
The rest of the ‘Introduction’ is Barth’s explication of what it means to say 
that history is living and therefore instructive.  Three points are made.  First, it 
means the crucial recognition that historical personalities with their words and deeds 
are only one possibility among other possibilities, a possibility at which true students 
of history do not stop.  Being taught by the living historical means learning the one 
eternal truth that the Holy Spirit wants to teach.  Second, it means that history aims 
not simply to say but rather to teach something.  If history fails to teach, it fails to 
                                                 
126 Barth, The Theology of John Calvin, 2; translation slightly revised per Karl Barth, Die Theologie 
Calvins 1922, ed. by Hans Scholl (Zürich: TVZ, 1993), 2. 
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be history.  In addition to an able teacher, dutiful students are also required, students 
who are not satisfied with repeating or echoing but rather strive to enter into dialogue 
with history, to be taught by it.  Third, in order to be taught by history, true students 
of history must stick to the actual intention and accomplishment of the objects of 
their study.127  When all three requirements are satisfied, history can be properly 
seen as living and instructive. 
Traditionally in Protestant theology, however, history had been widely 
viewed as a problem rather than a teacher.  Barth responds to this problem of 
history by maintaining that the variety of historical phenomena and the historical 
distance between objects and their observers are merely facts, not metaphysical 
realities.  What is metaphysically real for him is the one eternal truth that there truly 
is a unity in history, to which individual historical phenomena point as they point 
beyond themselves.  For this reason, historical study must transcend mere interests 
in the multiple facets in the past and instead seek the one unity of God.128  In 
addition, history as a mirror reflects the soul of its investigators.  Spoken to and 
taught by history, the researchers find what they seek and are shown what they are.  
This insight means for Barth a twofold verdict given by history: it is impossible to 
approach history without presuppositions, but it is perfectly possible to reflect on 
those presuppositions.129  Thus, if human multiplicity points beyond itself to the 
divine unity, and if investigators clearly confront their own presuppositions with 
critical reflection, then history of the past can be seen as not only true or interesting, 
but also necessary and significant; ‘the living, speaking, working past is the 
                                                 
127 Barth, The Theology of John Calvin, 1-5. 
128 Ibid., 7f. 




2D.1.2 Principle Put in Practice: Reformation as an Example 
Barth’s own presupposition is the instructiveness of history and the unity of God in 
history.  Applying this principle to his study on Calvin, he deals with the alleged 
drastic discontinuity between the Middle Ages and the Reformation, arguing that the 
contrast of ‘old’ and ‘new’ in the course of one and the same historical plane can be 
affirmed only in a very limited sense, and that the Reformers differ from their 
predecessors and successors only relatively and not absolutely.131  The relation of 
the old and the new, Barth proposes, should be considered from two perspectives.  
Originally and ultimately, there is a hidden antithesis of the distance and fellowship 
between God and humanity, one that is never intuitable, whether historically or 
otherwise.  This dimension is what is meant by the term ‘sacred history’.  Then, 
secondarily and derivatively, there are all sorts of different human possibilities which 
are historically intuitable, the whole range of which is often called ‘secular history’.  
The invisible hidden antithesis in sacred history and the visible human possibilities in 
secular history are, according to Barth, not opposed to each other but rather linked in 
an unintuitable way.  That is to say, on the one hand, the latter never corresponds 
directly to but rather only points to or indicates the former indirectly, otherwise the 
two would be related in an intuitably given way.  On the other hand, however, the 
latter can never be totally meaningless in regard to the former, otherwise the two 
would no longer be related at all.132 
Ontologically, Barth firmly presupposes an origin which is necessary for 
                                                 
130 Ibid., 8. 
131 Ibid., 16. 
132 Ibid., 16f. 
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historical occurrences first to exist and then to become known to us.  
Epistemologically, nevertheless, what is perceptible to us is only the secular history, 
and not the sacred history.  Furthermore, a relation of the two histories is again 
ontologically presupposed, as is seen from Barth’s conviction that all historical 
events are meant to direct us to the recognition of such a relation.  This relation, 
however, is at the same time epistemologically ambiguous in the sense that it is never 
comprehensible to human beings exactly how these two histories are related. 
Paradoxically, it is only when the ontological presupposition about the 
unintuitable and absolute antithesis between the divine origin and what is human and 
historical is clearly in view that it becomes known that all epochs on the historical 
plane are in such earthly continuity that the contrast between them becomes only 
relatively significant when measured by their likeness.133  In other words, the 
ontological presupposition serves for Barth to crush the illusional absoluteness of any 
‘new’ or ‘ground-breaking’ historical epoch.  All contrast and distinction in history 
is located in such a great historical continuity that within it there is no real breach.134  
The newness of even the Reformation is inevitably dimmed when it is considered in 
relation to the divine origin of all historical occurrences.  As Barth puts it, ‘there are 
no different times in relation to God, or … there is no progress in world history’.135  
The conclusion that Barth draws from all this, however, is not all negative.  On the 
one hand, the problem of history consists in the fact that history in its totality has its 
                                                 
133 Ibid., 17f. 
134 Ibid., 39. 
135 Ibid., 24.  By contrast, Schleiermacher’s philosophy of history, as Barth understands it, has at its 
heart the fixed presupposition of an unbroken historical continuum and, therefore, a firm and 
optimistic conviction, which in turn leads to an affirmation of Schleiermacher’s own contemporary 
age as the summit of history.  As a result, church history and the history of the civilised Christian 
peoples are viewed, alongside the resurrection of Jesus Christ, as the demonstrations of God’s grace.  
Such a presupposition and conviction, among other things, are that which Barth is determined to 
oppose.  Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, 23, 35, 51ff, 98. 
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share in what is eternally old.136  On the other, the solution of this problem is 
disclosed in the fact every epoch in history also has its share in the eternal new.137 
To conclude, for the Barth of The Theology of John Calvin, everything which 
occurs in history has a human face; it can be new and edifying only provisionally.138  
The true destination of history, then, is not the end of history as such, but a return to 
the Jenseits, namely the origin and goal which is the meaning and purpose of all 
history. 
2D.2 The End of History as the Frame of Reference: The Resurrection of 
the Dead (1923/1924) 
In this subsection we will first examine The Resurrection of the Dead, Barth’s 
lectures on 1 Corinthians in the winter semester of 1923/1924.  Its importance lies 
in the fact that it was one of Barth’s only two theological exegesis lectures which 
were published, and the only one of the Göttingen lectures that was printed.139  In 
these lectures one finds Barth’s insistence that the resurrection of Jesus Christ is the 
centre of gravity upon which hinges the whole of 1 Corinthians, Christianity and, 
indeed, the reality of all things.140  In what follows we seek to demonstrate that, like 
                                                 
136 The same strong sense of the division between the Old and the New also appears in Barth’s 
lectures on Zwingli [Karl Barth, Die Theologie Zwinglis, 1922/1923: Vorlesung, Göttingen, 
Wintersemester 1922/1923, ed. by Matthias Freudenberg (Zürich: TVZ, 2004)], where the New that is 
God’s benefit to human beings is presupposed not to appear in history.  To be sure, what seems new 
in history, ‘even in the history of the Reformation, belongs to the Old when seen from the viewpoint 
of this New.’ (47)  Therefore, the alleged historical antithesis between the Middle Ages and the 
Reformation is construed as one that is not essentially serious when one has in view the essential 
seriousness which ‘binds the historical antitheses in the oneness of that antithesis which never purely 
appears in history.’ (49)  Such an understanding of human history with respect to its essence brings 
about, in turn, Barth’s denial of the saving effect of historical knowledge, namely, his assertion that 
what saves us is the saving event itself (the Lord God was crucified for us) and not our historical 
knowledge of it (the knowledge of how or that Christ was crucified). (230) 
137 Barth, The Theology of John Calvin, 19. 
138 Ibid., 251. 
139 John Webster, ‘The Resurrection of the Dead’, idem, Barth’s Earlier Theology, 67-90 (67). 
140 A. Katherine Grieb demonstrates that, up to the point of Barth lectures on 1 Corinthians ‘[t]here 
was very little interest in the incarnation as such’, A. Katherine Grieb, ‘Last Things First: Karl Barth’s 
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The Theology of John Calvin, Barth’s treatment of the theme of history in The 
Resurrection of the Dead is also to a large extent a continuation of that in the 1922 
Römerbrief, but that some modifications can be seen.  For illustrative purposes, 
close attention will be given to Barth’s account of the historicity problem of the 
resurrection. 
2D.2.1 Relation of History to the End of History 
A central contention of The Resurrection of the Dead is Barth’s insistence that the 
end of history is not the termination of history.  This negative notion is then 
followed by Barth’s positive elaboration of what the end of history is.  This is done 
on several levels.  First, the end of history does not mean its termination, because 
the last things are so radically the end of all things that they are also fundamentally 
the grounding and beginning of all things.  In this sense, Barth argues, the end of 
history [Endgeschichte] means precisely the primal history [Urgeschichte].141 
Second, this end of history does not simply lie at the beginning and the end of 
the linear process of history, serving as the terminals of a linear series.  Instead, it 
forms the boundary of all history, bordering all history by embracing it, thereby 
dissolving the conventional conception of history as an endless sequence.142  That is 
                                                                                                                                          
Theological Exegesis of 1 Corinthians in The Resurrection of the Dead’, Scottish Journal of Theology, 
56 (2003), 49-64 (54).  This is evident also in Barth’s correspondence with von Harnack, in which 
Barth insists that ‘the Word became flesh, [and] God himself became a human-historical reality’, but 
that it is so only to the extent that this event lies beyond human cognition.  In other words, whatever 
is historically cognisable cannot be that event as such; that is why ‘[t]he existence of a Jesus of 
Nazareth … which can of course be discovered historically, is not this reality.’  Karl Barth, ‘An 
Answer to Professor von Harnack’s Open Letter’ (Apr 24 1923), H. Martin Rumscheidt, Revelation 
and Theology: An Analysis of the Barth-Harnack Correspondence of 1923 (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1972), 40-52 (44). 
141 Karl Barth, The Resurrection of the Dead, trans. by H. J. Stenning (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1933), 107-110.  German original: Karl Barth, Die Auferstehung der Toten: Eine 
akademische Vorlesung über I. Kor. 15 (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1924). 
142 Barth, The Resurrection of the Dead, 110-112. 
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why ‘[o]f the real end of history it may be said at any time: The end is near!’143 
Third, the end-and-beginning of history does not stay at the boundary of 
history, but takes place within it and takes effect in the whole range of it.  The 
‘fundamental and vital significance’144 carried by this end-and-beginning of history 
requires that we view our side from the standpoint of God.  For that purpose, the 
end-and-beginning of history takes place precisely on the historical plane: 
if the end of history set by God is here, if the new eternal beginning 
placed by God appears here, then that which has appeared from God 
applies to the whole of history within the scope of this horizon, then 
the miracle of God to Christ is immediately and simultaneously the 
miracle of God to us … .145 
The assertion that the resurrection took place in history as revelation is one point that 
Barth takes to distinguish himself from Paul Tillich.  For Barth, ‘Christ is the 
salvation history’, ‘a very special event’, and not ‘the symbol of revelation, present 
and knowable always and everywhere’ as with Tillich.146  But it should also be 
noticed that Barth was not yet able to hold to this position as firmly as he would later 
in his dogmatic lectures in Göttingen.147 
Moreover, the end-and-beginning of history is not firstly away from history 
and only then suddenly approaches it.  It is rather ever present: it once was hidden 
like a ‘subterranean stream’,148 and has now become perceptible for the first time on 
the human plane with the revelation of the resurrection of Christ.  Someday, at the 
                                                 
143 Ibid., 112. 
144 Ibid., 158. 
145 Ibid., 159, emphasis mine. 
146 Busch, Karl Barth, 152. 
147 See section 3A. 
148 Barth, The Resurrection of the Dead, 176. 
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Parousia of Christ, this already-existing ‘subterranean stream’ will come to the 
surface.  That will be the time when the promise given in the resurrection becomes 
fulfilled in the Parousia.  That will be the time when the idea of a boundary of all 
time ‘revealed and believed’ in the resurrection becomes ‘marked’ in the Parousia.149  
Thus, the end-and-beginning of history not only encompasses history, nor does it 
merely take place within history; it is also ever-present with history. 
Finally, as a result, from the notion of the end of history thus conceived arises 
something which Barth calls the Christian dualistic view of history,150 because this 
end creates a tension in history: the tension between promise and fulfilment.  This 
tension means for Barth that the present human history can be comprehended only in 
a Christian dualistic way as the expectation of the fulfilment of the promise.  In the 
light of the expected fulfilment to come, whilst the reality of history is affirmed, its 
completeness is nevertheless denied.  For history can never be an arena in which the 
meaning of the kingdom of Christ and of Christian faith is ‘exhausted in that which is 
present and given’.151  In Barth’s view, the relation of history to the end of history 
means the former’s dependence on the latter.  However true Christianity in this 
world may be, its ultimate meaning rests on ‘the existence or non-existence of this 
relationship’.152  However real history may be, there is always a goal to be hoped 
for, which is the end-and-beginning of history that encloses as well as is ever-present 
in history. 
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2D.2.2 Historicity Question of the Resurrection 
Concerning the historicity of the resurrection, The Resurrection of the Dead adheres 
to the main thesis set forth in the 1922 Römerbrief that the resurrection is such a 
specific event in history [Geschichte] that it does not belong to the same category as 
other events in history [Geschichte] which can be historically [historisch] 
investigated and understood.  The resurrection took place in history, but it is also 
distinct from it by embracing the entirety of it as Urgeschichte and Endgeschichte.  
However abrupt this juxtaposition may seem, neither pole should be cancelled by the 
other.  The strict separation of the resurrection from all other historical events does 
not obliterate the fact that Jesus’ resurrection took place in history, and Jesus’ 
uniquely historical resurrection is not to be confused with other general historical 
occurrences.  For our purposes, it means that not only does Barth not deny the 
historicity of the resurrection, but he also ‘[combats] an inadequate historicist 
interpretation of Paul’s main point’.153  It can be argued that, in that the objective 
event of ‘[t]he resurrection of Christ … precedes and constitutes our [subjective] 
faith’, its historicity is to be affirmed.154  Seen in this light, history is not devalued; 
it is ‘established and framed by the essentially eschatological reality of the 
resurrection’.155  It is in the context of the ‘larger theatre of eschatological reality’ 
that history is to be construed.156 
Having affirmed the historicity of the resurrection, we also agree with 
Webster that the question of the historicity of Jesus’ resurrection belongs to those 
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‘more formal matters’ which are only remotely relevant to ‘the exegetical and 
theological content of Barth’s reading of Paul’.157  After all, Barth emphatically and 
repeatedly states that he understands Paul to have no intention to prove or to defend 
the resurrection of Jesus, because it is for him a given fact to be recalled and 
recounted.158  In line with his interpretation of Paul, Barth, too, has no intention to 
formulate a Christian apologetics.  Instead, he plainly claims that the resurrection is 
a ‘deed of God’ which as ‘a historical divine fact … is only to be grasped in the 
category of revelation and in none other’,159 refusing to fall into the categories 
defined by those he refers to as liberals (who explain the appearances of the risen 
Christ as ‘visions’) or positivists (who attempt to prove or demonstrate them to be 
‘historical facts’). 
2D.3 Continuation and Moderation 
Taken together, these two lectures demonstrate how the Römerbrief principles are 
largely upheld whilst also undergoing some development in Barth’s early years in 
Göttingen.  Where Barth’s concept of history is concerned, all the important 
Römerbrief principles are found in force in the two lectures: eternity’s dominance 
over time, the primacy of beginning and end over against the process in between, 
history’s lack of value in itself, and the provision of value to it in bearing witness.  
What really matters about history is not its multiple content as such, let alone its 
method,160 but the unified theme to which it points. 
But it is important to notice that some development is still detectable, in 
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terms of all the elements mentioned above.  First, compared to the 1922 Römerbrief, 
we have observed in The Resurrection of the Dead a more embracing view of the 
end-and-beginning in relation to history.  David Fergusson observes in this 
connection an ‘inflation of eschatology [which] coincides ironically with a reticence 
about the last things’, as he has in view ‘twentieth-century eschatology’ in general.161  
Judging from the development of Barth’s own theology, however, one finds a slightly 
moderated eschatology which no longer dismisses all that which is not ‘final’.  
Similarly, in this phase Barth indeed has a ‘tendency to telescope all eschatological 
occurrence into a single momentary event’,162 but that event is not merely a moment, 
but rather an event which embraces all history as its beginning and end. 
Second, the reality of history as such is articulated in a slightly more positive 
way in The Theology of John Calvin: 
Always and everywhere that which we see as historical occurrence on 
the second front [i.e. ‘secular history’] stands only in relation to its 
origin in the primal antithesis [i.e. ‘salvation history’], but always and 
everywhere historical events do to some extent stand in relation to this 
their origin.163 
Lacking newness and dependent on its origin, history still ‘stands’ in its own right.  
Its reality is no longer as overwhelmed by revelation as was depicted in the 1922 
Römerbrief. 
Third, following a more positive view of the reality of history is a refined 
view of how history can serve as a witness to revelation.  All the requisites 
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previously proposed for effective witness-bearing remain here. 164   But some 
differentiating nuances become clear when it comes to what enables history to bear 
witness.  Whilst in Römerbrief it was revelation’s ‘unhistorical radiance from above’ 
that elevates history as such to be the witness to the unity and simultaneity, there is in 
the Calvin lectures a slight trace of Barth’s approval and even encouragement of the 
participation of human agents.  We have observed Barth’s claim that if past history 
is to be the living teacher of present life, the students of history have a role to play 
also.  In other words, in addition to the divine light from above, we human beings, 
as ‘dutiful students’, now have a role to play by ‘doing our best to follow [Calvin] 
and then―this is the crux of the matter―making our own response to what he 
says’.165  The ‘lessons’ that Barth concluded from his study of Calvin were no 
different from the same fundamental principles that he had already formulated.  But 
they were no longer principles metaphysically construed, but rather historically 
‘substantiated’ by the concrete study of Calvin and his history.  The nature of the 
field of historical theology, then, demanded that Barth engage actively with Calvin’s 
theology and times; talk of the multiplicity in history as trivial (as in the 1922 
Römerbrief) was not officially renounced, but quietly set aside. 
The foregoing observations by no means constitute a break in the 
development of Barth’s concept of history.  But it can be argued that a slight shift in 
tone is emerging in which the reality of history is affirmed in its relation to its eternal 
origin.  A consequence of this more positively conceived notion of the reality of 
history is Barth’s more concrete practice of historical investigation in which 
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historical happenings are taken into serious account and, in this way, the formulation 
of the relationship of history to its origin is more firmly grounded. 
2E Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we have examined the development of Barth’s concept of history in 
the ten years between 1914 and 1924, a period centring upon the 1922 Römerbrief.  
It has been demonstrated that elements such as the First World War, the discovery of 
eschatology, and the new found starting-point for theology constituted Barth’s break 
with theological liberalism and religious socialism, paving the way for the new 
theology in Römerbrief.  The defining motif of this period is the notion culminated 
and radicalised in the 1922 Römerbrief that human history is overwhelmed by the 
eternal God as the beginning and end of history.  Whilst in the 1919 edition God’s 
victory prevails in spite of human history, in the second edition it is preserved at the 
expense of history.  After 1922, unsurprisingly, the notion of the absolute priority of 
eternity over time, of revelation over history, extended in lectures that Barth gave in 
his early years in Göttingen.  But equally unsurprising is the fact that these 











Speaking God Revealed in History (I): 
Two Dogmatic Enterprises (1924-1930) 
 
Introduction 
Although 1924 is rarely seen as an important year in the development of Barth’s 
theology, it is chosen as the year dividing the first and second sections of this thesis.  
At least two reasons can be offered.  First, from a chronological point of view, in 
1924 Barth began his first lectures in dogmatics.  It is true that by that time as a 
professor of Reformed theology Barth had already undertaken serious academic 
engagement in the fields of historical theology and of New Testament exegesis.  But 
given that he was to remain in dogmatic investigation for the rest of his life, his ‘first 
exciting preoccupation with dogmatics’1 cannot be deemed as having no significance.  
Second, the embarkation upon dogmatic investigation in Göttingen bears material 
consequence, too, for our exploration on Barth’s concept of history.  As the Word of 
God as revelation was established as the central problem of dogmatics, the doctrine 
of Deus dixit came into sharper focus and received systematic treatment in greater 
detail than Barth had attempted before.  In that the doctrine of revelation constitutes 
the unmistakable doctrinal nexus in which the problem of history is dealt with not 
only in Göttingen but also in Barth’s subsequent dogmatic lectures in Münster and 
Bonn, the beginning of the dogmatic lectures in 1924 merits close attention, no 
matter to what extent they were later modified. 
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This chapter comprises four sections.  Section 3A will examine Barth’s 
dogmatic lectures in Göttingen, seeking to demonstrate that a new christological 
understanding of revelation enables Barth to conceive of the communication of 
revelation in history.  Section 3B will be a short exploration of a lecture given in 
1925 in which Barth’s famous formula concerning the subject-predicate relation of 
revelation to history first took shape.  Section 3C consists of a close reading of 
Barth’s construal of revelation as Urgeschichte as presented in the dogmatic lectures 
in Münster, a notion which witnessed Barth’s endeavour to provide a comprehensive 
elaboration of the subject-predicate relation of revelation to history, but also one 
which would be discarded soon after. 
3A Christological View of Revelation and the Three Forms of 
the Word of God: Dogmatic Lectures in Göttingen (1924) 
In many aspects the dogmatic lectures given in Göttingen (1924-1925) have not 
received the recognition that they deserve.  Many Barth scholars either make mere 
honourable mention,2 or completely ignore them.3  It is true that this document has 
an obvious provisional character, reflecting Barth’s rapidly changing thoughts during 
those years.4  But since a decisive christological view of revelation is established in 
it, it is significant for our purposes. 
                                                 
2 For instance, it is mentioned simply as Barth’s first attempt at the definition of his Reformed 
position in Gunton, The Barth Lectures, 41. 
3 See for example the beginning paragraph in von Balthasar’s treatment of the transitional years 
between Romans and the CD, in which he judges Prolegomena zur christlichen Dogmatik: Die Lehre 
vom Worte Gottes, lectured in Münster in 1927 as Barth’s second attempt at dogmatics, not only to be 
‘the most important document of those transitional years’, but also to be Barth’s ‘first attempt to 
sketch a full-scale dogmatics’, thereby totally neglecting the work in Göttingen from 1924 to 1925.  
Von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, 86.  Webster’s observation that the Göttingen 
Dogmatics has received more attention than other lecturing works in this period all the more 
highlights the meagre scholarship on the work of Barth in the 1920s.  Webster, ‘Some Unfinished 
Tasks’, Barth’s Earlier Theology, 1-14 (1-3). 
4 McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 337. 
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The notion of history is extensively treated in many parts in these lectures.  
But above all it is the doctrine of the Word of God, of the Deus dixit, that decidedly 
shapes his concept of history.  Turning to his doctrine of the Word of God, we will 
demonstrate in section 3A.1 Barth’s clear shift from an eschatological to a 
christological view of revelation.  This shift enables him to envisage the 
transmission of the Word of God from revelation through Scripture to preaching in 
history.  On this basis, we will deal first in section 3A.2 with the epistemological 
tracing back of God’s Word from Christian preaching to its origin, and then in 
section 3A.3 with the historical passing-down of God’s Word into preaching. 
3A.1 Basic Orientation: From Eschatological to Christological View of 
Revelation 
In the Introduction (§§1-2) to these dogmatic lectures Barth identifies Christian 
preaching as the beginning and goal of dogmatics.  Then in Chapter 1 (§§3-13) he 
seeks to ground human preaching objectively in the Word of God in its three forms 
as revelation, as Scripture, and then as preaching.  These three stages constitute 
what would later be known as the three forms of God’s Word in the first volume of 
the CD.5 
The doctrine of the three forms of God’s Word was literally ‘taking shape’ in 
Barth’s dogmatic lectures in Göttingen.  In the first lectures, Barth did not seem to 
have a clear stance towards revelation as the Word of God.  In §2 he registered what 
he termed as the ‘triunity’ of God’s Word: God’s Word in its present form (preaching), 
in its temporal or historical form (Scripture), and in its eternal form (revelation).6  
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6 GD, 36f., cf. 270. 
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Governed by eternity’s priority over time he came to make a very sharp distinction 
between revelation as such from Scripture and from preaching.  Revelation, being 
eternal, is in time but not ongoing and ‘never took place as such’.7  This construal 
of God’s Word seems to be more bipolar than ‘triune’, in that revelation is posited at 
the one end in eternity, and Scripture and preaching at the other end in time.  
McCormack is right to remark that ‘such a statement still stands under the impress of 
the eschatological perspective which had governed Romans II.’8  It also suggests 
that the ‘modification’ observed in section 2D was part of a process of fluctuation 
between the governing eschatological eternity-time dialectic and the new emerged 
view of the resurrection as not only before and after history but also as embracing it 
and in it. 
But in §3 Barth took more seriously the conception of God’s Word as ‘triune’.  
Seeking to ground preaching in Scripture and finally in revelation, he modified the 
construal of an ‘eternal’ revelation as ‘not ongoing’ and ‘not taking place’ and 
acknowledged the concrete ‘there and then’ of the incarnation as God’s speaking.9  
The result of this, as McCormack remarks, is a significant shift from a radical, 
eschatological view of the ‘eternal’ revelation to a moderate, christological view of 
revelation in history.10  On this basis Barth was now able to conceive of a real 
relationship between revelation, Scripture and preaching as the three forms of God’s 
Word.  In what follows we will examine this relationship in its two directions, i.e. 
                                                 
7 GD, 17; Unt1, 20. 
8 McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 338. 
9 ‘Already in his prolegomena lectures of 1924, Barth was describing the subject matter of the Bible 
in terms of the formula Deus dixit―thereby giving evidence of the fact that the focal point of his 
attention was now increasingly on the incarnation of God in history.’  Bruce McCormack, ‘Historical 
Criticism and Dogmatic Interest in Karl Barth’s Theological Exegesis of the New Testament’, Biblical 
Hermeneutics in Historical Perspective, ed. by Mark S. Burrows and Paul Rorem (Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1991), 322-338 (338n36).  See section 3A.3.1 for more detail. 
10 McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 327. 
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the epistemological tracing-back, and the historical passing-down. 
3A.2 Epistemological Tracing-Back to Deus dixit 
For Barth, Christian preaching must constantly trace its origin back [zurückgehen] to 
the historical basis in Scripture and the eternal basis in revelation, so that it may 
remain concrete as the Word of God.11  In this epistemological process two stages 
are included: the initial tracing-back from preaching to Scripture, and the further 
tracing-back from Scripture to revelation. 
3A.2.1 From Preaching to Scripture 
According to Barth, concrete preaching aims to make present the Word of God by 
working with both Scripture and the Spirit.  Working with Scripture means the 
making present of revelation in Scripture through history; working with the Spirit 
denotes the making present of revelation in preaching by the Spirit.  The loss of 
either aspect would be disastrous.  Had preaching to do only with either the letter of 
Scripture or the illumination of the Spirit, it would become either mere historical 
reference or the product of fantasy.  As a result, revelation would remain distant 
from contemporary believers, and preaching would fail to be concrete. 
This epistemological tracing-back to both Scripture and the Spirit 
presupposes history’s role in the mediation of God’s Word.  It is through history that 
Scripture (and in it revelation) is handed down to present-day believers by the Spirit: 
Through the Spirit revelation is as present and close to us as holy 
Scripture is through history, not without holy Scripture, but in it and 
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by it, and yet in it and by it it is the Spirit that makes revelation itself 
present and close.12 
It is of great importance to note from this passage that history is not placed on a par 
with the Holy Spirit in relation to their making known of revelation.  The Spirit is 
the subject which makes revelation known, whereas history merely serves as the 
medium through which Scripture is made known.  How close Scripture is to us 
through history is debatable, but history is still the requisite, indispensable medium.  
In this sense it can be argued that, just as revelation is not known without Scripture, 
so Scripture is not known without history. 
In order to truly speak of God, present-day preachers have to ‘place 
themselves in a series, on the ground of a certain piece of history, under an order’,13 
in a ‘fresh attention to the initial historical datum’.14  The identity of the true 
Christian church and the authenticity of true Christian preaching then rely on the 
church’s unceasing tracing-back through a certain chain of history (that of Scripture) 
to a certain point in history (revelation).  In this relation, history is presented as a 
necessary medium, because for Barth concrete preaching must be historically rooted 
in Scripture and in the original revelation. 
3A.2.2 From Scripture to Revelation 
According to Barth the step from the church back to Scripture is necessary but 
nevertheless insufficient.  His affirmation of Scripture as the historical source of 
preaching is immediately followed by a denial of Scripture as its ultimate origin.  
                                                 
12 Unt1, 45.  The English translation in GD, 36 (‘The Spirit makes revelation as present and close to 
us as history does holy scripture’) can be misleading in regard to the role of history in the making 
known of Scripture. 
13 GD, 53.  
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For him, just as preaching needs a previous historical basis in Scripture, Scripture 
also needs a source even further back in something which is more than, and indeed 
on the other side of, a historical datum, i.e. in revelation itself.15 
This view of history as a hindrance to the mediation of revelation finds its 
root in Barth’s insistence on God’s inaccessibility and incomprehensibility, which 
‘[do] not cease but [become] very great in [God’s] revelation’.16  Revelation can 
never be tamed and should never be placed at human disposal.  As a result, it is 
constantly hindered even in preaching by a human inability to attain to it, as well as 
always remaining concealed even in Scripture by ‘the separating distance of 
everything historical [Historischen]’.17  The hiddenness of revelation, then, compels 
Barth to regard history as a requisite but untrustworthy medium of revelation. 
To conclude, in Barth’s view, Christian preaching as the epistemological 
starting-point of dogmatic theology needs to constantly trace its origin upstream 
through and beyond history.  The tracing-back [Zurückgehen] through history to 
Scripture is necessary, but it will not be complete unless the tracing-back is pushed 
beyond history to revelation.  As the passively required medium in the 
working-back through history, history is in nature still an active component in the 
negative concealment of God’s Word which needs to be transcended in the 
working-back beyond history.  In an attempt to uphold God in revelation as 
supremely and absolutely the only speaking Subject in Deus dixit, Barth comes to 
view everything else involved in history inevitably and properly as relative, 
ambiguous, distant and fleshly. 18   It is unsurprising, then, to find that the 
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epistemological tracing-back ends in Barth’s insistence on the hiddenness of the 
Deus dixit, as well as in his opposition to the historicisation (Historisierung) of 
revelation in Scripture and of revelation into revealedness by the removal of the 
barrier between the two.19 
3A.3 Historical Passing-Down of Deus dixit 
The epistemological tracing-back from preaching through and beyond history ends 
with God’s Word in revelation, but precisely there Barth finds the starting-point of a 
return trip of the historical passing-down of revelation, which constitutes his 
explication of the historical relation between the three forms of God’s Word. 
3A.3.1 Revelation 
In chapter one of the Göttingen Dogmatics, ‘The Word of God as Revelation’, the 
revelation-history problem is explicitly treated twice, in §3 and §6 respectively.  In 
§3 the framework is the doctrine of Deus dixit; in §6 that of the incarnation.  Within 
slightly different frameworks, the two treatments take strikingly similar routes.  In 
each of the treatments, as we shall see, Barth first acknowledges the historicity of 
revelation with an emphasis put on the unveiling side of revelation.  He then 
expresses qualifications on the historicity of revelation, in an attempt to maintain a 
veiling in unveiling, a hiddenness in revelation, thus distinguishing revelation from 
history as such. 
Unveiling of Revelation 
In both §3 and §6 Barth takes up the revelation-history problem by acknowledging 
the temporality or historicity of revelation, because the Deus dixit means an address 
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and disclosure, and the incarnation means a real encounter of God with humanity in 
history.20  In §3, Barth states that ‘the Deus dixit means a here and now [, or] rather 
a then and there, for it is better to say that there is no avoiding the offensive “there in 
Palestine” and “then in the years A.D. 1-30”’.21  The ‘there and then’ is as much 
‘offensive’ as unavoidable, for there has to be an actual and concrete starting-point 
for revelation to address, to disclose, and to be passed down in time and space. 
At the end of §6.1 of the Göttingen Dogmatics, Barth states that: 
to inquire into [i.e. revelation’s] possibility … we must first speak 
about its temporality or historicity, that is, about Jesus Christ.22 
This passage demonstrates two things.  First, although Barth feels ‘compelled’ to 
speak of the possibility of revelation, he seems in effect to bracket this problem by 
appealing directly to Jesus Christ, who is later depicted as ‘the possibility of the 
possibility’ and ‘the actually existent possibility of revelation’,23 the latter of which 
can mean nothing but the reality of revelation.  Already in Göttingen, therefore, the 
inquiry about revelation does not start with a presupposed possibility of it, but with 
Jesus Christ as its actual existence or reality.  Second, Jesus Christ is the reality of 
revelation, in that He is also its temporality or historicity.  If revelation is to be 
revelation at all, if God is to really reveal Himself to humanity, a real encounter must 
take place between Him and humanity.  The basic logic is: revelation is possible for 
us, because it has really been established by God. 24   Historicity, then, is an 
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indispensible dimension of the incarnation of Jesus Christ as the reality of revelation.  
It is indispensible, not because revelation relies on it in order to be real, but in that 
God really became a human being as Jesus Christ in history. 
Moreover, the notion of historicity is indispensible also in connection with 
the concreteness of revelation.  In revelation, God is genuinely disclosed by really 
encountering humanity.  But the reality of revelation, as Barth stresses, is not 
general or abstract, but specific and concrete.  Earlier in §3 Barth makes the claim 
that ‘Deus dixit indicates a special, once-for-all, contingent event’;25 here in §6 too 
the incarnation as the reality of revelation is said to be a ‘once and for all’ event 
taking place ‘in history and in time’.26  The concreteness of revelation understood 
as its contingency, as McCormack observes, clearly constitutes a ‘subtle but 
momentous shift of accent’27 from Barth’s earlier conception of revelation as the 
‘eternal’ Word of God over against Scripture and preaching.  The real Subject of 
revelation is no longer an eternal moment standing outside history, but a concrete and 
contingent person in history.  In addition, just as revelation itself is concrete and 
                                                                                                                                          
it is possible to speak of God’s revelation is ruled, one way or another, by [its] reality.  It is possible 
then to speak of God’s revelation when it takes place’, Karl Barth, ‘Gottes Offenbarung nach der 
Lehre der christlichen Kirche’ (1927), idem, Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten 1925-1930, ed. by 
Hermann Schmidt (Zürich: TVZ, 1994), 217-295 (237). 
In a paragraph discussing this matter, Gorringe claims that ‘[i]t was only in the interval between 
[Die christliche Dogmatik in Entwurf] and the Church Dogmatics that Barth finally attained to 
complete clarity on the need to put reality before possibility’, stating that in the ChD ‘Barth spoke of 
both the objective and subjective possibility of revelation, only then establishing their reality.’  
Gorringe supports this claim, however, by referring to a passage in I/2 where Barth confesses to have 
been forced by Karl Heim to reconsider the reality-possibility relationship on the subjective aspect of 
revelation, i.e. the certainty of faith.  Based on the findings of this thesis, it appears that already in 
the Göttingen period Barth was very clear about the priority of reality to possibility at least on the 
objective side of revelation.  See Gorringe, Karl Barth, 107; and KD I/2, 64; I/2, 58.  The foregoing 
discussion is important to this thesis, in the sense that only when the reality of the incarnation is firmly 
established prior to the possibility of revelation can we speak of the real and concrete historicity of 
revelation.  And our contention is that Barth made that determination in the Unterricht in 1924. 
25 GD, 59. 
26 Ibid., 131. 
27 McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 340. 
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historically contingent, so is its encounter with humanity, which takes place in 
absolute singularity and uniqueness.28  Thus writes Barth, ‘the issue in revelation is 
not the manifestation of a general relation between the finite and the infinite, 
between time and eternity, but this concrete, contingent, historically accidental fact 
[historisch-zufällige Faktum]’.29 
In short, in face of the fact that God really speaks to human beings in a 
genuine and concrete encounter with them, Barth has come to the realisation that the 
incarnation is the historicity of revelation.  He can now even go as far as to 
acknowledge that ‘Christian revelation and Christian faith are historical 
[historisch]’:30 
revelation and faith are historical in the NT in exactly the same sense 
as in the OT; namely, they are prähistorisch and urgeschichtlich in the 
sense that what happens in time is withdrawn from direct 
intuition … .31 
This passage is significant in at least two senses.  Compared with the 1922 
Römerbrief, it indicates a moderation of the term Urgeschichte.  Being 
urgeschichtlich and being prähistorisch mean the same thing now, because the 
hiddenness of God is His hiddenness in history.32  Moreover, compared with The 
Resurrection of the Dead, we can detect here some expansion of Barth’s application 
of the notion of Urgeschichte, which, once exclusively applied to the resurrection, is 
now extended to the entirety of the incarnation. 
                                                 
28 GD, 142f. 
29 Ibid., 144. 
30 Ibid., 148. 
31 Ibid.; translation slightly revised per Unt1, 182. 
32 McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 363.  See also McCormack, ‘Revelation and History in 
Transfoundationist Perspective’, Orthodox and Modern, 34. 
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Veiling of Revelation 
Having recognised and acknowledged the historicity of revelation for genuinely 
theological reasons, Barth promptly begins taking all necessary steps to avoid the 
possible detrimental effects this might bring about.  In §3, he defines the ‘there and 
then’ of Deus dixit not as history in the usual sense, but as ‘qualified history 
[qualifizierte Geschichte]’.33  This term suggests that only under carefully defined 
circumstances can revelation be deemed history. 
At this point, it is advisable to recall the notion of Urgeschichte which, 
meaning not only the beginning but also the end of history, forms the boundary of the 
whole history.34  With the framework this notion provides, Barth is able to conceive 
revelation as so remarkable and unique that it does not confront history in antithesis 
but rather brackets that antithesis from the other side.  This important conception is 
explicitly presented in this passage: 
The Word of God … the here and now of revelation is an event which 
takes place in time and space (otherwise there would be no here and 
now), but insofar as it is revelation, it does not stand in the series with 
others which take place in time and space.  It is related to the whole 
contingent reality (to which it belongs!) in the same way as (but this 
side-glance at a philosophical correlation is made only as an analogy!) 
the notion of boundary or of idea [Idee] is related to the notion of 
reason: the former does not negate the latter but puts it in brackets, … 
coming with principial superiority over against it.35 
What is highlighted is a divine supremacy which, in distinction from human 
                                                 
33 GD, 60; Unt1, 72.  Cf. I/2, 58.  Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A 
Theological Aesthetics, Vol. 1, ed. by John K. Riches and Joseph Fessio, trans. by Erasmo 
Leiva-Merikakis (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982), 625; McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 340; 
Greene, Christology in Cultural Perspective (2004), 303. 
34 See sections 2D.2.1 and 3C.2. 
35 GD, 60; translation revised per Unt1, 72. 
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contingent reality, is able at will to enter that reality and even to commandeer that 
reality for its use.  Revelation belongs, according to Barth, to the contingent reality 
of human history in such divine supremacy that it refuses to be relegated to the 
historical series where other events belong. 
In §6 we find the aforementioned divine supremacy interpreted in terms of or 
rather, extended into, two further notions.  First, God’s supremacy means for Barth 
the hiddenness of revelation, i.e. the famous notion that ‘even in His revelation, 
precisely in His revelation God is the hidden God’.36  Barth feels compelled to insist 
on the hiddenness of God even in His revelation, because for him God is the living 
God, who is ‘the subject that escapes our grasp, our attempt to make him an 
object’,37 and therefore the free Lord of all things whose freedom is not limited even 
by His own deity.38  Second, the divine supremacy means for Barth the absolute 
particularity or singularity of that ‘historically accidental fact’ of revelation.  This 
‘historical’ event of revelation is so unique that its transmission or passing-down is 
utterly reserved for God Himself and God alone, therefore demanding the ‘radical 
dedivinization of the world and nature and history’.39  For this reason Barth refuses 
to grant any vantage point to the immediate future of Jesus of Nazareth, or to any 
other periods in history, dismissing as irrelevant the historical proximity to Him in 
terms of human recognition of revelation, despite the fact that the event of the 
                                                 
36 GD, 135; translation slightly revised per Unt1, 165. 
37 GD, 136. 
38 Assertion of God’s life and sovereignty to such an extreme is radical.  Barth seems aware of this 
when he brings forth these hypothetic questions (rather than giving an affirmative claim): what if God 
is so living and so free that He is revealed in hiddenness, that He becomes another whilst remaining 
Himself, that He makes Himself known as an object in His subjectivity―that is, what if ‘God be so 
much God that without ceasing to be God He can also be, and is willing to be, not God as well’?  
Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 144. 
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revelation of Jesus does takes up a time span in human history.40 
3A.3.2 Scripture 
We now carry on the exploration of the historical passing-down of God’s Word from 
revelation to Scripture.  As the historical basis of Christian preaching, Scripture 
finds its basis in the Deus dixit which occurred in Jesus Christ.  It is then observed 
that there is a historical series along the course of the mediation of God’s Word from 
revelation through Scripture to preaching. 
In saying so, Barth intends to highlight Scripture as the connecting-middle 
which prevents the church from falsely equating itself with revelation.  Scripture, 
understood as the second ‘address’ of the one Word of God, serves as the necessary 
and exclusive mediation of revelation to the church, whereas the church is deemed 
by Barth as by no means immediate to or unconditionally contemporaneous with 
revelation.  The significance of Scripture, in his view, lies not in its being the 
religious record of the historical origins of Christianity, but in the fact that it is the 
historical dimension [historische Größe] on which the beginning of the relation 
between revelation and the church is grounded.  It is that which is mediated, rather 
than the medium, that really matters.41  Nonetheless, Scripture is still the necessary 
middle between revelation and church which cannot be missing.42 
Now with Scripture positioned as the linking middle, how is God’s Word 
passed down?  Or, to use Barth’s terminology, how does church become 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 147. 
41 Ibid., 204-206. 
42 This point is reminiscent of Barth’s claim in the 1922 Römerbrief that history as a whole stands as 
the Mittel between the beginning and the end (R2, 105, 121), deprived of reality-value and provided 
only with witness-value.  In the Göttingen dogmatic lectures Scripture as a Mittel between revelation 
and preaching is obviously attributed with more (but not totally) positive significance. 
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contemporised with revelation through Scripture?  In adherence to the Protestant 
principle to uphold Scripture as the authority in the historical relation between 
revelation and the church, Barth contends that the presence of revelation in the 
church is not static or fixed.  It is the sort of presence that must be ‘established and 
sought and found and given afresh’ by way of Scripture in each individual period of 
that series. 43  God’s Word must be passed down, and the contemporaneity of 
revelation with church is to be established, but Barth insists that this must not be 
done at the expense of 1) the temporality or historicity of revelation, which must 
‘have an effect and shadow on the recognition of a temporally conditioned form of 
the communication of revelation too’,44 or 2) the concealment of revelation, which 
has a historical relation with the ‘temporally and historically [historisch] bound form 
of its historical [geschichtlich] propagation and communication to later 
generations’.45  Thus, Scripture is ‘the normative historical [geschichtlich] principle 
that gives [the church] birth’ that cannot be cancelled.46 
Barth argues that the contemporaneity between Christ and the church is never 
a static fact possessed in full by the church, for Christ is the crucified one ‘whose life 
is revealed in the church only to the extent that it becomes manifest to it (not only in 
it but to it and against it!)’,47 and His ‘becoming-manifest’ is to be sought exclusively 
in Scripture, not in an immediate relation to God presupposed by the modern concept 
of history.  The church can have revelation become contemporaneous with it only 
by first relegating the presumption of an immediate presence, and then accepting the 
                                                 
43 GD, 207; Unt1, 252. 
44 GD, 207; translation slightly revised per Unt1, 252. 
45 GD, 207; translation slightly revised per Unt1, 252. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., 208; translation slightly revised per Unt1, 253 to preserve Barth’s purposeful distinction 
between ‘offenbart ist’ and ‘offenbar wird’. 
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fact that revelation is historically mediated to it through Scripture.48 
In summary, as the historical passing-down of God’s Word, Scripture is 
necessary.  In this regard, the paradox or offense of temporality and historicity has 
to be maintained.  The present church will not be allowed a static comtemporaneity 
with revelation; that is to say, the church’s own historicity must be conditioned by 
and subdued under a superior criterion that lies in history: Scripture as the historical 
mediation of God’s Word. 
3A.3.3 Preaching 
Moving down to the furthest end of the historical passing-down of God’s Word, we 
find Christian preaching totally conditioned and governed by the authority of both 
revelation and Scripture.  Despite the entering into history of revelation (and thus to 
that extent the becoming-historical of revelation), the human witnesses to revelation 
in Scripture, and the subsequent development of both in the course of history, 
revelation still remains revelation, holding as firmly as ever its divine supremacy in 
sharp distinction from Scripture and preaching in its relation to both.  Even though 
Christian preaching in the church is ‘the last and supreme authority that we know in 
history’,49 Christian preachers must nonetheless be aware of and content with their 
status as ‘completely empty [vessels]’ in their lowliness as God’s servants,50 as God’s 
speaking is and remains the truth proper to God alone.  In short, in the historical 
passing-down of revelation, preachers stand in a position of authority, but ultimately 
‘being human and historical they are to be differentiated from the true authority and 
freedom that are divine’, i.e. the authority and freedom ‘reserved for Scripture’ by 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 210; Unt1, 256. 
49 GD, 270. 
50 Ibid., 271, cf. 245, 254. 
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virtue of revelation.51 
3A.4 Brief Summary 
In this section we have dealt with Barth’s concept of the historical relation of the 
three forms of God’s Word by way of a round trip via two different routes.  
Although still an obstacle, history is viewed nonetheless as an indispensible medium 
through which revelation is really and concretely communicated.  We have also 
demonstrated that the ontological condition for this conception of a real relationship 
between the three forms of God’s Word is a shift that took place in §3 of the lectures, 
i.e. to a christological rather than eschatological view of revelation.  Taking the 
‘there and then’ of the incarnation with all seriousness, Barth has come to the 
realisation that the incarnation is the historicity of revelation. 
Now that the christological view of revelation is established, it will remain 
pretty much in force in Barth’s theology in the rest of the 1920s and the most part of 
the 1930s.  How this christological view of revelation is played out in the 
development of Barth’s concept of history in this period will be the topic of the rest 
of this chapter as well as the next. 
3B Subject-Predicate Relation Announced: ‘Church and 
Theology’ (1925) 
Before the treatment of Barth’s second dogmatic enterprise in section 3C, this short 
section will be devoted to the elaboration of Barth’s concept of history as seen in 
‘Church and Theology’, an address that Barth gave in October, 1925.52  We choose 
this address, because in it Barth for the first time spells out his clearest articulation of 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 267. 
52 Busch, Karl Barth, 164. 
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the relation of revelation to history in terms of the relation of a subject to its 
predicate.  As we shall see, this formula will then become the motto which 
encapsulates Barth’s whole concept of history. 
In this address Barth agrees with Thurneysen’s definition of history as the 
wholly incomprehensible interim [Zwischenzustand] between creation and 
redemption in which humankind resides.53  One can hardly fail to relate the image 
of Zwischenzustand to that of Zwischen den Zeiten; both are in favour of the 
so-called dialectical theologians because of their acute awareness that this world and 
this age are but an interlude between the two major events, i.e. God’s creation and 
re-creation of all things. 
After describing history as an ‘interim’, Barth goes on to state that history is 
more than this, adding to history a negative side and a positive side.  The debate 
with Schmidt-Japing, which Barth refers to in this work, provides a good example.  
Schmidt-Japing holds that history and revelation belong to one body,54 and that in 
discarding history one runs the risk of losing the living God who effects and rules 
history.  Barth refutes this view fiercely, insisting that just as history does not effect 
salvation, so Jesus does not come to build history.55  On Barth’s account, history is 
the darkness into which the true Light came, and which did not apprehend the Light.  
‘Whoever speaks of history speaks with it non-revelation.  History means in 
theology just what Pontius Pilate means in the Creed.’56 
                                                 
53 Eduard Thurneysen, ‘Der Prolog zum Johannes-Evangelium’, in Zwischen den Zeiten, Jg. 3 (1925), 
Heft IX, 12-37 (27).  Cited in Karl Barth, ‘Kirche und Theologie’ (1925), idem, Vorträge und 
kleinere Arbeiten 1922-1925, ed. by Holger Finze (Zürich: TVZ, 1990), 644-682 (659).  English 
translation: Barth, ‘Church and Theology’ (1925), Theology and Church, 286-306 (292). 
54 Ibid., 657f.; ET, 292. 
55 Ibid., 658.  This part of Barth’s rebuttal to Schmidt-Japing is not seen in the English translation. 
56 Barth, ‘Kirche und Theologie’, Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten 1922-1925, 659; ET, 292.  The 




In addition to this negative side of history, there for Barth is also a positive 
side to it.  The positive side of history rests in the fact that history has been 
somehow assumed to bear witness to the true Light.57  But he also makes it clear 
that this positive side is attributed by God to history and does not lie in history itself.  
In fact, history ceases to be the subject when it is assumed to become a witness to the 
true Subject, God. 
Thus far nothing appears that is not also found in Barth’s previous works.  
What is new is a formula with which Barth manages to articulate the relation of 
revelation to history, a formula which he would repeat several times in his later 
works and which would become very famous: 
History can indeed become a predicate of revelation, but revelation 
never ever becomes the predicate of history.58 
We mentioned in section 3A that Barth’s conception of the relation of revelation to 
history stabilised in 1924 with his christological view of revelation and his construal 
of the incarnation as the historicity of revelation.  Now in 1925 the new found 
clarity has come to an articulate and simple expression in this subject-predicate 
relationship.  What is highlighted is that the two are related, but only so in an 
irreversible relationship.  This announcement would undergo some minor changes 
its later versions,59 but its definite form is already found here in 1925. 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid.: ‘Geschichte kann wohl ein Prädikat der Offenbarung werden, aber nie und nimmer wird die 
Offenbarung zum Prädikat der Geschichte.’ 
59 Its immediate recurrence took place in 1926 when Barth proclaimed in §36 ‘Die Gegenwart Jesu 
Christi’, Unt3, 450: ‘Revelation is a point in history.  Otherwise it would not be revelation (Joh. 
1:14).  But the flesh is not revelation; the Word that became flesh is.  The point in history is not the 
Revealer; God at this point of history is.  He remains Subject; He does not become the predicate of 
history.  His day is the day of revelation, not a day of history.  It is also a day of history, but insofar 
as it is such a day, it is not the day of revelation.’  This formula would then recur in the 1927 
Christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf (see footnote 70 in section 3C.2); in Barth, ‘Gottes Offenbarung 
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3C Revelation as Urgeschichte: Die christliche Dogmatik im 
Entwurf (1927) 
In October 1925 Barth moved to Münster to take the post of Professor of Dogmatics 
and New Testament Exegesis,60 and was to stay there until March 1930 when he 
moved to Bonn.  In Münster Barth revised his prolegomena lectures, which were 
published in 1927 under the title Die christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf.  This work 
is regarded by McCormack as adding ‘little that was decisively new’ to the Göttingen 
Dogmatics, as ‘the fundamental dogmatic decisions which control even Church 
Dogmatics I/1 and I/2 were already made in 1924/5 in Göttingen’,61 and Barth was to 
abandon this project some years later. 62  This being the case, Die christliche 
Dogmatik im Entwurf still provides a new and definite framework within which to 
analyse his view of the relation of revelation to history.  In what follows we will 
examine §15 ‘Weissagung und Erfüllung’, where Barth explicitly lays out the 
conception of revelation as Urgeschichte. 
The category of Urgeschichte first appeared in Barth’s work in 1911,63 and 
then it caught Barth’s interest when it was introduced to him by Thurneysen in 1920 
as one of Overbeck’s insights.64  In the revision of the Römerbrief in 1921 this 
notion played a central role,65 and then constantly appeared explicitly or implicitly 
                                                                                                                                          
nach der Lehre der christlichen Kirche’, Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten 1925-1930, 275; and in the 
1938 I/2 (see footnote 85 in section 4C.2).  For more detail, see the two footnotes indicated. 
60 Busch, Karl Barth, 162ff.; McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 374. 
61 McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 375. 
62 For detail see ibid., 421ff., and ‘Introduction’ in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
63 Barth, ‘Menschenrecht und Bürgerpflicht’ (1911), Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten, 1909-1914, 363. 
64  Barth, ‘Unsettled Question for Theology Today’ (1920), Theology and Church, 55-73.  
Thurneysen, 21. Januar 1920, in Barth-Thurneysen Briefwechsel: BandI: 1913-1921, 364-365 (365). 
65 R2, 6, 219, 231, 233; R2E, 30, 237, 248f., 250. 
114 
 
on a number of occasions in his subsequent works.66  But it was not until in the 
1927 dogmatic work that Barth decided to appropriate this category for a 
comprehensive theological construction of the ‘distinctive relationship between 
revelation and history’ by explicitly designating ‘the incarnation of the Word, the 
revelation of God in Jesus Christ, as “urgeschichtlich event”’. 67   Barth then 
expounds three dimensions of this statement. 
3C.1 More than Supra-History, Revelation is History 
First, the statement that ‘revelation is Urgeschichte’ means for Barth that ‘revelation 
is history’, and the designation of revelation as history means that it is more than just 
supra-history.68  He maintains that God does not stay in the opera ad intra of the 
Trinity; rather, He freely chooses to have a real encounter with humanity in time in 
the opus ad extra of the revelation.  Revelation first took place ‘there and then’, and 
from there it encounters human existence in our ‘here and now’.  The expression 
that revelation is supra-history falls out of favour with Barth, since it easily leads into 
the conception of a God who always resides in His eternity, thereby calling into 
question the reality of the incarnation, which is the possibility of revelation.  To be 
sure, Barth affirms the existence of this eternal history, or supra-history, inside the 
triune God Himself.  But in addition to it Barth endeavours to make it clear that this 
                                                 
66 Barth, Die Theologie Zwinglis 1922/1923, 66; Barth, Die Auferstehung der Toten, 58; English 
translation: The Resurrection of the Dead, 110; Karl Barth, ‘Das Schriftprinzip und seine 
Begründung’, in idem, Die Theologie der reformierten Bekenntnisschriften 1923, ed. by Eberhard 
Busch (Zürich: TVZ, 1998), 63-103 (90); §4 ‘Die Enzyklopädie’, in Karl Barth, Die Theologie 
Schleiermachers: Vorlesung Göttingen, Wintersemester 1923/1924, ed. by Dietrich Ritschl (Zürich: 
TVZ, 1978), 245-317 (273, 276), English translation: ‘The Encyclopedia’, The Theology of 
Schleiermacher, 137-177 (152-154); Unt1, 182, GD, 148. 
67 ChD, 310; cf. 309.  Neither before nor after 1927 did Barth place the notion of Urgeschichte and 
that of revelation in such close connection.  In the Unterricht, the notion of Urgeschichte was left 
almost totally untreated, with only one occurrence of the term ‘urgeschichtlich’ when Barth describes 
revelation and faith as prähistorisch and urgeschichtlich (Unt1, 182; GD, 148).  Later in I/2, 58 it 
will be explicitly discarded.  See footnote 85 in section 4C.2. 
68 ChD, 310. 
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supra-history in God is not yet revelation, because revelation means a real encounter 
between God and humanity.  Therefore, in that Urgeschichte is not only 
supra-history but also history, revelation is also history, not in a reduced but in the 
genuine sense.69 
3C.2 More than History in General, Revelation is Particular History 
Second, the statement that ‘revelation is Urgeschichte’ means for Barth that 
revelation, originating from the eternal supra-history and entering into human history, 
is more than mere history in general.  Like the notion of supra-history alone, the 
notion of history as such, too, is insufficient to account for revelation construed as 
Urgeschichte.  The subject-predicate relation of revelation to history, first 
formulated in 1925, recurs here.  Revelation is history, but history is not therefore 
revelation: 
History is a predicate of revelation, but revelation does not therefore 
become a predicate of history.  God acts in history, but history is not 
therefore God’s revealing act. … One cannot speak of history first in 
order to speak of revelation subsequently in some sort of application 
with some sort of amplification and emphasis.  One can only speak 
of revelation first, in order to speak of history subsequently by way of 
explanation.70 
                                                 
69 In Eberhard Jüngel, Barth-Studien (Zürich: Benziger Verlag, 1982), 144, Jüngel explores Barth’s 
conception, in ChD, of revelation as urgeschichtlich.  This adjective is misinterpreted in the English 
translation as ‘unhistorical’ in Jüngel, ‘Barth’s Theological Beginnings’, Karl Barth, 39. 
70 ChD, 311f.  Whilst it is stated in the 1925 ‘Kirche und Theologie’ that ‘[h]istory can indeed 
become a predicate of revelation, but revelation never ever becomes the predicate of history’, the 1927 
formulation is ‘[h]istory is a predicate of revelation, but revelation does not therefore become a 
predicate of history.’  It is not certain whether there is any decisive difference between ‘can indeed 
become’ and ‘is’.  One could argue that the expression ‘can become’ is revised, because it implies a 
possibility based on the ability on the part of history as such, whilst ‘is’ clearly refers to a reality. 
Following the 1927 dogmatics, there are two more occurrences of this formulation, in 1927 and 
1938, and both speak first of revelation and then of history, thus demonstrating stricter adherence to 
the fundamental precedence of revelation over history.  See Barth, ‘Gottes Offenbarung nach der 
Lehre der christlichen Kirche’, Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten 1925-1930, 275; and I/2, 58; KD I/2, 
64.  For detailed explication of these two later occurrences see footnote 85 in section 4C.2. 
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Revelation is more than history, because it is the case neither that history became 
divine, nor that someone or something in history is chosen to become revelation, but 
that God Himself freely enters into history and becomes revelation.  To use Barth’s 
term, revelation possesses a ‘more-than-historicity’ [Mehr-als-Geschichtlichkeit’].71 
Now the attribution of revelation as more than history means for Barth that 
revelation is particular history or qualified history.  This is the case because here we 
have to do with revelation, and the Subject of revelation in history is not history but 
God.  Revelation, as the revelation of God, is not necessary within history but is 
totally contingent upon God.  Earlier Barth depicts revelation as history, thus adding 
the notion of history to that of supra-history; now he depicts revelation as particular 
history, thus adding something special to the general notion of history.  That special 
element is the act of God’s speaking: ‘God in person speaks to us, and that is the 
particular historicity of revelation.’72  The general concept of history, then, is 
distinguished from the particular concept of history of revelation.  What is also at 
stake is the particular historicity of this concrete event of revelation.  Consequently, 
Barth places the investigation of revelation understood as Urgeschichte in the 
specific discipline of theology and dogmatics.73  This particular historicity sets 
revelation out of the reach of historical science [Geschichtswissenschaft], historical 
inspection [Geschichtsbetrachtung] and historical depiction [Geschichtsbild].74  Not 
even Christian faith as such is adequate for the task of ‘opening the closed door of 
history’ to trace this Urgeschichte. 75   In summary, in virtue of the particular 
                                                 
71 ChD, 312. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., 313f. 
74 Ibid., 314-316. 
75 Ibid., 317, Zusatz f. 
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historicity of revelation, ‘faith in revelation is grounded in the historical 
revelation’.76  But in virtue of its particular historicity: 
revelation is to be thought as … that indissoluble unity of event, 
speaking and hearing, as it is objectively attested in the Bible!  
Whoever wants to find it must seek it and not anything else, not 
merely that which it also is.  Otherwise he will never find it.77 
3C.3 Revelation Transforming History into the History of Promise 
Third, the statement that ‘revelation is Urgeschichte’ means that the event of 
revelation has an effect on history as such.  Barth maintains that history in general, 
although not revelation, still possesses some positive qualities.  For one thing, 
history can bear witness to revelation.78  For another, history, being in need of 
meaning, is capable of receiving meaning from revelation, which is the prototype, 
meaning and fulfilment of all history.  Revelation as Urgeschichte takes effect when 
history receives meaning from it, that is, when there arises ‘a history in history’, 
which Barth calls the ‘history of promise’.79 
In Barth’s view, Urgeschichte and the history of promise are linked in an 
irreversible but genuine relationship.  This relationship is irreversible, in that 
Urgeschichte is original and effective, and the history of promise is derivative and 
effected.  It is genuine, in that Urgeschichte takes effect in history by giving rise to 
the history of promise.  More specifically, Urgeschichte is effective in history, not 
by being situated at one point in history, but by embracing all history.  The effects 
of Urgeschichte are not simply after-effects.  If Urgeschichte were effective only in 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 318. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 319. 
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its own time, then it could only become decreasingly effective in the age after it, and 
not effective at all in the age before it.  But Barth makes it clear that every age in 
history is capable of becoming the history of promise, because Urgeschichte 
embraces all history, transcending historical distance.  Therefore, although as such 
‘Urgeschichte has no historical continuity’,80 it still ‘has effects directly as the speech 
of God to human beings of the nearest as well as the most distant ages.’81 
Barth concludes by writing the following: 
Revelation is more than eternal history in that it is a moment in the 
temporal history.  It is also more than temporal history in that it is 
not bound up to the irreversible series of temporal history, but itself 
the centre around which the remainder of the history closes into a 
circle, uniformly but also distinctively as Before and After.  And the 
positive relation of all history to Urgeschichte consists in this: that 
history can be related to revelation as the peripheral to the centre, as 
the promise to the fulfilment, as the Advent to Christmas.  Unlike 
Urgeschichte, history is not revelation, but it, in knowing about 
revelation, can bear witness to it, have a share in it, and thus be 
qualified history of the second order, that is, history which takes place 
on the plane of Urgeschichte … .82 
3C.4 Brief Summary 
It is beyond doubt that §15.1 of Die christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf constitutes the 
most comprehensive formulation of Barth’s concept of history in his doctrine of 
revelation up to this point of his career.  Having devised the motto about the 
subject-predicate relation of revelation to history, he kept seeking to refine and 
                                                 
80 Ibid.: ‘Die Urgeschichte hat keine geschichtliche Kontinuität.’ 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., 320.  To the extent that history plays its proper role as promise and the Advent bearing 
witness to the Urgeschichte, Barth proposes that the problem of ‘revelation and history’ be replaced 
by ‘revelation and church’.  ChD, 320f.  See also ‘Kirche und Theologie’, Vorträge und kleinere 
Arbeiten 1922-1925, 660; ET, 293. 
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expand it, and found the category of Urgeschichte.  By way of a very broad 
interpretation of Urgeschichte (as supra-historical, temporally historical, and 
historical in a particular sense), Barth was able to form a multi-layered conception of 
revelation in which both its immanent side (in history) and its transcendent side (not 
of history) were preserved. 
Precisely this two-sidedness is probably the reason why this conception 
would soon fall out of favour on both sides.  On the one hand, Friedrich Gogarten 
criticised Barth for failing to stay consistent with his self-acknowledged 
starting-point, i.e. the incarnation in history.  And this, according to Gogarten, led to 
the fact that Barth’s conception of revelation as Urgeschichte still presupposed a 
realm above history.  In short, Barth was not ‘historical’ enough.83  On the other 
hand, Barth himself would become more radically christocentric come the 1930s, and 
find the category of Urgeschichte ‘too historical’, in the realisation that he was still 
starting from ‘history’ of some sort in order to give account to revelation.  The 
result, then, is an explicit renouncement of the category of Urgeschichte in the late 
1930s.84 
3D Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we have shown 1) Barth’s shift from an eschatological to a 
christological view of revelation in 1924 in Göttingen, which enabled his construal of 
the three forms of God’s Word as the communication of revelation in history; 2) his 
                                                 
83 Friedrich Gogarten, ‘Karl Barths Dogmatik’, Theologische Rundschau, nf 1 (1929), 75.  Cited in 
McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 401.  In response to Gogarten’s criticism, it can be argued that 
the incarnation, as Barth’s new theological starting-point, was never simply human-historical but 
human-historical with a divine-eternal origin.  For this reason, Gogarten could disagree with Barth’s 
conception of the incarnation as in history with its origin above history, but the criticism that Barth 
did not remain true to his new theological starting-point does not seem justified. 
84 I/2, 58.  See footnote 85 in section 4C.2. 
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formulation of the subject-predicate relation of revelation to history in 1925; and 3) 
his appropriation of the category of Urgeschichte, in 1927, for an experimental, 
comprehensive conception of revelation as above history, in history, and in history in 
a particular sense.  Once seen as an impossibility made possible by God 
eschatologically in the resurrection, revelation in history is now seen as a reality 




Speaking God Revealed in History (II): 
Church Dogmatics I (1932-1938) 
 
Introduction 
In March 1930 Barth moved to Bonn, staying there for five years before he was 
expelled from Germany and moved to Basel.  In the turbulent decade of the 1930s 
Barth was alert to the external factors which he viewed as menaces to the Word of 
God.  He defined theology as a function of and within the church,1 emphasised on 
the first commandment while warning against the danger of having ‘other gods’ than 
the true one God,2 appealed for continuous, single-minded dedication to theology ‘as 
if nothing had happened’,3 strengthened his firm insistence on the primacy of Jesus 
Christ as the one Word of God and the one source of church’s proclamation, rejected 
any other lords in the form of ‘prevailing ideological and political convictions’,4 and 
directed a loud ‘No’ to what he considered the dangerous possibility of any contact 
point between God and humanity.5 
Regarding the development of Barth’s theology, two events stand out in the 
1930s.  The first is the publication of his famous Anselm in 1931, a book based on 
his seminar on Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo? given in the summer of 1930.  As 
                                                 
1 Karl Barth, ‘Die Theologie und der heutige Mensch’, Zwischen den Zeiten, 8 (1930), 374-396 (375). 
2 Karl Barth, ‘Das erste Gebot als theologisches Axiom’, Zwischen Den Zeiten, 11 (1933), 297-314. 
3 Karl Barth, Theological Existence To-day!: A Plea for Theological Freedom, trans. by R. Birch 
Hoyle (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1933), 9. 
4 Karl Barth, ‘The Theological Declaration of Barmen’, 1934 
<http://www.sacred-texts.com/chr/barmen.htm> [accessed 10 October 2010]. 
5 Karl Barth, ‘NO!: Answer to Emil Brunner,’ in Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, Natural Theology, 
trans. by Peter Fraenkel (London: G. Bles, The Centenary Press, 1946), 74f. 
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McCormack convincingly demonstrates, this book does not constitute the theological 
breakthrough that it was believed to be;6 it is probably not the or even an ‘important 
key’ to understanding his theological method as Barth himself described it,7 but 
rather an accumulation and recapitulation of Barth’s ongoing commitment since the 
christological grounding of revelation in the incarnation in 1924.  The centre of this 
book is Barth’s determination to give unwavering priority to ‘what is’ over ‘what can 
be’,8 and his contention that knowledge about God’s reality can only be given to us 
by God, and that we, instead of trying to prove or build that knowledge, can only 
recognise and assent to it with faith and hence reflect upon or think-after 
[nachdenken] it with understanding.9  For our purposes, this line of thinking means 
that, as in the two dogmatic enterprises in the 1920s, Barth’s concept of history in the 
1930s will continue to be developed in and measured by his doctrine of revelation. 
The second significant event in the 1930s, of course, is Barth’s decision ‘to 
begin again at the beginning, saying the same thing, but in a very different way’, the 
result of which is the thirteen volumes of the Church Dogmatics.10  Volume one is 
dedicated to the construction the doctrine of the Word, the very doctrine on the basis 
of which Barth establishes his grand theological enterprise.  For our purposes, CD I 
is significant for the remarkable extent to which Barth, within the bounds of the 
                                                 
6 For detail see McCormack, Dialectical Theology, 434ff. 
7 Barth, ‘Preface to the Second Edition’ (1958), Karl Barth, Anselm, Fides Quaerens Intellectum: 
Anselm’s Proof of the Existence of God in the Context of His Theological Scheme, trans. by Ian W. 
Robertson, 2nd edn (London: SCM Press, 1960), 11. 
8 Ibid., 52: ‘[Anselm’s] starting point is therefore not to seek “what can be” but to seek “what is” and 
in fact to seek “what cannot fail to be”.  It is precisely as “what cannot fail to be” that he tries to 
conceive “what is”.’ 
9 Ibid., 40.  It should also be remarked that for Barth, faith seeking understanding is not an option 
but a demand.  Acceptance of the truth of God’s reality necessarily entails thinking-after and 
describing it: ‘Any extension or explication of or meditation upon the acceptance of the Credo in faith 
can be nothing more than a description of this acceptance’, ibid., 28. 
10 ‘Preface’, I/1, xi. 
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subject-predicate relation, allows the notions of revelation and history to interact.  
Drawing on this subject-predicate interaction, we seek to demonstrate that, on the 
one hand, Barth allows the reality of the history which revelation both becomes and 
is to shape his doctrine of revelation and, conversely, allows the reality of revelation 
to shape his concepts of history and of time. 
For that purpose, this chapter is divided into three sections.  Section 4A will 
show that the historicity of revelation is placed at a crucial point in Barth’s 
conception of the dialectic of veiling and unveiling of God’s Word.  As this 
dialectic continues into Barth’s trinitarianly conceived doctrine of revelation, the 
concrete historicity of revelation in Jesus Christ exerts such significant impact that 
several specific forms of ‘historicisation’ can be detected with regard to revelation, 
the Son, and the Spirit, as will be argued in section 4B.  Finally in section 4C we 
will attempt to show that, in Barth’s teaching on the incarnation, corresponding to the 
‘historicisation’ in the doctrine of revelation, there is what might be termed a 
christological or revelatory concentration of human history.  Taken together it will 
be shown that, in that the speaking God is revealed, revelation takes place not above 
or on the verge of but precisely and really in history, reacting with history. 
4A The Dialectic of Veiling and Unveiling of God’s Word in 
History 
§5 of the CD constitutes a point of departure where Barth’s third attempt at a 
dogmatic project palpably differs from the previous two.  In it he emphatically 
announces that ‘we have to deviate … from the first edition of this book [i.e. Die 
christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf]’ in a painstaking attempt to rid himself of any 
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possible traces of existential thinking and anthropology. 11   Whilst its parallel 
paragraphs in the two predecessors began with the human side, 12  §5 begins 
distinctively with the an exploration of ‘the nature [Wesen] of the Word of God’.13 
In this paragraph Barth first defines God’s Word as God’s speech (§5.2), and 
then defines God’s speech as His act (§5.3) and as His mystery (§5.4).  In 
designating God’s speech as His act, Barth poses the dialectic of 
non-contemporaneity and contemporaneity; in designating God’s speech as His 
mystery, he poses the dialectic of mystery and secularity.  These two forms of 
dialectic can be seen as belonging to the dialectic of the veiling and unveiling of 
revelation, as revelation is the divine speech to humanity in history and in the world.  
By examining these two forms of dialectic, this section seeks to demonstrate that 
Barth unequivocally affirms the reality of the history which revelation becomes and 
is. 
4A.1 God’s Speech-Act Taking Place in History: The Dialectic of 
Non-Contemporaneity and Contemporaneity 
In §4 of the CD Barth defines revelation, Scripture, and preaching as the threefold 
form of God’s Word.  In §5 he defines the Word as God’s speech in act, and then 
asserts that ‘[t]he fact that God’s Word is God’s act means first its contingent 
contemporaneity’. 14   With this statement Barth registers the dialectic of 
non-contemporaneity and contemporaneity of God’s Word.  This dialectic consists 
                                                 
11 I/1, 125ff. 
12 §4 ‘Man and His Questions’, GD, 69ff.; §5 ‘The Word of God and the Human as Preacher’, §6 
‘The Word of God and the Human as Hearer’, §7 ‘The Becoming-Known of Human in the Word of 
God’, ChD, 69ff., 90ff., 109ff. 
13 Cf. KD I/1, 128. 
14 I/1, 145. 
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in that 1) the three moments are separated by historical distance (the veiledness of 
revelation), and 2) that it is only upon God’s act that they become contemporaneous 
(the unveiling of revelation).  When they become contemporaneous, it can only be a 
contingent occurrence (the unveiling of revelation contingent upon God’s act).  
Moreover, the three moments of God’s Word are distinguished ‘not only by the 
difference in periods and contents … but also by the fact that they place God to 
human beings in different ways.’15  What is observed is a differentiation which is 
not only temporal but also in terms of order: due to Jesus Christ’s unity with God, the 
revealed Word is prior to the written Word; because Scripture is the ground of 
Church proclamation, the written Word is prior to the proclaimed Word.  In this 
dialectic Barth is highlighting the fact that the differentiation in terms of order 
includes the temporal differentiation.  When the temporal differentiation is ignored, 
the differentiation in terms of order, too, is obscured. 
In maintaining this dialectic, Barth rejects modern Protestant theology’s 
attempt to view Jesus, biblical authors and even the Reformers as their ‘companion 
of one and the same time’.16  Specifically he deems Gotthold E. Lessing the 
forerunner of the new epoch of Neo-Protestantism and its overcoming of the 
Ungeschichtlichkeit of the Enlightenment with the newly found dictum ‘revelation in 
history’.  Whilst agreeing with Lessing in the latter’s contention for a ‘broad, ugly 
ditch’ between historical truths, 17  Barth differs with him in how this 
non-contemporaneity―in Barth’s terms―is to be overcome.  Whilst Lessing 
                                                 
15 Ibid.; translation revised per KD I/1, 150. 
16 I/1, 146. 
17 ‘If no historical truth can be demonstrated, then nothing can be demonstrated by means of historical 
truths.  That is: accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason.’  
Gotthold E. Lessing, ‘On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power’, idem, Lessing’s Theological Writings, 




(according to Barth), resorting to truths felt and experienced by us (not to truths 
demonstrated by historical investigation), ‘abandoned the non-contemporaneity of 
order, which is not to be sublated, in favour of an immanent non-contemporaneity, 
which is to be sublated immanently’,18 Barth holds that the non-contemporaneity 
cannot be overcome from the human side: 
if we abandon the distinction of the three times in terms of order, then 
no matter how loudly or sincerely we may talk about revelation and its 
concreteness and historicity, and no matter how illuminating or 
practical [everything may turn out to be], we have really abandoned 
the concept of the Word of God itself.19 
Barth’s insistence on this non-contemporaneity can be viewed as an affirmation of 
the historicity of revelation.  The history which revelation becomes and is is real 
history, so that the moment of revelation is differentiated from the other two 
moments of the same Word of God. 
The contingent contemporaneity of the three moments of God’s Word, when 
taking place on the basis of God’s act, also means that the unveiling of revelation 
takes place in history not generally but in a particular and concrete way: 
The problem of God’s Word [consists in the fact] that this specific 
revelation of God is imparted to this specific man to-day through the 
proclamation of this other specific man by means of this specific 
biblical text, so that a specific illic et tunc becomes a specific hic et 
nunc.20 
The concrete particularity of God’s Word can be understood from two aspects.  First, 
like all historical events, each moment of God’s Word in history has its own 
                                                 
18 I/1, 147; translation revised per KD I/1, 152. 
19 I/1, 147; KD I/1, 152. 
20 I/1, 149; translation slightly revised per KD I/1, 154. 
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particular ubi et quando.  In contrast with a general view of timeless truth, the 
particularity of the truth of God’s Word consists in its specific locale in time and 
space.  Second, different from all other historical events, which too have their own 
particular ‘there and then’, the moments of God’s Word in history claim a higher, 
unique particularity.  Their unique particularity consists in their being utilised by 
God Himself for the speaking and hearing of His Word.  In this light, in addition to 
Barth’s distinction between general, timeless truth and the particular truth of 
revelation in history, we might add another distinction, i.e. that between the ‘general 
particularity’ of all historical events and the ‘unique particularity’ of the historical 
event of God’s Word.  Due to this ‘unique particularity’, a purely historical 
understanding [historisches Verstehen] of God’s Word is dismissed for treating God’s 
Word as though it were among general events in history and thus abstracting it from 
the unique particularity proper to it.21 
4A.2 God’s Speech-Mystery Hidden in History: The Dialectic of Mystery 
and Secularity 
A second form of the dialectic of veiling and unveiling is that of mystery and 
secularity.  In that the event of revelation is the unveiling of something veiled, it is 
also an event of mystery taking place in the world. 
The dialectic of mystery and secularity is presented when Barth writes that 
                                                 
21 David Ford is right in commenting that in this regard there is indeed a ‘scandal of particularity’, 
meaning that ‘God is not primarily to be described in terms of general attributes …, but these 
attributes have their content determined by the way in which God has in fact determined himself, as 
told in the Bible.’  David Ford, ‘Barth’s Interpretation of the Bible’, in Stephen Sykes (ed.), Karl 
Barth, 55-87 (61).  In the same book Rowan Williams makes a similar complaint that ‘History, and 
the world as such, are wholly foreign to God: he can act through, but not in, the historical qua 
historical.’  Williams, ‘Barth on the Triune God’, ibid., 153.  For Barth, however, God does act in 
history [Geschichte], but only so in a way that is not historically [historisch] demonstrable. 
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‘[t]he speech of God is and remains the mystery of God, above all, in its secularity.’22  
On Barth’s account, God Himself is a mystery hidden from humanity, but the 
speech-act of God is God’s act of speech to human beings in the world and history.  
When God’s speech-act takes place, then, it takes forms which are human, secular 
and historical.  But even as the forms taken by God’s speech-act, in Barth’s view, 
Jesus, Scripture and the Church do not break open their thick veil of secularity; as a 
result, ‘[w]e do not have the Word of God otherwise than in the mystery of its 
secularity.’23 
The dialectic of mystery and secularity is obviously an expression for the 
dialectic of the veiling and unveiling of revelation.  On the one hand we do not have 
the Word of God except in those secular forms which it takes; on the other hand the 
form ‘as such is not the Word of God and … does not even give evidence that it is 
the form of the Word of God’.24  This form which the Word takes can be described 
as both necessary and unsuitable.  It is necessary for us to the extent that it 
addresses the weakness of us as human addressees of the Word.  It is unsuitable for 
the Word to the extent that it, not corresponding to but rather contradicting the Word, 
is not a reflection or complement but in essence an antithesis to and concealment of 
the Word.  The form then has the function of a buffer zone, so to speak, so that the 
mysterious can be unveiled in the world.  And the dialectic of mystery and 
secularity, then, consists in the fact that the mystery of God is unveiled to us not only 
in this secular form (as it is necessary for us) but also in spite of it (as it is unsuitable 
                                                 
22 I/1, 165; translation revised per KD I/1, 171. 
23 Ibid. 




The inappropriateness of the form of God’s Word, again, renders questionable 
the attempt to understand the Word by historical [historisch] method.  ‘Historical’ 
thinking which purports to penetrate those unsuitable forms is, in Barth’s view, 
simply a confusion of categories, as the secular form which God’s Word takes does 
not by itself lead to God’s speech-act, which, even in unveiling, remains a mystery 
hidden in the world and history.26 
In summary, this section has demonstrated 1) that in Barth’s notion of the 
dialectic of non-contemporaneity and contemporaneity the reality of the history 
which revelation becomes and is is affirmed (in that it is historically separated from 
other moments of God’s Word); and 2) that in view of the dialectic of mystery and 
secularity the contingent events of God’s Word are still hidden in history. 
Before we turn to the next section, it is crucial to notice the passage in fine 
print with which Barth concludes his treatment of God’s speech-act as mystery at the 
end of §5.  Here the dialectic of veiling and unveiling is directed to a clear 
distinction between God for us and God in Himself.  Barth warns against any forms 
of engagement in what he views as ‘correlation-theology’, in which ‘God swings up 
or down in His relation to us, either from below upwards so that God becomes a 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 166ff.  Rowan Williams argues that the form of the Word, thus conceived, constitutes a 
‘divorce’ of the form from the substance of revelation and is to be deemed as merely ‘external’, 
‘accidental’ and almost separable from it.  Williams, ‘Barth on the Triune God’, Sykes (ed.), Karl 
Barth, 153.  In Barth’s view, however, if the dialectic of mystery and secularity is not to be dissolved 
but maintained, the unsuitability of the form of the Word, too, needs to be maintained. 
26 I/1, 168.  It is important to notice that the Word as the mystery of God is not hidden in history in 
such a way that it is powerless in and limited by history.  As the Word is not confined within the 
bounds of or defined by those categories which are taken as important by ‘historical thinking’, it also 
is the ruling power that changes and makes history.  To a certain degree, this can be accounted for 
with Barth’s conception of the one-sidedness of the Word as a mystery.  See ibid., 149ff (especially 
152) and 174ff.  In this connection, Laurence Wood is misled to posit that Barth said that ‘revelation 
is not concerned with the general understanding of history as such’ because he ‘still defined revelation 
as the “Moment” of the pure presence of God’ (Wood, God and History, 198).  Revelation evades 
historical thinking, not because it is an eternal ‘Moment’, but because it remains a mystery in history. 
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predicate of man, or from above downwards so that man becomes a requisite in 
God’s nature.’27  To keep a distance from this danger, it is necessary that: 
we make a deliberate and sharp distinction between the Trinity of God 
as we may know it in the Word of God revealed, written and 
proclaimed, and God’s immanent Trinity, i.e., between ‘God in 
Himself’ and ‘God for us’, between the ‘eternal history of God’ and 
His temporal acts.28 
Accordingly, Barth emphatically contends that ‘the “God for us” does not arise as a 
matter of course out of [the background of] “God in Himself”’,29 that the Lord God 
exists not only as He addresses us in relation to us but also before that relation as 
God in Himself, in His eternal history.  In the final analysis, one might venture to 
say, Barth is seeking to keep the doctrine of revelation or Christology (understood as 
God’s revelation to us in Christ) in check by resorting to the doctrine of the Trinity 
(understood as God’s being in Himself): ‘in the strict doctrine of the Trinity as the 
presupposition of Christology [we] must speak of God in Himself, in isolation from 
man’.30  This statement suggests a view of God’s involvement with humanity and 
with history as grounded absolutely in God’s triune being in Himself.  It also 
indicates an attempt to control the revelation of Christ in history by the immanent 
Trinity in eternity.  Therefore, it not only opens up the gateway from the doctrine of 
the Word (§§1-7) to that of the Trinity (§§8-12), but also raises the question about the 
relationship between the doctrine of revelation and that of the Trinity.  With this 
question we move to the next section. 
                                                 
27 I/1, 172. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.; KD I/1, 179. 
30 I/1, 172. 
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4B ‘Historicisation’ in the Doctrine of Revelation 
The relationship between the doctrine of revelation and that of the Trinity in Barth’s 
theology is a clear focus of §8.  Here Barth attempts to establish the doctrine of the 
Trinity―along with all Christian dogma―on the ground of revelation.31  As the 
doctrine of revelation is being unfolded along a trinitarian line, the ‘unveiling’ aspect 
of the dialectic is given further and fuller consideration,32 as we shall see shortly. 
What follows in this section is based this significant passage from §8.2: 
And now we are no longer following the schema of subject, predicate, 
object (revealer, revelation, [being-revealed]) … Or rather, we now 
dissolve [lösen] this scheme … in the manner suited to the concrete 
form of revelation on the one side and the doctrine of the Trinity on 
the other.  The question of revealer, revelation and [being-revealed] 
corresponds to the logical and material [logisch-sachlichen] order both 
of biblical revelation and also of the doctrine of the Trinity. … But we 
must now follow another order if we are to see how biblical revelation 
and the doctrine of the Trinity are interconnected, how the second 
could and did proceed out of the first.  This is a historical question 
which has as such its own special form.  But it is governed by the 
fact that biblical revelation has on the one side a specific historical 
centre and the doctrine of the Trinity has on the other side a specific 
historical occasion [Anlaß] in biblical revelation.  Historically 
considered and stated the three questions answered in the Bible, that 
of revealer, revelation and [being-revealed], do not have the same 
importance.  The true theme of the biblical witness is the second of 
the concepts, God’s action in His revelation, revelation in answer to 
the question what God does, and therefore the predicate in our 
statement.  Within this theme the two other questions, materially no 
less important, are answered.  Similarly the doctrine of the Trinity, 
                                                 
31 I/1, 308ff, especially 311: ‘The basis or root of the doctrine of the Trinity, if it has one and is thus 
legitimate dogma―and it does have one and is thus legitimate dogma―lies in revelation’, and 312: 
‘We are not saying, then, that revelation is the basis of the Trinity, as though God were the triune God 
only in His revelation and only for the sake of His revelation.  What we are saying is that revelation 
is the basis of the doctrine of the Trinity; the doctrine of the Trinity has no other basis apart from this.’ 
32 I/1, 315ff. 
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when considered historically in its origin and development, is not 
equally interested in the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost.  Here 
too the theme is primarily the second person of the Trinity, God the 
Son, the deity of Christ.33 
This passage is remarkable in that 1) in the context of the doctrine of revelation the 
usual scheme of subject preceding act is dissolved, and emphasis is given to the 
action, the concrete form, and the historical centre of revelation; 2) in the context of 
the doctrine of the Trinity the usual scheme of Father preceding Son is dissolved and 
emphasis is given to its specific historical occasion, the Son; and 3) that which 
interconnects the biblical revelation with the doctrine of the Trinity is specified as a 
concrete form, a historical question.  With these three points in view, Barth decides 
to ‘follow another order’, i.e. a historical order that is pertinent to this historical 
question. 
In this light, this section seeks to argue 1) that in placing the act of revelation 
prior to the Subject of revelation, Barth ‘historicises’ the notion of revelation; 2) that 
in placing the self-unveiling of God prior to the veiled God, Barth ‘historicises’ the 
notion of the Son; and 3) that in Barth’s explication of the element of the revelation’s 
‘becoming-imparted to human’, we find a ‘historicisation’ effected by the Spirit.  
This threefold ‘historicisation’ in Barth’s doctrine of revelation is possible, we also 
contend, because the reality of the history which revelation becomes and is has been 
unequivocally affirmed by Barth.34 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 314f.; KD I/1, 331f.  Note that the schema of subject, predicate, object is one of revealer, 
revelation and being-revealed [Offenbarer, Offenbarung, Offenbarsein].  In this thesis the term 
Offenbarsein is consistently translated into ‘being-revealed’, instead of the somewhat confusing 
fluctuation between revealedness (e.g. I/1, 295, 298, 299), being revealed (e.g. 298, 299, 314, 330, 
331, 332), and revealing (e.g. 314). 
34 Two explanatory notes are to be made about the way we present our argument.  First, with the 
subject-predicate relation of revelation to history clearly in view, the ‘historicisation’ proposed here 
only refers to the history which revelation becomes and is, and not to human history in the general 
sense.  Second, in giving ‘historicisation’ such emphasis, we are not unaware of the general 
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4B.1 Act Preceding Subject: ‘Historicisation’ of Revelation 
As Jüngel rightly remarks, the notion of Deus dixit is considered the foundation of 
the doctrine of the Trinity already in Die christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf.35  In the 
CD, the doctrine of revelation is treated along an obvious trinitarian line.  This is 
clearly seen in Barth’s threefold definition of revelation as the event in which ‘God 
reveals Himself, He reveals Himself through Himself, [and] He reveals Himself.’36  
In this formula, ‘God Himself in unimpaired unity yet also in unimpaired difference 
is Revealer, Revelation and [Being-revealed].’37  Put differently, God as the Subject 
of revelation is totally identical with His act of revelation as well as with its effect.  
In revelation ‘He [as the Who of revelation] is completely Himself in this That and 
How.’38  In this threefold perspective of revelation thus structured an important 
aspect of Barth’s dialectic of veiling and unveiling begins to unfold. 
With in view the unity of God in revelation, we recall from the long passage 
cited at the beginning of this section that ‘[t]he question of revealer, revelation and 
being-revealed corresponds to the logical and material order’.  Logically and 
materially, the Revealer (the Subject, the who) precedes the other two elements, as 
admittedly there first is a subject to then perform the act, and then the effect follows 
the act. 39  Somewhat surprisingly, however, Barth then replaces this order by 
                                                                                                                                          
directionality in I/1 of referring from the revealed, acting God in the world to the eternal God in 
Himself (as in §§10-12).  What this proposal attempts to demonstrate is that already in I/1 the 
doctrine of revelation, even as the epistemological starting-point, still has some ontological import 
(‘historicisation’) to the second mode of being of the Trinity. 
35 Eberhard Jüngel, God’s Being Is in Becoming: The Trinitarian Being of God in the Theology of 
Karl Barth; a Paraphrase, trans. by John Webster, 2nd edn (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 28. 
36 I/1, 296. 
37 I/1, 295; KD I/1, 311. 
38 I/1, 297. 
39 The positing of a subject prior to its action presupposes an essentialist ontology.  In contrast, an 
actualistic ontology posits that a being consists in its actions, and therefore that God’s being is an act.  
134 
 
‘another order’ which gives priority to ‘the second of the concepts, God’s action in 
His revelation, revelation in answer to the question what God does’.  The act of 
revelation is then given priority to its Subject, because it is only through what God 
does that we may know who God is, and not the opposite.  The problem of 
revelation is for Barth a ‘historical question’, because in the biblically attested 
concept of revelation there is a ‘specific historical centre’, which is the ‘concrete 
form of revelation’.  In view of this historical centre, then, Barth suspends the more 
logically oriented order and follows the more historically oriented order, focusing on 
the reality of the act of revelation as it has takes place in human history.  In this 
sense, then, it can be argued that Barth has in a specific sense ‘historicised’ the 
notion of revelation.40 
4B.2 ‘Self-Unveiling’ Preceding the Veiled: ‘Historicisation’ of the Son 
The act of revelation is placed prior to the its Subject at the ‘historical centre’, 
because it is in this act that God is unveiled.  This is seen in another definition of 
revelation provided by Barth: 
Revelation in the Bible means the self-unveiling (which becomes 
imparted to humanity) of the God who by His nature cannot be 
unveiled to humanity.41 
What constitutes the act of God’s self unveiling as a ‘historical question’ is the fact 
that ‘in His revelation He takes form, and precisely this taking-form [Gestalthaben] 
                                                                                                                                          
For more detail see Paul T. Nimmo, Being in Action: The Theological Shape of Barth’s Ethical Vision 
(London: T&T Clark, 2007).  See related discussions in sections 5B.1 and 8A. 
40 The point made here is that the concrete historicity of revelation is taken with such seriousness that 
revelation cannot be said to be not in history.  By contrast, in the sense that ‘[t]he eternal Son is 
present in history indirectly, never becoming directly identical with the veil of human flesh in which 
He conceals Himself’, revelation is not historicised, as understood in the general sense.  See 
McCormack, Dialectial Theology, 366. 
41 I/1, 315; translation revised per KD I/1, 332f. 
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of His is His self-unveiling.’42  Because God by nature cannot be unveiled, when 
He unveils Himself, He takes a form, and in taking-form God distinguishes Himself 
from Himself.  For Barth God’s self-unveiling, taking-form and self-distinction are 
one and the same event.  Differently put, the act of revelation is the one act in which 
God unveils Himself and distinguishes Himself from Himself by taking a form.  
God’s taking-forming then stands out in Barth’s elaboration of God’s self-unveiling. 
Concerning God’s act of taking-form, two things need to be noticed.  First, 
the ‘form’ which God takes is not one which is independent of ‘content’.  ‘The 
distinction between form and content [Form und Inhalt] cannot be applied to the 
biblical concept of revelation.’43  The form [Gestalt] which God takes is not a form, 
so to speak, infused with some content which is external or separable from it;44 rather, 
it is a specific shape or configuration which is peculiar to one of His modes of being 
[Seinsweise].45  Second, God’s taking-form is an act peculiar to His mode of being 
of the Son in contrast with that of the Father, who ‘always, even in taking form in the 
Son, does not take form’.46  This form that God takes, then, is a form in history, a 
historical form, taken in the Son’s incarnation. 
In that the self-unveiling constitutes the ‘historical centre’ of revelation, and 
in that this self-unveiling consists in the Son’s taking form in history, we propose, a 
specific ‘historicisation’ of the Son is made possible and even necessary in Barth’s 
doctrine of revelation.  We refer to a passage of crucial importance to this 
understanding: 
                                                 
42 I/1, 316; translation revised per KD I/1, 333. 
43 I/1, 306; KD I/1, 323. 
44 Cf. Williams, ‘Barth on the Triune God’, Sykes (ed.), Karl Barth, 153. 
45 I/1, 316; KD I/1, 333. 
46 I/1, 324. 
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When the Bible speaks of revelation, it does so in the form of the 
report of a history or of a series of histories.  The content of this 
history and of each of these specific histories, however, is that 
self-unveiling of God.  In that it gives us this report, we admittedly 
also experience the fact that the One who thus unveils Himself is the 
God who by His nature cannot be unveiled to humanity, and that this 
self-unveiling becomes imparted to specific human beings.  
Logically and materially this immediately becomes equally important 
as that reported self-unveiling.  Historically the latter constitutes the 
centre. … In the historical life of humanity He takes up a 
place―indeed a very specific place―and makes Himself the object of 
human outlook, human experience, human thinking and human speech.  
He makes Himself an instance and a factor, a concrete instance and a 
historical factor, i.e. an element of human existence, one that is 
significant and effective in time and in temporal connections.47 
The proposition that ‘historically the latter [i.e. the reported self-unveiling] 
constitutes the centre’ can be accounted for in two complementary ways.  First, in 
terms of its recipients, revelation comes ad extra to human beings in the form of the 
history of God’s self-unveiling as it is reported in the Bible.  It is only by virtue of 
the historical report of the Son’s unveiling act that human knowledge of God is 
possible.  That is why ‘historically’ the self-unveiling, which takes place in and with 
the specific ‘historicisation’ of the Son, is said to constitute the centre.  This centre 
is ‘a concrete instance and a historical factor’, so that it may become the object of 
human perception.  This account of the historical reality of the event of revelation is 
not new.  What is remarkable is Barth’s conception of this historical centre as 
‘significant and effective in time and in temporal connections’.  Revelation, then, is 
not merely significant in time but also effective in temporal connections. 
Second, the self-unveiling of God as the ‘historical centre’ is seen as also 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 315f.; translation revised per KD I/1, 333. 
137 
 
related to God’s work ad intra, i.e. to His self-distinction.  In Barth’s view, God’s 
self-unveiling consists in His taking-form in the act of revelation.  And in taking 
form God becomes an ‘alter ego’ in the sense that whilst God in His ‘first mode of 
being’ is hidden in Himself, He in His ‘second mode of being’ becomes unlike 
Himself by taking form in history.  The incarnation of the Son in history, then, is the 
historical centre at which God’s self-unveiling and self-distinction takes place.  In 
the incarnation, God becomes historical whilst remaining eternal, thus distinguishing 
Himself as God the Son from Himself as God the Father whilst still maintaining the 
divine unity.48  The incarnation, as the historical centre, can then be taken as the 
specific ‘historicisation’ in which the Son is distinguished from the Father by taking 
form in order to unveil the veiled God. 
In registering this proposal, we are aware of the fact that the Son does not 
differ from the Father only in His assuming a historical form.  Even before the 
incarnation took place in history the Son is already differentiated from the Father in 
the eternity which they share with the Spirit.49  But there has to be a correspondence 
between God’s self-unveiling and His self-distinction, because in both cases we have 
to do with one and the same Jesus Christ.  Accordingly, the correspondence 
between the unveiled God and the veiled God has to be taken to mean also the 
correspondence between the Son in history and the Son in Himself: if the One who is 
revealed to us is the same One as He is in Himself, then the One who is the historical 
                                                 
48 I/1, 316-320.  In this connection Eberhard Jüngel remarks that revelation is the predicate of God 
in such a way that it is in every way identical with God, and therefore that ‘the doctrine of the Trinity 
is the interpretation of the self-interpretation of God’, Jüngel, God’s Being Is in Becoming, 29. 
49 See I/1 414ff. where Barth discusses ‘The Eternal Son’.  Drawing heavily on this subsection Paul 
Molnar emphasises that 1) Jesus Christ does not first become the Son of God in revelation; 2) Jesus 
Christ is the Son, not because He reveals Himself to us, but because He is; and 3) all thinking about 
Jesus Christ must begin and end with thinking about God.  Molnar, ‘Can Jesus’ Divinity be 
Recognized as ‘Definitive, Authentic and Essential’ if it is Grounded in Election?’, 45f. 
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centre of God’s self-unveiling is also the same One in distinction from His Father in 
eternity.  Therefore we make the point that, to the extent that Barth gives 
precedence to the self-unveiling over the veiled in his doctrine of revelation, he also 
‘historicises’ his concept of the Son in his doctrine of the Trinity.50 
4B.3 ‘Becoming-Imparted to Humanity’: ‘Historicisation’ by the Spirit 
In this subsection we intend to elaborate Barth’s conception of the historical 
impartation of revelation.  In Barth’s terms, this aspect of revelation refers to the 
‘becoming-imparted to humanity’ of the self-unveiling of God by the Spirit.  With 
the stress shifting to God the Spirit, Barth is now focusing on the ongoing effect of 
revelation, i.e. the impartation of the event of revelation to its human recipients.  In 
this sense, then, revelation entails not only the specific ‘historicisation’ of the Son, 
but also the Spirit-effected appropriation of it for concrete human beings in their 
historical particularity: a ‘historicisation’ by the Spirit. 
Barth’s account of the self-imparting dimension of revelation is constituted 
by a special treatment of the ‘particular historicity’ of revelation,51 a notion related to  
particular human beings as the destination of revelation.  That which is historical 
has constantly been regarded by Barth as particular, concrete, accidental, and 
unrepeatable.52  Here in the context of the self-impartation of revelation, too, the 
‘particular historicity’ has to do with the particular and concrete recipients of 
revelation.  As Barth sees it, this notion stands on guard against abstract and 
                                                 
50 In the meantime, we must add, in view of the fact that at this stage Barth still speaks of the eternal 
Son as ‘so antecedently in Himself as the Son or Word of God the Father’ (I/1, 399), the 
‘historicisation’ observed in the doctrine of revelation is rather limited in scope.  But in view of the 
‘historicisation’ more fully developed in his acutalistic ontology registered in II/1 and unfolded in II/2, 
this limited ‘historicisation’ in I/1 cannot be taken to have no significance. 
51 I/1, 326, 327, 329; KD I/1, 345, 347. 
52 Cf. R1, 20; Barth, ‘Reformierte Lehre, ihr Wesen und ihre Aufgabe’ (1923), Vorträge und kleinere 
Arbeiten 1922-1925, 202-247 (211); I/1, 147f., 314f. 
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metaphysical ideas about revelation on the one hand, and distinguishes itself from 
historical demonstrability as defined in modern historical research on the other.53 
These two battlefronts are related to the ontological question of the nature of 
the reality of the history which revelation becomes and is, and to the epistemological 
question of the proper approach to the knowledge of that reality, respectively.  In 
terms of the former, Barth holds that the particular historicity of revelation shares at 
least one certain ontological quality with other historical occurrences: 
if we bring in the concept of history in explanation, only this can be 
the tertium comparationis: that in revelation as in history it is a matter 
of a definite event which is different from every other event and which 
is thus incomparable and unrepeatable.54 
All historical occurrences are unique in the sense that none of them is a ‘mere 
exponent of some general occurrence’, ‘a special case under a rule’, or ‘the 
realisation of a general possibility’.55  Likewise, the relation of God to humanity in 
revelation is also to be understood as existing in a concrete and definite way.  The 
modern attempt to make a distinction between ‘eternal content and historical 
[historisch] “vehicle”’ 56  is to be denied, because it renders that particular 
God-human relation in revelation effective everywhere and at all times.57  On the 
contrary, the self-impartation of revelation possesses a particular historicity which is 
                                                 
53 I/1, 324ff. 
54 Ibid., 329; translation revised per KD I/1, 348. 
55 Ibid.  Cf. I/2, 209f.: ‘Revelation does not encounter man in any general way, as though it were the 
eternal definition or eternal meaning of all time, or the general solution of the riddle of temporal 
occurrence.’ 
56 I/1, 329. 
57 As Colin Gunton remarks, Barth has a commitment to ‘[preventing] the conception of revelation 
from degenerating into triviality, metaphysical generality, or myth.’  Colin E. Gunton, Becoming and 




shared by all other historical events. 
The other front is related to the approach to historical knowledge.  The 
approach to historical knowledge in general, according to Barth, is by way of 
assessing, therefore claiming or denying the possibility, probability or actuality of 
historical events.  What is and can be known through that approach, however, is 
merely the human side and temporal form of historical events.  By contrast, the 
particular historicity of revelation refers to the divine side of the specific historical 
event of revelation.  This particular relation between God and humanity in 
revelation, then, cannot be established or denied by purely historical judgement.  
‘No genuinely “historical” [judgement] can be passed on the [particular] historicity 
of the history recorded in the biblical witness’,58 for it is not a matter of general 
possibilities of human beings but of ‘hearing or non-hearing of the biblical history’.59 
At this point it seems suitable to consider Ebeling’s conception of particular 
historicity.  To Ebeling’s mind, the ‘particular historicity’ of revelation (or its 
historicity sui generic) derives from the presupposition of revelation’s ontological 
uniqueness.  He then criticises this notion for building ‘a [protective] wall around a 
certain sphere of history, distinguished from all other history’60 which isolates the 
historical fact of revelation from general history.  And ‘if the historicity of 
revelation is said to be a historicity that is essentially different and ontologically 
unique, in contrast to the historicity of history in general, we have turned our backs 
on the message of revelation of God in history.’61 
                                                 
58 I/1, 326; KD I/1, 345. 
59 Ibid., 327. 
60 Gerhard Ebeling, The Problem of Historicity in the Church and Its Proclamation, trans. by Grover 
Foley (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), 73. 
61 Ibid., 74. 
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Barth would agree with Ebeling insofar as the ontological particularity of 
revelation is concerned, but for Barth that ontological particularity does not translate 
into a protective wall.  Ebeling has this ‘isolated’ view of the particular historicity 
of revelation, because he presupposes that all historical events are ‘completely 
accessible to historical observation’.62  In Barth’s view, however, that particular 
historicity is not removed from general historicity, but added to it.63  Therefore, the 
particular historicity of revelation does not need to be surrounded by a protective 
wall; it rather, as it were, tears down the wall with which general historicity is 
surrounded by adding itself to it. 
The particular historicity of revelation consists in the impartation of 
revelation to particular human beings, and this is the work specifically of the Spirit.  
On Barth’s account, this third element of revelation is necessary, because revelation 
is not something self-evident, intelligible per se, or accessible to human beings 
everywhere and at all times.  It has to be the work of the Holy Spirit, so as to secure 
the one divine subjectivity in revelation by ensuring that He who makes impartation 
is totally identical with He who unveils and with He who is unveiled.64  Moreover, 
this moment of impartation by the Spirit gives rise to the responsive confession made 
by the human recipient: ‘this factual taking place, this becoming ascertainable and 
                                                 
62 Ibid. 
63 ChD, §15, 309ff.  Cf. section 3C. 
64 Ibid., 330.  By defining the third moment of revelation within the trinitarian framework, Barth 
distinguishes the dialectic of veiling and unveiling in revelation from the Hegelian dialectic in which 
the progress from in-itself to for-itself is self-evident and intelligible, and the outcome of which is the 
sublation of the first and the second into a third.  In sharp contrast with the Hegelian dialectic, God’s 
revelation, precisely on the basis of in-Himself, goes through the historical course, not for 
self-realisation of any sort, but rather in order to be not only in Himself but also pro nobis, that is, for 
us as historically located and conditioned beings.  Neither the first nor the second moment of the 
divine revelation is sublated or sublatable into a third; instead, all three moments are and remain 
united in the one deity of the triune God. 
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acknowledgeable, is the historicity of revelation.’65  To the extent that the Holy 
Spirit imparts the concrete event of revelation at one specific time in history to 
concrete human beings at many specific times in history, the self-impartation as the 
third moment in revelation can well be said to be the ‘historicisation’ of revelation by 
the Holy Spirit. 
Finally, it is true that Barth’s epistemological starting-point (the economic 
Trinity) in time leads his theology to the ontological end-point (the essential or 
immanent Trinity) in eternity.66  But as McCormack makes clear (based on his 
understanding of Jüngel), the revelation of Jesus Christ is not only an 
epistemological starting-point but also the only reality to which his doctrine of the 
Trinity can only provide ontological conditions.67  In Barth’s own words: 
we did not derive our differentiation of the Loci from the doctrine of 
the Trinity.  We derived the doctrine of the Trinity itself from the 
same source as that from which is now derived the differentiation of 
the Loci, viz., the work and activity of God in His revelation.68 
                                                 
65 Ibid.; translation revised per KD I/1, 349. 
66 Bromiley, An Introduction to the Theology of Karl Barth, 21. 
67 McCormack, ‘God Is His Decision’, Theology as Conversation, 58: ‘the doctrine of the Trinity is 
made to be the ontological condition of the possibility of revelation in time understood in Barth’s 
sense’, and 63: ‘Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity was constructed … in an effort to provide the 
ontological ground―not of his later Christology!―but of his doctrine of revelation, construed along 
the lines of a dialectic of veiling and unveiling.’  In this regard, David Ford’s comment is right that 
for Barth the doctrine of the Trinity is ‘exclusively revealed in the events of Jesus Christ’s existence’.  
But what he terms ‘a strong Christocentric bias’ reflects in fact simply Barth’s close adherence to 
God’s revelation in Jesus Christ.  Ford, ‘Barth’s Interpretation of the Bible’, Karl Barth: Studies of 
His Theological Method, 60. 
68 I/2, 878.  At this point it seems proper to register a critique of Paul Molnar’s contention that the 
doctrine of the Trinity constitutes the centre of Barth’s dogmatics.  In Divine Freedom and the 
Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity Molnar claims that Barth places ‘God as the foundation of true 
knowledge’ (x).  He is right in stating that for Barth ‘[t]he doctrine of the Trinity … depends on this 
Word’ (xi).  But ambiguity arises when he goes on to claim that ‘[i]t [i.e. the doctrine of the Trinity] 
can help to clarify who God is in revelation and is itself the central Christian doctrine, but it is not 
itself the controlling centre of dogmatics.  Since God is this centre’ (xi).  This remark is dubious for 
two reasons.  First, Barth does not write in the passage cited by Molnar (I/2, 878f.) that the doctrine 
of the Trinity ‘is itself the central doctrine’.  What Barth does write is that it is by first being 
instructed by the doctrine of the Trinity that we are then able to understand the ‘interconnexion and 
yet also the independence of the doctrines of creation, atonement and redemption’ to be analogous to 
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In this doctrine of revelation, which Barth unfolds along a trinitarian line with 
ontological conditions provided by the doctrine of the Trinity, the particular 
historicity of revelation is unequivocally affirmed.  It is because of this historicity 
that the three forms of ‘historicisation’ take place in Barth’s doctrine of revelation. 
4C Revelatory Concentration of History: The Time of 
Revelation 
The three specific forms of ‘historicisation’ in Barth’s doctrine of revelation 
demonstrate the remarkable extent to which Barth allows the ‘predicate’ (history) to 
exert influence on our understanding of the ‘subject’ (revelation).  In this final 
section, we seek to demonstrate how Barth shapes his concept of history and of time 
from the viewpoint of the ‘subject’, revelation. 
Revelation takes place in history as the subject of their relation.  The usual 
demand made on revelation for a justifiable account of its relation to history 
presupposes that history is an autonomous reality complete in itself and as such, and 
that we human beings are in possession of that reality.  But since revelation is the 
most actual reality, it means that we do not possess time as a dependent reality but 
that in revelation God has time for us.69  It then follows that a demand is made on 
                                                                                                                                          
the ‘independent modes of the being of God Himself, and therefore irreducible to any higher unity’ 
(ibid., 879).  The doctrine of the Trinity, then, is for Barth the prototype which sheds light on the 
other three doctrines at issue; but it is hardly ‘the central doctrine’ of every other doctrine. 
Second, just as Barth does not affirm the doctrine of the Trinity as ‘the central doctrine’, so does 
he not designate God Himself to be ‘the foundation of true knowledge’ or the centre of 
dogmatics.  When Barth ties the doctrine of God, including that of the Trinity, with the other three 
doctrines into one series of loci, what he has in mind as something of a higher order standing ‘outside 
the series of Loci’ (ibid., 879) is not God as such but God’s self-revelation.  For apart from this 
revelation we as human beings have no other access to God Himself.  Here as much as elsewhere 
Barth understands ‘this being of God in His work and activity’―as is revealed to us―as the event 
[Ereignis] of the Word of God (ibid., 879; KD I/2, 983).  Revelation, inasmuch as it is God’s 
self-revelation, is not merely God’s action but has God as its Subject and to that extent corresponds to 
God’s being as such.  On this ground, revelation is ascribed the status of the controlling centre of 
dogmatics.  For more detail see Hensley, ‘Trinity and Freedom’, especially 91-93. 
69 I/2, 46. 
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us for a justifiable account of history in the light of revelation.  Precisely this is 
what Barth attempts to do in §14 of the CD. 
This section will argue that to the ‘historicisation’ of the doctrine of 
revelation, there corresponds what I call the christological or revelatory 
concentration of history in Barth’s teaching of the incarnation.  This notion, which 
runs through §14, consists of a threefold conception of revelation as the ‘subject’ of 
history, namely the conception of revelation as God’s gift and fulfilment of time, as 
the Lord of time, and as the midpoint or centre of all history. 
4C.1 Revelation as the Gift and the Fulfilment of Time 
According to Barth, the statement that ‘God reveals Himself’ means that God’s 
revealing act is an event, and therefore that in the event of revelation ‘God has time 
for us’.70  Because revelation is the most actual reality, its presence in history and in 
time immediately brings two things to light.  On the one hand, revelation means for 
us the realisation that ‘our possession of time must be made comprehensible as God’s 
possession of it for us’.71  It is not as if we were in possession of time and were in 
the position to decide what has a share of it and what does not.  Instead, God is and 
is to be confessed as the sole owner and, indeed, creator of time.  Barth categorises 
time into three kinds―the God-created time, the fallen time of ours, and the time of 
revelation―and contends that none of it is possessed by us.  The originally created 
time is hidden and withdrawn from us, and the fallen time is problematic and is only 
thought to be known and owned by us.72  We must not fail to notice that here Barth 
is not denying the reality of time as such, which is created and rightfully owned by 
                                                 
70 Ibid., 45; KD I/2, 50. 
71 I/2, 46. 
72 Ibid., 47f. 
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God.  He is countering the view that we as human beings are the owner and master 
of time.  Whilst we do not own time, in that God reveals Himself in revelation, God 
still has time for us.  In revelation, therefore, the time which we do not possess is 
given to us by God.  In this sense, revelation is God’s gift of time for us. 
On the other hand, with revelation coming into history and time, a real picture 
of time in its entirety is presented.  Whilst time was created by God and became lost 
with the Fall of humanity, God is determined to restore it for us by creating a ‘right, 
genuine and real’ time in and with His revelation,73 i.e. in and with the most actual 
reality.  In that it is brought about by no other than the creator of time, the time of 
revelation is no other than the time originally created by God.  In that it is ‘posited 
anew in and with revelation’,74 the time of revelation is set apart as a new time 
different from the other two.  As the reset of the originally-created time, therefore, 
revelation is the fulfilment of time in time as God’s time and God’s time for us. 
One thing merits attention in this connection is a remark which Barth makes 
about his view of revelation in the 1922 Römerbrief.  Although Barth’s shift took 
place in Göttingen, he is seen here to register an official rejection of the 
eschatological view of revelation in it by uttering: 
an express warning against certain passages and contexts in my 
commentary on Romans, where play was made and even work 
occasionally done with the idea of a revelation permanently 
transcending time, merely bounding time and determining it from 
without.75 
As the battle at that time with ‘the prevailing historism and psychologism’ was over, 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 55. 
74 Ibid., 53; translation revised per KD I/1, 58. 
75 I/2, 50. 
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Barth is now more informed by the actual reality of the incarnation taught in John 
1:14, to which his Römerbrief did not do justice, and accordingly comes to conceive 
revelation as the God’s gift and fulfilment of time.76  By virtue of the event of the 
incarnation, which is not ‘divine necessity’ nor ‘human possibility’,77 revelation 
possesses the historicity and temporality which is not the slightest less genuine than 
‘any other real events in this space of ours’:78 
The reality of revelation in Jesus Christ is also what we call the 
lifetime [Lebenszeit] of a human being.  It is also a section of what 
we call the ‘historical [historisch] time’, or the world history with its 
ahistorical prehistory.  It is not only that, but it is also that. … 
Revelation in the sense of Holy Scripture … is an eternal, but not 
therefore a timeless reality.  It is also a temporal reality.  So it is not 
a sort of ideal; rather, it is itself the timeless content of all or some 
times.  It does not remain transcendent over time, it is not merely 
tangent to it, but it enters into time; nay, it assumes time; nay, it 
creates time for itself.79 
Obviously we have seen most of this.  Whilst the idea that revelation ‘is not merely 
tangent to [time]’ and the notion that revelation assumes time to itself can be viewed 
as a recapitulation of Barth’s previous insights, what is new here is the statement that 
revelation creates time for itself.  In doing so, revelation also fulfils time by 
restoring in time what it was and ought to be when it was originally created, and 
gives this fulfilled time to us. 
                                                 
76 Ibid. 
77 Cf. Karl Barth, Credo: A Presentation of the Chief Problems of Dogmatics with Reference to the 
Apostles’ Creed: Sixteen Lectures Delivered at the University of Utrecht in February and March, 
1935, trans. by J. Strathearn McNab (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1936), 65: ‘We know of no 
divine necessity on the basis of which the Word had to become flesh.  And we have absolutely no 
knowledge of any human possibility on the basis of which the Word could become flesh.  We can 
only know of the actuality: the Word became flesh.’ 
78 I/2, 51. 
79 Ibid., 50; translation revised per KD I/2, 55. 
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4C.2 Revelation as the Lord of Time 
The linking of the creation of time to revelation is brought about by, as well as also 
strengthens, the affirmation of revelation as the most actual reality.  Revelation can 
assume and include history and time precisely on the basis of the fact that it creates 
time.  Like its reality, its historicity or temporality too is not derivative but original.  
In this sense, Barth properly calls the subject of revelation the Lord of time.80 
The identification of the subject of revelation with the Lord of time, 
according to Barth, is a problem which belongs to ‘the nature of revelation’.81  The 
failure to grasp this identification gives rise to three errors, namely: mistaking history 
(the general phenomenon of time) as the starting-point, refusing to seek revelation 
where it is given and already found, and the misconception that revelation is 
something to be ‘discovered, dug up, worked out as the deeper ground and content of 
human history’.82  By contrast, the recognition of the subject of revelation as the 
Lord of time means approaching the revelation-history problem strictly from 
revelation as the only starting-point.83  In accordance with the notion that the 
                                                 
80 I/2, 52. 
81 Ibid., 56. 
82 Ibid., 58. 
83 Von Balthasar argues that history means real encounter with mutual influence and exchange of 
what is proper of each partner in it.  This Catholic viewpoint suggests starting from both God and 
humanity to look at history.  For him, real participation necessarily brings out a lasting ontic effect, 
and that makes the human part of the history between God and humanity a codetermining role that is 
relevant for God.  According to this principle, he criticised that ‘Barth rejects all discussion of 
anything in the realm of the relative and temporal that would make for a real and vibrant history of 
man with his redeeming Lord and God’ (Von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, 371).  We can 
respond by making two points.  First, it is certain that for Barth both the divine and the human take 
part in the history of the encounter between them; the human part is surely relevant to God, but 
probably not in the sense that it plays a codetermining role with any ontic effect or influence on God.  
The human part has a share in this history because God determines for it to be so, because God has an 
‘ontic effect’ on it.  Second, Barth does allow for ‘a real and vibrant history’ between God and 
humanity, but this history is real, not by virtue of human participation, but by way of a two-way 
participation, i.e. first the divine in the human, and then the human in the divine, as it is actualised in 




subject of revelation is the Lord of time, Barth reiterates the well-known motto: 
‘Revelation is not a predicate of history, but history is a predicate of revelation.’84 
In the light of the development of the motto, three observations can be made 
about its final form.85  First, since 1927 revelation has been decidedly set as the 
grammatical subject prior to ‘history’, denoting more rigid adherence to the principle 
that revelation precedes history as its subject.  Second, the depiction of the relation 
of history to revelation has developed from ‘can become’ (1925), through ‘is’ (1927) 
and ‘became’ (1927), to the final version ‘is’ (1938).  If this is not careless alteration 
but rather deliberate revision, one might argue, it perhaps reflects a development in 
which Barth has placed more and more stress on the actual reality of revelation.  
Having been actually assumed by this revelation, whose subject is the Lord of time, 
history not only ‘can become’ or ‘did become’ but once and for all ‘is’ a predicate of 
revelation.  Third, in CD I/2 Barth explicitly bid farewell to the notion of 
Urgeschichte, realising that his earlier employment of it in the explanation of the 
relation of revelation to history in fact rendered revelation a predicate of history.86  
The priority or subjectivity ascribed to revelation has grown so strong that even the 
original conceptual tool the notion was once associated with could no longer be 
considered comparable to the notion itself. 
In an attempt to elaborate this irreversible relation of subject to predicate, 
                                                 
84 I/2, 58. 
85 As mentioned in sections 3B (fn59) and 3C.2 (fn70, 84), this motto appeared first in the 1925 
article ‘Church and Theology’ and then in the 1927 Christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf.  Then, it 
recurred in the 1927 work ‘Gottes Offenbarung nach der Lehre der christlichen Kirche’, this time with 
revelation taking the place of history as the first grammatical subject of the sentence, as follows, 
‘Revelation is not a predicate of history; rather, history became a predicate of revelation’ (Vorträge 
und kleinere Arbeiten 1925-1930, 275).  A decade later, it took its ultimate form in §14 of the CD, as 
cited above in the text. 
86 I/2, 58; KD I/2, 64 
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Barth registers what he terms the ‘proper meaning [Eigen-Sinn]’ of revelation,87 and 
gives three determinations on it, namely, God’s lordship over history, 88  His 
hiddenness in history,89 and His miracle in history.90  These notions altogether make 
a strong claim about the ontological superiority pertaining to the Lord of time over 
against our history and time.  The ignorance or neglect of this superiority inevitably 
results in the losing sight of revelation altogether.91 
In identifying the subject of revelation as the Lord of time, in reiterating and 
elaborating the irreversible subject-predicate relation, does Barth in effect render 
historical predicates ‘basically external’, as if ‘there is nothing in these predicates 
which in any sense makes them “appropriate” to their content’?92  If by ‘internal’ is 
suggested an equation of revelation with history as defined by the modern historical 
science [Historie], then this relationship is undoubtedly ‘external’.  But if we accept, 
with Barth, that not all Geschichte is Historie, then in that revelation does become 
and is history in history, in that the taking-form has an effect even on God Himself, 
the subject-predicate relation of revelation to history is by no means ‘external’ but 
genuinely internal. 
                                                 
87 I/2, 59; KD I/2, 65. 
88 I/2, 60; translation revised per KD I/2, 66: ‘The fact that it is the temporal, historical revelation 
does not abolish its freedom.  Instead, precisely in its temporality and historicity it is free and so not 
the object of human interpretation and appraisement.’ 
89 With God’s revelation as the new aeon encountering and confronting the old, there inevitably arises 
the human resistance together with the divine offence.  Thus the fulfilled time, that is the years 1-30, 
comes in a hidden, unknown form ‘as though it were not revelation at all’, ibid., 62. 
90 The juxtaposition of two things which are incompatible due to their difference in order of rank, 
which is also the hiddenness of the divine offence in the midst of the human resistance, will be known 
as nothing other than a miracle.  To categorise revelation as a miracle, then, is to confess that it is 
completely inconceivable except as ‘the exponent of the special new direct act of God in time and in 
history’, ibid. 
91 The all too common attempt to ‘to abolish and to level up that order of rank’ between the fulfilled 
time and our time, to disregard the divine offence, according to Barth, would only create a ‘singular, 
indestructible, importunate picture of a single, almighty world-time and world-reality’, one that 
includes all kinds of different histories except the history of God’s great deeds.  Ibid., 62f. 
92 Williams, ‘Barth on the Triune God’, Sykes (ed.), Karl Barth, 153. 
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Therefore, although at this point Barth is showing the strongest determination 
in asserting the ontological superiority of revelation to history and time in general, it 
does not alter the fact that for Barth this superiority evolves from the actual reality of 
revelation and of its particular time.  The ontological superiority of the particular 
time of revelation on which Barth insists is not, and is not to be, achieved at the 
expense of the general time of history, but derives from the actual reality of 
revelation, i.e. its concrete historicity.  The reality of revelation comes from itself, 
and once it is established it needs not be maintained or accounted for by any human 
possibilities.93  In this way, the subject of revelation is affirmed as the Lord of time. 
4C.3 Revelation as the Centre of History 
In the final subsection, we will briefly mention the third form that Barth gives to 
what we term his christological or revelatory concentration of history, i.e. Barth’s 
conception of the time of revelation as the centre of history. 
In §14.2 and §14.3 Barth defines the Old Testament as the time of expectation 
looking forward to revelation, and the New Testament as the time of recollection 
looking backward to revelation.  He gives a lengthy exposition on the both 
Testaments, explaining how 1) both are witnesses to the time of revelation, 2) in both 
God is revealed as the hidden God, and 3) in both God is revealed to be present to 
humanity as the coming God.94  In this connection we will make three observations 
which directly concern our contention that revelation is the centre of history. 
                                                 
93 Understood from this view, one might venture to say, bearing revelation in mind does not entail 
losing sight of history; on the contrary, overlooking history, which revelation entered and assumed, 
will eventually lead to the losing sight of revelation.  One needs not to mute history in order to hear 
revelation; moreover, we might add, one must not silence history if one wants to hear revelation, 
because the Subject of revelation is precisely the Lord of time.  It is also worth noting that the notion 
of the subject-predicate relation will undergo some implicit but momentous development in IV when 
Barth reshapes his Christology.  This will be treated in section 8A.1. 
94 I/2, 70ff., 101ff. 
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First, we notice a concentration of general history upon a particular history.  
Barth makes it clear that it is not the time before revelation and after revelation as 
such that are directly related to the time of revelation.  Instead, the time directly 
linked to revelation is ‘a time within [general] time, the time of a definite 
[bestimmten] history that takes place in it’, 95 that is, the history of the both 
Testaments.  In that the two Testaments are singled out from the view point of 
revelation, there is a concentration of general history upon a particular history. 
Second, we notice a second concentration, i.e. that of this particular history 
upon revelation itself.  Although the two Testaments differ in their ‘locations’ in 
relation to revelation, and therefore in the directionality with which they are related 
to it (forward and backward), they are oriented to one and the same fulfilled time of 
revelation.  The general linear conception of time and history is replaced by a 
convergent conception.  In that ‘revelation itself is nothing else than the ultimate 
continuation, the peak and the goal of this history’,96 this particular history, which is 
itself the line upon which the whole history is convergent, is in its turn concentrated 
upon revelation. 
Third, this particular history can be said to be concentrated upon revelation, 
not by virtue of itself, but only when it bears witness to revelation.  In other words, 
the histories of the two Testaments, although conceived as particular, do not possess 
anything intrinsic to themselves that make them particular.  Barth stresses that, 
serving as signposts pointing to the signified,97 the singularity of the two Testaments 
has to be viewed strictly as acquired and not innate.98  This denotes that the whole 
                                                 
95 I/2, 70; KD I/2, 77. 
96 I/2, 70, emphasis mine. 
97 Ibid., 105. 
98 Ibid., 71f. 
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process of concentration of general history upon a particular history, and then of that 
particular history upon the history which revelation becomes and is, entirely depends 
on revelation as the Lord of time and the centre. 
4D Concluding Remarks 
Drawing on the subject-predicate relation of revelation to history, this chapter has 
demonstrated the remarkable extent to which Barth allows revelation and history to 
interact in his doctrine of revelation.  We began in section 4A with the dialectic of 
veiling and unveiling of God’s Word in history, examining closely the explanation of 
this dialectic in terms of comtemporaneity-non-comtemporaneity and 
mystery-secularity, arguing that, concerning the speech-act of God, history functions 
both as that which necessarily separates the three forms of God’s Word and as that 
which is secular and veiling the mystery of God’s revelation.  In section 4B, 
regarding how the ‘predicate’ influences the ‘subject’, resorting to Barth’s definition 
of the doctrine of revelation as a ‘historical question’ we identified three specific 
forms of ‘historicisation’ in Barth’s doctrine of revelation, namely 1) revelation is 
‘historicised’ in that the act of revelation precedes its subject; 2) the Son is 
‘historicised’ in that the self-unveiling of revelation precedes its veiledness; and 3) 
the Spirit ‘historicises’ revelation in that He imparts revelation to particular human 
beings.  Finally in section 4C, concerning how the ‘subject’ precedes and defines 
the ‘predicate’, we examined Barth’s christological concentration of history and time 
upon revelation, arguing that for him revelation means the gift, fulfilment, the Lord, 
and the centre of all history and all time.  Revelation and history are allowed such 
extensive interaction in their subject-predicate relationship, because for Barth 




Knowledge of God in History, and Eternal God in Time: 
Church Dogmatics II/1 (1940) 
 
Introduction 
On the basis of the irreversible yet highly interactive subject-predicate relation of 
revelation to history, Barth has been able to envisage the convergence of the whole 
human history upon revelation as the centre of time.  The question then arises: if in 
revelation God reveals Himself, then would revelation’s actual presence in history 
bring any ontological implications on the conception of the being of God as such?  
This question leads us into CD II. 
Focusing on CD II/1, which covers Barth’s accounts of knowledge of God 
and reality of God, this chapter seeks to demonstrate: 1) that human history is viewed 
as a limitation and also medium in the dialectic of veiling and unveiling in the 
formation of human knowledge of God; 2) that the notion of history is crucial to 
Barth’s actualistic conception of God’s being a being in act; 3) how Barth construes 
God as remaining the same as He is when He does new things in history; and 4) how 
Barth constructs the positive relation of eternity to time, with special attention to 
what he terms as the supra-temporality of God’s eternity.  At the end of the chapter, 
we will indicate the actualistic-ontological direction in which Barth seems to be led 
by his firm commitment to God’s revelation in Jesus Christ in history. 
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5A The Dialectic of Veiling and Unveiling in the Knowledge of 
God 
In the beginning of CD II/1 Barth continues with the dialectic of veiling and 
unveiling in his treatment of the knowledge of God.1  And throughout §§25-27 we 
find several forms of this dialectic: 1) the dialectic of the primary objectivity (of 
God’s self-knowledge) and the secondary objectivity (our our human knowledge of 
God); 2) that of the indirect object (i.e. God) and the direct object (i.e. God’s works 
in history) of our knowledge of God; and ultimately 3) that of veiling and unveiling 
in our knowledge of God. 2   These forms of dialectic maintains both God’s 
hiddenness and the truthfulness of human knowledge of Him. 
In the unfolding of this dialectic human history plays a crucial part.  
Drawing on Barth’s understanding of ‘man’s knowledge of God as the knowledge of 
faith’ 3, in what follows we seek to demonstrate 1) that in understanding the 
knowledge of God as faith, Barth maintains the objectivity of our knowledge of God, 
a knowledge that is mediated through history; 2) that in understanding the knowledge 
of God as faith, Barth construes the absolute particularity and concreteness of God as 
manifesting in history; 3) that human knowledge of God is always in need of 
repetition in time, and is always ‘on the way’ awaiting fulfilment.  It will be argued 
that, for all its inappropriateness, history is still used by God as a medium of 
knowledge of Him. 
                                                 
1 II/1, 3. 
2 In this dialectic ‘His unveiling in His works and signs always means for us His veiling too, … His 
revelation always means His hiddenness’, but ‘the purpose of His revelation, the direction of His will’ 
is not veiling but unveiling.  Ibid., 50, 215.  Cf. 183. 
3 Ibid., 12. 
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5A.1 ‘Knowledge’ of Faith: True Objectivity Indirect, Mediated in and 
through History 
5A.1.1 The True Objectivity Proper to Knowledge of God 
Understanding knowledge of God as true knowledge, Barth tackles the question of 
the objectivity in which God becomes revealed to human beings.  Careful 
deliberations are given on this objectivity.  First, knowledge of God can be real and 
true, because God has indeed revealed Himself in Jesus Christ.  If God has really 
revealed Himself, ‘forcefully [carrying] through that self-demonstration in His 
Word’,4 all questions of our ‘human non-understanding and misunderstanding’5 are 
in fact excluded.  This fact signifies a true objectivity of knowledge of God, 
because ‘[God’s] very revelation consists in His making Himself object to us’.6   
But this objectivity is also constrained objectivity, as human knowledge of God is 
bound to His Word proclaimed by the Church.  This knowledge ‘takes place, not in 
a free choice, but with a very definite constraint’,7 and ‘is bound to the object set 
before it by God’s Word―and to this object in its irrevocable objectivity.’8 
Second, the objectivity of God is a secondary objectivity in contrast to the 
primary objectivity in which God is known to Himself.  To be sure, the God 
revealed to us is truly God Himself.  But prior to human knowledge of Him in 
revelation there is first of all God’s self-knowledge in Himself; before God becomes 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 46. 
5 Ibid., 28. 
6 Ibid., 12. 
7 Ibid., 7. 
8 Ibid., 12. 
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objective to us He is first of all objective to Himself.9  This subordination of a 
secondary objectivity to the primary objectivity is meant to prevent the knowledge of 
God from being jeopardised by human objectification even in revelation.  To be 
sure: 
It was proper to seek this objectivity [of God] first in God’s revelation, 
in His works and signs, in His veiling and unveiling in the creaturely 
sphere … But even in this connexion we have already seen that 
without God’s objectivity to Himself there is no knowledge of God; 
without the truth of a primary objectivity of Him who reveals Himself 
to us there is no truth of His secondary objectivity in His revelation.  
But the primary objectivity of God to Himself is reality in His eternal 
being as the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.  As the triune God, 
God is first and foremost objective to Himself.10 
What is granted by Barth, then, is only the self-objectification of God, and not human 
objectification of Him. 
Finally, the objectivity of human knowledge of God is also indirect and 
mediated.  For Barth, for the human knower to have God as the direct object of 
knowledge it would simply mean cancelling the distinction between them.  A 
medium is then necessary in this relation so as to maintain the distinction between 
the human knower and God as the object of human knowledge: 
The reality of our knowledge of God stands or falls with the fact that 
in His revelation God is present to man in a medium. … The real 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 50: ‘even in His revelation we know Him only in consequence of the fact that knowledge of 
God is real as God’s own hidden work in His being as the triune God from eternity to eternity’. 
10 Ibid., 49; KD II/1, 53.  When the event of knowledge of God takes place, as Jüngel rightly points 
out, ‘in his being-as-object God remains deus coram homine [God before the human person] and, in 
becoming the subject of the knowledge of God, the human person remains homo coram dei [the 
human person before God]. … God as God differentiates himself from humanity precisely at the point 
at which he reveals himself to humanity’, Jüngel, God’s Being Is in Becoming, 60. 
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knowledge of God is concerned with God in His relationship to man, 
but also in His distinction from him.11 
As the knowledge-relation between God and human beings is a 
relation-in-distinction, it has to be maintained that ‘[God] is mediately objective to us 
in His revelation, in which He meets us under the sign and veil of other objects.’12  
As God gives Himself to be known only in a medium, ‘we really know Him only in 
His clothed objectivity.’13 
5A.1.2 History as Medium for Knowledge of God 
These three determinations on the objectivity of human knowledge of God bring to 
light what we may call Barth’s mediatory understanding of human history.  Since 
direct knowledge-relation between God and human beings is impossible, human 
history is used by God as ‘a piece of the objective reality surrounding human beings 
which is different from God’,14 serving as a medium or a ‘sign’ in this relation.  It is 
only in this medium that God gives Himself for us to know; it is only under this sign 
that we are directed to God.  In Barth’s words, ‘[e]ven our faith as such belongs to 
the veiling and limitation of revelation.  Our knowledge of faith itself is knowledge 
of God in His hiddenness.  It is indirect and mediate, not immediate knowledge.’15 
In the meantime, like the form of God’s Word, this medium or sign of 
knowledge of God is also unsuitable for its purpose, not corresponding to but rather 
contradicting that which it signifies.  Barth lays such great weight on the 
                                                 
11 II/1, 10. 
12 Ibid., 16. 
13 Ibid. 
14  KD II/1, 17: ‘einem Stück der ihn umgebenden, von Gott verschiedenen gegenständlichen 
Wirklichkeit’; II/1, 17. 
15 II/1, 57. 
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inappropriateness of this medium that precisely as a sign it is conceived also as a 
‘veil’. 16  As both the sign and the veil, then, history possesses a ‘necessary 
conditionedness [Bedingtheit]’―necessary, because it is only through it that God 
gives Himself to be known; conditioned, because from it God is sharply 
distinguished. 17   It is only when God freely makes use of history that this 
conditionedness become removed, and that God becomes unveiled through the 
veiling medium.18 
Barth’s understanding of history as ‘sign and veil’ has received criticism for 
his refusing to grant an internal unity between the ‘form’ and its ‘content’, thus 
rendering the former only external to the latter.  For instance, despite Barth’s 
explicit expression that it is only ‘in, with and under this form’ that God gives 
Himself to be objectively known,19 Rowan Williams suggests that Barth treats 
worldly circumstances as vehicles which are merely concealing and external.20  In 
Williams’ view, what Barth will not allow this medium is not only an inner unity of 
some sort with the content that it refers to, but also a real relation between the two. 
Two notions might help here.  First, in Barth’s own account of a positive 
relationship between a sacrament and the reality to which it refers, he insists on 
viewing a sacrament, which is posited in creaturely reality but which becomes taken 
up when used by God, positively from God’s side as a ‘divinely willed and ordained 
                                                 
16 Cf. Barth’s discussion of a similar relation of the content and the form of the Word, I/1, 166f.  See 
also section 4A.2. 
17 II/1, 56. 
18 Barth’s mediatory understanding of the reality of human history as ‘sign and veil’ is close to his 
understanding of the sacrament.  A sacrament is the visible form of an invisible content, and it is 
employed by God for the knowledge of God to take place.  Ibid., 50, 52. 
19 Ibid., 52. 
20 Williams, ‘Barth on the Triune God’, Sykes (ed.), Karl Barth, 154f. 
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determination’.21  In other words, despite its unsuitability, the medium, form or 
sacrament is still willed, ordained and really utilised by God as a means to bear 
witness to Him.  If knowledge of God is grace from God,22 as Barth describes it, the 
medium chosen and used for it, too, can only be grace. 
Second, in this connection, McCormack points out that it is due to his 
persistent worry over the analogia entis that Barth is only willing to grant an analogy 
of extrinsic attribution (and not intrinsic attribution) between God and the creature.23  
Challenging Barth on a ‘Barthian’, eschatological view of the creature, McCormack 
suggests that ‘Barth ought to have insisted that the analogia attributionis extrinsecae 
as realized in history presupposes the existence (protologically and eschatologically) 
of an analogia attributionis intrinsecae … [i.e.] the momentary actualization of that 
analogia attributionis intrinsecae’.24  In our context this suggestion means that, on 
the dynamic ground of the actualisation of an external relationship between God and 
history (understood as the medium for human knowledge of Him), it is possible and 
perhaps even necessary to assert an internal relationship between the two, not 
permanently granted but ‘momentarily actualised’ contingent upon God’s act. 
5A.2 Knowledge of ‘Faith’: in His Particularity and Concreteness 
Manifest in History 
When knowledge of God is understood as knowledge of faith, Barth proposes, it 
means that God as the object of our knowledge of Him is also the object of our faith 
in Him.  The notion of faith highlights chiefly the particularity and concreteness of 
                                                 
21 II/1, 53. 
22 See for instance ibid., 27, 29, 69. 
23 Ibid., 175ff.  Cf. also 238f. 
24  Bruce McCormack, ‘“The Limits of the Knowledge of God”: These on the Theological 
Epistemology of Karl Barth’, Orthodox and Modern, 167-180 (178). 
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the knowledge of God.  In Barth’s view, knowledge of God as faith ‘becomes and is 
a special knowledge, distinct from the knowledge of all other objects, outstanding in 
the range of all knowledge.’25  It is only proper for the God who distinguishes 
Himself from all other objects to give Himself as a particular object in the particular 
human knowledge of Him.  For us to know God in His particularity is to believe in 
Him. 
Corresponding to the particularity of the faith-knowledge of God, there is a 
particular process through which knowledge of this particularity is formed.  Barth 
makes it plain that the particularity at issue is not assumed a priori, but concretely 
formed a posterori.  For him, the particular faith-knowledge of God does not 
originate from any abstract ‘preconceived idea about the transcendence and 
supramundanity of God’, 26  but rather is brought to happen through concrete 
encounters between God and humanity in history as recorded in Scripture.  Then, 
drawing on the historical records in the Bible, Barth understands the occurrence of 
faith to be a ‘separation’ [Ausnahme] as the execution of God’s choice of 
sanctification.27  When God removes some people ‘into one particular position 
distinct from all other positions’,28 faith in God occurs accordingly and so does 
knowledge of God.  The only way for us to believe in God and know God is then to 
be faithfully in keeping with the concrete ‘historical events, forms and relationships 
which are His work.’29  And all these God’s dealings with humanity in history Barth 
deems to be initiated by nothing but the Word of God: 
                                                 
25 II/1, 15. 
26 Ibid. 
27 II/1, 15.; KD II/1, 15. 
28 II/1, 15.; KD II/1, 15. 
29 II/1, 17. 
161 
 
What happens [through] the Word of God is the history of this choice 
and sanctification.  It is this history that we recount; and our own 
faith only comes into play in so far as we keep to this history.30 
In this connection, the history of God’s dealings with humanity is affirmed as 
the direct object or medium through which human knowledge of God takes place.  
When it comes to the question as to how in general it comes about that creaturely 
reality, being distinct from the reality of God, can represent God, and how in 
particular it comes about that human history, being at least conceptually 
distinguished from the history of God’s dealings with humanity, can serve as the 
locale where that latter history takes place, Barth’s answer is straightforward: As the 
One the knowledge of whom has to be mediated, God has the sovereign freedom to 
commandeer ‘a piece of the objective reality’31 of history into the service of Himself.  
The chosen piece of history is taken up ‘above and beyond its own existence’32 so 
that it may and must serve to attest the objectivity of God; or, it may and must 
advocate or defend [für Gott eintritt] God ‘in so far as it is determined, made and [as 
such] used by God’ as a particular work of God.33  Note how Barth correlates the 
particularity of the creaturely object ‘in, with and under’ which knowledge of Him 
happens with that of the event of knowledge of Him: 
Thus, to the particularity of this event which, in contrast to all other 
objects, is grounded in the nature [Wesen] of God, there corresponds 
the particularity of one such other object which, in the sphere of the 
creaturely reality, points to the nature [Wesen] of God, a uniqueness 
which does not belong to this object in itself and as such, but which 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 16; KD II/1, 15. 
31 KD II/1, 17; II/1, 17. 
32 II/1, 17. 
33 Ibid.; KD II/1, 17. 
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falls to its lot [zuteil wird] in this event, and in which it is now 
effective.34 
Also note how he differentiates these two sorts of particularity by making the 
particularity of the object totally dependent on God’s making use of it: 
But [this object] is effective, not on account of its own ability, but in 
virtue of its institution [Einsetzung] to the service which this object 
has to perform at this point.  In other words, it is effective in virtue of 
the special work to which God has at this point determined and 
engaged it, because it has become the instrument of this work and has 
been marked off and is useful as such.35 
The particularity of the history of God’s dealings with humanity as the medium of 
knowledge of God consists, therefore, in the fact that it is contingently utilised (‘at 
this point … at this point’) and not universally valid, dependent and not 
self-sufficient.  Finally, note how faith is construed as that through which the human 
knower receives the indirect and particular knowledge of God: 
At bottom, knowledge of God in faith is always this indirect 
knowledge of God, knowledge of God in His works, and in these 
particular works―in the determining and using of certain creaturely 
realities to bear witness to the divine objectivity.  What distinguishes 
faith [Glaube] from unbelief [Unglauben], erroneous faith [Irrglauben] 
and superstition [Aberglauben] is that it is content with this indirect 
knowledge of God.36 
5A.3 Knowledge of God Proceeding in History 
From Barth’s conception of knowledge of God as faith in God concretely mediated 
                                                 
34 II/1, 17; KD II/1, 17.  Also note the close relation between ‘uniqueness’ [Eigenart] and ‘belong to’ 
[zu eigen ist]. 
35 II/1, 17; KD II/1, 17. 
36 II/1, 17; KD II/1, 17. 
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through particular events in history, there arises what we might call his actualistic 
understanding of the knowledge of God.  Although it is not until the second half of 
CD II/1 that Barth began to explain in detail his teaching of God’s being as being in 
act,37 already in the first half of it we find this notion at work in the context of the 
historical mediation of the knowledge of God in its particularity. 
According to Barth, the Israelites in the Old Testament were not dealing with 
an abstract idea of God, but the God who acted concretely in history.  Their 
conception of God was not formed once and for all, but through their ‘continual 
explanation of the divine work, of the action of God in the history of Israel, that is to 
say, in what had happened and what was happening to Israel’.38  The same can be 
said of the message of the New Testament, too, in that ‘it is given in the form of a 
continual explanation of a definite historical event―of the same historical event that 
began with the Exodus’ whose ‘concrete aim and its totality become quite clear.’39  
On the part of God, His self-manifestation always consists in His particular actions 
which take place in history; on our part, our knowing God always arises from our 
continual perceiving, conceiving and explaining of those events.  On God’s part, He 
is known ‘not simply because He is God in Himself, but because He reveals Himself 
as such; not simply because His work is there, but because He is active in His 
work.’40  On our part, our knowledge of God occurs when there are encounters 
between God and humanity. 
It might be helpful to at this point consider what it means for us to know God 
in time.  One important factor that composes the difference between God’s 
                                                 
37 See section 5B.1. 
38 II/1, 19; KD II/1, 19. 
39 II/1, 19. 
40 Ibid., 23. 
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self-knowledge and human knowledge of Him is the fact that, whilst God knows 
Himself perfectly in eternity, or ‘in an instance and once-and-for-all’ [in einem Nu 
und ein- für allemal],41 we know Him only conditionedly in time.  This means that 
the eternal God so lowers Himself that we as human beings in time may know Him 
‘in a temporal way [zeitlich]’. 42   ‘According to the measure of our human 
cognition’,43 we human beings can know God only temporally, i.e. in a continuous 
time flow in which knowledge of God occurs and recurs: 
Temporally means … in repetition [Wiederholung], in a cognition 
which progresses from one present to another and which begins afresh 
in every present, [and] in a series of unique acts of knowledge.44 
The notion of repetition is employed by Barth to illustrate the fact that human 
beings, as temporal beings, do not have knowledge of God unless it is a matter of 
procession in time.  Supposedly, then, from our point of view, our knowledge of 
God takes place in a linear procession in history, in time.  But in regard to the 
subject matter, in Barth’s view, the procession of our knowledge of God is conceived 
as surrounding a centre: 
[Our knowledge of God] happens in the whole circumference of this 
centre, in the whole circumference of sacramental reality, in a 
succession of attestations and cognitions, of which each expects and 
indicates another, each conditions and is conditioned by another―not 
as if each one did not always exist in whole truth, but in such a way 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 61; KD II/1, 67. 
42 II/1, 61. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid.; KD II/1, 67. 
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that the whole truth is truth temporally and thus in need of repetition 
for us.45 
This circular understanding of the knowledge of God is important, because it makes 
it clear that the linear procession of our knowledge of God does not rely on repetition 
as such, but rather on pointing to the centre.  This circular conception has the 
apparent advantage that, in that each point around the circle is equidistant from, and 
in that sense equally related to and conditioned by, its centre, no point can claim to 
be a ‘vantage point’ nearer to the centre than others.  We might call this an 
actualistic understanding of the human knowledge of God: that it constantly proceeds 
in the convergent movement towards its centre: God’s revelation in Jesus Christ. 
5A.4 Knowledge of God ‘On the Way’ 
Now we turn to §27 in CD II/1, the last paragraph of Barth’s teaching on knowledge 
of God, in which he deals with its limits or boundaries in respect to its human 
knowing subject.  Defining the event of our knowledge of God as a way or path, he 
sets out to delimit it by investigating its terminus a quo [starting-point] and terminus 
ad quem [end-point].  Formally speaking, according to the two headings of §27, he 
designates the hiddenness of God as the starting-point, 46  and the veracity or 
truthfulness [Wahrhaftigkeit] of human knowledge of God as the end-point. 47   
Materially considered, these two points converge on the one single fact of God’s 
                                                 
45 II/1, 61f.; translation slightly revised per KD II/1, 67.  It is noteworthy that each attestation and 
cognition at issue here conditions and is conditioned [bedingt und auch … bedingt ist] by another, 
instead of determines and is determined by another, as the English translation has it.  Also, the key 
point that it is ‘for us’ [für uns] that the knowledge of God needs to be repeated in time is somewhat 
obscured. 
46 II/1, 183; KD II/1, 205: ‘our knowledge of God begins in all seriousness with the knowledge of the 
hiddenness of God’. 
47 II/1, 214f.: ‘Just as the hidden God, and therefore faith in Him, forms its beginning, so also the true 
God and again faith in Him, forms its goal’. 
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sovereign freedom in human knowledge of Him, i.e. the fact that ‘God is known by 
God and by God alone.’48  This sovereign freedom of the Subject who makes 
Himself objective for human knowledge means on the one hand the divine 
hiddenness which stands between God and us,49 and on the other the ‘insurpassable 
and incontestable certainty’ of the knowledge of God.50  In terms of the hiddenness 
of God, neither the creaturely object as medium nor the human subject as the knower 
has any credit to claim in this matter.  Knowledge of God does not occur without 
creaturely objects, but it does not occur by virtue of them.  Also, knowledge of God 
consists in human perception and conception of God, but it does not occur on the 
strength of them.  ‘Knowing God, we do not ascribe to ourselves the capacity for 
the knowing.’51  As regards the certainty of this knowledge, however, neither the 
mediatory objects or the human knowing subject can be made in vain or put to shame 
in this matter.  For it is the Subject of knowledge of God Himself as the free Lord 
who not only allows but also commands our human attempt to know Him, and 
therefore guarantees the certainty and truthfulness of our human knowledge of Him. 
In this light, the human subjects in their noetic relation with God can be said 
to be kept in check (regarding the hiddenness of God) and at the same time held 
under guarantee (regarding the truthfulness of our knowledge of God) in the dialectic 
of veiling and unveiling in their knowledge of God.  Just as the mediatory object, 
the human knowing subject, too, is a creature that is situated in history.  It means 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 179; KD II/1, 200f. 
49 II/1, 182. 
50 Ibid., 180; KD II/1, 202. 
51 II/1, 184.  In this connection McCormack identifies a ‘twofold limitation’, i.e. the ‘internal 
limitation’ (hiddenness of God) and the ‘external limitation’ (incapacity of human thought and 
language for knowledge of God).  McCormack, ‘“The Limits of the Knowledge of God”’, Orthodox 
and Modern, 171f. 
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that, not knowing God ‘in an instance and once-and-for-all’,52 he/she is situated in a 
historical series whose terminals consist in the hiddenness of God and the 
truthfulness of our human knowledge of Him, respectively.  Posited in this 
historical series, being neither its own beginning nor its goal but between the two, 
human knowledge of God has to be understood as ‘on the way’. 
At this point Barth employs the notion of theologia viatorum, theology of the 
pilgrims, in an attempt to uphold the divine transcendence of grace.  The 
transcendence of grace over nature is in his view not to be lightly made equated with 
the distinction of eternity from time, of our future knowledge of God from its present 
temporal and perhaps corrupted form.  Instead, ‘[e]ven as eternal grace, freed from 
the whole enshrouding veil of our temporality and corruption, grace will still be the 
grace of God and not our nature.’53  In the usual sense this notion denotes the 
limited and imperfect theology of Christians on their pilgrimage on earth in contrast 
to theologia comprehensorum, the theology of those who have arrived in heaven, 
attaining to perfection.  But if, as Barth sees it, it is the distinction of God from 
humanity, and not of eternity from temporality, that makes human knowledge of God 
‘on the way’, then both the limits and possibility of human attempts at knowing God 
are indicated.  In terms of its limits, our knowledge of God is at best theologia 
viatorum even in eternity; in terms of its positive side, it can really be theologia 
viatorum even in the temporal process in history.  In this sense, history is not to be 
negatively construed as that which separates us from authentic knowledge of the 
eternal God, but rather positively as the opportunity given to us in which we can 
keep striving towards the goal of true knowledge of Him by His grace. 
                                                 
52 II/1, 61; KD II/1, 67. 
53 II/1, 209. 
168 
 
5A.5 Brief Summary 
In summary, beginning from the true objectivity of the knowledge of God 
presupposed by the reality of revelation, we have in this section dealt with some 
theological implications carried by Barth’s statement that knowledge of God means 
faith in God, and that it takes place only ‘on the way’ in the dialectic of veiling and 
unveiling.  What immediately concerns us is the assertion that knowledge of God is 
true and possible on condition that it is mediated though God’s concrete works in the 
proceeding time flow in history.  In this connection it has been established that 
human history is a limited medium, but a medium nonetheless.  But it is so, as 
should be clear by now, not in the sense that God has no choice but to make use of it, 
nor that, having made use of it, God is conditioned by or even imprisoned in it.  The 
proper sense in which human history is the medium consists in the fact that, 
sovereignly keeping distance from direct human knowledge, God has determined to 
make use of it and actually has made use of it, and that knowledge of God has 
therefore actually taken place with, under and in it.  Moreover, the historicity of the 
knowing subjects are also addressed in the sense that, just as the human knowers 
have past, present and future in history, their knowledge of God, too, is conceived as 
being informed and formed in the process from past through present to future.  
Needless to say, both the object (the creaturely reality in history) and the subject (the 
human knower) are limited and imperfect; that is why knowledge of God has to 
consist in the fact that ‘He unveils Himself as the One He is by veiling Himself in a 
form which He Himself is not.’54  But if God as the ultimate Subject in this 
connection has actually laid claim to them both, if it is true that ‘God reveals Himself 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 52. 
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in the mode of hiddenness[,] but the meaning of His revelation is His veracity’55―if 
God is for them―then we in our position as the secondary subject must not and 
certainly cannot be against either ourselves or the creaturely reality, denying the 
possibility of our knowing God or improperly underestimating the significance of the 
medium of history as the secondary object. 
5B The Reality of God 
In the second half of CD II/1 (§§28-31) Barth deals with the reality of God.  In §28 
he registers the axioms that God’s being is in His act of revelation and that God is the 
One who loves in freedom, and in §§29-31 he reinterprets what is traditionally 
termed the attributes of God, categorising them into God’s ‘perfections’ of love 
qualified by His freedom,56 and God’ perfections of freedom qualified by His love.57  
What directly concern our purposes are his actualistic understanding of God’s being, 
and his treatments of God’s constancy and of His eternity. 
5B.1 God’s Being in His Act 
The crucial significance of §28.1 of the CD lies in Barth’s actualistic understanding 
of God’s being.  For him the statement that ‘God is’ must mean that ‘God is who He 
is in the act of His revelation.’58  This statement binds together being and action, 
and guarantees that the God whom we meet in revelation is God’s ‘own, inner, 
proper reality, behind which and above which there is no other’.59  This conception 
of God’s being as being-in-act means four things. 
                                                 
55 Ibid., 215. 
56 §30: ‘Grace and Holiness’, ‘Mercy and Righteousness’, ‘Patience and Wisdom’. 
57 §31: ‘Unity and Omnipresence’, ‘Constancy and Omnipotence’, ‘Eternity and Glory’. 
58 II/1, 257, also 262. 
59 Ibid., 262. 
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First, it speaks of the God who not only acknowledges the reality of history 
but also works in His revelation effectively throughout the historical series in time, 
with which a God construed as being in eternity in opposition to time would and 
could have nothing to do.  The act of revelation, in which God’s being is, is an 
event [Ereignis] or happening [Geschehen] which is never not active.60  This act 
takes place comprehensively enclosing in itself past, present and future.  To be sure, 
the divine act of revelation of Jesus Christ took place once in the past, at one certain 
point in history.  But it never simply stayed in the past, but is still taking place here 
and now in the present, that is, in each present in every period in history.  Moreover, 
this divine act is equally futuristic in the sense that it is always in front of us, coming 
towards us.  With all these taken into account, Barth is able to conceive the divine 
act of revelation as historically closed or finalised in the past, fully contemporaneous 
in the present, as well as truly coming towards us from the future.61  His actualistic 
understanding of God’s being and his comprehensive view of revelation suggest that, 
on our side, we do not stand still but are walking actively in the circle of this event of 
revelation and that, on God’s side, His being is not only life but also the Living.62 
Second, the designation of God’s being in revelation as event, act and life 
needs further qualification, for this designation is not predicated on the general terms 
in which we understand these concepts.  In the strictest sense, Barth argues, we are 
                                                 
60 Ibid., 262, 263. 
61 KD II/1, 294: ‘eben in ihrer geschichtlichen Abgeschlossenheit und vollen Gegenwärtigkeit 
zugleich wahrhaft zukünftig ist’; II/1, 262: ‘it is in its historical completeness and its full 
contemporaneity that it is truly future.’ 
62 II/1, 262f.  On these two pages Barth begins his discussion by stating that ‘God is who He is in 
His revelation’, and ends it by stating that ‘[t]o its very deepest depths God’s Godhead consists in the 
fact that it is an event―not any event, not events in general, but the event of His action, in which we 
have a share in God’s revelation.’  Whilst the first statement indicates that God’s being is in His act 
of revelation’ (God’s being-in-act), the second suggests that God’s being is His act of revelation 
(God’s being-as-act).  In this thesis we will stick to the heading of §28.1: ‘The Being of God in Act’. 
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to understand these concept in terms of God, and not vice versa: 
God’s revelation is a particular event, not identical with the sum, nor 
identical with any of the content of other existing happenings either in 
nature or in human history.  It is a definite [bestimmte] happening 
within general happenings: so definite that, whilst it takes part in this 
happening [i.e. general happenings], it also contradicts it, and can only 
be seen and comprehended together with it in its contradiction … .  
So, … the action of God that takes place in revelation is a particular 
action, different from any other happening, even in contradiction to 
it.63 
To be sure, all events in history are ‘particular’ in their own right, for no historical 
event is a mere repetition of another event or a re-enactment of a general rule.  
Barth himself goes along this line of thinking when he argues for the particularity of 
theology against the general categories of philosophy or metaphysics.64  But more 
frequently he is seen to raise the standard for ‘particularity’ when he feels the need to 
safeguard the particularity of the historical event of revelation from any other 
historical events in their ‘particularity’.  That is why here Barth is upholding, so to 
speak, the ‘unique particularity’ of the historical event of revelation within but also in 
contradiction to the ‘general particularity’ of all other historical events.65  This 
‘unique particularity’, then, is one which ‘is not exhausted’ by the ‘dialectical 
transcendence’ of revelation which ‘must always be understood with equal strictness 
as immanence.’66 
Third, Barth further elaborates this ‘unique particularity’ of the event of 
revelation, emphasising that it does not separate itself from the visible, natural and 
                                                 
63 II/1, 264; KD II/1, 296. 
64 See for example I/1, 39f., II/1, 14-16. 
65 Cf. section 4A.1. 
66 II/1, 264.  Cf. Jüngel, God’s Being Is in Becoming, 79f. 
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outer world, staying only in some invisible, spiritual and inner realm.  On his 
account, the ‘spiritual’ world does not stand closer than the ‘natural’ or physical 
world does to the reality of God in His act of revelation.  Revelation, and therefore 
God’s being, do not simply transcend the physical and overlap the spiritual; they 
rather transcend both in comprehending both.  Precisely because the event of God’s 
being is also in the natural world, Barth contends, there is indeed a ‘true, real history 
of His doings in [the] genuine sense of the term’.67 
Finally, the three foregoing determinations of God’s being-in-act―as pure act 
and therefore life, as singular act and therefore freedom, and as act not only spiritual 
but also ‘natural’―point to a fourth: that this act ‘necessarily (if, when we speak of it, 
we turn our eyes solely on His revelation) means [God’s] own conscious, willed and 
executed decision.’68  This decision is that of the triune God, ‘executed once for all 
in eternity, and anew in every second of our time … in such a way that it confronts 
what is not divine being, not as a mere possibility, but always as a self-contained, 
self-containing reality’.69  What Barth aims to emphasise in the present context is 
that God’s being-in-act is that of a personal God, and that human conception of 
‘person’ derives from this ‘personal’ God and not vice versa.70  And what this 
means for our concerns is that God’s being-in-act as revelation in history is an act 
willed by God’s very own being.71 
                                                 
67 II/1, 267; emphasis mine. 
68 Ibid., 271. 
69 Ibid.  The rich implications contained this highly compressed account of possibility, reality and 
necessity on the one hand, of being, action and will on the other, as well as of the doctrines of 
revelation, the Trinity and God will be discussed in Chapters Six and Eight. 
70  Ibid., 272.  Justin Stratis correctly points out that in this connection ‘Barth deploys the 
Entscheidung terminology specifically in defence of the Persönlichkeit of God’, Justin Stratis, 
‘Speculating about Divinity? God’s Immanent Life and Actualistic Ontology’, International Journal 
of Systematic Theology, 12 (2010), 20-32 (26). 
71 As Webster summarises, ‘the essence of God’s will’ has to be taken to mean ‘the will of God’s 
essence’, so as not to ‘leave a gap in a metaphysical background to the being of God which is 
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With these determinations of God’s being-in-act in mind, we now proceed to 
examine Barth’s treatments of two specific perfections or attributes of God which are 
of special interest to the purposes in this thesis: God’s constancy and His eternity. 
5B.2 The Constancy of God 
This subsection deals with Barth’s explanation of God’s constancy, focusing on the 
relationship between God’s constancy and God’s working in history.  The next 
subsection will be devoted to an investigation of Barth’s account of the relation 
between eternity and time. 
The constancy or immutability of God means that God is changeless, 
eternally remaining the same without any succession, change or variation.72  In 
Barth’s words, it means that: 
there neither is nor can be, nor is to be expected or even thought 
possible in Him … any deviation, diminution or addition, nor any 
degeneration or rejuvenation, any alteration or non-identity or 
discontinuity.  The one, omnipresent God remains the One He is.  
This is His constancy.’73 
But this traditional definition is immediately followed by a qualification from the 
viewpoint of revelation.  In view of the fact that God has indeed established a true 
relationship with the world and humanity, Barth states, this constancy must not be 
                                                                                                                                          
indifferent to God’s historical acts of revelation’.  John Webster, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, in 
Jüngel, God’s Being Is in Becoming, 6.  For a brief account of Barth’s acutalistic ontology in §28 of 
the CD, see McCormack, ‘The Actuality of God’, Engaging the Doctrine of God, 213-219.  As 
McCormack sees it, ‘The root of Barth’s actualism is to be found in this eternal act of 
self-determination and in it alone’ (ibid., 217).  Whilst it is clear that the actualistic scheme 
registered in §28.1 receives great material elaborations in Barth’s doctrine of election in II/2, it has 
been argued that in II/1 Barth’s actualism already acquired material claims, ‘the most important of 
which is the dialectic of love and freedom’.  Stratis, ‘Speculating about Divinity?’, 22. 
72 Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: Set Out and Illustrated from the Sources, ed. by Ernst Bizer, 
trans. by G. T. Thomson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1950), 67. 
73 II/1, 491. 
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negatively considered a constraint preventing God from building this relationship.  
Concretely understood, ‘it is not a matter of knowing God in a more or less 
consequently conceived immutability as such, but of knowing God as 
“immutable”’,74 for the predicate ‘immutable’ should be determined by the subject 
‘God’.75  Qualified by the notion of revelation, as Gunton rightly formulated, the 
proper and positive meaning of God’s constancy consists in the fact that ‘God is what 
he is in eternal actuality; he never is it intermittently, but always and in every place 
he is what he is, continually and self-consistently’,76 both in His being in Himself 
and in His existence in relation to the world and humanity. 
On the basis this actualistic and concrete understanding of constancy as God’s 
constancy made manifest in revelation, Barth establishes his understanding of the 
relationship between the constant God and His works of creation, revelation and 
reconciliation.  This relationship can be explained by four important statements.  
First, being constant, God does new things, and in doing so He has a real history, i.e. 
salvation history, with the world and humanity.  In Barth’s view, the constancy of 
                                                 
74 Ibid., 493; translation revised per KD II/1, 554f.: ‘es handelt sich nicht darum, in einem mehr oder 
weniger konsequent als solches begriffenen Unveränderlichen Gott zu erkennen, sondern es handelt 
sich darum, Gott als «unveränderlich» zu erkennen’. 
75 In his treatment of God’s glory Christopher Holmes posits that, if God’s glory is to be God’s glory, 
it should be predicated not to ‘a relation or a way of God’s working’, but to God’s being as such.  In 
this regard, ‘Barth insists that God is revealed to us as God is; that God’s perfections are not anterior 
to God’s being, but that God has them in Godself prior to the historical outworking of the covenant.’  
Christopher R. J. Holmes, ‘The Theological Function of the Doctrine of the Divine Attributes and the 
Divine Glory, with Special Reference to Karl Barth and His Reading of the Protestant Orthodox’, 
Scottish Journal of Theology, 61 (2008), 206-223 (217).  Contrary to this reading, we propose that 
Barth’s designation of constancy as God’s constancy is not aimed to safeguard God’s being 
antecedent to His attribute.  Rather, what he seeks to ensure is concrete conception of ‘constancy’ as 
God’s attribute; that is to say, we have to do not with a general notion of constancy, but with the 
constancy of the particular, concrete God.  And the only proper and only possible way for us to have 
concrete knowledge of God’s constancy, is not to start from ‘Godself’ but from what is revealed to us 
in history.  This approach to knowledge of God’s attributes, of course, is built on the ground of 
Barth’s actualistic understanding of God’s being-in-act: the One revealed to us is no other and no less 
than the One who in Himself is.  We would consent to Holmes’ claim that ‘God is complete in 
Godself’ (ibid., 217) if by ‘Godself’ is meant the God of Jesus Christ, who is never not for us and 
therefore never without us. 
76 Gunton, The Barth Lectures, 107. 
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God in no way hinders Him from doing new things.  It is in doing new things that: 
[the constant] God has a real history in and with the world created by 
Him: the history of the reconciliation and revelation accomplished by 
Him, by which He leads the world to a future redemption.77 
In other words, a constant God who does not or cannot do new things cannot have a 
real history with the world.  And this real history between God and the world 
consists not in any new works, but in God’s new works of reconciliation, revelation 
and redemption.  Then we are told that this real history of these new works of God 
is precisely salvation history.  In this history there is indeed the ‘particular act of 
God’ [Das Besondere Gottes], and to this act there are indeed real peculiarities 
[Eigentümlichkeiten].78  These works in salvation history are so particular and so 
new that they cannot be understood simply ‘as the continuation and crown of the 
work of creation’.79  Rather, vis-à-vis the history of the created world in general, 
God’s particular works in salvation history has to be acknowledged as absolutely 
new: 
Taking place in the sequence [Folge] of another and many others, the 
special work of God does not result from [folgen aus] this other or 
from the series of all others; instead, amidst this other, it has the 
character of a termination [Abschluß] of all others and at the same 
time that of a beginning of a complete other.   In that they take place 
within the course and development of created things, in that they 
themselves too have the character of such created things, God’s words 
and deeds and also the faith and obedience in which humanity meets 
them (and also the unbelief and disobedience in which it opposes 
them!) have, at the same time and decisively, the character of an 
                                                 
77 II/1, 502; translation slightly revised per KD II/1, 565. 
78 KD II/1, 569, 570. 
79 II/1, 506. 
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interruption [Unterbruch], of an annulment [Aufhebung] of all that 
which hitherto exists in favour of a new order.80 
One need not be surprised to find Barth re-employing the notion of salvation 
history, which he explicitly dismissed in CD I/2.81  Whilst in I/2 the focus of 
discussion is revelation in its subject-predicate relation to history, in II/1 the 
immediate context is God’s new works in history as disclosed to us in revelation.  
Here in insisting that salvation history takes place in but does not results from 
general history, Barth retains the same basic argumentation that, just as revelation is 
in history but not of history, salvation history takes place in general history but does 
not result from it.  Revelation is precisely one of the new works which God does in 
salvation history. 
The second statement is that, in doing new things in salvation history, God 
remains constant.  If it is this constant God that created the world, then in the work 
of creation as His creation God became without becoming anything that He had not 
                                                 
80 Ibid., 509; translation revised per KD II/1, 572.  Three things are to be noticed in this block 
quote―the first two concerning my reworking of translation; the third about two specific German 
words.  First, in the English trasnslation there is observed the clear attempt to preserve the 
connection between Folge and folgen aus by using the two verbs ‘follows’ and ‘follows from’.  In 
doing so, however, the sense is obscured in which Barth says that God’s special work simply ‘takes 
place’ [geschehend] without following anything, a sense to which I choose to keep.  Second, I retain 
the long sentence beginning with ‘In that they’, thus preserving the connection between those clauses 
taken apart in the English trasnslation, so as to highlight the fact that between the ordinary character 
(taking place ‘within the course and development of created things’) and the extraordinary character 
of the divine-human dealings, there exists a relation of a paradoxical ‘in that’ [indem] rather than a 
contradictory ‘however’.  Third, the words Abschluß and Aufhebung are translated into ‘termination’ 
and ‘annulment’ respectively.  It would be helpful to bear in mind, however, that they could also 
mean, with a more positive tone, ‘completion’ and ‘sublimation’ respectively (cf. footnote 33 in 
Chapter Two).  And the latter understanding finds support in how Barth conceives the relation 
between nature and grace: ‘when grace reveals itself, nature indeed does not cease to be―how should 
it, as God there does not cease to be its Creator?  There within nature, however, is more than nature; 
there nature itself becomes the theatre of grace; there grace becomes visible as the lordship over 
nature and thus in its freedom over against it’ (II/1, 509; KD II/1, 572, emphasis mine).  Certainly 
Barth would not mean (at this point at least) for grace to be simply the perfection of nature.  But if it 
is within nature―which does not cease to be―that grace, in finding its theatre, makes nature more 
than nature, then the free lordship of grace over against nature is not to be understood as consisting in 
the pure negation or destruction (‘termination’ or ‘annulment’) of the latter by the former. 
81 I/2, 58.  See section 4C.2. 
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been.82  And if it is this constant God that brings about new things in His work of 
revelation and reconciliation, then these ‘new’ works of God do not overthrow but 
rather confirms the constancy of God.  Moreover, just as God the Creator does not 
oppose but rather asserts the God in se, so God the Revealer, Reconciler and 
Redeemer known in salvation history does not contradict but rather affirms God the 
Creator and therefore the God in se.83 
Third, not altering God’s being, these peculiarities seen in the new, particular 
work of God in salvation history demonstrates who this constant God in se is.  In 
doing these new works ‘God in some sense sets Himself apart from Himself, namely, 
from His being and doing as Creator’.84  And ‘in those peculiarities, His being [Sein] 
and doing as Creator and therefore also His divine essence [Wesen] as such acquires 
contours’ in a particular and concrete manner.85  Therefore, in that the constant God 
is who He is in His new works in salvation history, He can be known to us only 
retrospectively through these new works.  ‘It is in and with the knowledge of this 
second that we know the first; it is in and with this particular work that we know the 
general, and not vice versa.’86 
Fourth, like the discussion about God’s being-in-act in §28.1, the present 
discussion about God’s constancy and his new works in salvation history, too, leads 
distinctively to the notion of God’s choice: 
                                                 
82 II/1, 499. 
83 ‘In this history God does not become nor is He other than who He is in Himself from all eternity 
and in eternity [der, der er von Ewigkeit her und in Ewigkeit in sich selber ist; with in sich selber 
missing from the English trasnslation].  Again, His constancy does not hinder Him from being the 
real subject of this real history; instead, it is precisely in His constancy that He is able, empowered and 
willing [fähig, ermächtigt und willig] to be this. … God does not contradict Himself but confirms 
Himself precisely as the Creator of the world, in that He has a particular history with it also in the 
work of reconciliation and revelation’, ibid., 502f.; translation revised per KD II/1, 565. 
84 II/1, 506; translation slightly revised per KD II/1, 569. 
85 II/1, 506; translation slightly revised per KD II/1, 569. 
86 II/1, 507; translation revised per KD II/1, 570. 
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The special act of God in this new work of God’s appears … in the 
fact that from the very outset and in all its stages salvation history is 
based on a choice [Auswahl] … God does not become nor is another 
in this act of choice which constitutes the salvation history; rather, He 
is the One who He is as the Saviour out of sin an death in this 
particular form.87 
The full implications of the notion of the constant God grounding His new works in 
salvation history in His choice will be treated in the next chapter.  But one thing to 
be noted is that the choice of the constant God is not an arbitrary choice.  Rather, it 
is in aiming to ‘enter into a kind of partnership with humanity’ that God, the free 
Lord who is graciously loving, makes this choice.88 
5B.3 The Eternity of God 
5B.3.1 God’s Eternity Positively Related to Time 
In the context of the Christian doctrine of God, just as the notion of constancy is 
often defined negatively as changeless, that of eternity is often defined as timeless.89  
At the outset of §31.3 of the CD Barth rejects viewing eternity abstractly and 
negatively  The eternity at issue is for him God’s eternity, as a determination of 
God’s freedom, denoting His sovereignty and majesty.90  Behind this is clearly 
Barth’s insistence on viewing God’s being-in-act concretely and strictly from the 
view point of revelation.  On this ground, he registers a positive account of eternity.  
                                                 
87 II/1, 508; translation slightly revised per KD II/1, 572. 
88 II/1, 507; translation slightly revised per KD II/1, 570. 
89 The two notions are also used to interpret each other, strengthening the image of a timeless and 
therefore changeless God.  Cf. Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 65.  The Barth of the Unterricht 
maintained that one could talk legitimately about ‘the great and solemn “No” of the eternity of God’ 
only by way of negation, and that ‘[w]e do not begin to conceive God’s eternity and omnipresence by 
infinitely extending time and space but by negating them’ (Unt2, 113, 158f.; GD, 400, 434).  He was 
then quite happy about Schleiermacher’s definition of God’s eternity as absolute timelessness. 
90 II/1, 608.  Cf. 464f. 
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On this ground, he gives a preliminary definition of eternity as pure duration in 
which beginning, succession and end happen at one moment and at the same time 
[Einmal und Zugleich],91 thereby agreeing to view eternity as ‘non-temporality’ in a 
limited sense, excluding from the notion of eternity not time as such, but what he 
deems as the negative elements of time, i.e. separation, distance and contradiction.92  
On this positive view, when eternity is understood as pure duration, it might well be 
endless, not due to a lack of beginning and end, but due to their simultaneity; it is 
indivisible, not because there is no succession in it, but because beginning, 
succession and end are inseparable;93 it is independent, not in the sense that it is 
devoid of all change, but that time has no power over it. 
Having cleared the notion of timelessness from that of eternity, Barth furthers 
his account of a positive relation of God’s eternity to time.  This positively 
constructed relation of eternity to time can be accounted for from three aspects.  
First, their positive relation consists in the readiness of eternity for time.  This 
eternal God not only created time and therefore owns time, He also has time for us in 
His revelation in Jesus Christ; to this extent, ‘although God’s eternity is not itself 
time it is as such the absolute basis of time, and therefore absolute readiness for it.’94 
Second, it follows that this positive relation consists in eternity’s inclusion of 
time.  As discussed earlier, eternity, understood by Barth as pure simultaneous 
                                                 
91 Ibid.; KD, II/1, 685. 
92 II/1, 608.  Note that in the block where Barth reservedly agrees to deem eternity ‘in fact 
non-temporality’, he does not mean or write that ‘Time can have nothing to do with God’, as the 
English translation has it.  Instead, he is saying, ‘What would this [i.e. infinite extension of time] 
have to do with God?’ (‘Was hätte diese mit Gott zu tun?  Was hülfe ihr die Unendlichkeit ihrer 
Verlängerungen?’ KD II/1, 686.)  Readers must not be led to the misconception that the 
‘non-temporality’ specifically defined here means that eternity has nothing to do with time. 
93 Note that for Barth, ‘as true duration, the duration of God Himself is the beginning, [the] 
succession and [the] end.’  II/1, 610; KD II/1, 688. 
94 Ibid., 618; KD II/1, 696. 
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duration, does not lack time understood as before, present and after; it ‘simply lacks 
the fleeting nature of the present, the separation between before and after.’95  The 
opposition of the distinction between those three moments are excluded, but the 
distinction itself does not disappear but is included simultaneously in the totality of 
the divine eternity.  In addition to this conceptual argument, the concrete fact that 
eternity did become time also affirms the eternal God as ‘eminently temporal’,96 
meaning that He is ‘not only eternal but also temporal’,97 that is, ‘both timeless and 
temporal’.98 
Third, advancing from eternity’s readiness for time and inclusion of time, 
Barth goes on to delimit their positive relation as eternity’s surrounding or 
embracing time on all sides.99  Applying the boundary concept to this connection, 
Barth brings his explication to a climactic moment by developing a detailed 
elaboration of what he terms as the threefold temporality of God’s eternity.  
According to it, the eminently temporal eternity of God is in its completeness and 
                                                 
95 II/1, 613. 
96 KD II/1, 692; II/1, 614. 
97 II/1, 617; KD II/1, 695. 
98 II/1, 617; KD II/1, 696.  At this point in his discussion of eternity’s readiness for and inclusion of 
time Barth interposes a discussion about the basis and starting-point of this positive understanding of 
God’s eternity.  He first claims that ‘[a] correct understanding of the positive side of the concept of 
eternity, free from all false conclusions, is gained only when we are clear that we are speaking about 
the eternity of the triune God’ (II/1, 615).  This claim is followed by his affirmation that a correct 
understanding of the concept of eternity is reached only if we start from the other side, from the real 
fellowship between God and the creature, and therefore between eternity and time.  This means 
starting from the incarnation of the divine Word in Jesus Christ’ (ibid., 616; KD II/1, 694).  
Therefore, whilst the Trinity is the ontological ground or ‘inner divine basis’ (II/1, 618) of God’s 
eternity, its epistemological starting-point is God’s revelation in Jesus Christ.  Differently put, 
Barth’s concept of eternity, like all his teachings up to this point in the CD, derives from revelation 
and moves towards the doctrine of the Trinity.  That is why George Hunsinger, in offering an 
explication of the trinitarian implications of Barth’s concept of eternity, still complains that ‘God’s 
being as it is in itself needs to be more carefully distinguished, though not separated, from God’s 
being in relation to the world.’  George Hunsinger, ‘Mysterium Trinitatis: Karl Barth’s Concept of 
Eternity’, in For the Sake of the World: Karl Barth and the Future of Ecclesial Theology, ed. by 
George Hunsinger (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), 165-190 (180). 
99 II/1, 613f. 
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comprehensiveness to be understood as pre-temporal [vorzeitlich], supra-temporal 
[überzeitlich] and post-temporal [nachzeitlich].  Whilst the pre-temporal and the 
post-temporal aspects are two crucial constituents of the temporality of eternity,100 
what directly concerns our purposes here is the supra-temporality of eternity, to 
which we now turn. 
5B.3.2 The Supra-Temporality of God’s Eternity 
Supra-temporality is the notion at which Barth brings eternity closest to time.  He 
makes it plain that eternity is to be understood as ‘supra-temporal’ [überzeitlich],  
‘co-temporal’ [mitzeitlich] as well as ‘in-temporal’ [inzeitlich]. 101   Eternity is 
‘supra-temporal’, not in the sense that it is high above time or far away beyond it, but 
that eternity is present all over the sphere of time, surrounding it from every side, 
embracing the whole of it.102  That is why ‘this “supra-temporal” must not have the 
flavour of “timeless”.’103  The supra-temporality plays the pivotal part in Barth’s 
conception of the positive relation of eternity to time.  For one thing, it connects 
God’s ‘before’ and God’s ‘after’, so that the two would not be separated, and that 
eternity would not cease when time begins.  For another, it also relates our time to 
the beginning and the end, so that our time would not become self-enclosed, 
separated from the two, and that eternity would not be conceived merely as a 
perpendicular break-in in its relation to time. 104   Only by virtue of the 
supra-temporality of God’s eternity, then, may and must we as human beings in time 
                                                 
100 Ibid., 621-623, 629-638. 
101 Ibid., 623; KD II/1, 702. 
102 II/1, 623. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Therefore ‘any conception of the relation of time and eternity is in error which tries to find eternity 
only in an immediate perpendicular connexion with each moment of time’, ibid., 624. 
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‘seek to know God as present not only in that which is before all time, but in all time 
and in each single part of time.’105 
To the possible objection that such conception of eternity accompanying and 
surrounding time runs the risk of rendering God’s transcendence over and beyond the 
world diminished by or subordinate to His immanence in the world, Barth has two 
replies.  First, eternity’s being in company with time is a gracious decision of God’s 
free will by virtue of which He allows His eternity to be accompanied by time.106  
Second, directly engaging with Leopold von Ranke’s famous aphorism that ‘Every 
epoch is immediate to God’,107 Barth feels that he must reverse the subject-predicate 
relation by claiming that it is not the case that each epoch is immediate to God, but 
rather that God as the Lord of history is immediate to each epoch in His giving 
meaning immediately to every pooch.108  In this way, world history has been, so to 
speak, dethroned from the judgement seat, on which it arrogated the authority to 
judge the world, ‘arbitrarily exalting an epoch here and equally arbitrarily debasing 
an epoch there’.109  Instead, it is the transcendent God in His immanence in world 
history that is rightly and justly in the position to judge the world and its history.  
The sovereign God therefore remains transcendent, as He freely chooses to be with 
time and stays free in the company of history. 
On this ground, Barth goes on to remark that von Ranke’s statement can and 
should be stretched to mean that ‘the meaning [not only of every epoch but] also of 
                                                 
105 Ibid.; KD II/1, 703. 
106 II/1, 623: ‘eternity does not will to be without time, but causes itself to be accompanied by time’. 
107 Leopold von Ranke, Weltgeschichte (Leipzig, 1881), Band 8, 177. 




the whole world history as such is immediate to God’.110  Specifically speaking: 
because the concrete work of God’s hands in time is the Church which 
has its root in Israel, every epoch, every period of history and every 
life-time has its significance from Israel and the Church and with a 
view to Israel and the Church [von Israel und von der Kirche her und 
zu Israel und zur Kirche hin].  In its innermost content, its final 
riddles and revelations, its true possessions and privations, its peculiar 
[eigentlichen] height of achievement and its catastrophes, and no less 
in the times which lie between light and shadow [in den jeweils 
zwischen Licht und Schatten liegenden … Zeiten], which seem empty 
and are really most decisive, the whole world history is not ‘world 
history’, but the history of Israel and the Church.111 
It is, then, not history in general but the history of Israel and the Church that is the 
real ‘world history’, because it is this history to which revelation is directly related, 
which is revealed to us in God’s being-in-act, and which is constituted by God’s new 
works of revelation, reconciliation and redemption.112  In Barth’s view, this notion 
is sufficient to correct the ‘speculation’ of historians (if not historicists) such as von 
Ranke’s, in which the term ‘God’ is left undetermined and contentless.  It is also 
necessary for avoiding the usual theological-mythical attempt to ‘[take] refuge in a 
desperate hypostatising of the “now” of our time which cannot be hypostatised’.113  
                                                 
110 Ibid.; translation slightly reversed per KD II/1, 704.  Emphasis mine. 
111 II/1, 625; translation slightly revised per KD II/1, 704f.  Whilst David Ford is right in remarking 
that ‘Barth’s definition of eternity is tailor-made for making Jesus Christ’s history eternal’, Barth is 
more ‘ambitious’ than that―he aims to include world history in the history of the Church, and 
therefore in the history of Jesus Christ.  David F. Ford, Barth and God’s Story: Biblical Narrative 
and the Theological Method of Karl Barth in the Church Dogmatics (Frankfurt am Main and Bern: 
Verlag Peter Lang, 1981), 141. 
112 This line of thinking can be traced back to the mid-1920s.  ‘For history has no theological 
authority; the Church does’, Barth, ‘Kirche und Theologie’ (1925), Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten 
1922-1925, 660; English translation: ‘Church and Theology’, in Barth, Theology and Church, 293.  
Also, ‘it is precisely the church, the history of God on earth which was grounded once and for all in 
Jesus Christ, which in history surpasses the remaining history. … Above all, it would require that the 
fearful further-negotiation of the problem “revelation and history” should ultimately again take place 
under the right name, and the name would just have to be “revelation and church”’, ChD, 320f. 
113 II/1, 625. 
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Barth’s concept of ‘world history’, then, resists both the positivistic-historicist 
approach on the one hand and the theological-mythical contemplation on the other, 
and concentrates instead exclusively upon the revelation of Jesus Christ and the 
particular history pointing to it. 
5B.3.3 God’s Eternity Distinct from and Inclusive of Time 
At this point it seems proper to discuss Richard Roberts’ criticism of Barth’s concept 
of time, according to which this concept incurs detriment to the whole of Barth’s 
theology.  Acknowledging that the Church Dogmatics differs from the Römerbrief 
in that ‘the dialectic of antitheses in The Epistle to the Romans has given way to a 
dialectic informed by a new conjunction of transcendence and immanence, that is a 
creative “inclusion” of time by eternity’,114 Roberts still makes the severe criticism 
that Barth’s concept eternity and time 
is double-edged at the very least.  On the one hand he denies the 
involvement of true eternity with the dialectic of finite and infinite 
categories; on the other he affirms eternity as the total time-positing 
action of God.115 
Roberts takes this juxtaposition to mean that the alleged ‘time’, too, cannot be 
involved in the finite-infinite dialectic.  And this also means for him that ‘the vast 
and complete temporal system that emerges in the Church Dogmatics must never 
coincide with the non-theological temporal categories in identity, only in the 
so-called dialectic transcendence’.116  On this view, the ‘time’ posited by Barth’s 
doctrine of eternity is not involved in ‘the world of experience and the cosmos’, 
                                                 
114 Roberts, ‘Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Time’, A Theology on Its Way?, 21. 




because it is ‘systematically at one remove from it’.  This ‘time’, with Barth’s 
theologically posited realities, is ‘absolutely undetectable outside the peculiar 
theological mode of [its] positing and perception’.  Contained in this self-enclosed 
‘theological circle’ and ‘systematically excluded’ from the ‘shared time of human 
and cosmic existence’, Barth’s concept of time will eventually undergo a ‘logical 
implosion into timelessness’.117 
According to our findings, Roberts’s account can be faulted at several crucial 
points.  First, in the CD there is indeed posited a divine transcendence over the 
finite-infinite dialectic.  But the divine transcendence, too, is conceived by Barth as 
belonging to another dialectic, i.e. the dialectic of transcendence and immanence.  
This means that wherever there is God’s transcendence over the world, there is also 
His immanence in it. 118   In other words, God is never posited as simply 
‘transcending’ the world.  Second, by virtue of the dialectic of transcendence and 
immanence, Barth is able to conceive the divine being-in-act, including God’s 
eternity, as transcending the finite-infinite dialectic, not by being removed from the 
dialectic, let alone simply from the ‘finite’ realm, but by embracing, including both 
the finite and the infinite.119  Therefore, in that the divine transcendence in and not 
over the world consists in its inclusion of both the finite and the infinite in the divine, 
the divine is in no way a ‘self-enclosed’ system self excluded from what Roberts 
terms the ‘shared time of human and cosmic existence’. 
Third, Roberts directs a rigorous challenge to Barth’s concept of time, 
                                                 
117 Ibid. 
118 As mentioned in section 5B.1, Barth insists that the ‘dialectical transcendence’ of revelation ‘must 
always be understood with equal strictness as immanence.’  II/1, 264. 
119 See section 5B.1: ‘Revelation, and therefore God’s being, do not simply transcend the physical 
and overlap the spiritual; they rather transcend both in comprehending both.’  Cf. II/1, 267. 
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because he interprets it as deriving from Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity: ‘as Barth 
derives the Fatherhood of God from his antecedent, eternal Fatherhood of Jesus 
Christ, so, likewise, must time be derived from within the “self-enclosed” circle.’120  
On this view, Barth presupposes the notion divine eternity in antecedence, and only 
then derives the notion of time from it, just as he presupposes God’s eternal 
fatherhood in relation to His eternal Son, and only then derives God’s fatherhood in 
relation to us.  Now, as we have mentioned, the doctrine of the Trinity is for Barth 
the ontological basis and not the epistemological starting-point of his notion of God’s 
eternity.  Barth’s entire treatment of God’s eternity in the first half of §31.3 of the 
CD starts from the concrete understanding of God’s eternity positively related to time 
from the viewpoint of the reality of God’s self-revelation in history.  From God’s 
eternity thus understood it then derives the three forms of temporality of God’s 
eternity.  At the end it undergirds the conclusion thus reached by resorting to the life, 
the unity and especially the perichoresis of the triune God.121  God’s eternity thus 
known, then, is far from a self-enclosed circle but literally in every way relating to 
time by preceding, accompanying and following it. 
It then seems clear that Roberts’ criticism of Barth’s doctrine of time is 
misguided.  What he attacks are the general concepts of ‘transcendence’ and 
‘eternity’, and not what Barth understands as God’s transcendence and eternity 
according to His self-revelation in Jesus Christ.  His interpretation of Barth’s notion 
of eternity as self-enclosed and exclusive could only have derived from a failure to 
appreciate Barth’s strict commitment to the historical actuality of revelation as the 
only starting-point of theological knowledge. 
                                                 
120 Roberts, ‘Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Time’, A Theology on Its Way?, 20.  Emphasis mine. 
121 II/1, 639f. 
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5C Concluding Remarks 
Focusing on Barth’s treatments of knowledge of God and the reality of God, this 
chapter has examined three things.  First, in the dialectic of veiling and unveiling in 
the knowledge of God, history is construed by Barth negatively as a limitation but 
also positively as a medium.  On the side of God, this medium ensures that He is 
known without becoming a direct object of human perception, and that He is 
believed in the particularity and concreteness proper to Him.  On the side of human 
knowers, this medium constitutes a way on which human knowledge of God 
proceeds, surrounding revelation as the centre, towards the end of the truthfulness of 
our knowledge of God. 
Second, we have affirmed in Barth’s actualistic understanding of God as 
being-in-act that in the history which revelation becomes and is we have to do with 
no other and no less than God Himself, as God’s being is His pure, particular action 
in this history, an action which transcends the nature-spiritual distinction, and is 
based on a self-willed act of decision of God. 
Third, we have affirmed in Barth’s treatments of God’s constancy and His 
eternity that the constancy of God consists in His doing new things in salvation 
history whilst remaining constant, and that the eternity of God is His eminent 
temporality, in its readiness for time, positive relation to time, and inclusion of it in 
itself, without rendering itself merely temporal or confining itself in a self-enclosed 
realm separated from reality as we know it. 
At this point in the thesis, at the end of the chapters covering the ‘Early 
Dogmatic Period (1924-1940)’, we have demonstrated Barth’s firm commitment to 
the revelation of the speaking God in Jesus Christ, and his subsequent, unequivocal 
affirmation of the reality of the history which revelation becomes and is.  It has 
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been observed that, starting strictly from his doctrine of revelation as the 
epistemological point of departure set in CD I/1, Barth seems to be moving in CD 
II/1 towards a position which gives priority to the dynamic action over the static 
being (as in the case God’s being-in-act, section 5B.1), to the salvation history of 
God’s new, ongoing works over the history of the already created world as such (as 
in the case of God’s constancy, section 5B.2), and to a revelatory and therefore 
christological grounding of theological knowledge over a trinitarian grounding of it 
(as in the case of God’s eternity, section 5B.3).  It has also been noted that these 
new works of God in salvation history, in which His being is, are said to be based on 
a choice, a decision.  In that in CD II/2 Barth begins to explicitly unfold this notion, 










Electing God Determining History: 
Church Dogmatics II/2 (1942) 
 
Introduction 
Barth’s doctrine of election, in its christocentric form in CD II/2,1 is the volume 
which Barth wrote with a great ‘joy of discovery’ and indeed a particular sense of 
satisfaction. 2   Broadly speaking, it consists of a twofold argument: a radical 
correlation of God’s being in Himself to His works in relation to the world, and a 
radical concentration of all God’s outward works and, to that extent, of God’s inner 
being too, on the election of Jesus Christ in the beginning with God.  To speak of 
God, on the correlative account, we always have to do with the God in His 
relationship to the reality created by Him and distinct from Him.  On the 
concentrative account, to speak of God’s works in His relation to the created reality, 
we must always start from a determined disposition of God―that is, from His 
decision to be God in that relation in the election of Jesus Christ.3 
In this light, section 6A will explore Barth’s christocentric grounding of the 
election of Jesus Christ as the beginning of God’s relation to the created reality.  
Section 6B will examine his conception of Jesus Christ as the electing God and its 
ontological consequences concerning both the being of Jesus Christ and the triune 
                                                 
1 For a detailed analysis of the development of the doctrine of election in Barth’s theology, see 
Matthias Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher on the Doctrine of Election: a Systematic-theological 
Comparison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chs. 3-5. 
2 Barth, ‘To Dr. Setsuro Osaki, Göttingen’ (1967): ‘in C.D. II, 2, which I wrote with a joy of 
discovery I experienced perhaps in no other volume, in a way that is understanding, vital, and, so far 
as I can see, correct’, Karl Barth, Letters, 1961-1968, ed. by Jürgen Fangmeier, Hinrich Stoevesandt 
and G. W. Bromiley, trans. by G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981), 237-242 (238). 
3 II/2, 3-7; KD II/2, 1-5. 
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essence of God.  Section 6C will draw on Barth’s understanding of the election of 
Jesus Christ as both the Urgeschichte and the Urentscheidung, and propose a 
historical understanding of election and an elective understanding of history. 
6A Christocentric Grounding of Election: Jesus Christ 
Electing and Elected 
In CD I, whilst the epistemological starting-point was the revelation of Jesus Christ 
in history, the ontological end-point was the eternal Sonship.  What could be 
potentially at stake in this formulation is a gap between the divine Son in eternity and 
the God-human Jesus Christ in history.  The actualistic claim in CD II/1 about 
God’s being-in-act is crucial, but then the force of this claim was not brought back to 
Christ’s eternal being and His action in history.  The gap between the two still 
remained largely unbridged. 
In CD II/2 Barth directly addresses this gap by the forceful christocentric 
assertion that Jesus Christ in His election is in the beginning with God.  In the unity 
of the divine nature and human nature present in Jesus Christ, the Elector and the 
elect come at one in the pre-temporal eternity, thereby dissolving the gap.  Barth’s 
christological concentration in the doctrine of election consists of two propositions: 
first, Jesus Christ is the beginning of all God’s works ad extra and, second, Jesus 
Christ is both the electing God and the elected human being. 
6A.1 Jesus Christ: the Beginning of All God’s Ways and Works 
When Barth asserts that the election of Jesus Christ is the beginning of all God’s 
ways and works, he brings the divine-eternal and the human-temporal to the closest 
possible connection.  It should be noted that this move is not merely about the two 
poles as such, but primarily about the unity of the God-human Jesus Christ.  If Jesus 
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Christ, the incarnate Word of God in history, is in the beginning with God Himself in 
eternity, then in Him the human-temporal, too, is already present or anticipated in 
eternity. 
Following this line of thought, we first notice Barth’s understanding of the 
eternal Word from the viewpoint of the incarnate Word Jesus Christ.  According to 
the opening verses of John 1, on Barth’s account, the claim that the Word was in the 
beginning declares its eternity, that the Word was with God asserts its status as 
belonging to God Himself, and that the Word was God, affirms the same being and 
dignity which the Son shares with the Father.4  But exactly who is this Word?  To 
this question Barth gives an answer of great significance when he contends that the 
concept of the Word has a mere preliminary, provisional and even veiling function.  
What is intended by John is the designation of the attributes of the Word to the 
God-human Jesus Christ: 
It is His place which, by means of the predicates given to the Logos, is 
simultaneously marked off, cleared away and secured.  He, Jesus, in 
the beginning, is with God, is by nature God.  That is what is being 
secured in John 1:1.5 
Eternity and time converge on this point where the God-human Jesus Christ is 
reckoned to be properly in the beginning with God.  This is not a human projection 
of the temporal into the eternal, for the incarnation described in the prologue, as 
Barth sees it, refers to a happening [Geschehensein]6 which has eternity as its content 
                                                 
4 II/2, 95f. 
5  II/2, 96; KD II/2, 103.  Translation McCormack’s, ‘Karl Barth’s Historicized Christology’, 
Orthodox and Modern, 221n49.  That is why Barth can argue that John did not honour Jesus by 
ascribing to Him the title ‘Logos’; instead, he ‘honoured the title itself by applying it a few lines later 
as a predicate of Jesus’, II/2, 97. 
6 Ibid., 97; KD II/2, 105. 
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and time as its form and therefore is both eternal and temporal.7 
Second, we observe that Barth defines this beginning, which is Jesus Christ, 
as the beginning of all God’s ways and works.8  According to him, this beginning is 
that ‘of what we have to say concerning God’s dealings with His creation’,9 that is, 
that of God’s works ad extra.  But so eminent is the beginning that it is placed 
‘indeed before the beginning’10 as ‘the eternal beginning’,11 one that is so ‘beyond 
time and beyond the nexus of the created world and its history’ that is ‘the sphere 
where God is with Himself’.12  At this point, what was traditionally considered 
God’s works ad extra seems to be linked with God’s being in Jesus Christ as the 
beginning. 
Third, at some other points, however, this does not seem to be the case.  
Barth would still speak of a different beginning in God Himself which is not Jesus 
Christ: 
                                                 
7 Barth’s equation of the eternal Word with the incarnate/to-be-incarnate Word has been charged with 
a confusion of the divine and the human, a misconception of the Logos asarkos as the Logos 
ensarkos/incarnandus, and an intrusion upon God’s freedom by the world.  For example, 
Pannenberg remarks that ‘Barth distinctively doubled the concept of preexistence, referring to the 
deity of Jesus Christ, the eternal Son, in I/1, 414, and to the human reality of Jesus in II/2’.  In 
Pannenberg’s view, our understanding of the incarnation should be derived ‘from the eternal relation 
of the Son to the Father and not by the detour of the doctrine of predestination’, for ‘the act of the 
election is part and parcel of the freedom of God’s relation to the world, so that its content cannot be 
constitutive for the eternal identity of his divine essence.  If it were, the world itself would be the 
correlate of this essence.’  Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, trans. by G. W. 
Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 368n127.  Pannenberg’s view is clearly based on an 
understanding of God’s freedom as freedom from what is not God.  If one starts, as Barth does, with 
God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ, one will see that God’s freedom revealed to us is His freedom 
for us.  For this reason, we propose in response to Pannenberg that Barth does not so much ‘[double] 
the concept of preexistence’ as accords to it what he views as its proper content, by pointing out the 
provisionality of the concept of Logos on the one hand and the togetherness of the eternal essentiality 
of the historical existence of Jesus Christ in the divine election on the other. 
8 II/2, 3. 
9 Ibid., 89. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 94. 
12 Ibid., 100. 
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[Jesus Christ] is God’s beginning before which there is no other 
beginning except for the beginning which God has in Himself, so that, 
except for God Himself, nobody and nothing can derive from 
elsewhere or look back to a different beginning.13 
Sometimes he would simply deny God a beginning: 
He was not at the beginning of God, for God has indeed no beginning.  
But He was at the beginning of all things, at the beginning of God’s 
dealings with the reality which is distinct from Himself.14 
It has been suggested that passages like these are moments of inconsistency as they 
appear to be contradictory to basic logic of Barth’s overall scheme to make Jesus 
Christ the only starting-point and the ultimate destination of our human knowledge 
of election. 15   But even with the alleged problem of individual passages in 
opposition to the general project set aside, one still easily finds these passages at least 
in tension with each other.16  They could be considered consistent only in their 
common indication that beyond Jesus Christ there is something else (‘the beginning 
which God has in Himself’) or someone else (God Himself who ‘has indeed no 
beginning’), and that, to that extent, Jesus Christ is ‘merely’ the beginning of all 
‘things’.  At such moments, it can be argued, Barth is plainly not at his best. 
But this distinction of Jesus Christ as the beginning from the God who has no 
beginning, of God’s works ad extra from God’s inner being―and even the seeming 
subordination of the former to the latter―appears to be no more than a logically 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 94, translation revised per KD II/2, 101. 
14 II/2, 102. 
15 McCormack, ‘Karl Barth’s Historicised Christology’, 217n45.  In this regard Hector suggests that 
‘[t]hat which McCormack identifies as inconsistencies in Barth’s theology, Molnar sees as evidence 
that Barth was primarily concerned with affirming God’s independence.’  Molnar, on the other hand, 
contests that he does not equate God’s freedom with His independence, but rather grounds God’s free 
actions ad extra in His independent existence.  See Hector, ‘God’s Triunity and Self-Determination’, 
252; Molnar, ‘The Trinity, Election and God’s Ontological Freedom’, 303. 
16 For instance, how could the God who ‘has indeed no beginning’ also have a beginning in Himself? 
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necessary presupposition.  Despite some ‘inconsistent moments’ mentioned above, 
Barth is unequivocal in his attempt to root this beginning of God’s works ad extra in 
the necessity of God’s inner being.17  These two are so closely connected that: 
it is not of any importance whether the mention of [this will and 
decree of God] preceding [all] history … are meant to refer to the 
eternity of God in itself, or ‘only’ to the beginning of the creation, and 
therefore of the [world] and time.  What is certain is that … the 
reference is to the beginning of all God’s ways and works [‘ad 
extra’].18 
In other words, what we do know for certain is that as the beginning, at the beginning, 
Jesus Christ is ‘not content simply to remain identical with the inward and eternal 
being of God, but [operates] ad extra in the ways and works of God’, ‘enclosing 
within Himself the autonomy of all other words, decrees and beginnings.’19  What 
is not as certain, in contrast, is whether or to what extent this beginning points also to 
God’s inner being.  Barth not only reserves his answer to this question, judging the 
distinction between ad extra and ad intra as merely provisional if not questionable,20 
but also determines it as ‘not of any importance’.  Resolved to hold firmly only to 
what is certain, Barth does not allow himself to be detained by what is uncertain. 
In summary, in Barth’s positing Jesus Christ at the beginning of all God’s 
ways and works, the historical God-human is brought into the eternal with God 
                                                 
17 ‘[God’s self-committal to the created reality] is characterised (no matter what time-concepts may 
be presupposed) as a relationship which is not haphazard and transitory, but which derives its 
necessity from God Himself’, II/2, 102. 
18 II/2, 103; KD, II/2, 110.  Emphasis mine. 
19 II/2, 95. 
20 This is indicated by the two sets of quotation marks, ‘only’ and ‘ad extra’.  Note the quotation 
marks for ‘ad extra’ is neglected in the English translation.  See also: ‘For what [“extra”] is there 
that the ways and works could serve, or necessitate, or evoke?  There is no [“extra”] except that 
which is first willed and posited by God in the presupposing of all His ways and works.  There is no 
[“extra”] except that which has its basis and meaning as such in the divine election of grace’, II/2 95; 
KD II/2, 102. 
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Himself by way of anticipation.  We recall that, in both the 1922 Römerbrief and his 
dogmatic teaching on the Word of God which began to unfold in the mid-1920s, 
what Barth had to offer was a downward movement ‘from above’.  Here, in placing 
Jesus Christ as the eternal Word or Son at the beginning with God, he has conceived 
another form of ‘from above’.  In both conceptions the divine-eternal comes down 
from above, based on a divine-eternal decision, with the intention to take up the 
human-historical from below.  But the later, more radically christocentric 
conception is distinctive in its unequivocal claim that the divine-eternal decision is 
made specifically by the God-human Jesus Christ (as will be demonstrated shortly).  
If the Subject of God’s eternal decision to be for the human-historical is this 
God-human, then the taking-up of the human-historical is not a mere outcome which 
follows the decision, awaiting its realisation, but a reality already determined in the 
decision, awaiting its actualisation.  Therefore, Jesus Christ not only enters into a 
special history in the incarnation, creating for Himself a particular history amidst 
general history, but also already includes that history in Himself in His election. 
6A.2 Jesus Christ: the Subject and Object of Election 
The notion of Jesus Christ as the beginning of God’s works ad extra is elevated to a 
new level when Barth equates this beginning with the election of Jesus Christ.21  To 
speak of this beginning as an election means for Barth that it is a deliberate act of 
will: in the beginning God according to His will ‘elects man, … determines man for 
Himself, having first determined Himself for man’.22  And adhering strictly to the 
principle of ‘christological reference’ in the doctrine of election,23 Barth focuses the 
                                                 
21 II/2, 89, 99. 
22 Ibid., 91. 
23 Ibid., 63. 
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whole of the God-human relation solely on Jesus Christ, in whom God stands before 
the human being and the human being stands before God.24 
In this connection Barth innovatively views Jesus Christ as not merely the 
object of election (the elected human being) but primarily its subject (the electing 
God).  Both notions carry heavy theological weight and each in its own way throws 
significant light on our current investigation. 
6A.2.1 The Elector 
On the whole, Barth’s doctrine of election serves to achieve one end, i.e. ‘to 
overcome and set aside the Calvinistic decretum absolutum (the notion that the true 
basis of election is an indeterminate and abstract good-pleasure of God), and to attain 
to a genuinely Christian understanding of the doctrine of predestination.’25  For that 
purpose, he contends that the Subject of election is not a God hidden or unknown to 
us, but Jesus Christ, in whom God Himself is revealed to us.  For the notion that 
Jesus Christ is in the beginning of all things, this current notion that He is the 
electing God means two things. 
First, it furthers Barth’s thesis that the election of Jesus Christ is the 
beginning of all things.  If the Subject of election were not Jesus Christ but rather 
God the Father or the triune God as such, we would have a decision of a hidden God 
which ‘precedes the being [Sein] and will and word of Christ’,26 and Christ would 
then be reduced to an instrument or ‘serving organ’27 of the electing God, only later 
executing the decree or, at best, making the formal or technical decree.  This 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 94. 
25 Ibid., 115. 
26 Ibid., 64; emphasis restored per KD II/2, 68. 
27 II/2, 65; KD II/2, 70. 
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depreciatory understanding of Jesus Christ, in Barth’s view, would clearly contradict 
the determination of Him as the beginning of all things.  On the contrary, with Jesus 
Christ defined as the acting Subject of election, His position as the beginning of 
God’s relation to the created reality is strengthened and finalised.  On the ground of 
the notion of Jesus Christ as the Subject of the divine election, therefore, His status 
as the beginning of all things is more firmly established as one that must not and 
cannot be preceded. 
Second, the conception of Jesus Christ as the electing God also effectively 
distinguishes Jesus Christ as the beginning of all things from all created things 
without separating Him from them.  To be sure, ‘in view of God’s eternal knowing 
and willing all things may be said to have been in the beginning with God, in His 
plan and decree.’28  But this is not the proper sense in which Jesus Christ is the 
beginning.  Instead, He was in the beginning as the electing God, thus 
distinguishing Himself transcendently as the Subject of election from all the objects 
elected, willed and known by God.  But this does not ‘separate’ Jesus Christ from 
the created reality,29 as in Him and for Him as the electing God the latter, too, is 
elected.  Furthermore, for this very reason, the created reality is also related to Jesus 
Christ in that He is the one determination of God in which everything else is 
determined: 
We can and must say that Jesus Christ was in the beginning with God 
[just as] all creation and its [entire] history was in God’s plan and 
decree with God.  But He was so not merely in that way.  He was … 
in the beginning with God [also] as ‘the first-born of every 
                                                 
28 II/2, 104. 
29 The phrase ‘these are two separate things’ in the English translation can be misleading, for what 




creature’ … Himself the plan and decree of God, Himself the divine 
decision with respect to all creation and its [entire] history whose 
content is already determined [die inhaltlich bestimmte göttliche 
Entscheidung hinsichtlich aller Kreatur und ihrer ganzen 
Geschichte].30 
In addition to its implications for the notion of Jesus Christ as the beginning, 
the conception of Jesus Christ as the Elector has christological ramifications also.  
In particular, a dispute has arisen over the relationship between the ‘eternal’ election 
on the one hand, and the ‘historical’ incarnation in two natures on the other.  In one 
of the most hotly debated and controversial paragraph in CD II/2, Barth begins a 
discussion on Thomas Aquinas’ teaching that election concerns Jesus Christ only in 
regard to His human nature, and that Jesus Christ as the Son of God, in His deity, has 
nothing to do with election.  Barth agrees with Thomas in that: 
Of course, the fact that Jesus Christ is the Son of God does not rest 
on … election [Erwählung].  What does rest on it is the fact that as 
such He also becomes man, that as such … He is ‘sent’, that as such 
He is the bearer of the divine name of the Father in the world.31 
But he also deems this conception as ‘not sufficient’,32 expressly criticising its 
limitation of election solely on Christ’s humanity as unsustainable: 
Between the eternal Godhead of Christ which needs no election and 
His elected humanity, there is a third … which was overlooked by 
Thomas.  And that is the being [Sein] of Christ in the beginning with 
God, the act of the good-pleasure of God …, the covenant which God 
made with Himself and which is for that reason eternal, the oath 
                                                 
30 II/2, 104; KD II/2, 112.  The phrase ‘its [entire] history whose content is already determined’ 
seems to indicate a deterministic character of election.  But the German original unmistakingly 
shows that it is the ‘divine decision’ and not the entire history of the creature whose content is 
determined. 
31 II/2, 107; KD II/2, 114. 
32 II/1, 106. 
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which God sware by Himself in the interests of man.  But this third 
possibility does not belong only passively to the aeterna Dei 
praedestinatio … if He and the Father are one in this unity of the 
divine name and glory, a unity in which there can be no question of 
rivalry, then it is clear that the Son, too, is an active Subject of the 
aeterna Dei praedestinatio as [zum] Son of Man, that He is Himself 
the electing God, and that only in this way, and therefore in an 
unlimited divine sovereignty, is He [also] the Elect, the One who is 
subjected to the divine predestination … If we say only what Thomas 
would say, then we have knowledge only of the election [die 
Erwählung] of the man Jesus as such, and not of the election and 
personal electing [das Erwähltwerden und eigene Erwählen] of the 
Son of God which precedes this election [jener Erwählung].33 
Three points need to be noted.  First, what is at issue for Barth here is not Jesus 
Christ’s deity or humanity as such, but a third: the being [Sein] of Jesus Christ in the 
beginning with God.  Thomas’ concept of election is insufficient (according to 
Barth), knowing of only Christ’s elected humanity and not of His electing deity, 
precisely because he did not see this third.  For Barth, this being is both the electing 
(as the Son of God) and the elected (as the Son of Man), first the active electing and 
then the passive elected.  So ‘the fact that Jesus Christ is the Son of God does not 
rest on … election [Erwählung]’, because His deity is not passively elected (only His 
humanity is).  But Jesus Christ as the Son of God still has to do with election in that 
He is the active Subject of election. 
Second, is there a sense in which Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the active 
Elector, is also elected [erwählt]?  There is, according to Barth, for in the act of His 
own electing [eigene Erwählen] to become the Son of human,34 the Son of God also 
                                                 
33 Ibid.; KD II/2, 114f. 
34 In his exposition of this passage, Paul Molnar takes the ‘personal electing [eigene Erwählen] of the 
Son of God’ to literally refer to the ‘person’ of Jesus Christ, thereby claiming that election is to be 
attached to ‘the person of Jesus Christ’, ‘the divine/human person’ which Jesus Christ is (Molnar, 
‘Can the Electing God be God without us?’, 206).  What Barth clearly and carefully ties with 
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becomes elected [Erwähltwerden] in the being [Sein] of Jesus Christ.  It is then 
clear that in this passage Barth is not upholding Christ’s deity (which ‘does not rest 
on … election’) over against His humanity (which is elected) in election.  Instead, 
by calling special attention to ‘a third’ which was unduly overlooked, i.e. Jesus 
Christ as the electing God in the beginning, he is virtually relating His humanity to 
His deity (in the one divine act of election of Jesus Christ).  Third, Jesus Christ’s 
electing deity and His elected humanity, although bound together in the unity of His 
being [Sein], is not equal in order.  Primacy is to Jesus Christ the Elector over the 
Elect.  Jesus Christ is the electing; only in this way and for this reason, with His due 
and full divine sovereignty, is He also the elected human being.  In the election of 
Jesus Christ, His own divine electing and becoming-elected precede, and then His 
human election or electedness follows.  We are then not allowed to set these two in 
rivalry; on the contrary: 
we can only believe this if we can find in that election [dieser 
Erwählung, that of the human Jesus] the eternal election [Erwählung] 
(both passive and also active) of the Son of God Himself, if we can be 
absolutely certain that in Jesus Christ we have to do immediately and 
directly with the electing God.35 
6A.2.2 The Elect 
The thesis that Jesus is first and primary the electing God in the beginning functions 
as a crucial qualification of the other thesis that He is the elected human being.  
                                                                                                                                          
election is ‘the being [Sein] of Christ’ (the third), which is in some way distinct from ‘the eternal 
Godhead of Christ’ (the first).  For him election is made not so much by ‘the triune God … in 
himself in pre-temporal eternity’ as Molnar asserts (ibid.), but by this being of Christ who in making 
this decision in pre-temporal eternity is already having regard for temporal history which is not merely 
preceded by God’s pre-temporal eternity but also surrounded and accompanied by His supra-temporal 
(überzeitlich) eternity and succeeded by His post-temporal eternity. 
35 II/2, 107f.; KD II/2, 115. 
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According to it, Jesus Christ is not an elect but the Elect, and thus ‘[t]he election of 
Jesus Christ is the eternal choice and decision of God’.36  The proper content of 
election is no one and nothing other than ‘the existence of this one created being 
[Geschöpfs], the man Jesus of Nazareth, and the work of this man in His life and 
death, His humiliation and exaltation, His obedience and merit.’37  ‘[W]e can never 
be too comprehensive as we attempt to understand the election [Erwähltsein] of 
Jesus as the beginning of all things.’38 
If the divine election or electedness of Jesus Christ is all-inclusive or even 
exhaustive, it then follows that the election of humanity and creature takes place only 
in His.  Since He is the Elect from the beginning, no one and nothing that is elected 
is elected alongside Him, let alone outside Him―it is only in Him that we, too, with 
the created reality are elected.  And this means for Barth a relation-in-distinction 
between the divine and the human.  In the light of the divine act of election, these 
two are related in that, just as the becoming-elected [Gewähltwerden] of Jesus Christ 
corresponds as closely as possible to His electing [Wählen],39 so in Jesus Christ as 
the sole Elect God brings the human, the creaturely into ‘the closest possible union’ 
with Himself.40  They are nevertheless distinct, however, in that His election takes 
place in eternity, in the beginning, whilst the actualisation of our election, which took 
place in His in eternity, occurs in time and history, following His. 
                                                 
36 II/2, 115; KD II/2, 123. 
37 II/2, 116; KD II/2, 125. 
38 II/2, 126; KD II/2, 135. 
39 II/2, 105; KD II/2, 112. 
40 II/2, 121. 
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6A.3 Brief Summary: Jesus Christ as God’s Self-Determination and as 
the Determination that Determines Everything 
This section has explored Barth’s twofold definition of Jesus Christ as both the 
electing God and the elected human being in the beginning of God’s relation to the 
created world.  What is demonstrated is a particular model of the eternal ‘double 
predestination’.41  Regarding the active definition if, on Barth’s account, there is no 
‘Godhead’ in and for itself which is abstracted from or can be found prior to Jesus 
Christ as the Elector in the beginning,42 then Jesus Christ’s act of electing must 
function effectively as God’s self-determination to be God-for-other.  Concerning 
the passive definition, if there is no absolute decree on the created reality as such 
which is abstracted from or can be found prior to Jesus Christ as the Elect in the 
beginning,43 then the election of Jesus Christ must function effectively as the one and 
only divine determination concerning all that is created.44  As Barth puts it, Jesus 
Christ is both ‘God’s self-determination and the resultant determination of man’.45 
6B Ontological Consequences of Election 
At the beginning of his doctrine of election, Barth makes it plain that it is insufficient 
to simply say ‘God’, the Subject of theology, ‘for itself and as such’ [für sich und als 
solches], for such theological talk would inevitably be abstract, reduced and 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 161f. 
42 Ibid., 115: ‘In no depth of the Godhead shall we encounter any other but Him.  There is no such 
thing as Godhead in itself.  Godhead is always the Godhead of the Father, the Son and the Holy 
Spirit.  But the Father is the Father of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and 
the Spirit of Jesus Christ.’ 
43 Ibid.: ‘There is no such thing as a decretum absolutum.  There is no such thing as a will of God 
apart from the will of Jesus Christ’. 
44  Christ’s election [Erwähltsein], being original and unique, is comprehensive, ‘universally 
meaningful and efficacious’.  II/2, 117; translation revised per KD II/2, 125. 
45 II/2, 52. 
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flattened.46  For him, human talks about God must begin with Jesus Christ, or rather, 
the Jesus Christ who is the Subject of election.  In placing the doctrine of election in 
the doctrine of God, 47  Barth takes the election of Jesus to be ‘the eternal 
self-determination of God’:48 
In this matter of election [we are] noetically to hold by Christ and 
Christ alone because ontically there is no election and no electing God 
outside Him.49 
This strict epistemological adherence to Jesus Christ brings enormous 
ontological consequences.50  Its immediate ontological consequence falls in the 
christological connection, raising the question whether the Subject of the eternal 
election is ‘only’ the divine-eternal Christ or Word, or the God-human Jesus Christ 
and therefore also the human-historical Jesus.  On the other hand, as Jesus Christ is 
‘the revelation of the triune God’ in history, and also the electing God ‘with the 
Father and the Holy Spirit’ in eternity, 51  the strict reckoning with Him has 
ontological consequence also in the trinitarian connection, raising the question 
whether in election as God’s eternal self-determination God determines Himself not 
only for humanity but also to be triune.52  In what follows we will focus on Barth’s 
                                                 
46 II/2, 5; KD II/2, 3. 
47 II/2, 76ff. 
48 Ibid., 25. 
49 Ibid., 63. 
50 McCormack, ‘Grace and Being’, Orthodox and Modern, 187f. 
51 II/2, 24, 105. 
52 Common to these two connections is the question whether God’s inner being should be conceived 
as first and necessarily in and for itself and only then and contingently as also for another (world and 
humanity), or whether it is in itself never not for another.  Or differently put: whether the reality of 
God’s determination concerning us as revealed in Jesus Christ is a possibility which God freely 
chooses to realise but which God could have decided not to, or whether that reality belongs at the 
outset in God’s self-determination and therefore is, to that extent, also a necessity which God freely 
decides to bear.  In the final analysis the foregoing questions amount to one question: whether God 
should be construed as so free as to be independent from all that which is not God, or as so free as to 
determine Himself to be never not for another.  But if one thinks through these questions in line with 
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conception of the being of Jesus Christ and of the ‘essence’ of the triune God, 
discerning his position regarding the aforementioned nexus of questions and what it 
means for our construction of his concept of history. 
6B.1 The Being of Jesus Christ 
In his doctrine of election Barth is very restrained from speaking of the eternal Word 
of God in a mode prior to His incarnation in history.  An important reason is his 
conviction that Jesus Christ, ‘the Son of God incarnate’, not only represents but also 
is Himself the divine election of God.53  If we are to be fully confident in holding 
onto ‘the Deus incarnatus’, it has to be presupposed that there is no higher or deeper 
divine being behind Jesus Christ the incarnate Word.54  Employing John 1:1-2 as an 
exegetic ground, he makes the Logos predicated upon Jesus Christ and not the 
opposite.55  The (epistemological) starting-point and (ontological) end-point both 
converge on the Logos ensarkos or Logos incarnandus. 
There is only one point in his doctrine of election at which Barth goes beyond, 
so to speak, the incarnate Word to the Word to be incarnate.56  Even there, the 
discussion does not occupy a significant space but merely appears in a rather brief 
engagement with Augustine.  In Barth’s view, Augustine was right in identifying of 
‘the incarnation, the reality of the divine-human person of Jesus Christ’ with ‘the 
                                                                                                                                          
Barth’s actualistic ontology, one will agree with John Webster that a term like ‘freedom’ is for Barth 
‘to be filled out by depiction of the events of the history of the covenant rather than by formal or by 
abstract considerations (we might call this Barth’s “actualism”).  Freedom is always “the event of 
freedom”.  Therefore, ‘[w]hat Barth offers … is not a better theory of God's freedom but an example 
of sustained attention to the mysterious and utterly specific history of the covenant and to the partners 
in that covenant.’  John B. Webster, Barth’s Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth’s Thought 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 102, 106.  For relevant literature see footnotes 55 and 58 in 
Introduction to this thesis. 
53 II/2, 163. 
54 Ibid., 66. 
55 Ibid., 95-99. 
56 All quotes in this paragraph are from II/2, 108; KD II/2, 116. 
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eternal purpose of the good-pleasure of God’.  In the decision in which these two 
are identical, ‘the eternal God not only foresees and foreordains this person, but … 
He Himself, as the presupposition of its revelation in time, actually is this person.’57  
On Augustine’s account, what is later to be in time is already established in the 
eternity of God Himself and in His co-eternal Word.  In doing so, Augustine was 
‘defining [the] temporal existence [Sein] [of Jesus Christ] as something [eternally] 
pre-existent [vorherexistierend] in God’.  Then Barth qualifies Augustine’s position 
by claiming that the latter’s notion of an eternal Word is ‘understandable, and valid 
and important’ if it is identified with the Word ‘in the beginning with God as 
maintained in Jn. 1:1-2’, with ‘Jesus’, and with ‘in Verbo eius incarnando’.  In 
other words, in Barth’s view, talk of an eternal or ‘pre-existent’ Word are legitimate 
only if we reckon with either the incarnate Word or the Logos incarnandus, but we 
can go no further back than that.58 
In this connection, one of those who makes every endeavour to uphold the 
notion of the eternal or pre-existent Word is George Hunsinger.  In a detailed 
interpretation of the relationship between election and the Trinity in Barth’s theology, 
he first provides a conceptual framework by distinguishing ‘the incarnate Son’ (Jesus 
Christ), ‘the eternal Son qua eternal’ (contingent, incarnandus and not incarnatus) 
and ‘the eternal Son qua Son’ (necessary, neither incarnandus nor incarnatus).59  
And then, resorting to a ‘numerical sameness’ of the different modes of being of the 
                                                 
57 II/2, 108; emphasis restored per KD II/2, 116. 
58 For a detailed explication of the notions of Logos asarkos, Logos ensarkos, Logos incarnatus, and 
Logos incarnandus, see McCormack, ‘Grace and Being’, Orthodox and Modern, 184-186.  He 
concludes that for Barth ‘the Logos is incarnandus in and for himself, in eternity’ (186).  Cf. Robert 
W. Jenson, Systematic Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), Vol. 1, 141, where he 
maintains that ‘[w]hat in eternity precedes the Son’s birth to Mary is not an unincarnate state of the 
Son, but a pattern of movement within the event of the Incarnation, the movement to incarnation’, 
emphasis mine. 
59 Hunsinger, ‘Election and the Trinity’, 182f. 
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one Son, 60  and to what he calls ‘the grammar of perichoresis’ and ‘a 
unity-in-distinction and distinction-in-unity’,61 he concedes that ‘the Son incarnatus, 
or Jesus Christ, is the subject of election’, but only in the sense that this ‘Son 
incarnatus is not external but internal to the pre-existing eternal Son’.62  Even if we 
put aside his rather unconventional employment of the trinitarian category (‘modes 
of being’) in Christology, as well as the clear scarcity of concept tools which he tries 
to appropriate from Barth’s theology,63 it is still not difficult to see that his argument 
is conducted along a line which is counter to Barth’s.  As shown in his engagement 
with Augustine, Barth starts from the incarnate Word and is willing to go only as far 
as God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ takes him, i.e. the Word to be incarnate, and 
refuses to go any further.  Hunsinger, on the contrary, starts from what he assumes 
to be ontologically prior, i.e. the eternal Word neither incarnandus nor incarnatus, 
and makes the incarnate Word in history in conformity to it (at least conceptually).64 
We therefore agree in this regard with McCormack’s reading that ‘at the 
beginning of all ways of God with the world stood not a Logos asarkos … but the 
God-human, Jesus Christ’. 65  As he rightly remarks, out of his worries over 
                                                 
60 Ibid., 182. 
61 Ibid., 183. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Hunsinger is not unaware of this point, as he too admits that what he terms the ‘trinitarian shape of 
eternity as simultaneity-in-distinction and distinction-in-simultaneity’ is a concept which ‘Barth rarely 
makes … explicit … [A]nd even when he does, it is only in a more or less piecemeal fashion’.  
Hunsinger’s explanation for this scarcity is that this notion is ‘presupposed as a background belief’ 
(ibid.).  In contrast to this scarcity, what Barth does resort to explicitly and frequently in his teaching 
on God’s eternity as well as elsewhere is God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ to us.  See section 
5B.3 for our contention against Roberts that Barth’s teaching of God’s eternity has revelation as its 
starting-point and only ends with a brief mention of the concept of perichoresis. 
64 For McCormack’s response to this part of Hunsiger’s argument, see McCormack, ‘Election and the 
Trinity’, 208-210.  For those who, like Hunsinger, uphold an ontological priority of an ‘eternal 
Word’, see van Driel, ‘Karl Barth on the Eternal Existence of Jesus Christ’, and Molnar, ‘Can Jesus’ 
Divinity be Recognized as “Definitive, Authentic and Essential” if it is Grounded in Election?’. 
65 McCormack, ‘Grace and Being’, Orthodox and Modern, 184. 
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speculation into an indeterminate Logos, Barth ‘must deny to the Logos a mode or 
state of being above and prior to the eternal decision to be incarnate in time. … he 
must … say that there is no Logos in and for himself in distinction from God’s act of 
turning towards the world and humanity in predestination … the Logos is 
incarnandus in and for himself, in eternity.’66  For Barth’s explicit, revelation-based 
argument is the identification of the incarnate Word with the eternal Word in the 
beginning, and the identification of the eternal Word with the electing God. 
6B.2 The Essence of the Triune God 
The second dimension of the ontological significance which Barth attributes to the 
election of Jesus Christ has to do with the triune essence of God.  Because Jesus 
Christ is God’s self-revelation: 
Without the form of Jesus Christ, the triune God too has no face and 
no speech for us; He too is and remains to us the unknown God.67 
It was inevitable that precisely in revelation one has to do not merely 
with a relative truth but, without reservation or hidden agenda, with 
the proper, the inner truth of God.68 
From the viewpoint of Jesus Christ, Barth writes that the Father ‘is not only the 
Father of the eternal Son, but as such He is the eternal Father of this temporal 
man’,69 and he tells us that Jesus Christ as the eternal Son is also the Subject of 
election with the Father and the Spirit.70  In his view our human ‘confident turning 
                                                 
66 Ibid., 186.  See section 8B.1 for further treatment of this aspect of Barth’s Christology in the 
context of CD IV. 
67 II/2, 150; translation revised per KD II/2, 162. 
68 II/2, 67; KD II/2, 72. 
69 II/2, 8. 
70 Ibid., 100, 107. 
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to the Deus incarnatus’ is possible only when there is not another will of another 
God lying behind or above that of Jesus Christ.71  If there is no election and no 
electing God outside or deeper than Jesus Christ, if we mean by election God’s 
eternal election, and by electing God the God who elects from all eternity, then 
according to the unreserved knowledge of God revealed to us in Christ we are 
compelled to acknowledge that ‘God wills to be God solely in Jesus Christ.’72 
Perhaps nowhere in CD II/2 is this ontological import brought closer to the 
surface than in the following passage: 
we maintain of God that in Himself, in the primal and basic decision 
in which He wills to be and actually is God, in the mystery of what has 
happened [geschechen ist] from all eternity and in all eternity in 
Himself, in His triune being [Wesen], God is none other than the One 
who in His Son or Word elects Himself, and in and with Himself 
elects His people.73 
There is little doubt that the aforementioned ‘proper’ and ‘inner’ truth of God refers 
to who God is in His triune essence.  It then becomes clear that, in that the election 
of Jesus Christ takes place in the eternal triune God Himself, the being of the electing 
God is no other than the essence of the triune God.  In this light, Barth speaks of the 
‘Godhead’ that: 
There is no such thing as Godhead in itself.  Godhead is always the 
Godhead of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.  But the Father is 
the Father of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father 
and the Spirit of Jesus Christ.74 
                                                 
71 Ibid., 66. 
72 Ibid., 91. 
73 II/2, 76; translation slightly revised per KD II/2, 82. 
74 II/2, 115. 
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Again, this line of thinking starts strictly with Jesus Christ as God’s self-revelation in 
history.  From this starting-point Barth determines the eternal Word at no point to 
differ from the Logos incarnandus; from it he also determines that the triune 
relationship proper to and within Godself is a relationship with and not without Jesus 
Christ. 
We now continue the discussion about Barth’s claim that ‘Of course, the fact 
that Jesus Christ is the Son of God does not rest on … election’,75 which was briefly 
mentioned in section 6A.2.  Clearly indicated in its immediate context, Barth’s ‘of 
course’ appears as the prelude and not conclusion of his engagement with Thomas on 
the role of Jesus Christ in election.  Following this prelude, Barth criticises Thomas’ 
all-too-easy differentiation between the Sonship of Christ (which was said to have 
nothing to do with election) and Jesus’ humanity (which alone was said to be related 
to election as its object), and he concludes that we have to understand Jesus Christ as 
the electing God.  Judging from the whole picture of its context, it is clear that 
Barth’s ‘of course’ claim does not set the eternal Son over against election, nor gives 
precedence to the eternal Son over election as if the eternal Son so preceded election 
that He were independent from it or had nothing to do with it.  His claim that 
Christ’s Sonship does not rest on election simply means that His Sonship is not 
passively ‘elected’, that He is not ‘sent’ to be the Son.  But to the extent that He is 
primarily and properly the electing God who becomes elected on His own account, 
Jesus Christ, the eternal Son of God, has everything to do with the divine act of 
election, which is His own act of electing. 
In summary, with Jesus Christ being the electing God, the Subject of election, 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 107; KD II/2, 114. 
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the decision of election is to be properly sought, not in ‘the mystery of God’s essence 
[Wesen] which exists for itself [für sich]’, but in ‘the being [Sein] and will and word 
of Christ’ which must not and cannot be preceded.76  Restrained from attempting to 
give a precise approximation to that ‘mystery’, perhaps even further from doing so 
by subordinating God’s triune being to His elective act in Christ,77 Barth is simply 
maintaining that, in terms of election, Jesus Christ is not only the beginning of all 
things (in His passive determination) but also in the beginning with God as God (in 
His active determination).  The proper sense in which this determination is God’s 
self-determination is that God from all eternity has determined Himself for humanity 
in Jesus Christ; it is God’s self-determination because it is His fundamental 
disposition to turn towards the humanity.  On this basis, ‘God wills to be God solely 
in Jesus Christ.’78  And for our purposes, we should add that it is only on this basis 
that all God’s ways and works in and as history are what they are; or rather, that it is 
only on this basis that they are what they must be, because their happening in and as 
history is in no way an accident but derives from of that sole decision deeply rooted 
in God’s very inner essence.79 
                                                 
76 II/1, 64; translation revised per KD II/2, 68: ‘jenem Geheimnis des für sich existierenden Wesens 
Gottes’. 
77 See section 8D for an analysis of McCormack’s claim that God determines Himself to be triune in 
His act of election, a comparison between his position and Hector’s, and a delimitation of the position 
of this thesis. 
78 II/2, 91.  For this reason, Barth urges that we must not conceive a God ‘as not yet in the 
determinedness and form of His temporal act, as separated from that name and that person―that is, as 
not identical with Jesus Christ’, II/2, 149; translation revised per KD II/2, 162.  See also: ‘Apart from 
the relation between God and man such as it exists in Jesus Christ, all that we said would be equivocal 
and dangerous and even false’; Karl Barth, The Faith of the Church: A Commentary on the Apostles’ 
Creed, ed. by Jean-Louis Leuba, trans. by Gabriel Vahanian (London: Collins, 1960), 26f. 
79 See also IV/2, 31f. 
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6C Historical Understanding of Election and Elective 
Understanding of History 
Viewing Jesus Christ as in the beginning the electing God and the elected human 
being, Barth terms His election as God’s primal decision [Urentscheidung].80  This 
designation is to be understood in two major senses.  First, to do full justice to the 
determination of Jesus Christ as the electing God, it means that prior to, beyond and 
alongside His act of electing there is no other decision.  This notion bears 
significant implications for Christian knowledge of Christ’s being, and of God’s 
‘essence’ in the light of Christ’s being, as explored in section 6B.  Second, to do full 
justice to Jesus Christ’s determination to be the elected human being, the designation 
of Urentscheidung also means that all other decisions subsequent to it can be seen 
only as following that of His election, included in it.  In this section we take up the 
task to investigate with more clarity and precision Barth’s conception of history as 
determined in the divine Urentscheidung, which is the election of Jesus Christ. 
6C.1 Urgeschichte and Urentscheidung 
Right at the beginning of his doctrine of election, Barth resorts to the notion of 
primal history [Urgeschichte] to explain the particular history of the particular 
relationship between God and humanity.  This particular history, in the midst of 
history in general, is said to be inaugurated by the election of Jesus Christ, which is 
God’s ‘primal and basic decision [Urentscheidung]’81 at the beginning.  Therefore 
we begin this section by examining Barth’s conception of Urgeschichte and 
Urentscheidung in the light of each other. 
                                                 
80 See for instance KD II/2, 8, 53, 55, 98-99, 184-185; II/2, 9, 50, 51, 91-92, 168-169. 
81 II/2, 76; KD II/2, 82. 
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The notion of Urgeschichte has played different roles in different stages in 
Barth’s theology.82  Despite the renouncement of this notion in CD I/2, one need not 
be surprised to find this notion, mentioned only once in CD II/1,83 taken up again at 
the very outset of CD II/2.84  Here in the doctrine of election, Barth no longer 
considers it as so dangerous as to carry the inevitable result of rendering revelation a 
predicate of history.  Hence he more generously re-employs it, not to indicate the 
particular historicity of revelation, but to mean the particular history between God 
and human as determined in the election of Jesus Christ.  It highlights the fact that 
the ‘other’ to which God elects to relate Himself in Jesus Christ is not primarily the 
general history of world and humanity as such, but the particular history between 
God and human in which God’s eternal decision is enacted. 
Barth’s re-employment of the notion of Urgeschichte in the doctrine of 
election is significant in two ways.  First, if we view Urentscheidung in the light of 
Urgeschichte, we see that Barth is bringing the historical realisation of the eternal 
election into the election as such, thus adding historicity to election.  Second and 
conversely, if we view Urgeschichte in the light of Urentscheidung, we see that Barth 
is construing Urgeschichte as directly willed by God in the election of Jesus Christ at 
the beginning, thus strengthening the originality of Urgeschichte, adding 
intentionality to history.  These two lines will be pursued in the following 
                                                 
82 See sections 2C.1, 2D.2, 3A.3.1, 3C, 4C.2. 
83 II/1, 600, where Barth takes the Old Testament history as ‘the primal history of the covenant 
between God and man’, and as the revelation of God. 
84 II/2, 7-9.  Cf. Jüngel, God’s Being Is in Becoming, 90n57: ‘it is surprising that in his doctrine of 
election Barth takes up the concept of “primal history” again.  Is he rejecting his own rejection?  Or 
does the concept acquire a new meaning?  Where is its theological place?  Primal history is now the 
history which is played out between God and the one man Jesus (cf. CD II/2, p. 8), in that the Son of 
God takes the humanity of the man Jesus upon himself (cf. ibid., p. 124).  Primal history refers to the 
incarnation but precedes this event (cf. ibid., p. 105).  It is “the attitude and relation in which by 
virtue of the decision of His free love God wills to be and is God” (ibid., p. 9) and therefore (in 




6C.2 Historical Understanding of Election 
Barth’s attribution of historicity to election opens a possibility of perception of 
election from the viewpoint of history.  This can be understood in two ways. 
6C.2.1 The Concept of Election ‘Upstream’ Disclosed by Revelation 
First, a historical understanding of election means the recognition that our concept of 
the eternal election is ‘upstream’ disclosed by God’s self-revelation in history.  For 
Barth, Christian concept or knowledge of election is strictly a posteriori.  Because 
the fact that Jesus Christ is the Subject of election is revealed also by Him,85 human 
conception of the divine election is no mere human invention or speculation, but 
rather derives strictly from the divine revelation in Jesus Christ. 
This fact can be understood from two propositions.  First, it is through Jesus 
Christ that we know of election.  We as human beings in time have no access to the 
eternal election as such; it may be revealed to us only through Jesus Christ as the 
execution and fulfilment of that election.86  Second, through Jesus Christ we know 
of election.  By virtue of Jesus Christ as both the Subject of election and its revealer, 
Barth maintains, God’s eternal will of election is not a distant mystery hidden from 
us, but a revealed truth to us in time.  This ‘positive understanding’ of election is the 
departing point where Barth distinguishes himself from what he views as the 
traditional understanding of predestination.  On Barth’s positive view, although we 
as human beings in time have no direct access to God’s eternal will of election, yet 
                                                 
85 Ibid., 59f., 63f. 
86 Cf. II/2, 181: ‘For us, then, who exist in time, the living God is perceptible and meaningful and 
active only in the execution and fulfilment of His predestination, not in predestination itself’. 
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assurance is give in the fact that ‘what was at the beginning of all things as the 
eternal divine plan and decree was precisely what is made known to us in time as the 
revelation of God and therefore as the revelation of the truth about all things.’87  
Taking place in time, revelation makes manifest to us not only the temporal but also 
the eternal, i.e. God’s eternal decree concerning all things.  For this reason, ‘[even] 
in respect of predestination we must not and need not separate ourselves from the 
revelation of God as such’. 88   As ‘the light of the divine good-pleasure’, 89  
revelation discloses to us the content of election, which would otherwise be 
undetermined or empty. 
At the core of this positive understanding is Barth’s insistence that the eternal 
election and the historical revelation must never be separated: 
We have to recognise [erkennen] in this one also the other.  And 
precisely in this one is actually the other, too, recognisable [erkennbar] 
to us.90 
And in their inseparable relationship, insofar as in ‘this one’ ‘the other’ too is made 
manifest, there can be no unrecognisable background (of election) lurking behind the 
recognisable foreground (of revelation).  Rather, as Barth puts it, ‘in this matter 
background and foreground are one and the same, and … in the foreground 
recognisable to us, we may recognise the background too.’91  We in our historical 
                                                 
87 II/2, 156; translation revised per KD II/2, 169. 
88 II/2, 156; KD II/2, 170. 
89 II/2, 156. 
90 Ibid., 156; translation revised per KD II/2, 170. 
91 II/2, 159; translation revised per KD II/2, 173.  See also II/2, 115; KD II/2, 123: ‘In the … 
foreground of our [historical existence] we can and should cleave wholly and with full assurance to 
Him because in the eternal background of [all] history [too], in the beginning with God [too], the only 
decree which was passed, the only Word which was spoken and which prevails, was the decision 
which was executed by Him.’ 
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existence can have assured knowledge of the eternal election because, as we cleave 
to Him, what we know of is nothing less than the actual reality of election.  In that 
our understanding of the eternal election is made possible and substantiated by 
nothing else than the historical revelation, then, it must be acknowledged that the 
concept election is positively ‘upstream’ disclosed by revelation.92 
Of course, that which makes possible and real this ‘upstream’ disclosure lies 
on the side of God.  But the God whom we have at this point is the One who, being 
high above there in eternity, embraces what happens below here in time in His 
election of Jesus Christ.  If we ask about the basis on which Barth binds the eternal 
election to the historical revelation, the answer is the unity of the one God and of His 
one eternity.  Just as there is only one God, so He has but one eternal will, and it has 
been made visible through and in His revelation, which ‘has all [the] forms of 
eternity’.93  Revelation reveals to us ‘not only what the will of God is, but also what 
it was and what it will be’, because ‘[t]he pre-temporally eternal will of God is no 
other than His supra-temporally eternal will, which reveals itself as such in time and 
is effective in it.’94  Therefore, in virtue of the unity of the one God and of His 
all-embracing one eternal will, Barth is able to push the recognisability, factualness 
and completeness of the historical revelation ‘upstream’ into the sphere of eternity, 
thus determining our human recognition of the divine election.95 
                                                 
92 Already in II/1 Barth maintained of the identity of the divine decree with Jesus Christ that the will 
revealed in Jesus Christ is none other than the revelation of the decreed will.  II/1, 519-522. 
93 KD II/2, 170, translation missing from II/2, 156. 
94 II/2, 156; KD II/2, 170. 
95 In relation to Barth’s doctrine of election, Roberts holds that ‘[t]he tension between eternal work 
and temporal realization is still problematic … so long as all the interpretative categories are grounded 
in and derived from the divine and eternal being of God’ (Roberts, ‘Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Time’, A 
Theology on Its Way?, 34).  On the contrary, the discussion up to this point in the chapter has made it 
clear that the ‘interpretative category’ employed by Barth is neither God in Himself nor humanity as 
such, but a ‘third’, the God-human Jesus Christ who, embracing time from all directions in eternity, 
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6C.2.2 Election as History 
Second, Barth’s historical understanding of election also consists in his claim that 
election itself is also history.  Barth ends §33 of the CD by advocating an 
‘actualistic’ [aktuell] or dynamic understanding of election96 in contrast with an static 
or quietistic one.  On his account, whilst election had been understood by others as 
the ‘lifeless and timeless’ decretum absolutum which rules over temporal life, in that 
Jesus Christ as the Elector is ‘the living and eternal Lord of temporal life’,97 election 
should accordingly be construed as an ‘living act’, a ‘divine activity’, a ‘present 
secret’ which ‘takes place [eternally] in time’.98  In that it never ceases to take place 
election, ‘notwithstanding its eternity, … is history [as] the self-attestation of 
eternity’,99 in the same way in which the Word is an eternal happening in the form of 
time as well as a temporal happening with the content of eternity.100  On the basis of 
this actualistic understanding of the reality of the divine as divine acts set in motion 
in history,101 election cannot be thought of as a dead system once fixed in the 
pre-temporal eternity, belonging only to the past as the schema of history.  It is 
rather a divine act eternally happening as ‘[a] history [once] determined in God’s 
                                                                                                                                          
discloses in history what the eternal election must be like.  In Him the alleged ‘tension’ does not 
exist. 
96 KD II/2, 205; II/2, 187: ‘activist’. 
97 II/2, 187f. 
98 Ibid., 180, 184, 185, 186; KD II/2, 198, 202, 204. 
99 II/2, 160; KD II/2, 175. 
100 Ibid., 97.  Once again the conception of the threefold temporality of God’s eternity is operative 
here: ‘If it [i.e. this history] is the content of the eternity before time, then this eternity cannot remain 
back before time, then it is per se in time as well as before time, then it can only be history also in 
time.’  II/2, 188; translation revised per KD II/2, 206. 
101 As Barth explains elsewhere, ‘It is a question of a history, or something which has come to pass in 
time, of a relationship of will and love: God loves, God wills―this is how Calvin explains 
himself.  There is will, there is love―that is how a philosopher would express himself.  With the 
latter, truth is abstract; with the former it is an historical reality’ (Barth, The Faith of the Church, 31).  
For him, to talk about the reality of God has nothing to do with abstract ideas it but everything to do 
with the reality of God’s action in history. 
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own will and decree’ as well as determining ‘all other temporal histories, encounters 
and decisions within the sphere of creaturely reality’.102  Being the presupposition 
of all history, it never ceases to happen but remains unbroken and lasting; it ‘does not 
only stand but also moves’.103  And it takes place and moves in history as the 
eternal election: 
For what took place in Jesus Christ―and we shall have to take this 
further step if we are to see and confess in God's revelation God’s 
eternal decree [too]―was not merely a temporal event, but the eternal 
will of God temporally actualised [gewordene] and revealed in that 
event.104 
Furthermore, in Barth’s historical understanding of election, election is 
history because it becomes history, or rather, must become history.  For the 
actualisation of election in history is God’s victory over sin.  In deciding Himself 
for humanity, God has in the eternal election decided of suffering and death for 
Himself, which were alien to God and so had to become event in history.  Also, in 
deciding humanity for Himself, God has in the eternal election chosen glory and 
victory for humanity, which are innate to God from all eternity but has to be 
actualised in time as the history between God and humanity for the sake of 
humanity.105  Therefore, in that it is the actualisation of God’s victory and glory, 
                                                 
102 II/2, 184; KD, II/2, 202f. 
103 II/2, 184. 
104 Ibid., 179; KD II/2, 197. 
105 For instance: ‘What is in God Himself the simple, immediate victory of light over darkness―a 
victory which never stands in question―must have the form of this history in the creaturely sphere 
and therefore for the human (as God willed to have the human to be the witness to His glory); it had to 
become [an] event on that way in time’, II/2, 141; KD II/2, 152f.  Similarly, God’s inner glory, inner 
life and inner activity, too, have to overflow outward to become event in history.  See for instance 
II/2, 126, 169, 175. 
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election must become an event taking place in history.106 
In short, as the eternal God of election is living, the eternal election is also 
living, i.e., eternally happening as the history between God and humanity.  It has to 
happen as history in history.  This notion will play a crucial role in Barth’s 
conception of history as determined by election, to which we now turn. 
6C.3 Elective Understanding of History 
In connecting Urgeschichte and Urentscheidung, Barth not only ascribes historicity 
to election but also attributes intentionality to Urgeschichte and thus in it to all 
history.  We term this attribution an elective understanding of history. 
6C.3.1 Election ‘Downstream’ Determining History 
Its notion ‘upstream’ disclosed by the historical revelation, itself also history, the 
eternal election is also the sole factor stretching ‘downstream’ to determine all that is 
included in the created reality and its history.  As argued in section 6A.2.2, 
primarily as the Elector and then also as the Elect, Jesus Christ’s election 
[Erwähltsein] is all-inclusive and even exhaustive.  It is only in His determinedness 
[Bestimmtheit] as God’s self-determination that all the ways and works in history is 
determined to be God’s ways and works.107  And, according to Barth, we ‘must be 
aware of the determinedness of these ways and works from their beginning, and … 
must bring to expression the determinedness of these ways and works at all times and 
                                                 
106 The conception of election as history is further developed in IV/1 into the conception of atonement 
as history: ‘The atonement is history.  To know it, we must know it as such.  To think of it, we must 
think of it as such.  To speak of it, we must [recount] it as history.  To try to grasp it as 
supra-historical or [a-historical] truth is not to grasp it at all.  It is indeed truth, but truth [coming to 
pass] in a history and [becoming manifest] in this history as such―[manifest], therefore, as history.’  
IV/1, 157; KD IV/1, 171. 
107  II/2, 19: ‘His decision precedes every creaturely decision. Over against all creaturely 
self-determination it is pre-determination-prae-destinatio.’ 
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in all places.’108 
Now when we take notice of this determinedness, we find that it consists first 
of all, again, in a constant differentiation of a particular history from the general 
history.  It is true that God’s determination applies to the whole of the history of the 
created reality.  But in view of the fact that revelation becomes and is history as the 
centre of a particular history,109 and that election, taking place in eternity, becomes 
and is a history determining all history,110 it becomes clear that ‘history’ cannot be 
viewed as an indiscriminative whole.  Because God’s will concerns primarily and 
properly the election of Jesus Christ and only then those elected in Him, history, too, 
is originally about the Urgeschichte, a highly particular history, of Jesus Christ, and 
derivatively about the particular history His people, and only then and more 
derivatively about the general history of the world and humanity.  Discrimination 
was already made from the very beginning, and is always being made and manifested 
all along the way. 
6C.3.2 The History of Jesus Christ and the History of His People 
The determination of history by election, or the intentionality of all history, consists 
of two facts.  To begin with, the history of Jesus Christ’s people exists because God 
wills to give it life in Jesus Christ: 
It is God’s choice that under the name of Jesus Christ He wills to give 
life to the substance of His people’s history and to that people itself … 
It is God’s choice that in this specific form, in one age, in the very 
midst of that people’s [time], He acts on behalf of all ages, thus giving 
to all created time, becoming indeed, its meaning and content. … It is 
                                                 
108 Ibid., 93; translation revised per KD II/2, 99, emphasis mine. 
109 See section 4C.3. 
110 See section 6A.2. 
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God’s choice that in every stage in its history He deals with this 
people with that purpose in view.111 
God gives His life to, or rather Himself becomes the life of, this particular history of 
His people to such an extent that the being of Jesus Christ is inseparable from the 
history of His people.  Barth continues: 
To put it the other way round: If we [want to] know who God is, and 
what … the meaning and purpose of His election [is], and in what 
respect He is the electing God, then we must look away from all 
others, and excluding all side-glances or secondary thoughts, we must 
look only upon and to the name of Jesus Christ, and the existence and 
history of the people of God [decided in] Him.  We must look only 
upon the divine mystery of this name and this history, of this Head 
and this body.112 
We have already made clear Barth’s insistence on understanding the being of God 
Himself only from Jesus Christ so as not to conceive wrongly of an abstract God in 
general.  Now the foregoing passage further suggests that the existence of Jesus 
Christ (which itself would be conceived as consisting of a twofold history in Barth’s 
mature Christology in CD IV)113 has been so interwoven with the existence of His 
people (which is itself nothing other than a history) that it is simply impossible to 
look at the former without also looking at the latter.  It then follows that the 
existence of God’s people in history can no longer be construed as accidental or 
external to the existence of Jesus Christ Himself in history.  On the contrary, it must 
be regarded as necessary and internal.  It is necessary, in the sense that this 
particular existence in history is not to be dismissed as ‘side-glances [and] second 
                                                 
111 II/2, 54; KD II/2, 57f. 
112 Ibid.  See also II/2, 58f.; KD II/2, 63. 
113 §59.1, IV/1, 157ff.; §64.2, IV/2, 20ff.  See Chapter Eight. 
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thoughts’, but is rather the only proper object upon and to which we are to look, 
alongside the name of Jesus Christ, in order that we may in truth know God.  And to 
that extent, it is also internal to the existence of Jesus Christ in history, in the sense 
that it is firstly determined in Jesus Christ in God’s pre-temporal eternity, and then 
given in time ‘its meaning and content’ which is none other than Jesus Christ 
Himself. 
Second, the determination of history by election, or the intentionality of all 
history, consists also in the fact that, gaining life and substance from the 
human-historical event of the incarnation, ‘all the preceding history of Israel’ and ‘all 
the succeeding history of the Church’ must keep referring to Jesus Christ in order to 
attain their meaning.114  This is what it means to denote Jesus Christ as the centre of 
history: it is by keeping referring to Him that the history of God’s people becomes 
particular.  An in a quite figurative manner, Barth interprets this ongoing process of 
referring as a process of ‘narrowing down’ [Sonderung],115 for he takes the history 
recorded in the Bible as demonstrating that the ‘whole generations and whole 
sections of the people’116 were cut off so as to make manifest the history of particular 
figures such as Jacob-Israel, David, and Zerubbabel.  Moreover, even these 
particular figures did not make known themselves but rather prepared for and pointed 
to the particular One, i.e. God’s Son as the King of His people.  Through the long 
process of ‘narrowing down’, the history of the existence of God’s people finds its 
meaning and necessity only in preparing for and making visible ‘the existence of a 
                                                 
114 II/2, 53; translation revised per KD II/2, 56f.  Cf. Barth, The Faith of the Church, 47: ‘And the 
Christians are members of the cast of that history.  And their small stories exist only as referring to 
that great history’. 
115 II/2, 55; KD, II/2, 59. 
116 It is precisely the process of narrowing down, argues Barth, that made this people a people: ‘It had, 




special case’117 which is its King who is to come.118  It is true that there are times 
when some are called into the formation of God’s people,119 but it is more often the 
case that in the historical sequence ‘countless members are continually cut off and 
falling away [dauernden Abgeschnittenwerden und Herausfallen Unzähliger]’.120  
In Barth’s words again, ‘[Precisely, eben] [t]he dissolution [Abbauen] of the 
historical existence of the people as such … [becomes] the true and proper [theme] 
of [its] history and its record.’121 
In short, the being of Jesus Christ and the existence of His people are 
inseparable.  As both are identical with their respective histories, the history of 
Jesus Christ and that of His people are also inseparable.  The former history gives 
life and meaning to the latter by becoming its life and meaning, thus making it 
necessary and internal.  And the latter history, in its turn, bears witness to the 
former by being constantly going through the process of separating the particular 
from the general. 
6C.3.3 The History of Jesus Christ’s People and the ‘Remaining’ Histories 
If Barth’s elective understanding of the particular history of Jesus Christ’s people 
holds true, it then has to be asked, how does it account for the general history of the 
world and humanity?  What place does he give to this general history in the nexus 
of the two particular histories?  Two interconnected sets of points are to be 
mentioned and put under scrutiny. 
                                                 
117 Ibid., 56. 
118 Ibid., 58: ‘This is the man who is the fulfilment of the promise and hope of His people, and the 
meaning … of its existence and history’. 
119 Ibid.: ‘Those who are called by this King, and hear this King, whether they are Jews or Gentiles, 
constitute the people whose existence was envisaged throughout the whole of that long history’. 
120 Ibid.; KD II/2, 62. 
121 II/2, 56; KD II/2, 60. 
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First, the general history of the world and humanity is said to be located 
under the framework of the particular history of Jesus Christ’s people, with its 
meaning thus consisting only in bearing witness to the latter.  Involved here is a 
complete reversal of the framework under which the two kinds of histories are often 
related.  Instead of placing the particular history (of Jesus Christ’s people) within a 
framework of general history (of the world and humanity), Barth insists that: 
this is not the biblical picture of world and of history: that it is 
somewhere in the framework of a history of nature and world, a 
history that is in operation beforehand and in itself, that the history of 
Israel, Jesus Christ and the Church, too, acts out.  According to the 
Bible, the framework and basis of all temporal occurrences is the 
history of the covenant between God and humanity, from Adam to 
Noah and Abraham, from Abraham and Jacob to David, from David 
to Jesus Christ and believers in Him.  It is within this framework that 
the whole history of nature and world, too, plays its determined role, 
and not the reverse, although logically and empirically the course of 
things ought to have been the reverse.122 
In this passage Barth not only draws a distinction between general history and the 
particular history of Jesus Christ’s people, but also gives priority to the latter over the 
former in setting the former as the framework of the latter.123 
With primacy given to that particular history, Barth takes the general history 
to have no independent meaning, a basic feature observed since the 1922 Römerbrief, 
depending totally on that particular history for meaning.  It serves as the sphere or 
theatre where Urgeschichte is acted out;124 it exists only for the sake of pointing to 
                                                 
122 II/2, 136; translation revised per KD II/2, 146. 
123 This reversal of framework is made even more radical in his lectures on the Apostle’s Creed, 
given in 1940-1943, around the same time of II/2 (1942).  See Barth, The Faith of the Church, 84f. 




the latter, which is acted out in the midst of it; it reaches its goal as the latter does 
so.125  In this set of statements, the general history is subsumed to the particular 
history of Jesus Christ’s people.  It functions as a signal to the latter in the latter’s 
function as a signal to the history of Jesus Christ. 
The second set of points bears a quite different feature from the first.  
According to it, the general history of the world and humanity is also said to be 
separated from the particular history of Jesus Christ’s people, and is therefore almost 
veiling in nature for the manifestation of Urgeschichte, which is Jesus Christ.  The 
general history, according to Barth, is under the sway of the ‘narrowing down’ 
mentioned above.  Different from the particular history, which has to go through a 
long process of division and distinction, the general history is said to have been cut 
off and fallen away ‘right from the beginning of the history of this race [of Israel]’,126 
for the Bible on Barth’s account is not concerned with universal world history or its 
problems as such but has its focus only on that particular history.127  As that 
particular history is distinguished from the general history, the general is also 
excluded from that particular.  Those histories cut off and left behind from that 
particular history then become ‘remaining’ histories. 
This line of thinking leads Barth to the conception that the reality of election, 
which is Jesus Christ’s history, is always hidden in the general history, and may 
                                                 
125 II/2, 7f., 94.  In the same vein, ‘[the event of incarnation] divides time itself into ante Christum 
natum and post Christum natum.  This does not mean simply all time before Christ and all time after 
Him, but it is qualified time before Him and after Him. … What is described here is not time in 
general, not the history of the world, but the time of the Covenant of God which is fulfilled in the 
appearance of Jesus Christ’.  Karl Barth, ‘The Christian Understanding of Revelation’, Karl Barth, 
Against the Stream: Shorter Post-war Writings, 1946-52, ed. by Ronald G. Smith, trans. by E. M. 
Delacour and Stanley Goodman (London: SCM Press, 1954), 205-240 (218). 
126 II/2, 217. 
127 Seen in this light, Adam is important, ‘not because he is the father of the human race, but because 
he is the first of these special cases, the first in this succession of particular men’, ibid., 55. 
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become visible only in the particular history of His people.  In this respect the 
general history is veiling by nature.  Refusing to ‘dissolve predestination into the 
stream of the general temporal world events’ or ‘into the particular salvation event, in 
which world events come to their meaning and goal’,128 Barth maintains that: 
It is, rather, the secret which is hidden in the general world events as 
such and becomes manifest in the particular salvation event as 
such. … All other events in the world aim at the salvation event; they 
must take place for the sake of this: that this decision of God which 
precedes everything, the divine electing of human, the election of 
human by God, becomes visible and effective in time … .129 
This second set of statements, quite different from the first, tells us that the general 
history is separated from the particular history of Jesus Christ’s people.  It might 
point to that particular history, but in no way does it as such unveil the election of 
Jesus Christ’s Himself as its ‘secret’, its hidden reality. 
Two concerns should be raised at this point.  For all their richness in clarity 
and sharpness in focus, these two sets of statements regarding the general history do 
not always seem coherent or sufficiently concrete.  The first concern is about 
coherence.  If the general history is subsumed under the framework of the particular 
history, as the first set of statements maintains, it is then included in the latter and 
connected with the latter.  But then how are we to account for the second set of 
statements that the general history is separated from that particular history? Is it 
connected to it only by being cut off from it in its beginning?  This is certainly a 
rather strained explanation.  It is not an easy task, then, if we are to reconcile these 
two quite opposing views of the general history in its relation to or separation from 
                                                 
128 II/2, 185; translation revised per KD II/2, 203. 
129 II/2, 185; translation revised per KD II/2, 203. 
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the particular history of Jesus Christ’s people.  The incoherence indicated here 
suggests that, even in Barth’s mature doctrine of election, a certain degree of tension 
still exists, not between eternity and time as a whole, but between the general history 
of the world and humanity and the particular history of Jesus Christ’s people.130 
The second concern is about concreteness.  It is fair to say that, on the whole, 
Barth often gives an impression of depreciating of the general history or at least of 
showing disinterest to it.  His conception of the general history can easily be 
interpreted as being subordinating the general to the particular, or even as excluding 
the former from the latter.  Probably for this reason, whereas a lot is said in CD II/2 
in explanation of how that particular history concretely bears witness and makes 
manifest Jesus Christ as Urgeschichte, only little account is given, in a rather abstract 
way, how the general history may point to the history of Jesus Christ’s people.  And 
this problem is made more acute in view of his assertion that: 
Because the eternal predestination becomes manifest to us in that 
salvation event, we will accept it also as the secret of all remaining 
happenings in the world, and at any rate we have to consider and 
assess―if not also understand―all remaining happenings in the 
world on the whole and in detail according to the instruction of our 
knowledge about that happening.131 
There is no question that, according to our analysis thus far, Barth has always fully 
accepted the Jesus Christ―in the form of His resurrection (since Römerbrief), His 
incarnation as God’s revelation (since Unterricht in der christlichen Religion), His 
election (CD II/2), and His history (CD IV)―as the hidden reality of the whole 
                                                 
130 This seems to remain the case even in Barth’s mature Christology presented in CD IV.  By virtue 
of his actualistic divine ontology, the divine-eternal and the human-historical are indeed joined in 
harmonious union in the history of Jesus Christ; what remains problematic is the persisting tension 
between His history and the ‘remaining’ histories which are not included in the history of His people. 
131 II/2, 185; translation revised per KD II/2, 204.  Emphasis all mine. 
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history therefore of the ‘remaining’ histories too.  Not insisting on understanding 
how this is so, he maintains that we must at least consider and assess the general 
history both on the whole and in detail.  The proposed ‘consideration’ and 
‘assessment’ of the ‘remaining histories’, we should add, are not aimed to prove or 
even produce the acknowledgement of the divine election, but come as a 
consequence of it.132 
6C.4 Brief Summary: Historicity and Intentionality in Reciprocity 
In short, according to Barth’s historical understanding of election and elective 
understanding of history, historicity is attributed to election and intentionality to 
history.  In their asymmetrical reciprocity, election becomes and is history and 
history is the theatre of the actualisation of election; the two are brought into an 
inseparable relationship.  Incoherence arises, as we have shown, when Barth gives 
two sets of statements, which suggest the subsumption of the general history under 
the particular history of Jesus Christ’s people and the exclusion of the former from 
the latter.  Whichever the case, very few concrete accounts are provided as to how 
the general history may be of service to that particular history’s bearing witness to 
Jesus Christ Himself. 
6D Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has demonstrated how Barth in his doctrine of election in CD II/2 
convincingly argues for the centrality of the election of Jesus Christ which 
overcomes the divergence of the divine-eternal and the human-historical.  In that He 
is the electing God, the human-historicity of Jesus Christ must be brought ‘upstream’ 
                                                 
132 Later in Barth’s teaching on providence we will see how, for Barth, we know that history as a 
whole proceeds under God’s providence but we do not really know how.  See footnote 35 in section 
7B.2 for more detail. 
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into our conception of God’s inner being; in that He is the elected human being, the 
divine-eternal-ness of the election of Jesus Christ must be extended ‘downstream’ 
throughout the human-historical.  What this means for the purposes of this thesis is 
this: His history is brought into an unprecedented depth in the bosom of God Himself 
by virtue of the divine-eternal anticipation of the human-historical and, in that sense, 
the subsequent participation of the human-historical in the divine-eternal. 
By virtue of the participation of the divine-eternal in the human-historical, as 
already demonstrated, ‘history’ is divided into two orders, at least conceptually.  On 
the one hand, we have the general history of the world and humanity; on the other, 
the particular history of Jesus Christ and His people, Urgeschichte, or salvation 
history.  In Chapter Seven we will turn to CD III, Barth’s doctrine of creation, to 
examine his covenantal account of the general history in the framework of this 
particular history.  Then in Chapter Eight, we will turn to CD IV, Barth’s doctrine of 
reconciliation, to examine his christological account of the particular history of Jesus 
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Introduction 
This chapter will examine Barth’s concept of history by looking at his doctrine of 
creation in CD III.  Central to this volume is Barth’s conviction that the divine act 
of creation is for the sake of reconciliation, as foreordained in the election of Jesus 
Christ.  According to it, Barth posits that creation is the external basis of the 
covenant,1 and that the covenant is the internal basis of creation.2  In this scheme 
the whole process of history is understood as the development of this 
external-internal relationship between creation and covenant.  Pursuing this line of 
thought, this chapter seeks to demonstrate 1) that history has its beginning in creation 
for the sake of the covenant; 2) that history in its proceeding is preserved by 
providence for the sake of covenant history; and 3) that history constitutes the 
essence of human being because the human Jesus exists in history.  Whilst the first 
two sections focus on the history of the world, the final section highlights the history 
of human beings, with a view to shifting to the treatment of Barth’s account of the 
history of Jesus Christ in CD IV in the next chapter. 
                                                 
1 III/1, 94ff; KD III/1, 103ff. 
2 III/1, 228ff.; KD III/1, 258. 
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7A The Beginning of History in Creation 
7A.1 Creation as History: Creation History 
As ‘creation comes first in the series of works of the triune God’,3 history has its 
beginning in the act of creation.  As the junction of pre-temporal eternity and time 
itself, creation is on the one hand genuine history, and has on the other hand a 
particular character in contrast with all its subsequent history.  This subsection will 
examine how Barth defends the historicity of creation on the one hand, and 
safeguards it from historical research on the other hand. 
7A.1.1 Geschichte and Historie 
The relation and distinction between Geschichte and Historie play an important role 
in Barth’s doctrine of creation.  The thesis of §41 in CD III/1 states of creation that 
‘its historical [geschichtlich] reality eludes all historical [historisch] observation and 
account’. 4   Throughout this paragraph God’s act of creation is construed as 
unhistorische Geschichte,5 and Barth defines the two notions as follows: 
Objectively speaking, Historie, i.e. the Geschichte which is accessible 
to human because visible and perceptible to him and comprehensible 
for him, is creaturely Geschichte in the connection with other 
creaturely Geschichte―a happening prior to and alongside which 
there is also other happening principially of the same type with which 
it allows itself to be ordered together into one picture.  And 
                                                 
3 III/1, 42. 
4 Ibid., 42; KD III/, 44. 
5  ‘[Creation] can only be unhistorische Geschichte, and there can only be unhistorische 
Geschichte-writing of it’, III/1, 78; translation revised per KD III/1, 84.  We retain the German 
original where it is necessary, since phrases such as ‘“non-historical” history’ in the English 
translation can be confusing. 
232 
subjectively speaking, Historie is the picture of such creaturely 
happening in its creaturely connection.6 
According to this view, the two ‘histories’ are not mutually exclusive concepts; rather, 
one includes the other.  Whilst all Historie is Geschichte, some Geschichte is not 
Historie.  It is on this ground that Barth defines creation as unhistorische 
Geschichte. 
7A.1.2 Unhistorische Geschichtlichkeit of Creation 
In the doctrine of creation Barth is determined to establish the historicity 
[Geschichtlichkeit] of creation by resorting to its relation to covenant history: 
Since the covenant of grace, and therefore [the] history, is the aim of 
creation, creation itself belongs to [the] history and therefore to [that] 
sequence of [time-fulfilling] events … .7 
On this view, creation is history not because it belongs to time, but because it belongs 
to covenant history as the history, because it ‘aims at the history’.8  In this sense, it 
is primarily through its connection with covenant history, and not simply in virtue of 
its own temporality, that creation acquires its historicity. 
Creation is history, also because neither its basis in God’s eternal decree nor 
its triune Creator is without history [geschichtlos].  As ‘the basis of creation’, ‘this 
eternal pre-truth itself obviously has a historical character in the bosom of eternity’.9  
                                                 
6 III/1, 78; translation revised per KD III/1, 84. 
7 III/1, 60; KD III/1, 64. 
8 III/1, 59; translation revised per KD III/1, 63.  The German original reads: ‘Die Schöpfung zielt auf 
die Geschichte’, and this ‘die Geschichte’ is, as made clear in the immediate context, not history in 
general but ‘the history of the covenant of grace’.  Similarly, von Balthasar’s remark concerning this 
passage that ‘[t]he concept of history is already immanent in creation’ does not hold true unless by 
‘history’ it is meant the history, i.e. covenant history.  See von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, 
123. 
9 III/1, 66. 
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Moreover, even ‘the pure, eternal being [Wesen] of God as such’ is not without 
history [geschichtlos], ‘for being [als] triune it is … historical even in its eternity’.10  
Therefore, in that its basis and Creator are both historical, creation is also historical, 
itself becoming the historical basis of what follows it in history as history.11 
Because creation derives its Geschichtlichkeit from the history, the ‘historical’ 
decree of the ‘historical’ God, it then does not depend on a correspondence to the 
external criteria set up by the historical science.  As the ‘Geschichte which we are 
not able to see and comprehend’,12 creation is to be recognised as unhistorische 
Geschichte. 
7A.2 Creation History and Covenant History 
Having established the unhistorische Geschichtlichkeit of creation, Barth seeks to 
explore the relationship between creation history and covenant history.  The key 
notion is that covenant history follows [folgen] creation without deriving from 
[folgen aus] it.  Although creation history precedes covenant history chronologically, 
the latter precedes the former ‘intentionally’ as the implementation of the gracious 
covenant.13  It is proposed that in the connection between the two histories lies 
‘Barth’s profound theology of history’.14  In what follows we seek to formulate this 
connection by way of three propositions. 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 66; KD III/1, 71. 
11 III/1, 66. 
12 Ibid., 78; KD III/1, 84.  Also III/1, 79; KD III/1, 86.  At this point Barth makes it clear that with 
his conception of unhistorisch Geschichte he has in mind theologians such as Bultmann who, based 
on historical science, claim all biblical stories (including the creation-Geschichte) which are 
unhistorisch to be not Geschichte but rather myth.  In an attempt to undermine their dismissal of 
biblical accounts, Barth employs the terms of Sage and Legende to denote Geschichte which is 
unhistorisch or prähistorisch, in distinction from Geschichte which is historisch.  The point he 
advances is that Geschichte can be not historisch.  For more detail see III/1, 80ff.; KD III/1, 87ff. 
13 As Gunton puts it, ‘Covenant is prior in intention, creation is first in execution.’  Gunton, The 
Barth Lectures, 244. 
14 Gorringe, Karl Barth, 185. 
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7A.2.1 Creation and Covenant as History 
First, for Barth, creation is an event taking place as history initiating history, and the 
covenant is an event made first in eternity and then actualised in history as history.  
Just as the revelation of Jesus Christ, as the centre of the grace-covenant, really 
becomes and is history, so creation, as the chronological beginning of the 
grace-covenant, really constitutes the beginning of history.  Precisely in that 
revelation, creation and covenant are all actual events taking place in history, it can 
be maintained that vis-à-vis these three divine moments the reality of human history 
is not overwhelmed but rather affirmed.15 
7A.2.2 Creation History Deriving from Covenant History 
Second, it is for the sake of the covenant that there is creation, and it is for the sake 
of covenant history that there is the creation of history.  The relation between 
covenant, creation and history thus conceived is clearly the outworking of Barth’s 
doctrine of election, according to which election becomes and is history and history 
is the theatre of the actualisation of election in their asymmetrical reciprocity.  In 
that God’s will of election is predominant but remains in the background, it ‘requires 
a stage [Raum]’16 for covenant history to be played out in the foreground, in the 
sphere of the creation history as its theatre.  In other words, ‘the time of creation 
is … to be understood as the counterpart [Gegenbild] of that of grace, and therefore 
                                                 
15 Barth speaks of covenant history that ‘[t]o attack its temporality would be to attack its reality.’ 
(III/1, 72)  Conversely speaking, to affirm its reality one has to affirm its temporality, and therefore 
the reality of time and history too.  The same holds true of the historicity and thus temporality of 
revelation and creation, too. 
16 III/1, 44; KD III/1, 46.  See also: ‘in the Christian concept of the creation of all things the question 
is concretely one of man and his whole universe as the theatre of the history of the covenant of grace’ 
(III/1, 44), ‘creation consists in the establishment of the ground and sphere and object and instrument 
of this other work’ (ibid., 47), and ‘[c]reation as history fashions the world as a [the] sphere for man 
who is to be a participant in this grace’ (ibid., 67). 
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the time of grace as the true prototype [das eigentliche Urbild] of all time.’17  
Therefore, because the covenant is the external basis of creation, because ‘creation 
does not precede reconciliation but, follows it’,18 creation history follows covenant 
history as its internal or material presupposition. 
7A.2.3 Covenant History Following Creation History 
Third, in ascribing priority to covenant history over creation history, Barth’s does not 
undervalue the significance of the latter.  On the contrary, in that the connection 
between creation history and covenant history is affirmed as necessary, the necessity 
of history as the stage of covenant history is also affirmed.19  Balance in the 
connection between creation and covenant is indeed maintained in Barth’s doctrine 
of creation.  On the one hand, it is true that covenant history is directly willed by 
God and indeed from God Himself, and that the whole history that follows the 
creation history is determined to participate in that definite history.  Creation history 
not only exists, but exists for this specific purpose.  This being the case, on the other 
hand, God’s gracious covenant is by nature not to be kept high above there without 
or over against the creature; rather, the covenant is determined to take place as a 
history in history, i.e. in the history that begins with the creation history.  
Differently put, ‘if the time of creation is ultimately the reflection and counterpart of 
the time of grace, then it too, precisely because and as it is the beginning of all time, 
must be no less than that real time―real in the potentiated sense.’20  Therefore, 
                                                 
17 III/1, 75; KD III/1, 82. 
18 III/1, 75; KD III/1, 82. 
19 Since time is the sphere of covenant history, ‘since the covenant and its history are the ratification 
and renewal of creation on the one hand, and creation is the presupposition of the covenant on the 
other, it follows from this that the temporality of creation and its history is a necessity’, III/1, 72. 
20 III/1, 75; translation slightly revised per KD III/1, 82. 
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because creation is the external basis of the covenant, because creation prepares for 
the covenant, covenant history follows creation history as its external or formal 
presupposition.21 
7B The Proceeding of History under the Providence of the 
Lord of History 
Based on election and for the sake of covenant history, creation takes place, and there 
begins history.  After the act of creation, creaturely history still proceeds, under the 
divine providence.  In what follows we will first position these two histories in the 
nexus of the doctrines of election, creation and providence, and see how these three 
doctrines are related in view of the two histories.  We will then demonstrate that, 
according to Barth’s doctrine of providence, creaturely history is set in a positive 
relationship with covenant history on the one hand, but also set under certain 
limitations on the other hand. 
7B.1 Covenant History and Creaturely History: Positioning in Doctrinal 
Nexus 
7B.1.1 Covenant History: Rooted in Election, Commenced in Creation, 
Sustained by Providence 
Proceeding from the creation history, according to Barth, there begins ‘first and 
decisively’ the history, i.e. covenant history as the ‘meaning, basis and goal’ of 
creation.22  What also follows the creation history is ‘the rule of divine providence 
                                                 
21 III/1, 46: ‘God’s first work, the positing of the distinct reality of man and his world, is indelibly 
marked off from every other source or beginning by the fact that it precedes and prepares for the 
second work, God’s gracious dealing within the sphere of this reality.’ 
22 Ibid., 6. 
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which accompanies, surrounds and sustains the history of the covenant, the 
fulfilment of divine predestination, as what we may and must call a second history 
strictly related to the first and determined by it.’23  Therefore both creation and 
providence occur for the sake of covenant history, as determined in election. 
7B.1.2 Creaturely History Commenced in Creation, Sustained by Providence 
Besides covenant history and providence, with creation there also begins ‘the history 
of creaturely existence’,24 ‘the history of the … encounter and co-existence of God 
the Creator with the reality [in general and as such] created by Him’.25  Creaturely 
history serves as the external basis of covenant history.26  Like covenant history, 
creaturely history also stands in need of sustaining by providence. 
In short, Barth’s doctrinal positioning of the two histories is clearly the 
theological-logical outcome of what he achieved in his doctrine of election.27  In 
that it is rooted in election, covenant history is the unquestionable centre of creation 
and providence.  For the sake of covenant history, there also begins creaturely 
history. 
7B.1.3 Continuity between Election, Creation and Providence, and the 
Relation between God and Creaturely History 
Barth’s doctrinal positioning of the two histories also tells of a continuity and a 
relationship.  First, it indicates the continuity between the three doctrinal moments, 
                                                 
23 Ibid., KD III/3, 5. 
24 III/3, 8. 
25 Ibid., 8; KD III/3, 7. 
26 See III/3, 45; KD III/3, 53. 
27 By contrast, his doctrine of providence in Göttingen had nearly no reference to election or covenant, 
and only very limited mention of Jesus Christ, the notion of whose two natures were employed as an 
analogy, as the prototype of the teaching on the concursus of God in world history.  See §20, Die 
Vorhersehung, in Unt2, 245ff., especially 269. 
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i.e. election, creation and providence.  To be sure, each of them has a distinctive 
characteristic: election is an eternal event, creation a one-time unrepeatable historical 
event, and providence a continuing series of moments in the proceeding of history.28  
But they are clearly connected in the beginning and proceeding of covenant history.  
This continuity bears witness to the fact that ‘the One who sees and cares for the 
creature is also its Creator’29, and that the Creator God is also the electing God.  
And this continuity is ordered, having election as its origin: God creates for the sake 
of election; God sustains for the sake first of election and therefore also of the 
created reality. 
Second, from this continuity there follows a relationship in which God stands 
to the creaturely existence in history.  This relationship is consistent, guaranteed by 
God the Elector and Creator, and therefore is even ‘necessary’, not in the sense that 
He needs it, but that He wills it.30  In this relationship, God remains faithful to 
Himself and therefore to His creature and, for this reason, co-exists with His creature 
in such a way that ‘He [allows] the history of the creature to be [at the same time] the 
history of His own glory’.31  In the doctrine of providence, therefore, we know in 
faith that the faithful God is the glorious Lord of history,32 whose rule over history 
extends in its every aspect and its whole span. 
                                                 
28 Cf. ‘Creation and providence are not identical.  In creation it is a matter of the establishment, the 
incomparable beginning of the relationship between Creator and creature; in providence of its 
continuation and history in a series of different but comparable moments.’  III/3, 8; KD III/3, 7. 
29 III/3, 9; KD III/3, 8. 
30 ‘This God, who stands over against His creature in such transcendence, stands to the continuation 
and history of His creature manifestly in a relationship; such a relationship could only be accidental 
to some “highest being” or a mere demiurge, and might not be peculiar to him, but it is necessary to 
Him, this Creator.  Precisely the eternity of God is the pledge of the fact that He is always for His 
creature, that is, it will have time too as long as He wills.’  III/3, 10; translation revised per KD III/3, 
9. 
31 III/3, 12; KD III/3, 12. 
32 See for instance III/3, 12, 13, 34, 38, 41, and 43.  Cf. 26: ‘That God Himself is known as Lord is 
the decisive difference between the belief in providence and every philosophy of history’. 
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The foregoing discussion can be summed up in the following: 
It is because God wills this history [i.e. covenant history] for this 
reason that He willed the creation and that He wills also the 
preservation of the creature.  Because servatio, therefore creatio and 
therefore conservatio.  For this history to take place the creature 
must have space and time and permanence [Raum, Dauer, Bestand].  
Because God wills the history He creates and gives it these things, and 
thus preserves the creature.33 
To be sure, the axiom ‘[b]ecause servatio, therefore creatio and therefore conservatio’ 
properly expresses the order of election, creation and providence.  But we should 
also notice in it the continuity of the three, and therefore the ‘necessary’ relationship 
in which the one God stands with even creaturely history. 
7B.2 Creaturely History Set in Positive Relationship to Covenant History 
In view of the relationship between God and creaturely history, we argue that there is 
also a positive relationship between covenant history and creaturely history.  By 
exploring this positive relationship between the two histories, we seek to further 
clarify the question with which the last chapter came to an end, i.e. the question of a 
seeming cutting-off of the general history of the world and humanity (i.e. creaturely 
history) from the particular history of Jesus Christ and His people (i.e. covenant 
history). 
The positive relationship between the two histories is one of the core themes 
running through Barth’s doctrines of election, creation and providence.  On the one 
hand, covenant history is the internal basis and presupposition of creaturely history: 
it is the latter’s purpose, meaning and goal.  On the other hand, creaturely history is 
                                                 
33 III/3, 80; KD III/3, 91. 
240 
the external basis and presupposition of covenant history: it is the necessary sphere, 
theatre or stage on which covenant history is acted out.  In this sense, the two 
histories are positively related in that they presuppose and establish each other. 
In addition, the positive relation between the two histories also consists in the 
fact in their proceeding creaturely history is not separated from but is rather included 
in covenant history.  We recall that in the doctrine of election Barth spoke of a 
continuous ‘narrowing down’ [Sonderung] 34  of the general history from the 
particular history, the very process through which covenant history is said to be 
formed.  By contrast, in the doctrine of providence Barth speaks of the 
co-proceeding of the two histories.  Differently put, whilst in the doctrine of 
election the proceeding of covenant history was conceived as entailing separating 
from itself creaturely history, in the doctrine of providence it is construed as 
proceeding with creaturely history. 
Knowing that creaturely history stands in a positive relationship to covenant 
history under the providence of the Lord God, Barth does not give a comprehensive 
explication as to how exactly this is so. 35   He does, however, draw several 
                                                 
34 II/2, 55; KD, II/2, 59. 
35 This, I believe, is the reason of Barth’s language of ‘in some sense’ and ‘something of God’s rule’.  
See III/3, 13; KD III/3, 13: ‘In this history, therefore, we need not expect turns and events which have 
nothing to do with His lordship and are not … in some sense [in irgend einem Sinn] [directly] acts of 
His lordship [too]’ (cf. also ibid., 38) and III/3, 24; KD III/3, 26: ‘… the Word of God[,] in which he 
believes, and which he believes, can as such cause him to see something of God’s rule [etwas … von 
Gottes Walten], not His universal plan or total view, but God Himself at work at various points’.  
The reserved tone can be taken to suggest Barth’s ‘correction towards a more personal, and less 
deterministic, providence’ (Darren M. Kennedy, ‘A Personalist Doctrine of Providence: Karl Barth’s 
Church Dogmatics III.3 in Conversation with Philosophical Theology’ [PhD thesis submitted to the 
University of Edinburgh, 2007], 145); it can also mean his endeavour not to say too much whilst 
avoiding saying too little about creaturely history as the external basis of covenant history.  See III/3, 
45f.  This notion recalls a question mentioned in the last chapter about the proposed ‘consideration’ 
and ‘assessment’ of general history according to our knowledge of particular history (II/2, 185; KD 
II/2, 204).  Here in the context of the teaching on providence, we are told that what we can know for 
sure is the particular history of the covenant, which culminates in the history of Jesus Christ, because 
it is this history that is directly revealed to us.  How exactly the ‘remaining’ histories are related to 
that particular history, by contrast, cannot be known in detail.  In this connection cf. Tanner, 
‘Creation and Providence’, in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, 117f. 
241 
‘permissible’ [erlaubt] but also ‘imperfect’ analogies36 in an attempt to describe what 
the distinction-in-relation of the two histories is like.  He mentions Luther’s 
metaphor of mask and face, focusing on the dialectic relation of them.37  He likens 
the two histories to the original [Urbild] and its reflection [Abbild] in a mirror, 
focusing on the two counterparts [Gegenbild] being in complete likeness but 
dialectically also complete reverse.38  He also compares the two to the centre and its 
circumference relating to and defining each other.39  But above all, it is the analogy 
of one line versus many lines that most illustratively explains the positive 
relationship between the two histories. 
With the analogy of one line and many lines, Barth first admits that within the 
many more obvious lines of the world history covenant history is but ‘one narrow 
line’, ‘an astonishingly thin line’.40  But he still insists that general history belongs 
to that particular covenant history, in that the latter is the former’s ‘ontic and [also] 
noetic basis’ [Realgrund und auch ihren Erkenntnisgrund].41  It is posited in the 
doctrine of providence that, for all its inconspicuousness, covenant history is one 
                                                                                                                                          
This being the case, we still see that Barth identifies four ‘special elements’ which ‘in the midst 
of world-occurrence generally … do testify and confirm and demonstrate … from where and by 
whom that occurrence is ruled’ (and not how) (III/3, 199).  And he makes a special effort to examine 
Jewish history (ibid., 210ff.), concluding that it is as ‘no people’ that the Jews are the people of God, 
and that it is because they have ‘no history’ that they have ‘the only truly human history, the history of 
man with God’ (ibid., 218).  Schröder terms these special elements as ‘a middle ground … between 
the history of the covenant and general creaturely occurrence’, thus suggesting that the two histories at 
issue are separated and mutually excluded.  But our investigation (as will be seen shortly) will make 
it clear that for Barth the two histories are neither separated nor exclusive, but positively connected 
with one ordered to the other.  See Schröder, ‘“I see Something You Don’t See”’, in For the Sake of 
the World, 133. 
36 III/3, 51; KD III/3, 59. 
37 III/3, 19f. 
38 Ibid., 49f.  Also III/1, 75, 154. 
39 III/3, 50, 183ff. 
40 Ibid., 36. 
41 III/3, 37; KD III/3, 42. 
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particular line ‘exalted above all other history’.42 
Second, exalted above many other lines, covenant history is still one line that 
is situated in many.  Because as covenant history takes place, ‘there [also takes 
place] simply … the history of the creature as such’,43 this ‘exaltation’ of covenant 
history must not be taken to mean a mutual exclusiveness of the two histories. 
Furthermore and most importantly, the one thin line of covenant history is not 
an alien element simply embedded in the many lines of creaturely history; it is rather 
inseparably intertwined with the latter.  In Barth’s words: 
the special occurrence in Israel, in Jesus Christ and in His community 
is not merely embedded in this general occurrence, but so inextricably 
woven into it [bis zur Ununterscheidbarkeit verwoben] that everything 
that happens there particularly bears the character of this general, too; 
everything must be seen and understood also under the aspect of this 
general, as a part of the history of the creature.44 
If the two histories are ‘inextricably woven’ together, then we can no longer think of 
the general history as being cut off from the particular history, or of the particular 
history as merely added to the general history.  At one point in CD III/3 it is even at 
least implied that the covenant and creation share one and the same history of 
theirs.45 
In summary, seen in the light of Barth’s doctrine of providence, covenant 
history and creaturely history are not two unrelated, parallel, or exclusive histories 
                                                 
42 III/3, 37; KD III/3, 42. 
43 III/3, 37; KD III/3, 43. 
44 III/3, 37; translation revised per KD III/3, 43. 
45 III/3, 38; KD III/3, 44: ‘the covenant of its external basis and creation of its internal are connected 
to each other also here in their history, and stand in a positive relationship to each other also in their 
history’. 
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standing ‘[side by side] and [then] continually contradict one another’.46  On the 
contrary, in that the two presuppose and establish each other, the latter stands to the 
former in a relationship which is ‘not merely … factual but … materially positive 
and inner’.47  
7B.3 Creaturely History Set under Limitations 
Now we aim to demonstrate that the doctrine of providence also places necessary 
limitations to the concept of creaturely history.  We argue that, for all its reality 
derived from its positive connection with covenant history, creaturely history is still 
kept in check by the God of providence who, not only the Lord of covenant history 
but also ‘the Lord of this general history’,48 is ‘the Lord of the whole’.49 
The limitations put to creaturely history by its Lord can be concluded in the 
statement that both the basis of its reality and that of its recognition lie in God and 
not in itself. 
7B.3.1 The Ontic Basis [Realgrund] of Creaturely History 
The reality of creaturely history is not self-evident; it derives from its co-operation 
with covenant history.  It is real only insofar as it becomes real, as it is assigned and 
integrated into the co-operation with covenant history, in the divine providence: 
The faithfulness of God is that He assigns and subordinates the 
creaturely occurrence under His lordship to the occurrence of the 
covenant, grace, and salvation, causing it to serve the latter, that He 
‘integrates’ it into the coming of His kingdom, in which the whole of 
the reality distinct from Himself has its meaning and historical 
                                                 
46 III/3, 40; KD III/3, 46. 
47 III/3, 40. 
48 Ibid., 38.  Cf. 196. 
49 Ibid., 41. 
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substance, that He causes it to ‘co-operate’ precisely in this 
occurrence.50  
Moreover, the ‘integration’ and ‘co-operation’ at issue consist in the fact that 
creaturely history may, must and does indeed serve covenant history when and as it is 
used by God.51  Whilst Barth’s language of assigning, integration and co-operation 
highlights creaturely history’s close, positive relationship to covenant history, the 
language of service and utilisation makes clear that creaturely history’s reality is not 
self-evident but dependent on God’s making use of it, not absolute but relative.  
Again, the fact that creaturely history depends for its reality on God’s making use of 
it affirms God as the Lord of history.52 
7B.3.2 The Noetic Basis [Erkenntnisgrund] of Creaturely History 
In addition to its ontic basis, creaturely history has another limitation put on its noetic 
                                                 
50 Ibid.; translation revised per KD III/3, 47.  Concerning this passage, two things are to be noted.  
First, from this point onward till the end of §48, whilst the concepts of assigning, ‘integration’ and 
‘co-operation’ are all retained and rigorously employed, the language of subordination never appears 
again, leaving the impression that Barth prefers the concept of assigning or ordering [zuordnen] to that 
of subordination [unterordnen] to describe the relationship of creaturely history to covenant history.  
Second, as seen in the German original, Barth makes a clear contrast between the concept of assigning 
on the one hand and that of ‘integration’ and ‘co-operation’ on the other by adding quotation marks to 
the latter―and this remains the case in many of the subsequent passages, see III/3, 41, 44, 45, 51, 52; 
KD III/3, 47, 51, 52, 59, 60.  The implication would be that his employment of these two concepts 
are cautious and qualified. 
51 III/3, 43. 
52 At this point it is important to notice that, on Barth’s account, God does rule over history as its 
Lord, but He does not do so in a deterministic sense.  God is the divine Ruler and not some 
overruling ‘fate’ in that ‘His rule is determined and limited: self-determined and self-limited, but 
determined and limited none the less’ (II/2, 50; KD II/2, 53).  Because the God who puts limitations 
to creaturely is also the self-limiting God, He as the sole Subject of covenant history ‘is undoubtedly 
not alone in this history, but has a partner in man, and to that extent in the cosmos’ (III/3, 45; KD III/3, 
52).  For this reason, His rule over history is confirmed not by ruling out but by including human 
beings who has ‘relative freedom and autonomy’ (ibid., 42) in their creaturely history: ‘Again there is 
no doubt that, in that covenant history takes place, the creature is present as subject of a history of its 
own [eigen]; not in vain, not as passive spectator, not as mere object, it is rather present as a 
meaningful part’ (III/3, 45; translation revised per KD III/3, 53).  For this reason, too, there will be 
little question of the intrumentalisation of creaturely history in God’s making use of it.  For 
comparison, one is referred to §20, Die Vorhersehung in Unt2, where Barth so emphatically claims 
God to be conclusively the only Subject of creaturely history, which is the object of the divine 
providence.  For instance: ‘God is not here but there, that precisely as the God who is immanent in 
the world preserving everything He is the Subject over against the objectivity’ of the creaturely world’, 
Unt2, 273. 
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basis.  For Barth, the foregoing accounts of the positive relationship between the 
two histories can only be knowledge of faith.53  This means, firstly, that faith in 
providence is not blind faith but rather knowing faith54 and, secondly, that knowledge 
of providence is different in kind, and does not derive, from knowledge of history.  
It is knowledge of faith, because it is faith ‘objectively grounded’ in revelation as ‘an 
objective fact’;55 it is also knowledge of faith, because it belongs to the category of 
‘axiomatic knowledge’ of its own kind, a kind which is not attained through the 
formation, or rather invention, of the human thinking subject. 
Now the second point made above means two things for Barth.  First, there 
is a sharp distinction between the faith-knowledge of providence and human 
conception of history.  Second, human conception of history does not establish the 
faith-knowledge of providence; rather this faith-knowledge is based on and derives 
from the acknowledgement of revelation, election, creation and therefore providence.  
To be sure, Barth grants that human conceptions of history are ‘necessary, right and 
good’.56  But he still makes it clear that: 
The belief in providence embraces these conceptions, but it also limits 
them. … it is faith in God and His dominion and judgment to which 
all history, even [all intellectual history], even [all history] of human 
conceptions of human history, is wholly subject.57 
Thus, both ‘the reality of history’ and ‘the true knowledge of this reality’ rely totally 
on the God of providence.58 
                                                 
53 III/3, 15ff. 
54 Ibid., 23, 40. 
55 Ibid., 16, 40. 
56 Ibid., 24. 
57 III/3, 21; KD III/3, 23. 
58 III/3, 22; KD III/3, 24. 
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In summary, we have demenstrated three things in this section.  First, for 
Barth, election precedes creation, and creation precedes providence.  With this 
doctrinal ordering, the three are in a continuity guaranteed by the one God.  And 
this means that, for the sake of covenant history, which is rooted in election, 
creaturely history is commenced in creation and sustained by providence, thus 
standing in a positive relationship to God.  Second, the positive relationship of 
creaturely history to God is in fact the positive relationship between it and covenant 
history.  Special attention was given to the analogy of one line and many lines, 
employed to explain that the two histories are so positively and closely related that 
they are ‘inextricably woven’ together.  Third, to this positive and materially 
inseparable relationship Barth adds necessary limitations: that both the ontic basis of 
history and the epistemological basis of providence in history depend completely 
upon the God who, according to His eternal election, sustains creaturely history in its 
reality and reveals the truth about it to us. 
7C The Being of Humanity as History after Jesus as the Lord 
of Time 
In this section the focus shifts from the world to human beings.  It will be pointed 
out that, in Barth’s theological anthropology, the being of humanity, or of the human 
person, is construed as history after the human Jesus as the Lord of time. 
7C.1 The Being of Humanity as History 
Barth’s notion that ‘the being [Sein] of man is a history’59 can be understood from 
three aspects.  First, from a general-anthropological viewpoint, the designation of 
                                                 
59 III/2, 157; KD III/2, 188. 
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the being of humanity as history signifies that it is not a ‘state’ [Zustand].60  We 
recall that God’s election, as history too, ‘does not only stand but also moves’.61  
But in the context of the historicity of the being of humanity, emphasis is laid not 
simply on its being in motion, but also on its confrontation with new possibilities 
from without: 
History, therefore, does not occur when the being is involved in 
changes or different modes of behaviour intrinsic to itself, but when 
something takes place upon and to the being as it is.  The history of a 
being [Wesen] begins, continues and is completed when something 
other than itself and transcending its own nature encounters it, 
approaches it and determines its being in the nature proper to it, so 
that it is compelled and enabled to transcend itself in response and in 
relation to this new factor.  The history of a being occurs when it is 
caught up in this movement, [this] change and [this] relation, when its 
circular movement [in itself] is broken from without by a movement 
towards it and the corresponding movement from it, when it is 
transcended from without so that it must and can transcend itself 
outwards.62 
In this sense, a being is only to the extent that it responds to new possibilities 
happening to it.  And this can only happen in a history, with the being being a 
history.63 
Second, following this general possibility-responsive understanding, Barth 
furthers a Christian-theological account of the historicity of the human being.  Just 
as the historicity of creation is founded on a covenantal basis, so the historicity of the 
                                                 
60 III/2, 157; KD III/2, 188. 
61 II/2, 184; KD II/2, 202f. 
62 III/2, 158; KD III/2, 189. 
63 Cf. ‘A being with a history is as this history occurs, and its nature is therefore located wholly 
within the history.’  Adam Neder, Participation in Christ: An Entry Into Karl Barth’s Church 
Dogmatics (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), 33. 
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being of humanity is founded on a christological basis.  This means that we know 
what it means to be human only by looking at the human Jesus; by doing so we know 
that we are human beings in that we are in Jesus Christ.  Therefore, the being of 
humanity is history, not simply because it is temporal, but also because it essentially 
corresponds to the existence of the human Jesus.  The historicity of the human Jesus 
is the prototype of the historicity of all human beings.  His existence is history, 
because He is the Creator and creature in one, because in Him we find ‘the otherness 
and newness of the Creator in relation to the creature’: 
This creature is what it is as creature in a dynamic movement of the 
Creator to itself and itself to the Creator.  It [is, in that it resides] in 
this movement from another to itself and itself to this other―a 
movement which, since God the Creator is this Other, it is quite 
impossible to describe as a movement within itself.64 
In that the existence of the human Jesus is the continuing encounter between the 
Creator and creature, ‘Jesus is, as this history takes place’.65  In this sense, He is 
‘the fulfilment of [that] strict concept of history’, 66 i.e. history understood as 
encounters with and responses to changes.  Also here, ‘if anywhere, the use of the 
term “primal history” [Urgeschichte] is perhaps appropriate’,67 for our human history 
consists in His human history. 
Finally, the christological understanding of the being of humanity as history 
is brought back to the doctrine of election as its ultimate foundation.  The Creator 
God becomes one with the creature human Jesus in His history, because it is 
                                                 
64 III/2, 159; KD III/2, 190. 
65 III/2, 160. 
66 Ibid., 159. 
67 Ibid., 157. 
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determined from all eternity that there will be history, i.e. the history between God 
and humanity: 
The existence of the man Jesus is this history.  It is nothing more.  It 
has nothing behind it but the eternal will and counsel of God.  It has 
no other foundation.  Thus, apart from the eternal will and counsel of 
God, Jesus exists only in this history, i.e., in this history of the 
covenant and salvation and revelation inaugurated by God in and with 
the act of creation.68 
In summary, just as the creation of the world is history, and has its internal 
basis in covenant history, so the being of humanity is history, and its historicity has 
its basis in the historicity of the existence of the human Jesus.  In both instances, the 
category of history constitutes the reality of the world and of humanity, although it 
should be added that it is not as if history in itself and as such had the ability or 
possibility to constitute the creation of the world or humanity, but that God has 
determined from all eternity to establish the covenantal relationship with humanity in 
history. 
7C.2 Human Jesus as the Lord of Time 
If Barth’s mature theology of history reaches a climax in his doctrines of creation and 
providence, his mature theology of time is found in §47.1, ‘Jesus, the Lord of 
Time’. 69   With a strong sense of christological orientation of theological 
anthropology, there Barth focuses on the time of Jesus as the ground of all human 
time, and holds 1) that Jesus as a human has His own history and therefore time,70 2) 
that the human Jesus also has the Easter history as His time and is thus manifested to 
                                                 
68 Ibid., 160.  My emphasis. 
69 III/2, 437ff.; KD III/2, 524ff. 
70 III/2, 439-441. 
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be God,71 3) that the Easter history is the revelation of the mystery of Jesus’ life 
history,72 and 4) that, by virtue of the Easter history, the time of the human Jesus is 
stripped off its limitedness, thereby acquiring new significance in all of its three 
temporal dimensions.73 
Although the foregoing points do not say much that is decisively new, 
significant contrasts are still observed.  Whilst in §14 the time of Jesus Christ is 
posited as the centre of convergence to which the OT prophetic time of expectation 
looks forward and the NT apostolic time of recollection looks backward, in §47.1 we 
find that this time of His is made the point of divergence from which alone one can 
properly look backward and forward to understand the past and the future.  Whilst 
in §31.3 it is the eternity of God that is defined as the All-embracing that is before 
time, above but with time, as well as after time, in §47.1 it is the time of the human 
Jesus, as the eternal time of God, that is portrayed as the All-permeating that is the 
present, past and future of all times. 
With these continuities and developments, several important observations 
need to be made.  First, the existence of the human Jesus in history is treated in a 
more explicitly positive tone.  Perhaps due to worries over the Jesus-cult, the ‘Life 
of Jesus Movement’, and the quest for the historical Jesus, it was observed that Barth 
broadly refrained from speaking of the life of Jesus in a positive tone in his teaching 
on the incarnation in the doctrine of revelation.74  Here in the context of the 
theological anthropology, however, an emphasis is placed on the historical life span 
                                                 
71 Ibid., 441f. 
72 Ibid., 454f. 
73 Ibid., 464f. 
74 For instance I/2, 64, 110f., 136f.  For Barth, because Jesus Christ is the human being whom God 
became, His human life as accessible to historical research does not itself constitute the divine 
revelation, nor does it lead automatically to the recognition of it. 
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of the human Jesus as a real event with real beginning, duration and end, together 
with ‘the temporal limitations to which Jesus was subject’.75  The Easter history is 
the necessary revelation of Jesus’ earthly life in history,76 but in this light: 
It is in this history [of the man Jesus]―the history [from] which [His 
temporality] is inseparable …―that the man Jesus [is] and is the 
eternal salvation of all men in their different times.77 
The human Jesus is only as His human history takes place, that is, the whole of His 
historical life span. 
Second, on a more general level, history is given precedence over time; or 
rather, the particular concept of history precedes the general concept of time.  Time 
as the form of all creaturely existence is not to be taken as an independent entity; 
‘there is no such thing as absolute time … [t]here is no time in itself, rivalling God 
and imposing conditions on Him.’78  Rather, time is real only to the extent that God 
once took it to Himself, and this is made manifest first in creation history and 
ultimately in covenant history, which has Jesus as its centre.  In that creation history 
began as the ‘primal- and pre- history of all history’,79 time also began.  Even Jesus’ 
temporality derives from His history. 
Third, history takes precedence over time, precisely because it is Jesus Christ 
Himself, and thus covenant history, who is the object of God’s eternal election.  
                                                 
75 III/2, 463f., and 441. 
76 Ibid., 454f. 
77 Ibid., 441; KD III/2, 528.  Note that the phrase ‘the history which is inseparable from his 
temporality’ in the English translation suggests Jesus’ historicity rests on his temporality.  What 
Barth writes indicates the opposite, that Jesus’ temporality rests on his historicity: ‘die Geschichte, 
von der sich seine Zeitlichkeit nicht trennen läßt’. 
78 III/2, 456. 
79 Ibid., 438; translation revised per KD III/2, 525: ‘mit dem Anheben dieser Ur- und Vorgeschichte 
aller Geschichte auch die Zeit’. 
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This is clearly seen when Barth traces the being [Sein] of the human Jesus in time 
from the Easter-time backward through His lifetime, via the Old Testament time of 
prefiguration and expectation, to the beginning of time in creation history;80 all these 
times are properly His time because Jesus was.  But the ultimate ground of all this is 
to be found further back in the election of grace: 
if creation and covenant are so integral to one another …, if 
finally―and this is the point on which everything else depends―the 
One who was to come as the appearing reality of the covenant has 
really come in the man Jesus, is it speculation to say that even the time 
of creation was His time?  To the extent that it was the time when the 
Creator began to execute His will, it too was His time; the time when 
He was the primary, proper object of this divine will, foreseen and 
foreordained in [bei] the creation of all things.81 
On this account, then, the onceness [Einmaligkeit] and the eternity of the existence of 
the human Jesus in time are not mutually excluded, because its onceness is 
pre-determined from all eternity: 
At this last and highest stage, the pre-existence of the man Jesus 
coincides with His eternal predestination and election, which includes 
the election of Israel, of the Church, and of every individual member 
of His body.82 
7D Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we have examined Barth’s doctrine of creation and demonstrated 
three things: 1) that history begins with the Creator God’s act of creation, in order 
                                                 
80 III/2, 474ff., especially 477 (KD III/2, 572): ‘Hence for the apostolic community the yesterday of 
Jesus extends beyond the prior yesterday of the Old Testament to the primal history and primal time 
which are beyond [all Historie], not only in practice, but in principle; to the history and time when 
being, history and time began as such.’ 
81 III/2, 477; translation slightly revised KD III/2, 572f. 
82 III/2, 484f.; KD III/2, 582. 
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that the particular history of the covenant as the actualisation the eternal election of 
grace may begin (as in Barth’s teaching on creation); 2) that history proceeds under 
the Lord God’s preserving, accompanying and ruling providence, and is thereby set 
in a positive relation to and within the framework of covenant history (as in his 
teaching on providence); and 3) that a human being exists only in that his or her 
history takes place, that is, history strictly understood as a series of encounters with 
new factors which are different than the being itself; for a human being is only in that 
the human Jesus is―in that the whole life span of His history takes place as the 





Reconciling God ‘Historicised’ and ‘Ontologising’ History: 
Church Dogmatics IV (1953-) 
 
Introduction 
This thesis now enters Barth’s doctrine of reconciliation CD IV/1.  This volume has 
decisive bearings on our purposes for two reasons.  First, regarding its external 
intention, CD IV/1 is written as Barth’s conscious debate with Rudolf Bultmann, 
whose ‘subject [Sache] is always present’ in the writing of this volume. 1   
Determined not to pay allegiance to ‘any philosophy, epistemology, or 
methodology’,2 Barth recognised in Bultmann’s New Testament hermeneutics Martin 
Heidegger’s existentialism as its philosophical presupposition.3  In Barth’s view, a 
philosophical consequence of Bultmann’s existentialist hermeneutics is the removal 
of the subjective significance (meaning) from its objective basis (text); applied to the 
field of NT exegesis, existentialist principles has as its outcome that Christian 
kerygma can be abstracted from Christ as its actual content.4  For Barth, however, 
just as significance is inseparable and derivative from what is significant,5 kerygma, 
                                                 
1 ‘Forward’ to IV/1; ‘Vorwort’ to KD IV/1.  See also Barth, How I Changed My Mind, 68f; Busch, 
Karl Barth, 386f.; John B. Webster, Barth’s Ethics of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 91f. 
2 Barth to Bultmann, Basel, 24 Dec 1952, Barth, Karl Barth-Rudolf Bultmann Letters 1922-1966, 
105. 
3  Karl Barth, ‘Rudolf Bultmann―An Attempt to Understand Him’, Kerygma and Myth: A 
Theological Debate, ed. by Hans-Werner Bartsch, trans. by Reginald H. Fuller, Vols. I and II 
combined (London: SPCK, 1972), Vol. II, 114f. 
4 Ibid., 96. 
5 Barth insists that the New Testament kerygma can only have significance [Bedeutsamkeit] when it is 
based upon something significant [Bedeutsame].  IV/1, 223; KD IV/1, 245. 
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too, is inseparable and derivative from Christ;6 He is the ‘objective subject’7 who can 
exist in Christian preaching and individual faith because He existed antecedently in 
the past history with its objective existence.8  Not to cast doubt upon the importance 
of subjective faith but to accord it a proper ground so as to ensure that it does not 
become its own content,9 Christ must be posited prior to His benefit to us, or 
Christology prior to soteriology.10  For this reason, the historicity of the Christ event 
cannot be taken to mean the Christian transition from the old to the new made 
possible by the kerygma, as proposed by Bultmann.  Instead, as Barth argues in CD 
IV, it should firstly mean the concrete, objective historicity of Jesus Christ in His 
historical existence. 
On a more internal-material level, the whole of CD IV, as a full-scale 
outworking of the insight achieved in the doctrine of election, is a thoroughgoing 
reworking of Christology in the form of the doctrine of reconciliation.11  From the 
two doctrines highlighted in CD IV our present research will receive great light.  To 
begin with, reconciliation means for Barth the restoration of a reality in which God is 
with us, and that reality is a common history that God wills to share with humanity.  
On this account, the reconciliation of humanity to God cannot be viewed as a fixed 
status or two separated histories, but as a common history between the two: ‘He does 
                                                 
6 Barth, ‘Rudolf Bultmann―An Attempt to Understand Him’, 96. 
7 Charlotte von Kirschbaum to W. Simpfendörfer, 16 May 1952, cited in Busch, Karl Barth, 
389n243. 
8 Cf. Barth, ‘Rudolf Bultmann―An Attempt to Understand Him’, Kerygma and Myth, 94. 
9 Webster, Barth’s Ethics of Reconciliation, 92. 
10 Or, as Pannenberg asserts rather firmly, ‘Jesus Christ is the criterion in defining our understanding 
of salvation precisely in the sense of the subordinating of soteriology to christology’, Pannenberg, 
Systematic Theology, Vol. II, 398n1.  See also Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus―God and Man, trans. by 
Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (London: SCM Press, 1968), 47f. 
11 For a detailed analysis of the contrast between Barth’s early and later Christology, see McCormack, 
‘Karl Barth’s Historicized Christology’, Orthodox and Modern, 201-233. 
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not allow His history to be His and ours ours, but causes them to take place as a 
common history.’12  To the extent that it is a history that God shares with humanity, 
this common history does take place within the general history of humanity.  Insofar 
as it is a history that God shares with us, this common history does not come from 
some possibility or necessity immanent in human history as such.13  It rather arises 
from without as ‘an invasion into our own history’14 so as to turn the general history 
of the world into ‘a qualified history peculiar to the humankind’ [eine qualifizierte, 
seine eigentümliche Geschichte].15  It is, then, in virtue of this common history 
between God and humanity that ‘the general history which is common to God and 
man, to God and all creation, becomes at its very heart and end [the] redemptive 
history.’16 
Moreover, Barth’s doctrine of reconciliation, which has the covenant as its 
presupposition,17 consists materially of a comprehensive Christology, and must be 
understood strictly in the light of this Christology.18  On this view, the common 
history between God and humanity―the history of ‘God with us’ and therefore the 
salvation history for us―that reconciliation is has Jesus Christ as its beginning, 
                                                 
12 IV/1, 7; KD IV/1, 5.  On this view, Adam Neder remarks that by ‘including humanity in the 
history of the covenant’ God shares His being with humanity.  Neder, Participation in Christ, 44. 
13 IV/1, 49. 
14 Ibid., 7; translation slightly revised per KD IV/1, 5.  Cf. ‘It is not an immanent, this-worldly 
revelation, but comes from outside man and the cosmos.  It is a transcendent revelation’, in Barth, 
‘The Christian Understanding of Revelation’, Against the Stream, 208. 
15 IV/1, 8; translation slightly revised per KD IV/1, 6. 
16 IV/1, 8; KD IV/1, 7. 
17 Cf. ‘The Covenant as the Presupposition of Reconciliation’, §57.2, IV/1, 22ff.  Barth once 
planned to entitle this volume the doctrine of the covenant, see Busch, Karl Barth, 377. 
18 On Christology replacing the doctrine of revelation to be posited as the epistemological ground of 
theology in Barth’s mature thinking, see McCormack, ‘God Is His Decision’, Theology as 
Conversation, 48-66, especially 65: ‘Christology is the epistemological ground of election and 
election is the ontological ground of Christology.  That is the key to understanding the relation of the 
early volumes of the Church Dogmatics to the later.’ 
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centre and aim, because it is He who inaugurates, implements and fulfils it.  In 
answering the question concerning who Jesus Christ is, as we shall see shortly, Barth 
sets forth a actualistic reinterpretation of the classical doctrines of Christ’s one 
person, two ‘natures’ and two ‘states’, integrating them into the one history of Jesus 
Christ.  In this Christology, Barth sets aside what he views as metaphysical ideas, 
and places the history of Jesus Christ to the foreground to be the determining factor 
in its relationship to the former. 
The preceding paragraphs indicate that the category of history is no longer a 
problem to be accounted for but rather the hermeneutical key―it is employed in CD 
IV as an integral part in Barth’s christocentric doctrine of reconciliation in such a 
way that, on the one hand, a genuine relationship of God to humanity is allowed and, 
on the other, the objectivity and concreteness of Jesus Christ is secured.  On this 
basis, this chapter goes on to argue that 1) in that the being, person and nature of 
Jesus Christ consist solely in His work, Jesus Christ is who He is in His history; 2) in 
that the two states of Jesus Christ consists in two movements or directions in His one 
history, His humiliation means the humiliation of God Himself and, to that extent, 
also the ‘historicisation’ of the being of God, and 3) His exaltation means the 
exaltation of humanity and, to that extent, also the ‘ontologisation’ of human history.  
Finally by way of an excursus, a proposition will be made regarding the relationship 
between election and the Trinity. 
8A The Being of Jesus Christ as His History 
Hans Küng once remarks on Barth’s ‘historical scepticism’ that: 
Karl Barth …, as a result of the conclusions of the early liberal quest 
for the historical Jesus, took up an attitude of historical skepticism … 
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and linked this up with Kierkegaard’s conception of faith, defending a 
faith that is historically uncertain (or dogmatically insured against 
history) as true faith.19 
For Küng, the Christian faith is historical because it has no other ground than the 
historical human Jesus Christ: 
The Christ of the Christians is quite a concrete, human, historical 
person: the Christ of the Christians is no other than Jesus of Nazareth.  
And in this sense Christianity is essentially based on history, Christian 
faith is essentially historical faith.20 
Based on the findings of this thesis, however, it is to be maintained that Küng’s first 
comment is valid only if it concerns the Barth of the Römerbrief period.  As for the 
faith-history relation presented in the second comment―and this is what we seek to 
demonstrate in this section―Barth’s position in his doctrine of reconciliation is more 
radical and concrete than Küng’s: more radical, because for Barth the key is not only 
that Christ is Jesus but also that Jesus Christ is who He is in His history; more 
concrete, because Christianity is for him rooted in ‘history’ only insofar as it is 
rooted in ‘a’ history, i.e. ‘the’ history in which Jesus Christ is. 
8A.1 Subject-Predicate Relationship Reconsidered 
The Christology in CD IV presents a Jesus Christ who is no longer deemed as a 
predicate only passively and accidentally assumed by the divine Word; He is rather 
the proper Subject of the event of incarnation.  This indicates a refinement of the 
subject-predicate relation of revelation to history advocated in CD I/2 according to 
Barth’s actualistic ontology. 
                                                 
19 Hans Küng, On Being a Christian, trans. by Edward Quinn (London: Collins, 1977), 154. 
20 Ibid., 146. 
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This refinement can be explained first from the viewpoint of the essentialist 
ontology.  Whilst in Barth’s Christology prior to CD II/2 it is the predicate (history) 
that is not to be abstracted from the Subject (the Word or revelation), in his mature 
Christology it is the Subject (the Word or revelation as Jesus Christ) that is not to be 
abstracted from its predicate (history).  This is not a reversal of the 
subject-predicate relationship at issue, because both elements remain in their 
respective places.  The Word or revelation, as Jesus Christ, still remains the sole 
Subject of His relationship to history, but just as the predicate is not without its 
Subject, the Subject, too, is not and never without His predicate.21  From the 
perspective of an essentialist ontology, what has taken place is a significant shift in 
tone: a shift from the predicate in need of its Subject to be concrete, to the Subject 
self-determining and therefore determined to be concretely with His predicate. 
But if one views the matter from the viewpoint of Barth’s actualistic ontology, 
it becomes clear that that ‘shift in tone’ is in truth a new, actualistic understanding of 
the ‘subject’.  The ‘subject’ to which Barth assigns ‘an absolutely controlling 
position and function’22 regarding every other aspect of our understanding of God 
and human, is now identified as nothing other than Jesus Christ’s history.  This 
history is the subject away from which the humanity of Jesus Christ as such would 
become an ‘empty predicate’.23  This history is the subject of which even the Word 
                                                 
21 Cf. III/2, 56; KD III/2, 65 where Barth maintains that Jesus Christ ‘is wholly and utterly who and 
what He is in the continuity of this history’. 
22 IV/2, 19. 
23 Barth states that without its subject, in itself and as such the humanity of Jesus Christ is a ‘predicate 
suspended in empty space’, an ‘empty predicate’ (ibid., 102).  ‘The decisive thing’, i.e. the subject, is 
to be sought, first of all, not horizontally but vertically.  However, it is to be sought vertically not in a 
still status but a dynamic movement, not, moreover, in a one-way imposition but a two-way, 




or revelation, the dominating notion in CD I/2, is a predicate.24  Either in that it 
accentuates the need for the Subject to adhere to its predicates in its actual existence 
(essentialistically viewed), or in that it empties the concept of ‘subject’ of abstractly 
formed ideas and refills it with the concrete history of Jesus Christ (actualistically 
viewed), Barth’s mature Christology in CD IV is rightly recognised to be 
characterised by an actualistic ontology. 
8A.2 Unity of Being and Act: One History in its Two Movements 
On the basis of his ‘actualised’ Christology, Barth argues that the being of Jesus 
Christ is nothing more or less than His history.  This proposition can and must be 
sharpened into the further statement that the being of Jesus Christ is the one history 
of His earthly acts, in terms of its two-directional movement.  Before we unfold this 
claim shortly, two decisive quotes in this connection merit immediate mention: 
It is in the particular fact and the particular way that Jesus Christ is 
very God, very man, and very God-man that He works, and He works 
in the fact and only in the fact that He is this One and not another.  
His being as this One is His history, and His history is this His being.  
This is the truth which must light up the doctrine of reconciliation as 
Christology.25 
And also: 
We hasten to explain that the being of Jesus Christ, the unity of being 
of the living God and this living man, takes place in the event of the 
concrete existence [of God and the concrete existence] of this man.  
                                                 
24 For Barth’s idea that Jesus Christ’s history is the content of the Word of God, see IV/1, 48: ‘We 
only need to hear the word of His historical existence and we shall hear the Word of God’.  In IV/3 
Barth goes on to say that revelation is the predicate of reconciliation, i.e. a predicate which ‘has no 
independent being [Wesen]’ over against its subject. (IV/3, 9; KD IV/3, 7)  On this view, revelation 
is the manifestation of nothing other than reconciliation, and reconciliation is nothing other than what 
is accomplished in the history of Jesus Christ. 
25 IV/1, 128; KD IV/1, 140. 
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It is a being, but a being in a history.  The gracious God is in this 
history, [and] so is [the] reconciled man, [and] so are both in their 
unity.  And what takes place in this history, and therefore in the 
being of Jesus Christ as such, is atonement.  Jesus Christ is not what 
He is―very God, very man, very God-man―in order [then] as such 
to mean and do and accomplish something else which is atonement.  
But His being as God and man and God-man consists in the completed 
act of the reconciliation of man with God.26 
In the light of these quotes, our statement is broken down into three parts.  First, in 
that we are presented with a radical integration of Christ’s being and act, His person 
and work, into one history, the history of Jesus Christ functions as the embracing 
unity that resolves the seemingly irreconcilable being-act or person-work antithesis.  
Negatively stated, Jesus Christ never is without also working, and He never works as 
someone who He Himself is not.  Positively stated, who Jesus is consists always in 
the work that He does, and He does the work that He does always as the One who He 
is.  Insofar as Jesus Christ is so and does so always in His history, ‘His being as this 
One is His history, and His history is this His being’,27 ‘this history in its unity and 
[entirety]’.28  Leaving ‘no place for anything static at the broad centre of the 
traditional doctrine of the person of Christ … or in the traditional doctrine of the two 
states’,29 then, the history of Jesus Christ claims to be the sole basis on which His 
                                                 
26 IV/1, 126f.; KD IV/1, 138f. 
27 IV/1, 128; KD IV/1, 140.  In McCormack’s formulation: ‘For Barth, Jesus Christ is his history.  
He is the history set in motion by an eternal act of self-determination; hence, the history that he is 
finds its root in election.  This is what he is “essentially”.  Jesus Christ is what he is in his eternal 
act of self-determination and in its outworking in time.’  McCormack, ‘The Actuality of God’, 
Engaging the Doctrine of God, 222. 
28 IV/1, 136; KD IV/1, 149.  It is worth noting at this point that in II/1, having just asserted that ‘God 
is who He is in the act of revelation’, Barth goes on to say that ‘God is who He is in His works.  He 
is the same even in Himself, even before and after and over His works, and without them. … He is not, 
therefore, who He is only in His works.’  II/1, 257, 260.  This is a clear example of what 
McCormack terms Barth’s ‘earlier “metaphysical moments” which is greatly at odds with Barth’s 
later, actualistic ontology.  McCormack, ‘Karl Barth’s Historicized Christology’, Orthodox and 
Modern, 217n45.  Also McCormack, ‘The Actuality of God’, Engaging the Doctrine of God, 213. 
29 IV/1, 106; KD IV/1, 117. 
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being and act are united and can ever be talked about. 
Second, concerning the act or work of Jesus Christ, it is clear from the first 
quote that Barth not only equates Jesus Christ’s being with His history, but also 
makes this identification the decisive light to ‘the doctrine of reconciliation as 
Christology’.  The act in which the being of Jesus Christ consists, then, is nothing 
other than the work of reconciliation, i.e. the work for which Jesus Christ is elected 
from all eternity, and which He accomplishes and reveals in history.  On this 
account, not only the work of God is given the concrete form of history, but also the 
Subject of that work receives greater concreteness and specificity.  Barth’s call for a 
concrete understanding of the Subject from the viewpoint of the predicate derives not 
from an abstract metaphysical commitment but from the concrete work of 
reconciliation, which Jesus Christ accomplishes in history.  Transcending his earlier, 
relatively abstract insistence on the divine Word as the Subject, Barth is now 
advancing the thesis that ‘[t]he Subject Jesus Christ is this history.’30  The history 
of Jesus Christ, then, is made the sole and supremely concrete subject by which 
reconciliation as the work of God is done. 
Third, that the being of Jesus Christ, which is inseparable from reconciliation 
as the act of God, consists in His history means that this history, albeit unifying His 
being and act, is not unitary but has two forms.  For the One who completes the 
work of reconciliation is neither God in Himself nor the human as such, but the 
God-human; and this God-human exists not in a uniform history but in the history of 
His two states.  Differently put, just as the one person of Jesus Christ has true 
divinity and true humanity as His two natures, so His one history has what is 
                                                 
30 IV/1, 107; KD IV/1, 118.  Also IV/3, 179; KD IV/3 205: ‘To say “Jesus” is necessarily to say 
“history”, His history, the history in which He is what He is and does what He does.’ 
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traditionally called the condescension and the exaltation as its two forms [Gestalten], 
two directions, or two lines of movements,31 which as Barth views them take place 
not successively but simultaneously in this one history.32  In this connection, if the 
category of ‘nature’ is replaced by that of ‘history’,33 then the category of ‘states’, 
too, is integrated in that of history and expressed in concrete terms. 
The above analysis denotes that the one history and being of Jesus Christ is 
the one history (which unites being and action, deity and humanity) in its two forms 
of humiliation and of exaltation.  It also spells out the axiomatic claim that Barth 
makes in the opening paragraph of §59 that ‘the atonement is history’: it is not 
supra-historical or ahistorical truth but truth ‘coming to pass in a history and 
becoming manifest in this history’,34 because it is in the history of Jesus Christ, in 
which He the reconciling God condescends and we human beings are exalted and 
reconciled in Him, that reconciliation is accomplished.  By way of this ‘right and 
necessary’ move of bringing together the doctrines of the two natures and the two 
states into the one history of Jesus Christ,35 Barth redefines the meanings of true 
deity, true humanity, humiliation and exaltation.  This has great ontological and 
epistemological significance for our present concerns,36 for from the being-as-history 
                                                 
31 See for instance, ‘The concrete views of God and man … cannot be mixed but can only be seen 
together as the forms [Gestalten] of a history: the reconciling God and the man reconciled by Him’, 
IV/1, 136; KD IV/1, 149. 
32 IV/1, 132; KD IV/1, 145. 
33 McCormack, ‘Karl Barth’s Historicized Christology’, Orthodox and Modern, 222.  As Barth 
explains, the notion of ‘nature’ presupposes ‘a generally known or knowable essence of deity, and … 
a [generally] known or knowable essence of man’, thus easily leading to ‘a general concept of deity’ 
and ‘a general anthropology’.  Christian theology and theological anthropology, by contrast, ‘can be 
learned only with and from [bei und von] Him’, i.e. with and from Jesus Christ as He is and acts in 
His history.  IV/2, 26; KD IV/2, 27. 
34 IV/1, 157; translation revised per KD IV/1, 171. 
35 IV/1, 132ff.; KD IV/1, 145ff. 
36 As regards Barth’s statement that ‘the atonement is history’ being a theological, ontological and 
epistemological claim, see Webster, Barth’s Ethics of Reconciliation, 84f. 
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of Jesus Christ one can 1) look ‘upward’ and see the true deity, and 2) look 
‘downward’ and see the true humanity; both of these ‘natures’ are, according to Barth, 
not only revealed but also constituted in the being-as-history of Jesus Christ.  Two 
statements can then be formulated.  First, looking ‘upward’, one sees the 
humiliation of the ture God, and understands that in the ‘from above downwards’ 
movement in the one history of Jesus Christ, the Subject of Jesus Christ’s 
condescending and of His suffering in it is God Himself.37  In this sense, the divine 
being is ‘historicised’ or actualised in such a way that it can no longer be regarded as 
a static being in and for itself alone but rather, in the most proper sense, as a 
historical being-in-act for us.  Second, looking ‘downward’, one sees the exaltation 
of the true human being, and understands that in the ‘from below upwards’ 
movement in the one history of Jesus Christ, the One who ascended and participates 
in the divine being is the true human being Jesus Christ.38  In that the human history 
that Jesus is is taken up to have a part in the divine being itself, this human history is 
‘ontologised’ or accredited with an ontic status in the sense that it can no longer be 
regarded as accidental (secondary in the divine will) or improper (unsuitable for the 
divine being) but rather, in the most proper sense, as legitimate reality included in the 
divine being.  These will be the two lines along which the following sections 
unfold. 
                                                 
37 In what way the suffering human Jesus is identified with the second person of the Trinity, and how 
well this identification upholds both differentiation and unity in God’s triune life, although important, 
cannot be discussed here.  For more detail see McCormack, ‘Karl Barth’s Christology as a Resource 
for a Reformed Version of Kenoticism’, especially 247f. 
38 The ‘participation’ at issue here is in concreto primarily Jesus Christ’s elevation back to God, 
secondarily our inclusion in His elevation, and therefore in no way some deification, either of the 
human Jesus nor of us, in abstracto.  For detail see section 8C.2.2. 
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8B ‘Historicisation’ of the Divine Being in the Being of Jesus 
Christ 
In this section we argue that God’s being is ‘historicised’ in the being of Jesus Christ, 
which is in His self-humiliation in history.  Two steps will be taken: first, Barth 
identifies the Word with Jesus Christ; and then he identifies Jesus Christ as God in 
His second mode of being.  At the end of this section we will attempt to formulate 
the relationship between God’s history in Himself and Jesus Christ’s history in the 
world according to our proposal of the ‘historicisation’ of God’s being. 
8B.1 The Word as Jesus Christ 
Ever since his theological breakthrough in 1915/16, one central concern of Barth’s 
theology has revolved the question of the impossible obligation for incapable human 
beings to speak God’s Word.39  It is fair and correct to state that it is on the fact of 
Deus dixit,40 on the Word of God as ‘the criterion of dogmatics’,41 that Barth’s 
theology as a whole is established.  In his detailed elaboration of the threefold form 
of the Word of God, Jesus Christ as the revealed Word of God in history is indeed 
‘held up on high’ and made the governing factor of the other two forms (written, and 
preached) of the Word. 42  But at some crucial points in his earlier work an 
impression was left that the Word reserves a formal priority over its incarnation as 
Jesus Christ.43 
                                                 
39 See for instance Barth, ‘The Word of God and the Task of the Ministry’ (1922) in The Word of God 
and the Word of Man, 183-217. 
40 GD, 45ff. 
41 I/1, 45. 
42 Ibid., 111f., especially 117. 
43 For instance, ‘True enough, He is the incarnate Word, i.e., the Word not without flesh, but the 
Word in the flesh and through the flesh―but nevertheless the Word and not the flesh.  The Word is 
what He is even before and apart from His being flesh.’  I/2, 136, my emphasis. 
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It is not until Barth’s christological revision made in CD II/2 that a 
conspicuous turning point is made: that it is the eternal Word of God that is the 
provisional ‘stopgap’ or ‘place-holder’ [Platzhaler] for Jesus Christ, who was to 
become incarnate in history as the definitive fulfilment of that place, and not the 
opposite.44  This christocentric particularism and realism, to use Joseph Mangina’s 
term,45 has since then led Barth to the conviction that ‘the whole conception of the 
Logos asarkos, the “second person” of the Trinity as such, is an abstraction.’46 
Now, especially in the context of the doctrine of reconciliation, ‘we must not 
refer to the second “person” of the Trinity as such, to the eternal Son or the eternal 
Word of God in abstracto’; instead, ‘[a]ccording to the free and gracious will of God 
the eternal Son of God is Jesus Christ as He lived and died and rose again in time, 
and none other.’47  In that God has indeed sent His Son to the world for the sake of 
our reconciliation with Him, the largely formal-logical assumptions of the 
pre-existence of an indeterminate Logos asarkos,48 of a God not yet revealed to us,49 
and therefore of a God who in Himself and as such is not yet for us, not yet God the 
Reconciler, can and must be set aside.50  If in ‘His action as the Reconciler of the 
                                                 
44 II/2, 96f.; KD II/2, 103f.  See also Jüngel, ‘The Royal Man: A Christological Reflection on 
Human Dignity in Barth’s Theology’, Jüngel, Karl Barth, 127-138 (130); McCormack, ‘Karl Barth’s 
Historicised Christology’, 221n49. 
45 Mangina, Karl Barth, 116. 
46 III/1, 54. 
47 IV/1, 52. 
48 Barth could in his earlier Christology certainly sympathise with the Reformed concern to affirm the 
reality of the Logos asarkos: ‘They did not want the reality of the Logos asarkos abolished or 
suppressed in the reality of the Logos ensarkos.  On the contrary, they wished the Logos asarkos to 
be regarded equally seriously as the terminus a quo, as the Logos ensarkos was regarded as the 
terminus ad quem of the incarnation.’  I/2, 169. 
49 Barth, too, conceives in his doctrine of the Trinity of God the Father, the Subject of revelation, as 
‘the God who by nature cannot be unveiled to men’, I/1, 320. 
50 Cf. Barth’s slightly less sympathetic remark on the Extra Calvinisticum that ‘right up to our own 
day it has led to fatal speculation about the being and work of the Logos arsarkos, or a God whom we 
think we can know elsewhere, and whose divine being we can define from elsewhere than in and from 
the contemplation of His presence and activity as the Word made flesh’, IV/1, 181.  But it is crucial 
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world’ God does not contradict but precisely confirms Himself,51 and if ‘[t]here is no 
moment in which Jesus Christ does not stand before God’ as the Reconciler between 
God and humanity,52 then it is most proper for God to always be the Reconciler.  
And once it is established that God is always the reconciling God, it then follows that 
the Word of God is always the reconciling Word.  For this reason, to hear the Word 
of God Himself, ‘We only need to hear the word of His historical existence’.53  
Moreover, that the Word is always reconciling can only mean that the eternal Word 
of God always has Jesus as its determined form and concrete content, i.e. the human 
Jesus, whose ‘history … is the event of atonement’.54  That is why Barth could later, 
in his simple but pregnant introduction to ‘evangelical theology’, conclude this 
radical christocentric identification of the Word of God with the Word of the history 
of Jesus Christ by saying: 
The Word of God, therefore, is not the appearance of an idea [Idee] of 
such a covenant and communion.  It is the Logos of this history, [and 
thus] the Logos, or Word, of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, 
who, as such, is the Father of Jesus Christ.  This Word, the Word of 
this history, is what evangelical theology must always hear, 
understand, and speak of anew.55 
                                                                                                                                          
to recognise that, even in his mature Christology, Barth never denies the existence of Logos asarkos if 
the notion is taken to mean God’s aseity.  Rather, he rejects it as ‘fatal speculation’ only insofar as it 
is understood as a Logos asarkos which is not yet the Logos incarnandus, a notion which in his view 
posits the existence of an indeterminate Logos.  In McCormack’s words, ‘the Logos is incarnandus 
in and for himself, in eternity’, McCormack, ‘Grace and Being’, Orthodox and Modern, 186. 
51 IV/1, 194. 
52 Ibid., 315, emphasis mine.  Cf. ibid.: ‘The moment of this particular “contingent fact of history” 
was the moment of all moments.’ 
53 Ibid., 48. 
54 Ibid., 53. 
55 Karl Barth, Evangelical Theology: An Introduction, trans. by Grover Foley (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
William B. Eerdmans, 1963), 20f.; translation slightly revised per Karl Barth, Einführung in die 
Evangelische Theologie (Zürich: EVZ, 1962), 28f. 
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8B.2 Jesus Christ as God 
Identifying the Word with Jesus Christ is the first step of Barth’s ‘historicisation’ of 
the divine being in the doctrine of reconciliation.  The next step is to identify the 
God-human Jesus Christ as God in His second mode of being.56 
At first sight this move seems insignificant and even too trivial to be 
mentioned.  But once we take into account the general motif throughout CD IV that 
Jesus Christ is who He is in His history, and the particular proposition made in CD 
IV/1 that in His history of humiliation Jesus Christ is the Lord as Servant, a corollary 
of this move immediately becomes clear: that the humiliation of Jesus Christ in His 
historical life is essentially the humiliation of God Himself.  This can be explicated 
in the two following lines. 
The first concerns suffering: in the history of the humiliation of Jesus Christ, 
in that Jesus Christ really suffers, God too really suffers.  In Barth’s view, although 
Jesus Christ is and never ceases to be the majestic Lord God, suffering and humility 
are not something unfitting to Him.  Or rather, it is precisely because Jesus Christ is 
and never ceases to be the majestic Lord God that suffering and humility are most 
fitting to Him, for it is precisely in accordance to His own sovereign will and divine 
nature that He suffers as the Lord.57  Furthermore, if in His deity Jesus Christ is 
capable of suffering and does actually suffers, and most properly so, then God 
Himself, too, in His second mode of being is capable of suffering and does actually 
                                                 
56 With our statement thus formulated, we differ ourselves from ‘Hegel’s philosophical theology (i.e., 
the direct identification of the second person of the Trinity with a human being’.  Cf. McCormack, 
‘Karl Barth’s Christology’, 245. 
57 IV/1, 160ff., especially 165: ‘the whole history of the man Jesus [is] a history of suffering’ 




suffers, and most properly so.58  The suffering that Jesus Christ underwent in the 
history of His humiliation is nothing new to God; it is proper to Him in His Godhead.  
The second concerns the actuality of God’s becoming human-historical: in 
the history of the humiliation of Jesus Christ, in that God the Son really became 
human, God Himself too really became human.59  This does not have so much to do 
with the historical reality or actuality of God’s becoming human.  It is beyond 
dispute that Barth unequivocally affirms God’s becoming human as a historical 
reality.60  But given out present concern, i.e. the ‘historicisation’ of the divine being 
in Jesus Christ, the question is more about the extent to which God in His Godhead is 
involved in this historical reality.  And this question relies on the extent to which 
God was in Christ.  In other words, the extent to which God was in Christ will 
decide that to which God allows Himself to be involved in the historical reality that 
the incarnation is.  Now for Barth, it is clear that God has to be construed as ‘truly 
and altogether in Christ’ in order for reconciliation to be effective.61  That ‘God was 
in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself’―the most ‘exalted’ and ‘profound’ 
word that dogmatics has―,62 means that ‘it is God Himself who intervened to act 
and work and reveal’,63 that the incarnation, ‘far from being against Himself, or at 
disunity with Himself’, ‘corresponds to His divine nature’,64 and that ‘all that God 
is … is characterised by the fact that He is everything divine, not for Himself only, 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 192f.  See also IV/2, 357 for Barth’s remark on the mystery of the ‘fatherly fellow-suffering 
of God’ that God the Father does suffer in the suffering of His Son. 
59 IV/1, 179f. 
60 E.g. Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, trans. by G. T. Thomson (London: SCM Press, 1949), 69. 
61 IV/1, 183, emphasis mine.  Cf. 193: ‘The One who reconciles the world with God is necessarily 
the one God Himself in His true Godhead’, emphasis mine. 
62 II/2, 88. 
63 IV/1, 74. 
64 Ibid., 186, 187; KD IV/1, 204. 
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but also, in His Son, for the sake of man and for him.’65  Just as it is only in His 
complete humiliation that Christ is completely the true Christ who is for all,66 so God, 
too, is nowhere truer God than in the humiliation of Jesus Christ as the Son of God.  
From this arises the conclusion that, in totally becoming human condescendingly, 
God Himself is totally involved in the historical reality that Jesus Christ in His 
incarnation is.67 
8B.3 The Incarnation History and the Inner-Triune History 
That God really suffers in Jesus Christ, and that He becomes and is totally human in 
Jesus Christ, presuppose that God is entirely involved in the history that Jesus Christ 
is.  To this extent, we argue, the divine being is ‘historicised’ in the being of Jesus 
Christ.68 
                                                 
65 IV/2, 86. 
66 Karl Barth, Christ and Adam: Man and Humanity in Romans 5, trans. by Thomas A. Smail 
(Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1956), 20. 
67 In Barth’s words, ‘the existence of the man Jesus (as the beginning of this history, which includes 
already the fulness of the whole) coincides with the [existence] of God Himself’, IV/2, 336; KD IV/2, 
375. 
68 It seems proper here to make a few points concerning the debate over Barth’s self-declared 
fondness for ‘a bit of “Hegeling”’ (Busch, Karl Barth, 387) in his later theology.  There was indeed a 
certain kind of ‘historicisation’ of God’s being starting in Barth’s doctrine of election and taking full 
shape in his doctrine of reconciliation.  And Barth’s version of ‘historicisation’ seems to bear some 
formal similarities to Hegel’s.  For example, Adam Eitel examines the roles which resurrection plays 
in the theologies of Hegel and of Barth and draws the conclusion that ‘the similitude of Barth’s view 
and Hegel’s is not so much in Barth’s divinization of history but rather in his historicization of the 
divine’ (Adam Eitel, ‘The Resurrection of Jesus Christ: Karl Barth and the Historicization of God’s 
Being’, International Journal of Systematic Theology, 10 [2008], 36-53 [53]).  But ‘historicisation’ 
for Barth differs materially from that for Hegel at more than a few crucial points.  First, whilst Hegel 
brings into God’s being the general history of the world, Barth integrates into it the concrete history of 
Jesus Christ.  Second, whilst the inclusion of world history in God’s being is for Hegel based on a 
necessity imposed from without, i.e. God’s being (thesis) in need of world process (antithesis) to 
develop into completion (a third, superior synthesis), the inclusion of Jesus Christ’s history and ours 
in His is for Barth based on a free decision, i.e. God’s self-determination to be for us and with us.  
Third, consequently, whilst ‘historicisation’ is for Hegel the necessary realisation and completion of 
God’s being in and through history, it is for Barth the free actualisation of God’s being, which is 
already real and complete in itself.  In the final analysis, whilst Hegel posits a God conditioned upon 
and perhaps even imprisoned by history in general, Barth’s God, for all His freedom from worldly 
necessity, is so divinely free as to be able to determine Himself to be for us and with us, and therefore 
us to be for Him and with Him, in the history of Jesus Christ.  For the above and related discussions 
see Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 406; IV/2, 53f.; McCormack, Dialectical 
Theology, 353f.; McCormack, ‘Revelation and History in Transfoundationalist Perspective’, 29f.; 
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This proposition brings us back to the abiding concern of those who interpret 
Barth from an essentialist-ontological viewpoint as preserving a certain freedom of 
God from the created-reality even in His love towards it.69  Questions which they 
raise to actualistic-ontological interpreters of Barth include: Is not every aspect of 
God’s outward relationships with the world supposed to be in constant need of a 
basis in God’s innermost being so as both to ground the ultimate reality of the 
relationships in God and to reserve for God the freedom and therefore possibility to 
have chosen not to build and enter them?  Ought not ‘God for us’ to be preceded by 
and subordinate to ‘God in Himself’?  In the final analysis, ought not the economic 
Trinity to always have the immanent Trinity as its basis?  In our present connection, 
they would posit an absolute priority to what one may call the inner-triune history of 
God over the incarnation history of God. 
By the ‘incarnation history of God’ I mean the history of Jesus Christ, 
preordained from all eternity and actualised in time in fulfilment of God’s gracious 
covenant with humanity, in which Jesus Christ is who He is and, to that extent, in 
which God too is.  By contrast, the ‘inner-triune history of God’ refers to the eternal 
history, as it were, in which the Father, the Son and the Spirit share their 
intra-trinitarian relationships.  Whilst the former is often supposed to highlight 
                                                                                                                                          
McCormack, ‘Grace and Being’, 190f.; Jones, The Humanity of Christ, 198ff.; David W. Congdon, 
‘Hegel: A Great Problem, A Great Promise’, 2007 
<http://derevth.blogspot.com/2007/06/karl-barth-blog-conference-2007-hegel.html> [accessed 18 
June 2007]; Halden Doerge, ‘A Still Greater Historicity: Hegel, Jüngel, and the Historicization of 
God's Being’, 2008 <http://derevth.blogspot.com/2008/06/still-greater-historicity-hegel-jngel.html> 
[accessed 15 July 2008]. 
One final remark.  Paul Jones’ observation is illuminating in pointing out that, whilst for Hegel 
Christ (incarnation) only has meaning in world history as the Spirit’s self-realisation, for Barth 
‘Geschichte draws meaning exclusively from the concrete person of Christ’.  See Jones, The 
Humanity of Christ, 199.  It only needs to be added that, as has been made clear, in Barth’s mature 
Christology ‘the concrete person of Christ’ is the Geschichte of Jesus Christ to the extent that it is 
concrete.  It is His history that gives meaning to all history. 
69 Prominent among these scholars are Paul Molnar and George Hunsinger.  See footnote 58 in 
Introduction to this thesis. 
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God’s gracious love to humanity, the latter can be employed to preserve God’s 
sovereign freedom in Himself.  Set in this frame of reference, our designation of 
‘historicisation’ of the divine being would seem to presuppose a certain lack of 
history―the ‘inner-triune history’―in God.  Conversely, one would ask, if from all 
eternity and therefore in the pre-temporal eternity God has always been in His 
‘inner-triune history’, what sense can we possibly make in speaking of the 
‘incarnation history of God’ as the ‘historicisation’ of the divine being in the being of 
Jesus Christ? 
In posing this question we acknowledge two things: that already in CD I/1 
priority is given to the ‘eternal history of God’ over ‘His temporal acts’,70 and that 
even in CD IV Barth still upholds the intra-trinitarian relationships and their history 
as the basis or prototype of God’s relationship with the created world and humanity 
and of its history. 71  But this emphasis on the Godhead consisting in God’s 
inner-triune history does not downplay the ‘incarnation history of God’.  There are 
two reasons for this.  First, Barth applies the category of history to God’s triune life 
mainly in an attempt to underscore the dynamic and interactive character of God’s 
one being: 
He does not exist otherwise than as Father, Son and Holy Spirit.  He 
exists in their mutual interconnexion and relationship.  He exists in 
their difference, not in their identity … His being [Sein] as God is His 
being in [the happening of this history of] His own’.72 
In other words, for its indissoluble unity, God’s one being is not an abstract, static or 
monistic ‘Godhead’, but consists in ‘the happening of this history of His own’.  The 
                                                 
70 I/1, 172. 
71 Cf. IV/1, 203; KD IV/1, 222. 
72 IV/1, 205; KD IV/1, 224. 
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category of history, then, is utilised by Barth as a proper description of the living 
relationship in God Himself. 
Second, it is not the ‘incarnation history of God’ as such, but the history of 
God’s work ad extra, that is contrasted with and perhaps underplayed by the 
‘inner-triune history of God’.  To be sure, God’s relation to the world and humanity 
and its history are based on His triune self-relatedness and its history, and are 
therefore essentially a reflection of the latter.73  But distinct from the history of the 
creature, what we call the ‘incarnation history of God’ belongs to another rank, the 
rank of the being of God as such, in that it is the execution of God’s eternal election 
in time.74  Its importance, therefore, cannot be undermined even when put in 
contrast with the ‘inner-triune history of God’, just as the significance of the 
incarnation is in no way overshadowed but rather confirmed by the eternal election 
of Jesus Christ. 
To clarify the relationship between the two histories at issue, we may 
consider the characteristic of the incarnation as God’s self-humiliation in history.  
Barth claims that in this self-condescending history: 
God gives Himself, but He does not give Himself away.  He does not 
give up being God [Gott gibt sich hin, aber nicht weg und nicht auf] in 
becoming a creature, in becoming man.  He does not cease to be 
God.75 
In that God does give Himself, the world and humanity may be reconciled to Him; in 
                                                 
73 IV/1, 203: ‘His speaking and activity and work ad extra consist in the fact that He gives to the 
world created by Him, to man, a part in the history in which He is God’. 
74 E.g. II/2, 116 (KD II/2, 125): ‘in and with the existence of this man the eternal divine decision has 
as its object and content the execution of the divine covenant with man, the salvation of all men.’ 
75 IV/1, 185; KD IV/1, 202.  An alternative way of putting this would be that God does give Himself 
away, but in giving Himself away He does not lose Himself, He does not give up being Himself. 
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that God does so without giving Himself away, He remains and even confirms 
Himself in His ‘incarnation history’.  Therefore we refute any subordination of the 
‘incarnation history of God’ to His ‘inner-triune history’, because it runs the risk of 
construing the God in the former history as less divine than that in the latter.  And if 
the God in ‘the incarnation history’ were less essential than in the ‘inner-triune 
history’, it would mean that God not only gives Himself but also gives Himself away 
in the incarnation.  By contrast, our proposition is that, for Barth, the ‘incarnation 
history of God’ most fittingly derives from His ‘inner-triune history’ without being 
subordinated to or subsumed in it.  This proposition finds support back in Barth’s 
doctrine of election too when he asserts that Jesus Christ is also and primarily the 
Subject―in addition to the object―of election.  On this view, it is not simply the 
case that Jesus Christ is chosen by God to suffer; instead He also chooses to be 
chosen by God to suffer.  Again, a subordinative view of the ‘incarnation history of 
God’ would diminish the status of Jesus Christ as the proper Subject of His own 
election. 
The origin-derivative relationship between the ‘inner-triune history of God’ 
and His ‘incarnation history’ does not invalidate our proposal of the ‘historicisation’ 
of the divine being in the history of Jesus Christ.  The designation of ‘historicisation’ 
is appropriate because, deriving originally from His ‘inner-triune history’, God’s 
‘incarnation history’ still possesses a certain kind of historical novelty that is proper 
to, characteristic of and even endemic to the revelation of the Son.  In Barth’s words, 
‘God is historical even in Himself, and much more so in His relationship to the 
reality which is distinct from Himself[!]’76  Because of this ‘much more so’, Barth 
                                                 
76 IV/1, 112; exclamation mark restored per KD IV/1, 122, expressing the ‘newness and strangeness’. 
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speaks of the incarnation that its 
newness and strangeness [Neuheit und tiefste Erstaunlichkeit] … as 
the content of this free divine decree ought not to be put into the shade 
or weakened by this reference to its inter-trinitarian background.77 
The historical novelty of revelation, of the incarnation, when taken in all seriousness 
due to it, means that God’s ‘incarnation history’ is to be construed as somehow 
distinct from His ‘inner-triune history’, although corresponding to it.  The novelty 
of God’s ‘incarnation history’, or its distinctness vis-à-vis the other history, consists 
in the fact that God’s ‘incarnation history’, based on His will and the overflow of His 
love, is inclusive and for others.  And this tells us that His ‘inner-triune history’ is 
not self-contained but rather already for each other (i.e. each of the three modes of 
being of God) and―like His ‘incarnation history’―ready for others, that is, for us, 
for our reconciliation with Him.  In other words, according to His free will to be 
together with us, God actualises Himself in the event of incarnation.78  By doing so, 
God causes His history and human history to take place as one common history,79 
and to that extent, allows His divine being to be ‘historicised’ in the ‘incarnation 
history’. 
                                                 
77 IV/2, 42; KD IV/2, 45.  Cf. Barth’s discussion of God becoming an alter ego whilst remaining 
Himself in the event of revelation, I/1, 316f. 
78 In this regard one might venture to say that, to the extent that the event of incarnation is God’s 
self-actualisation, it is also His self-historicisation.  For how it is that God’s being, which is already 
actual and real, becomes actual in incarnation, see IV/2, 113f.  Cf. Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 
Vol. II, 389ff. 
It is worth emphasising here that God’s self-historicisation does not violate His freedom.  On 
the contrary, it is in this way that God’s freedom is affirmed and revealed.  If it is true that the history 
of Jesus Christ, and especially of His humiliation, makes manifest the fact that God’s freedom is not 
from but rather for humanity in Jesus Christ, then ‘[w]e may not speak of God’s own freedom apart 
from the history of God’s dealings with man.’  See Karl Barth, ‘The Gift of Freedom: Foundation of 
Evangelical Ethics’, Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, trans. by John Newton Thomas and Thomas 
Wieser (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 1960), 69-96 (70).  In view of God’s 
freedom thus revealed, one has to ask with von Balthasar: ‘what could be more free, more completely 
unconditioned and grace-given, than the plan of the incarnation and its accomplishment?’  Hans Urs 
von Balthasar, A Theology of History (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 70. 
79 IV/1, 7. 
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For this reason, we give consent to Mangina’s remark on the agreement 
between Barth and Jenson that ‘[b]ecause Jesus is the Son, this act of utter 
self-giving is itself an inner-triune event, an event in God’s life’,80 only with the 
qualification that in really giving Himself in the history of Jesus Christ this 
‘inner-triune event in God’s life’ acquires a different kind of historicity, one that 
originates from and therefore corresponds to the historicity of God’s inner-triune life, 
but differs from it nonetheless.  For the same reason, for all the force of Eberhard 
Jüngel’s convincing argument to ground the historicity of the incarnation in the 
historicity of God’s being itself,81 it still needs to be added that the incarnation 
establishes its own location as a historical location, its own reality as an earthly 
reality, ‘seeking to be historically real and effective for us’.82 
8C ‘Ontologisation’ of Human History in the History of Jesus 
Christ 
One central motif of Barth’s doctrine of reconciliation, as should be clear by now, is 
that God humbles Himself in Jesus Christ’s―the true God’s―history of suffering, 
obedience and death, in order that humanity may be elevated to participate in Jesus 
Christ’s―the true human being’s―history of exaltation and glorification.83  Set in 
                                                 
80 Mangina, Karl Barth, 137. 
81 Cf. ‘Does not the being of God which becomes manifest in and as history compel us to think of 
God’s being, in its power which makes revelation possible, as already historical being?  And can we 
think historically of God’s being in its potency which makes possible historical revelation in any other 
way than as trinitarian being? … Even in readiness for the powerlessness of death … the historical 
power of God’s revelation must already be grounded in the historical potency of the being of God as 
Father, Son and Spirit.’  Jüngel, God’s Being Is in Becoming, 6.  Cf. 83, 103n118, 109f. 
82 Jüngel, ‘The Royal Man’, Karl Barth, 129. 
83 Cf. ‘In Him humanity is exalted humanity, just as Godhead is humiliated Godhead.  And 
humanity is exalted in Him by the humiliation of Godhead.’  IV/1, 131; KD IV/1, 144.  On the basis 
of the one history of Jesus Christ as true God and true human being, Barth is able to proclaim his 
‘the-anthropology’, stating that ‘[i]t is precisely God’s deity which, rightly understood, includes 
humanity.’  See Barth, ‘Evangelical Theology in the 19th Century’ and ‘The Humanity of God’, The 
Humanity of God, 11, 46. 
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this framework, our interpretations about the theological conception of history is to 
be thus formulated: In becoming human God allows His being to be ‘historicised’ in 
the being of Jesus Christ (which is His history) with the consequence that, in being 
elevated to participate in the history of Jesus Christ (which is His being), human 
history as such is accorded the ontological reality that is elected for it and thus proper 
to it and, to that extent, fully ‘ontologised’.  In the last section we looked upward 
and saw the ‘historicisation’ of God’s being in the humiliation as one moment in 
Jesus Christ’s history; in this section we will look downward to see the 
‘ontologisation’ of human history in the exaltation as the other moment in the same 
history of Jesus Christ.84 
For Barth, both the humanity of Jesus Christ and its exaltation take place and 
indeed consist in His human history; to speak of them, then, means for him to speak 
of this history.85  This history will be explored in this section. 
8C.1 High Anticipation and Deep Actualisation 
The human history of Jesus Christ, although fully human, is nonetheless the 
actualisation in time of what is antecedently determined and anticipated in eternity.  
The anticipation of this human history is high, in that it takes place right at the heart 
of the eternal will of God; its actualisation is deep, in that it takes place right in the 
midst of our human-temporal sphere.  Before we speak of the ‘ontologisation’ of 
                                                 
84 In that the two directions are always coexisting and interlocked in the life and work of Jesus Christ 
(cf. IV/1, 136, IV/2, 19, 32f.), Pannenberg’s complaint that Barth’s Christology is dominated by a 
one-sided ‘from above to below’ movement seems to miss the other, secondary but equally important 
moment in the whole picture of Barth’s doctrine of reconciliation.  Pannenberg, Jesus―God and 
Man, 314f. 
85 To be more precise, the true humanity of Jesus Christ consists in ‘the particularity of the history 
which /took place when He became man, and still takes place as He, the Son of God, is man’ (IV/2, 27; 
KD IV/2, 28).  Similarly, exaltation ‘means the history of the placing of the humanity common to 
Him and us on[to] a higher level … the history in which this movement takes place, in which this man 
is man’ (IV/2, 28f.; KD IV/2, 29f.). 
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human history, we need to first speak of the divine height and of the human depth of 
the human history of Jesus Christ as its presuppositions. 
8C.1.1 His Human History Anticipated in Eternity 
In Barth’s view, the human history of Jesus Christ is rooted in God’s very being, 
because the ground of its being or reality [Seinsgrund or Realsgrund] lies in the 
eternal event of election.  This construal then gives rise to the conception that the 
human history of Jesus Christ already exists in eternity, and that it does so in the 
form of anticipation. 
This deep grounding of a human-historical in the divine-eternal is the 
ontological basis on which Barth’s mature Christology is established.  By virtue of 
it, on the one hand, Barth is able to construe the incarnation as a sui generis event 
taking place in the sequence of world history but not as its consequence,86 or, in 
history but not of history.  On the other hand, it allows Barth to hold the human 
history of Jesus Christ to be not accidental but necessary: 
It disperses the last appearance of contingency, externality, 
incidentality and dispensability which can so easily seem to surround 
the historical aspect of the Christ-event in its narrower sense.  It is 
essential [wesentlich] and integral [Substanz] to this event that it is 
not only ‘act of God’ but that as such it includes a human history, the 
history of the true man, which means the existence of the man Jesus.  
This is what we learn from our glance back at God’s eternal election 
of grace.  It shows us that there can be no dissolving of the unity of 
this human history with the act of God with which we have, of course, 
to do in the Christ-event.87 
It will not escape our attention that it is on the basis of ‘God’s eternal election of 
                                                 
86 IV/2, 37. 
87 Ibid., 35; punctuation (‘act of God’) restored per KD IV/2, 36. 
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grace’ that the human history of Jesus Christ can be accorded ‘essential’ and ‘integral’ 
status.  In view of its indissoluble unity with the divine act of election, this specific 
human history cannot be thought of as something to be distinguished or even 
separated from its anticipation in eternity; in Barth’s words, there is not ‘something 
higher, non-worldly, purely divine and eternal and spiritual’ from which this history 
could ‘[withdraw] and finally [disappear] as a mere economy of only provisional and 
practical significance.’ 88   As the human history of Jesus Christ is eternally 
anticipated in God’s election of grace, its status is one that has an ontological 
significance determined and bestowed by God Himself.  That is why ‘[t]here is no 
divine, eternal, spiritual level at which the Christ-event is not also “worldly” and 
[also] this human history.’89 
8C.1.2 His Human History Actualised in Time 
The human history of Jesus Christ, having been eternally anticipated on high in 
election and thus endowed with divine necessity and ontological significance, then 
comes to pass deep into time to become historically actualised in the event of the 
incarnation. 
At a number of points in this connection, the category of history plays a 
crucial role in Barth’s interpretation of ancient christological doctrine in the light of 
his actualistic ontology.  To begin with, ‘historicity’ is one important aspect that 
Jesus Christ shares with all other human beings, one that, one may go on to say, 
constitutes Him as fully human.  The existence of the human Jesus is in history; His 
genuine humanity consists in His genuine historicity.  But this genuine humanity of 
                                                 
88 IV/2, 35; KD IV/2, 37. 
89 IV/2, 35; KD IV/2, 37. 
280 
 
His consists also in His particular historicity, since as the history of God’s becoming 
human ‘His temporal history is not a realisation of one of the possibilities immanent 
in the created cosmos’ but ‘the final and supreme actualisation’ as ‘an absolutely 
new event’ transcending the creaturely sphere and the historical series.90  For all its 
particularity, however, Jesus Christ’s history is still genuinely human; as the 
actualisation not of an idea but of a ‘concrete possibility’, it ‘will be like the concrete 
possibility of the existence of all men’.91 
Second, Barth applies the category of history also to his explanation of how it 
takes place that the divine and human ‘essence’ became and are one.  By virtue of 
the actualistic nature of Jesus Christ’s history, what is actualised in the incarnation 
according to the divine election is not a static unity but a dynamic union.  In it no 
identity or identification is involved, so that the characteristics distinctive to either 
side are not dissolved but preserved. 92   For our concerns, the unconfounded 
character of this union means that what is actualised in time, as is anticipated in 
eternity, is not only a divine history but also a genuine human history.  Differently 
stated, in that it is the actualisation of the divine anticipation, this history of the true 
human being Jesus Christ, unlike all other humanly accidental history, is divinely 
necessary. 
Third, it is in the human history of Jesus Christ that what Barth terms ‘the 
common actualisation [Verwirklichung] of divine and human essence’ takes place.93  
Largely along the lines of the Reformed tradition yet without completely following 
them, Barth understands and interprets the doctrine of the communicatio 
                                                 
90 IV/2, 37; translation slightly revised per KD IV/2, 39.  Emphasis mine. 
91 IV/2, 48; KD IV/2, 52. 
92 IV/2, 63. 
93 IV/2, 73; KD IV/2, 79. 
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operationum94 ‘historically, actually [geschichtlich, aktuell], as an operatio between 
God and man, fulfilled in Jesus Christ as a union of God with man.’95  More 
specifically, sharing the Reformed concern to secure the sovereignty of God and 
therefore to preserve the ‘integrity and essentiality’ of each ‘nature’,96 Barth insists 
that the union between the two must be thought of, not as an accomplished static 
status, but as an operation taking place in an ‘ongoing process [in Fluß begriffenen 
Vorgang]’,97 i.e. in the reality of Jesus Christ as it takes place as a genuine human 
history in human history. 
In summary, when it comes to the integrity of Jesus Christ’s human ‘nature’, 
and to how it comes about that the two ‘natures’ become conjoined and actualised 
whilst retaining their respective distinctiveness, much depends―as we have 
demonstrated―on safeguarding the genuine ‘historicity of the Subject … and 
especially … the historicity of the relationship of His two predicates’,98 that is, their 
common actualisation in a genuine human history.  The actualisation of Jesus 
Christ’s human history, having its basis in ‘a divine necessity and ordination’,99 
serves in turn as the basis for the actualisation of the two ‘natures’.100 
                                                 
94 According to McCormack, this doctrine was ‘originally designed to suggest that in every act of the 
God-human, both “natures” are fully active, working together to produce a single effect’, McCormack, 
‘Karl Barth’s Christology as a Resource for a Reformed Version of Kenoticism’, 249.  Cf. IV/2, 
104ff.; Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 445f. 
95 IV/2, 105; translation slightly revised per KD IV/2, 116. 
96 Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 446. 
97 IV/2, 105; KD IV/2, 116. 
98 IV/2, 115; KD IV/2, 128. 
99 IV/2, 290; KD IV/2, 322. 
100 The ‘high anticipation’ and ‘deep actualisation’ of Jesus Christ’s human history for which we have 
been arguing based on CD IV find a slightly more essentialistic-ontological but refined and pregnant 
expression back in II/1, 345: ‘What He is there in the height for us and for our sakes, here in the 
depths He is also in Himself’. 
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8C.2 Full Representation and Participation 
Upon the foundation of Jesus Christ’s human history as laid in section 8C.1, we are 
now in the position to build the argument concerning our human history: from the 
high anticipation and deep actualisation of His human history, it comes about that our 
human history is fully represented by, participating in and, to that extent, 
‘ontologised’ or realised in His history. 
8C.2.1 His Human History Representative for Ours 
Jesus Christ as the Reconciler between God and humanity is ‘the One who vouches 
[einsteht] and stands well for God before us all, before the world, and for us all, the 
world, before God’,101 thus representing God to humanity and humanity God.  In 
that ‘He becomes a man and as this man the Representative [Stellvertreter] of all 
men’,102 His human history also represents the history of us all. 
Barth’s conception of Jesus Christ’s human history as the representation of 
our human history is a clear corollary of his understanding in CD III of covenant 
history as the inner presupposition and basis of creaturely history on the one hand, 
and of creaturely history as the external presupposition and basis of covenant history 
on the other.  And this arrangement in turn finds its doctrinal root in CD II, because 
it is for the actualisation of the eternal election of God’s gracious covenant that 
covenant history comes to pass.  This line of thinking reaches an apex when Barth 
makes the rather unconventional but unequivocal claim in CD III that covenant 
history is the history,103 and the consequent statement that the being of the human 
Jesus is history in that it is a being in a movement in which ‘God is for Him and He 
                                                 
101 IV/2, 98; translation slightly revised per KD IV/2, 108. 
102 IV/1, 551; KD IV/1, 615.  Cf. IV/2, 48; KD IV/2, 51. 




This insight is carried into CD IV, with the emphasis now laid on Jesus 
Christ’s history as the event in which God reconciles the world and humanity to 
Himself.  Here the basic logic is: in that reconciliation is Jesus Christ, in that the 
reconciliatory event takes place in His history, this history is our salvation history, for 
it fully represents our history before God.  Two remarks are to be made in this 
connection.  First, in that He does represent us in His act to save us,105 Jesus 
Christ’s human history, being particular [besonder], is not a private or even isolated 
history [Sondergeschichte]: 
But for all its singularity [Einzigartigkeit], as His history it was not 
and is not a private history, but a representative and therefore a public, 
His history which occurred in the place of all other men and in 
accomplishment of their atonement: the history of their Head, in 
which they all participate.  Therefore, in the most concrete sense of 
the term, precisely the particular history of this One is world history.  
When God was in Christ He reconciled the world to Himself (2 Cor. 
5:19), and therefore us, each one of us.  In this One humanity itself, 
our human essence [Wesen] as such, was and is elevated and 
exalted.106 
For the sake of the reconciliation of the world and humanity to God, then, Jesus 
Christ’s history fully represents the history not only of us all but also of us in all 
times.107 
Second, we hasten to add, in that He represents us in His act to save us, this 
                                                 
104 III/2, 159. 
105 In speaking of ‘representation’ in the context of the doctrine of reconciliation, we are fully aware 
that Jesus Christ saves us by not simply by representing us but ultimately by an ontological elevation 
of us in the exaltation of Jesus Christ. 
106 IV/2, 269; translation slightly revised per KD IV/2, 298f. 
107 Cf. IV/1, 315: ‘There is no moment in which He does not stand before God as our Representative 
who there suffered and died for us and therefore speaks for us’. 
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history does not forfeit its distinctiveness to become simply one history among other 
histories.  For as the Representative for us, Jesus Christ is not only one but the true 
human being, and He is therefore not a mere example [Beispiel] but the head [Haupt] 
of all humanity.108  In the humanity, i.e. that of Jesus Christ, we see particularity 
concretely united with universality.  In that Jesus Christ is the true human being, He 
represents us all to God by being our head, and for this reason His human history can 
be and is indeed the salvation history of us all.109 
8C.2.2 Our Human History Participating in His 
The foregoing discussion has prepared us for a final step.  In being fully represented 
by His human history, what becomes of our human history as such?  Our contention 
is that our human history is fully ‘ontologised’ as it is elevated to participate in Jesus 
Christ’s human history.  This contention has at its heart a participation which 
affirms the reality or ontological status of human history.  As we shall see, it arises 
from Barth’s argument about the participation of our humanity in the divine, which 
in turn results from the participation of Jesus Christ’s humanity in God’s being in the 
hypostatic union accomplished in the event of incarnation. 
In this connection Barth is extremely cautious about two things.  The first is 
a potential confusion of the participation, elevation or exaltation of the human in the 
divine on the one hand, with deification or divinisation of the human on the other.  
In order to avoid the confusion, he places several strict preconditions to this 
                                                 
108 This notion leads to the consideration whether designations such as Platonism and exemplarism do 
justice to Barth’s doctrine of reconciliation.  See for instance Gunton, The Barth Lecture, 187ff.  
For Barth, it is Jesus Christ, not an ideal, principle, example or the like, that is the Subject of the 
reconciliation of humanity to God as accomplished in His history.  Cf. IV/2, 58 (KD IV/2, 62) for 
Barth’s refusal to understand ‘Jesus Christ as the representation [Darstellung] and vehicle of a general 
divine-human (or divine-worldly) principle, and therefore as an exemplary “religious personality”.’ 
109 IV/2, 36; KD IV/2, 38.  Also IV/2, 51: ‘and His history is our history of salvation which changes 
the whole human situation’. 
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participation at issue.  First, the possibility of human participation in the divine does 
not root in itself or some intrinsic human capability, but rather in the mutual 
participation among God’s three modes of being.110  The divine-human union in 
Jesus Christ is possible because there is already in God Himself the triune unity.  
Second, human participation in the divine is not an already realised, readily made 
status accessible and available at all times, but becomes actualised in, with and 
through a history, i.e. that of Jesus Christ.111  Moreover, its actualisation is by no 
means brought about by its human side but is ‘achieved by the Son of God in the act 
of God’.112  Jesus Christ alone is the Subject of the history in which it is actualised.  
Finally, the bringing about of the human participation at issue is not the only thing or 
even the primary thing that takes place in Jesus Christ’s history.  It is accompanied 
by, or rather, the consequence of a divine humiliation as the two take place not one 
after the other but simultaneously as two movements in the one history of Jesus 
Christ. 
To be sure, Barth’s scheme effectively forbids us to construe the participation 
of the human in the divine in abstracto as an independent category, autonomous in 
and with itself; rather, its possibility is rooted in the triune unity, and its actualisation 
is brought about through a divine act in the history of a divine Subject as a 
consequence of the divine humiliation.  Negatively stated, where the history of 
Jesus Christ is followed through, there ‘a deification of the creature’ and a 
‘humanisation of the Creator’ are decidedly avoided.113  Positively stated, however, 
                                                 
110 IV/2, 62f. 
111 The humanity of Jesus, urges Barth, must not be ‘disconnected [gelöst] from the dynamic of the 
history in which it was and is one with the divine’, ibid., 80; translation slightly revised per KD IV/2, 
87. 
112 IV/2, 63. 
113 Ibid., 79, cf. 82. 
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when this history is indeed followed through and all the aforementioned provisos 
fulfilled, Barth’s scheme not only allows for but also demands genuine human 
participation in the divine, without giving rise to worries about divinisation, 
humanisation, or human conditioning upon or even imprisonment of the divine. 
The second thing which Barth is careful to avoid is the temptation to put the 
human participation in the divine (by way of being elevated) on a par with the divine 
participation in the human (by way of self-condescending).  Barth is cautious of this, 
because for him the genuine human participation in the divine, taking place in 
concreto in the history of Jesus Christ, is characterised by its correspondence to the 
underlying divine initiative, by its happening as a response on the part of the human 
to its divine cause.  This notion, again, points us back to Barth’s conception of the 
one history of Jesus Christ as consisting of two directions or movements.  Although 
these two movements are simultaneous, they are not therefore equal, interchangeable 
or reversible, because the exaltation of the human only takes place as a result of the 
condescension of God in the history of Jesus Christ.  From this, we are led further 
back to the ontological cornerstone of Barth’s theology: that the election of Jesus 
Christ is first and primarily God’s self-determination and only then and secondarily 
God’s determination of and to us.  On these grounds, human participation in the 
divine is in essence human receiving of divine giving,114 human hearing of divine 
speaking, and human response to divine address.  There indeed takes place a 
reciprocal relationship between the human and the divine in the history of Jesus 
Christ, but it must be qualified as asymmetrical.  If the endeavour to avoid 
deification is one to ensure that the human participation in the divine does not 
                                                 
114 Ibid., 70. 
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confuse but preserves the distinctiveness on the both sides, the attempt to avoid 
ascribing equal weight to both sides is one to ensure that the human participation 
does not transgress the order to which it is appointed: it arises in sequence as a 
consequence of the divine self-determination and therefore of the divine initiative to 
elevate the human.  In other words, there is no confusion or reversal of divine and 
human in view.115 
Now when the two aforementioned conditions are fulfilled, that is, when 
there takes place this non-divinised, properly-ordered and therefore genuine human 
participation in the divine as a consequence of the divine initiative, there may and 
must also occur the participation of Jesus Christ’s―and therefore our―human 
history in the divine, for His history fully represents ours.  To the extent that Jesus 
Christ’s human history is elevated into participation in the divine,116 so does our 
human history.  And in being elevated into this participation, our human history is 
accorded the highest possible ontological status; that is why we term this attribution 
the ‘ontologisation’ of human history.  It should be clear by now that in no way does 
the ‘ontologisation’ of human history in the history of Jesus Christ involve 
deification, because it is not brought about by way of ‘an elevation of [human] nature 
above the limits proper to the human’,117 but by God’s gracious act of including our 
                                                 
115 This point is further elaborated in IV/3 when Barth explains the meaning of unio cum Christo.  
For him, the Christian’s union with Christ ‘does not mean the dissolution or disappearance of the one 
in the other, nor does it mean identification’; rather, it is ‘their conjunction in which each has his own 
independence, uniqueness and activity’ (IV/3, 540).  For further elaboration on the difference 
between participation and deification, see McCormack, ‘Participation in God, Yes; Deification, No: 
Two Modern Protestant Responses to an Ancient Question’, Orthodox and Modern, 235-260, esp. 
236-247. 
116 As Jüngel puts it, ‘[t]he history of the human Jesus is not only a history that moves the eternal 
being of God downward, but as such also a history that is moved upward by God … If Jesus’ history 
were not the history that is moved by God, then it would not also be the history of a human being that 
moves God’s eternal being.’  Jüngel, ‘The Royal Man’, Karl Barth, 133f.; translation revised per 
idem, Barth-Studien (Zürich: Benziger Verlag, 1982), 240f. 




human history in His Son’s as it takes place in and with the historical actualisation of 
a―or rather, the―divine anticipation.  But it need be maintained with equal force 
and clarity that this ontological status thus and thus alone attributed to our human 
history must be conceived of as genuine and unreserved: genuine, because the history 
in which our human history is elevated to participate is Jesus Christ’s real history in 
which the deep actualisation of God’s high anticipation truly comes to pass; 
unreserved, because in that the self-actualisation of God’s own being takes place in 
the history of Jesus Christ our human history too, fully represented in His, is elevated 
to fully participate in the divine being.  In that the entirety of it is given a real share 
in God’s being as the only source of all reality, 118  our human history is 
‘ontologised’.119 
                                                 
118 Concerning God’s reality as the source of all other realities, see Webster, Barth’s Ethics of 
Reconciliation, 90: ‘Christian existence is not the point at which the gospel of reconciliation first 
becomes “real”.  The “reality” of the gospel is not something of which it comes to be possessed by 
virtue of our existence and acts; our existence and acts come to possess ‘reality’ in so far as they share 
in the axiomatic reality of God with us, set forth in the gospel.’  But the ‘objective’ reality of God 
does not simply take our ‘subjective’ reality by arbitrary force; instead, it elevates and includes the 
latter in a way that corresponds to itself.  See for instance, ‘What we have said about the objective 
content of truth of the reality of Jesus Christ, which includes our own reality, presses in upon us, from 
its objectivity to our subjectivity, in order that there should be in us a correspondence’, IV/2, 303.  In 
a real sense, then, the earthly reality of the God-human is ‘of the first and supreme order’ as ‘the 
concrete limit and measure and criterion of all other earthly reality’, ibid., 166. 
119 The ‘ontologisation’ of our human history finds a vivid illustration in Barth’s exposition of the 
history of the apostle Paul.  Despite taking place as a secondary moment compared to the history of 
Jesus Christ as the primary moment, this history is nonetheless described as ‘an irresistible 
[unaufhaltsamer] consequence’, as Paul’s ‘own history’, and as ‘the obvious history of all those who 
have discovered or will discover Jesus Christ, and themselves in Him’.  From Paul’s case Barth goes 
on to make a more general statement that: ‘to be “with Christ” is to take part in His history, so that in 
His history that of the community and all its members has already happened, and has therefore to find 
in His history its model and pattern, to see itself again in it; the result being that the community and its 
members necessarily cease to be what they are if they are guilty of any arbitrary deviation from His 
history.  This “with Christ” determines their past and present and future; their whole history’ (IV/2, 
277; KD IV/2, 307).  Along this line, the ‘ontologisation’ of our human history, the maintaining of 
the true being of the Christian community, and our togetherness with Christ all rely on our 
participating in His history.  But, again, all these are secondary moments dependent on the divine 
initiative: ‘But this participation of the world in the being of God implies necessarily His participating 
in the being of the world, and therefore that His being, His [own] history, is played out as 
world-history’ (IV/1, 215; KD IV/1, 236, emphasis mine). 
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8D Election and the Trinity: an Excursus 
Given the affirmation that the self-determination of God to be for us and with us is 
the foundation of both the ‘historicisation’ and the ‘ontologisation’, it is still a matter 
of debate whether it is theologically tenable to take it to such an ontological height as 
the determination with which God constitutes Himself as triune.  In McCormack’s 
view, if one is to think in strict accordance with Barth’s revised doctrine of election 
in CD II/2 one must make (as Barth himself, too, should have made) the explicit 
claim that: 
[t]he decision for the covenant of grace is the ground of God’s triunity 
and therefore the eternal generation of the Son and the eternal 
procession of the Holy Spirit from Father and Son.  In other words, 
the works of God ad intra (the Trinitarian processions) find their 
ground in the first of the works of God ad extra (viz., election)’.120 
McCormack’s grounding of the Trinity in election should be understood at four 
sequential levels.  First, both these notions are construed in actualistic-ontological 
and not essentialist-ontological terms.  For McCormack as well as for Barth, no 
being is to be abstracted from its action.  Second, McCormack affirms the 
chronological simultaneity between the two by stating that ‘both the works of God 
ad intra [i.e. the Trinity] and the first of God’s work ad extra [i.e. election] take place 
simultaneously, in one and the same eternal event’.121  In that the two are both 
eternal events, ‘neither precedes the other chronologically’.122  Third, McCormack 
gives logical priority to election over the Trinity, because for him it is not the case 
that a static triune being first exists and then decides to elect Jesus Christ in order to 
                                                 
120 McCormack, ‘Grace and Being’, Orthodox and Modern, 194. 
121 McCormack, ‘Seek God Where He May Be Found’, ibid., 265. 
122 Ibid., 266. 
290 
 
be with humanity, but that the acting God, in electing Jesus Christ in order to be with 
humanity, constitutes Himself to be triune.  It is in this logical sense that he grounds 
the Trinity in election.123  Fourth, McCormack goes on from this logical priority to 
assert an ontological priority of election over the Trinity by saying that ‘the triunity 
of God is a function of the divine election’,124 despite his explicit attempt to 
‘abandon all talk of “ontological priority” where the relation of triunity to election is 
concerned’.125 
On the basis of its analysis of the notion ‘history’, however, this thesis: 1) is 
informed by Barth’s actualistic ontology, and 2) holds the position that the 
self-determination of God to be for us and with us does not violate but rather 
confirms His identity as the triune God, just as His triune identity does not exclude or 
hold back but rather contains His determination to be for us and with us in Jesus 
Christ, 3) whilst still giving logical priority to election over the Trinity 4) without 
engaging with debates over the ontological relationship between the two.  In thus 
articulating its stance, this thesis, on the one hand, positions itself at a more moderate 
point than McCormack’s scheme, in that we agree with him up to the third (the 
logical) level identified above, but then strictly refrain from entering the fourth (the 
ontological), for reasons to be given shortly.  On the other hand, our position is 
more radical than that of Kevin Hector.  Although it seems similar to Hector’s 
argument that ‘we must speak of the simultaneity of election and triunity: Father, Son 
and Spirit subsist eternally in the movement of this decision, but this decision 
                                                 
123 McCormack, ‘Election and the Trinity’, 208.  Cf. idem, ‘Grace and Being’, Orthodox and 
Modern, 194. 
124 McCormack, ‘Grace and Being’, ibid., 194; idem, ‘Seek God Where He May Be Found’, ibid., 
266.  McCormack is fully aware that in doing this he is moving beyond Barth’s own position.  See 
McCormack, ‘Election and Trinity’, 224. 
125 McCormack, ‘Election and Trinity’, 206. 
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subsists only in the relation of Father, Son and Spirit’,126 it actually differs from it in 
that, whereas Hector’s ‘simultaneity’ seems to be defined more in terms of a logical 
equality (contra McCormack’s ‘logical priority’) than of a chronological 
simultaneity,127 we, whilst affirming the chronological simultaneity between election 
and the Trinity (with McCormack and Hector), still give logical priority to election 
over the Trinity (with McCormack and contra Hector) and are, to this extent, more 
radical than Hector. 
Now the reasons for the aforementioned position will be given as followed, in 
reverse order of the four levels depicted above.  First, this thesis refrains from 
making ontological claims about the relationship between election and the Trinity, 
simply because it deems it a transgression of the epistemological boundaries within 
which we as human beings are placed.  It would be as equally ‘abstract’ and 
‘metaphysical’ to claim an ‘ontological priority’ of election over the Trinity as to 
claim that of the Trinity over election.128  Second, this thesis gives logical (but not 
ontological) priority to election.  Compared to maintaining a logical equality 
between election and the Trinity (as Hector does), this scheme offers a better 
framework within which our two basic proposals in this chapter are accounted for 
and supported.  On the one hand, it better preserves the novelty that we in section 
8B.3 ascribed to the incarnation history vis-à-vis the inner-triune history, thus also 
better maintaining the integrity of ‘historicisation’ of God’s being in Jesus Christ.  
On the other, it also enhances the sense in which the ‘ontologisation’ of human 
                                                 
126 Hector, ‘God’s Triunity and Self-Determination’, 261.  See also 258: ‘God’s triune being 
coincides eternally with God’s decision to be God-for-us’. 
127 That is why, despite the fact that McCormack maintains a chronological simultaneity, it is by 
asserting yet another simultaneity that Hector rejects McCormack’s ‘logical priority’. 
128 Hector poses the same challenge to McCormack by contending that ‘McCormack’s move appears 




history in Jesus Christ is articulated, because on this view the basic reality of our 
human history is already present, already anticipated, in election as the first work of 
God.  Third, this thesis upholds the chronological simultaneity (but not logical 
equality) between election and the Trinity, not only because it would make no sense 
to envisage two eternal events in one temporal sequence, but also because of the 
basic fact that the electing God is always the triune God, and that the triune God is 
always the electing God.  The insistence on the chronological simultaneity between 
election and the Trinity, then, ensures that the God of whom we speak is always in 
concreto the God who always works both ad intra (in trinitarian processions and in 
intra-triune relating) and ad extra (in electing).  Finally, all three foregoing points 
are made on the basis of Barth’s actualistic ontology, according to which Jesus Christ 
is His history, and therefore human knowing and speaking of Him is knowing and 
speaking of His history. 
8E Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we have demonstrated that in what Barth consciously terms as an 
actualisation of the doctrine of the incarnation,129 the one history of Jesus Christ is 
made the decisive category in and through which God’s being and action, as well as 
God and humanity, are united.  We have further demonstrated that in the one 
being-as-act-in-history of the God-human Jesus Christ, there takes place first the 
‘historicisation’ of the divine being in the humiliation of God and then, upon this 
firm basis, the ‘ontologisation’ of human history in the exaltation of humanity.  Like 
Barth, we have carefully maintained the novelty of the incarnation history as God’s 
self-historicisation without compromising the inner-triune history as its origin.  
                                                 
129 IV/2, 105. 
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Equally carefully we have also affirmed the ontologisation of human history without 
confusing it with God’s deity or upgrading it to the level of its divine initiative.  
Thus it is further confirmed that the ‘historicisation’ and the ‘ontologisation’ at issue 
have a relationship that is mutual and reciprocal, but asymmetrical and irreversible.  
For ultimately it is in determining Himself that God determines us and our history, 





This thesis has traced the development of the concept of history in Barth’s theology 
and offered a complete chronological account of it.  It has also demonstrated clearly 
that, despite not being a dominant category in Barth’s early thought, receiving 
consistent recognition or specific treatment, the concept of history nonetheless bears 
growing significance through the development of his increasingly christocentric 
theology.  Only a few observations and comments remain to be made in this 
concluding chapter by way of summarising the conclusions reached in this thesis, 
and by way of marking out possible ground for further exploration. 
First, this thesis has decidedly refuted the dominant criticism in the field that 
Barth ignores, evades, or even holds a strong antipathy towards history.  Strictly 
speaking, the radically eschatological ‘rejection’ of human history is confined to only 
one stage in the development of Barth’s theology, that is, the Römerbrief period, in 
which Barth placed the revelation of Jesus Christ in human history only at the 
beginning, on the verge, and at the end of it, as God’s ‘No’ to it.  Before this period, 
Barth the liberal theologian took history as the presence of divine reality in human 
consciousness and experience; after that, Barth the Reformed dogmatician came to 
take fuller account of the reality of revelation as God’s speech-act not only to but 
also in human history.  Ever since the beginning of his dogmatic enterprise in the 
mid-1920s, the central thrust of Barth’s theology was how it is that God reveals 
Himself while remaining Himself.  God reveals Himself: thus the conception of 
revelation as in history, not as supra-history but as genuine history;1 God remains 
                                                 
1 GD, 131ff.; ChD, 310f. 
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Himself in His self-revelation: thus the designation of revelation as qualified history,2 
the attribution of Urgeschichtlichkeit3 or particular historicity4 to it, and the axiom 
that ‘Revelation is not a predicate of history, but history is a predicate of revelation’.5  
The latter aspect of this axiom prompted Barth, primarily during the 1930s, to take 
such great pains to maintain the Godness of God that he, granting that revelation is 
really in history, refrained from stating explicitly that revelation is history.  But God 
does not simply remain Himself; He remains Himself precisely as He reveals 
Himself in history.  This thesis has given close attention to both dimensions of this 
veiling-unveling dialectic without allowing either to suppress the other, and has 
correspondingly argued that God’s self-revelation is for Barth in history but not of 
history. 
Second, this thesis has provided a clear chronological account of how Barth’s 
concept of history developed in the course of his career as a Reformed dogmatician.  
It has been demonstrated that, initially organised around the doctrine of revelation, 
Barth’s concept of history became increasingly shaped by his developing Christology.  
Decisive steps along this development include: the commencement of Barth’s 
actualistic ontology with the equation of God’s being with His act of revelation (CD 
II/1); his construal of God’s eternity as not opposed to but including time through an 
all-embracing understanding of Jesus Christ (CD II/1); most crucially, his 
identification of Jesus Christ as the Subject of election in the beginning of God’s 
gracious covenantal relation with humanity (CD II/2); his consequent positioning of 
creation and creaturely history within the framework of covenant history (CD III/1); 
                                                 
2 GD, 60. 
3 ChD, 309ff. 
4 I/1, 326; KD I/1, 345. 
5 I/2, 58. 
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and ultimately his christologically grounded soteriology in which the eternally and 
graciously decreed covenantal relationship of ‘God with us’ is actualised in the one 
history of the God-human Jesus Christ (CD IV).  Ultimately, the concept of history 
has taken centre stage, replacing the traditionally dominant christological category of 
‘nature’ and reshaping the understanding of ‘person’. 
Third, this thesis―informed by Barth’s actualistic ontology―has 
demonstrated that God’s being is ‘historicised’ to the extent that God actually became 
human in Jesus Christ or, conversely, that the event of incarnation is His 
self-actualisation in history.  The notion of the Word of God, so predominant in 
Barth’s earlier theology, gave way increasingly to his concrete understanding of 
Jesus Christ, first in CD II/2 as the eternal God of election (but no less ‘essentially’ 
human), and then in CD IV as the historical human person (but no less ‘essentially’ 
divine) to whom God condescends and in and through whom humanity is elevated to 
God.  In registering the historicisation of God’s being, we have also proposed that 
the history of incarnation, whilst corresponding to the inner-triune history, still 
possesses a certain historical novelty vis-à-vis the latter, thereby constituting the 
‘historicisation’ of God’s being in a real sense. 
Fourth, this thesis―informed by Barth’s covenantal understanding of 
creation―has demonstrated that human history, originally coming into being with 
the creation of the world, acquires its reality ultimately from the divine act of 
election.  Humanity is real only to the extent that it is included in the reality of the 
God-human Jesus Christ determined in this act in which God determines Himself 
from all eternity to be for and with humanity in His Son.  This procedure seeks God 
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exclusively ‘where He Himself has given Himself to be found’6 and offers a radically 
christological and therefore reconciliatory account of history.  By centring on the 
history of Jesus Christ in this way, it affirms both divine sovereignty and human 
dignity in their asymmetrical reciprocity instead of upholding only one of them at the 
expense of the other, or simply transforming one into the other. 
The initial motive for this thesis was the wish to find a worthy location for the 
concept of human history in Christian theology.  I began it in hopes of discovering 
in Barth’s theology evidence in support of his affirmation of human history.  I was 
hoping that history as a human reality would be appreciated by Barth to possess a 
certain value that could not be overlooked.  Indeed, I wished to locate a scheme in 
which God so recognises the reality and value of the human history that He created 
that He reveals Himself not as it but nevertheless in it and that He allows His Word 
to be transmitted not by it but certainly in it and even through it.  These wishes have 
been fulfilled by the conclusions of this thesis, but not in the way initially envisaged. 
Barth’s theology offers a vision that is neither theomonistic nor anti-human 
but christocentric,7 in which the reality and value of human history are indeed 
affirmed.  But this is done not by way of a self-authenticating effort from within 
human history as such, but as human history becomes authenticated and elevated into 
participation in the history of Jesus Christ.  Human history is authenticated, because 
God does not remain content to rest simply in and for Himself but first determines 
Himself to be for us and with us from all eternity and then actualises this 
self-determination in time.  Human history is ‘ontologised’, because the 
                                                 
6 II/1, 197. 
7 Cf. IV/4, 17-21. 
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actualisation of God’s eternal self-determination has to be ‘really a history’;8 it is 
ontologised because, as a result of this actualisation, the movement of God from 
above to below, by virtue of its ontological and therefore logical precedence, really 
brings forth the movement of humanity and its history from below to above.  It is 
precisely this condescension of divine sovereignty that ensures human dignity by 
elevating it. 
The results of this thesis offer two particularly significant possibilities for 
further theological reflection.  First, the recognition that theology itself is a 
historical task suggests that a theologian is also a historian of theology.  It is 
legitimate and necessary for theological studies to be attentive to the history of 
theology.  This is not to suggest that theology is nothing more than history, but to 
draw attention to the fact that theology has a history, and that theology is what it is 
only as it participates in the history of the ongoing debates over the identity of God, 
just as both divine essence and humanity are what they are as they become actualised 
in Jesus Christ’s history as the history of the dealings of God with humanity.  
Theology as a whole benefits as dogmatic theology and historical theology 
progressively interact with each other, but would also benefit from the hitherto 
largely unattempted study of the history of historical theology. 
Second, the recognition that the study of history in general (and church 
history in particular) is a theological task suggests that a theologian is also a 
theologian of history.  It is legitimate and necessary for theological studies to be 
attentive to history, and not just to church history.  It may not always be wise for 
theologians to attempt to offer theological accounts of the wide range of events in 
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general history; such offers, even when made with good intentions can easily end up 
being naïve or strained.  But the concentric nature of history demands an 
understanding of the history of Jesus Christ by way of the witnesses borne to Him in 
both the ecclesial and the universal spheres of history.  Moreover, if ‘[t]he God 
whose identity is enacted in the history of Jesus and followed, explored and 
articulated in the Church’s history cannot be reduced to the level of an agent within 
history among others [but] wills to be in communion with human agents in all times 
and all corners of the world’,9 then the pluralist character of ‘history’―and the 
ongoing theological imperative to attend to it―must be acknowledged. 
 
                                                 
9 Rowan Williams, Why Study the Past?: The Quest for the Historical Church (London: Darton, 
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